Garcia v. Algiers Charter Schools Association et al, No. 2:2017cv08126 - Document 111 (E.D. La. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS re: 99 , 109 . The Court rules on defendant's objections as indicated herein. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 01/14/2019.(am)
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Garcia v. Algiers Charter Schools Association et al Doc. 111 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LINDSAY ARMOND GARCIA VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-8126 STANLEY GREEN, ET AL. SECTION “R” (3) ORD ER AN D REASON S Plaintiff Lindsay Arm ond Garcia pursues dam ages for intentional infliction of em otional distress from defendant Stanley Green on the basis of his behavior while she was his subordinate at the William J . Fisher School. 1 In anticipation of trial, Green has objected to several of Garcia’s exhibits. 2 The Court rules on these objections as set forth below. I. D EFEN D AN T’S OBJECTION S A. EEOC Charge of Discrim ination Green seeks to exclude Garcia’s Charge of Discrim ination filed with the EEOC as irrelevant to her IIED claim and substantially m ore prejudicial than 1 See R. Doc 1. Garcia has not subm itted any objections to the Court. She also did not object to any of defendant’s exhibits in the pretrial order, except to object to “im peachm ent evidence.” See R. Doc. 70 at 21. The Court thus considers her to have waived any objections to Green’s exhibits. See R. Doc. 81 at 3 (“Objections that are not raised in the pretrial order will be considered waived except for good cause shown.”). 2 Dockets.Justia.com probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 40 3. 3 Garcia’s act of filing the EEOC charge is relevant evidence on the issues of her severe em otional distress and the lack of welcomeness of Green’s advances. Fed. R. Evid. 40 2. While the charge is hearsay if introduced for the truth of the claim s made in it, it m ay be introduced as relevant evidence of Garcia’s attem pts to report Green’s behavior. Dunn v. Hunting Energy Servs., 288 F. Supp. 3d 749, 762 (S.D. Tex. 20 17) (com plaint m ay be introduced for the non-hearsay purpose of proving that it was filed). The charge is not unduly prejudicial because Garcia’s accusations against Green in the charge are no m ore prejudicial than the evidence that will be elicited through Garcia’s testim ony. In addition, the Court can lim it any prejudice by instructing the jury of the lim ited purpose for which the charge m ay be used. The EEOC charge’s probative value as a contem poraneous record of Garcia’s actions to report Green is not substantially outweighed by its risk of prejudice under Rule 40 3, and it is therefore adm issible. OVERRULED. 3 R. Doc. 99 at 2. 2 B. Garcia’s Affidavit For the reasons explained in the Court’s order on Green’s m otion in lim ine seeking to exclude the sam e affidavit, 4 Garcia’s affidavit is hearsay and cannot be used to prove the truth of the m atters asserted within it. But Garcia m ay introduce the affidavit to prove that she com plained about Green’s behavior to ACSA, which is relevant to the severity of her em otional distress. Dunn, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 762 (workplace com plaint is not hearsay when used to prove that it was filed). In addition, because the notebook from which Garcia created the affidavit was not lost in bad faith, the loss of the original notebook does not render the affidavit inadm issible under Federal Rule of Evidence 10 0 2. The affidavit is not a sum m ary, so Rule 10 0 6 does not apply. OVERRULED. C. Confidential Investigation Report and Supplem ental Report For the reasons explained in the Court’s order on defendant’s m otion in lim ine to exclude these reports, 5 Tafaro’s reports are hearsay and are not covered by any exception to Rule 80 2. inadm issible. 4 5 See R. Doc. 10 9 at 5. Id. at 6-9. 3 The reports are therefore SUSTAINED. D. Green’s Hire Date Green seeks to exclude ACSA’s record of Green’s hire date because it is not relevant to Garcia’s claims. 6 The date that Green was hired does not have any bearing on his actions toward Garcia. The relevant dates for Garcia’s claim s would instead be the date that Green met Garcia, began working with her, or began harassing her. The Court therefore finds this exhibit inadm issible under Federal Rule of Evidence 40 2. SUSTAINED. E. Green’s Salary Change Green’s salary is also irrelevant to Garcia’s claims against him . Garcia m akes no claims regarding Garcia’s pay or personal assets. His salary change is therefore inadm issible under Rule 40 2. SUSTAINED. F. Green’s Adm inistrative Leaves, Disciplinary Action Charge, and Term ination Green argues that ACSA docum ents putting him on adm inistrative leave, taking disciplinary action against him, and term inating his 6 R. Doc. 99 at 3. 4 em ploym ent are substantially m ore prejudicial than probative under Rule 40 3. 