Magee v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., No. 2:2017cv08063 - Document 25 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 22 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 5/2/2018. (cg)
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Magee v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. Doc. 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SCOTT MAGEE, on behalf of himself and all others sim ilarly situated VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-80 63 WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC. SECTION “R” (4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is Defendant Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.’s m otion for attorneys’ fees. 1 For the following reasons, the Court denies the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a dispute over the accessibility of Glacier Water Refill Stations at Winn-Dixie stores. 2 The water refill stations are self-service m achines that dispense filtered water into containers provided by the custom er. 3 Plaintiff Scott Magee is legally blind. 4 On August 21, 20 17, plaintiff filed a class action com plaint asserting violations of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 5 The com plaint alleged that plaintiff attem pted 1 2 3 4 5 R. Doc. 22. R. Doc. 1. Id. at 1 ¶ 2. Id. at 3 ¶ 10 . Id. at 9-12. Dockets.Justia.com to use a water refill station at the Winn-Dixie store located at 211 Veterans Mem orial Boulevard in Metairie, Louisiana, in the late evening of August 17, 20 17, or the early m orning of August 18, 20 17. 6 Plaintiff alleged that he was unable to use the water refill station during this visit because the station “did not utilize any braille m arkings or other non-visual m eans for [plaintiff] to interact with the m achine.”7 The com plaint further alleged that plaintiff attem pted to access the water refill m achine at other times with no success because the m achine “offers no non-visual interface.”8 On J anuary 22, 20 18, the Court dism issed the complaint for lack of standing because plaintiff failed to show that he suffered an injury-in-fact. 9 The Court found that plaintiff’s allegation that he was unable to use the water refill station because it lacked any braille m arkings was contradicted by evidence that the m achine had at least some braille stickers at the tim e of his alleged August 20 17 visit. 10 Plaintiff failed to offer sufficiently concrete inform ation regarding his other alleged visits to the water refill station. 11 Defendant now m oves for an award of attorneys’ fees. 12 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Id. at 7 ¶ 32. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36. Id. at ¶ 36. R. Doc. 20 . Id. at 9. Id. at 7. R. Doc. 22. 2 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD The general rule in the United States is that, “in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants m ust pay their own attorneys’ fees.” Christiansburg Garm ent Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978). Congress has created lim ited exceptions to this rule under certain statutes protecting various federal rights. Id. To encourage private enforcem ent of civil rights statutes, a prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights case should receive attorneys’ fees “in all but special circum stances.” Id. at 416-17. But the policy considerations that support granting fees to a prevailing plaintiff are absent when the defendant prevails. A district court m ay grant attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant only when the court finds that the action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Id. at 422. The Supreme Court has em phasized that district courts should not find a plaintiff’s action unreasonable or groundless sim ply because he did not prevail. Id. at 421-22. Engaging in such “hindsight logic” would “discourage all but the m ost airtight claim s” and undercut Congress’s efforts to prom ote vigorous enforcement of civil rights statutes. Id. at 42223; see also My ers v. City of W est Monroe, 211 F.3d 289, 292 n.1 (5th Cir. 3 20 0 0 ) (explaining that the lim it on recovery of fees by a prevailing defendant “attem pts to prevent any chilling effect on the enforcement of civil rights”). III. D ISCU SSION A. Fe e Re qu e s t u n d e r th e Am e rican s w ith D is abilitie s Act Defendant m oves for attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee-shifting provision. 13 See 42 U.S.C. § 1220 5. A fee request by a prevailing defendant under the ADA is governed by the sam e legal standard applicable to other civil rights cases. See N o Barriers, Inc. v. Brinker Chili’s Tex., Inc., 262 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 20 0 1). A defendant m ay recover fees only if the plaintiff’s claim s were “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” Id. Defendant first argues that a fee award is warranted because plaintiff wrongly asserted that no braille was present on the water refill station when he attem pted to use the m achine on the evening of August 17, 20 17. 14 In its order dism issing the com plaint, the Court found that it was m ore likely than not that at least som e braille stickers were present at the tim e of plaintiff’s alleged August 20 17 visit. 15 The Court based this finding on a declaration from a Glacier Water employee stating that he applied braille stickers to the 13 14 15 R. Doc. 22-1 at 4-5. Id. at 6-7. R. Doc. 20 at 8. 