7 ACSA’s decision to place Green on adm inistrative leave, its decision to fire him for violating its sexual harassm ent policies, and the findings of its investigation are all probative of whether Green’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. Such evidence is thus adm issible in the form of witness testim ony. But the exhibits to which Green objects do not include any factual findings of Green’s conduct. The docum ents putting him on adm inistrative leave m erely state that the leave is “with pay pending investigation,”8 and “with pay until investigation is com plete.”9 The disciplinary action form provides only that Green violated the school’s policies, 10 and the term ination form shows that the term ination was involuntary with no other details. 11 None of the docum ents contains inform ation about the nature of Green’s conduct toward Garcia. Without facts about the underlying conduct, the form s have little probative value for Garcia’s intentional infliction of em otional distress claim . In addition, adm ission of these docum ents creates a risk that the jury will construe ACSA’s decision to fire Green as 7 8 9 10 11 R. Doc. 99 at 3. Plaintiff’s exhibit Plaintiff’s exhibit Plaintiff’s exhibit Plaintiff’s exhibit 12. 13. 14. 15. 5 determ inative of his guilt. The docum ents are therefore excluded as substantially m ore prejudicial than probative under Rule 40 3. SUSTAINED. G. Magendie’s Declaration Green seeks to exclude Tansey Magendie’s declaration describing ACSA’s sexual harassment policies and practices, as well as the steps she took to investigate Garcia’s claim s against Green, on the ground that it is inadm issible hearsay. 12 The declaration is indeed hearsay under Rule 80 2 if used to prove the truth of the m atters asserted within it. In addition, Garcia intends to call Magendie as a witness, so the declaration is cum ulative of her testim ony. The Court therefore finds the declaration inadm issible. Fed. R. Evid. 40 3 (allowing courts to exclude relevant evidence when it is needlessly cum ulative). SUSTAINED. H. Em ail from Magendie to Garcia Green also seeks exclusion of em ail correspondence between Magendie and Garcia as hearsay, irrelevant, and m ore prejudicial than probative. 13 In m ost of the em ail m essages, Garcia is expresses frustration with the school 12 13 Id. at 4. Id. 6 adm inistration rather than discussing Green directly. These em ails are substantially m ore prejudicial than probative under Rule 40 3. Their probative value is slight because they do not relate directly to Green’s actions or Garcia’s em otional distress caused by Green. They are prejudicial because they confuse the issues in the case by introducing Garcia’s dissatisfaction with the school district rather than Green himself. They are therefore inadm issible. But in one em ail, Garcia requests access to counseling services, which is probative of her level of em otional distress. This email is not hearsay because it is a statem ent of Garcia’s then-existing state of m ind and em otional condition. See Fed. R. Evid. 80 3(3) (hearsay statements of “the declarant’s then-existing state of m ind . . . or emotional . . . condition” are adm issible). Because it speaks directly to Garcia’s em otional state and does not m ake allegations against ACSA, this em ail is m ore probative than prejudicial under Rule 40 3, and it is therefore adm issible. OVERRULED IN PART. I. Green’s Online Em ploy m ent Application, Green’s N ew Hire, Green’s Ethics History , Green’s Authorizations, Green’s Driver’s License, Green’s Em ploy ee File, and Green’s LA State Police Background Check For the reasons explained in the Court’s order on Green’s m otion in lim ine to exclude his pre-em ployment docum ents, Green’s employment 7 application, ethics history, and authorizations are not adm issible. 14 Green’s “new hire” form is the same docum ent as his “hire date” form that the Court already excluded as irrelevant. The “em ployee file” consists of his disciplinary action form that the Court already determ ined is inadm issible, the two forms putting him on paid leave that the Court determ ined inadm issible, and the EEOC charge that the Court determ ined adm issible. Green’s driver’s license is inadm issible because it is irrelevant under Rule 40 2. His state background check is inadm issible because it is m ore prejudicial than probative for the reasons explained in the Court’s m otion in lim ine granting Green’s m otion to exclude his crim inal convictions. 15 Accordingly, the Court sustains Green’s objection to these exhibits as either duplicates of other exhibits, irrelevant, or as substantially m ore prejudicial than probative. SUSTAINED. J. Investigator’s N otes and Em ail to Re-Open Investigation For the reasons explained in the Court’s order granting Green’s m otion in lim ine to exclude investigator Lauren Tafaro’s notes and em ail re-opening 14 15 R. Doc. 10 9 at 20 -24. Id. at 3-4. 8 her investigation, these docum ents are inadm issible because they are hearsay under Rule 80 2 and are not covered by any exception to the Rule. 16 SUSTAINED. II. CON CLU SION The Court rules on defendant’s objections as indicated above. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _14th _ _ _ day of J anuary, 20 19. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 16 Id. at 6-9. 9
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