4 water m achine on February 1, 20 17, and a second declaration from an individual who took pictures of the m achine on August 22, 20 17. 16 But plaintiff is blind, and there was no finding that plaintiff knew the braille stickers were present when he filed the lawsuit. Thus, the Court finds that defendant has not shown that plaintiff’s com plaint was frivolous or groundless when he initiated this suit. Defendant further contends that plaintiff and his counsel continued to litigate this m atter after it became clear that plaintiff’s claim s were groundless. 17 Specifically, defendant states that plaintiff and his counsel continued to assert that the water refill station lacked braille even after defendant’s counsel inform ed them that braille was present on the m achine. 18 But defendant does not indicate when it inform ed plaintiff that braille stickers were present on the m achine. The sole com m unication m entioned in defendant’s m otion is a letter from defense counsel to plaintiff’s counsel dated September 8, 20 17. 19 The September 20 17 letter states, in relevant part: “Please advise your client that the braille stickers regarding the instrum entation required to use 16 17 18 19 Id.; see also R. Doc. 6-2; R. Doc. 6-3. R. Doc. 22-1 at 6. Id. at 7. Id. at 4; R. Doc. 6-5 at 4. 5 the Glacier Water m achine located at the Winn-Dixie at 211 Veterans Mem orial Boulevard, Metairie, Louisiana have been re-applied to the m achine.”20 This letter does not indicate that braille stickers were already present on the machine at the time of plaintiff’s alleged August 20 17 visit. On the contrary, the letter im plies that the water refill station previously lacked satisfactory braille stickers. See EEOC v. Kim brough Inv. Co., 70 3 F.2d 98, 10 3 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding that civil rights suit was not vexatious in part because defendant’s settlement offer suggested a need for steps to redress discrim ination). This letter therefore did not put plaintiff on notice that braille stickers were present on the m achine in August 20 17. To the extent defendant argues that the September 20 17 letter advised plaintiff that his com plaint was m oot, this does not dem onstrate that continuation of the suit was unreasonable. The Court did not dism iss the com plaint based on m ootness, and plaintiff presented a non-frivolous argument that defendant’s voluntary corrective action was insufficient to m oot his claim s. 21 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (20 0 0 ) (explaining that a defendant asserting that its voluntary conduct renders a case m oot bears a “heavy burden of 20 21 R. Doc. 6-5 at 4. R. Doc. 16 at 7-9. 6 persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again”). In its m otion to dism iss, defendant offered evidence for the first tim e that the water refill station was outfitted with at least som e braille stickers at the tim e of plaintiff’s alleged August 20 17 visit. 22 There is no indication in the record that defendant com m unicated this inform ation to plaintiff before filing its m otion. The Court granted the m otion, and dism issed the com plaint. 23 Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to press his claim any further, and defendant has therefore not shown that he unreasonably continued to litigate after receiving notice that his claim was groundless. Cf. N o Barriers, Inc., 262 F.3d at 498-50 (affirm ing fee award to prevailing ADA defendant when plaintiff failed to tim ely am end his com plaint despite defendant’s “repeated protestations and a strong suggestion from the district court” that he had sued the wrong party); see also Sm ith v. Touro Infirm ary , No. 14-2689, 20 16 WL 3511717, at *5 (E.D. La. 20 16). Although the Court has reservations regarding the conduct of plaintiff and his counsel in this m atter, defendant has not m et the high bar to show that plaintiff’s suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that he 22 23 R. Doc. 6-1; R. Doc. 6-2; R. Doc. 6-3. R. Doc. 20 . 7 continued to litigate after it clearly becam e so. The Court thus denies defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees under the ADA. B. Oth e r Bas e s fo r Atto rn e ys ’ Fe e s Defendant also asks the Court to award attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s inherent power. 24 Section 1927 perm its the Court to require an attorney “who so m ultiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously . . . to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. For the reasons explained above, defendant has not shown that plaintiff’s counsel unreasonably and vexatiously m ultiplied the proceedings in this action. The Court m ay also im pose attorneys’ fees as part of its inherent power to sanction bad faith and vexatious conduct. See Cham bers v. N ASCO, Inc., 50 1 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991). But the Court should ordinarily rely on its inherent power only when “neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task.” Id. at 50 . The ADA’s fee-shifting provision directly addresses the award of attorneys’ fees in frivolous suits, and the Court declines to im pose sanctions under its inherent power. 24 R. Doc. 22. 8 IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s m otion for attorneys’ fees. 2nd New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of May, 20 18. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 9
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