Taylor v. Marquette Transportation Company Gulf Inland, LLC, No. 2:2017cv07934 - Document 61 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that the 43 motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC, be and hereby is DENIED. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
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Taylor v. Marquette Transportation Company Gulf Inland, LLC Doc. 61 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A J OSEPH TAYLOR, Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 17-79 3 4 MARQU ETTE TRAN SPORTATION COMPAN Y GU LF-IN LAN D , LLC, D e fe n d an t SECTION : “E”( 3 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S This is a m aritim e personal injury case. Before the Court is a m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent filed by Defendant Marquette Transportation Com pany Gulf-Inland, LLC (“Marquette”). 1 Discovery having been com pleted on August 14, 20 18, 2 Defendant tim ely filed the instant m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent on August 21, 20 18. 3 Defendant argues, because Plaintiff’s fall occurred from a piling owned by United Bulk Term inal, his in juries were not the result of the unseaworthiness of the M/ V AUDREY PEARSON. 4 Additionally, Defendant argues it did not owe Plaintiff a duty of seaworthiness for an injury sustained off the vessel. 5 Alternatively, Defendant argues, if it did owe Plaintiff a duty of seaworthiness for an injury sustained while not onboard the M/ V AUDREY PEARSON, the M/ V AUDREY PEARSON was a seaworthy vessel that did not em ploy any unsafe work m ethods. 6 Plaintiff J oseph Taylor opposes the m otion. 7 1 R. Doc. 43. R. Doc. 14 at 8 . 3 R. Doc. 43. 4 R. Doc. 43-1 at 2-4; R. Doc. 43-3 at 1. 5 R. Doc. 43-1 at 2-4. 6 R. Doc. 56 at 1-4 7 R. Doc. 49. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com Defendant has filed a reply. 8 For the reasons that follow, the m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent is D EN IED . SU MMARY JU D GMEN T STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate only “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.”9 “An issue is m aterial if its resolution could affect the outcom e of the action.”10 When assessing whether a m aterial factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the eviden ce in the record but refrain[s] from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the eviden ce.”11 All reasonable inferen ces are drawn in favor of the non-m oving party. 12 There is no genuine issue of m aterial fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonm oving party, thus entitling the m oving party to judgm ent as a m atter of law. 13 “[A] party seeking sum m ary judgm ent always bears the initial responsibility of inform ing the district court of the basis for its m otion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes dem onstrate the absence of a genuine issue of m aterial fact.” To satisfy Rule 56’s burden of production, the m oving party m ust do one of two things: “the m oving party m ay subm it affirm ative evidence that negates an essential elem ent of the nonm oving party’s claim ” or “the m oving party m ay dem onstrate to the Court that the nonm oving party’s eviden ce is insufficient to establish an essen tial elem ent of the 8 Id. F ED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322– 23. 10 DIR ECTV, Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 20 0 5). 11 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. N ationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 – 99 (5th Cir. 20 0 8 ); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plum bing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 – 51 (20 0 0 ). 12 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). 13 Hibernia N at. Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1993) (citin g Am oco Prod. Co. v. Horw ell Energy , Inc., 969 F.2d 146, 147– 48 (5th Cir. 1992)). 9 2 nonm oving party’s claim .” If the m oving party fails to carry this burden, the m otion m ust be denied. If the m oving party successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the non-m oving party to direct the Court’s attention to som ething in the pleadings or other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of m aterial fact does indeed exist. 14 If the dispositive issue is one on which the non-m oving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the m oving party m ay satisfy its burden of production by either (1) subm itting affirm ative evidence that negates an essential elem ent of the non-m ovant’s claim , or (2) affirm atively dem onstrating that there is no eviden ce in the record to establish an essential elem ent of the non-m ovant’s claim . 15 If the m ovant fails to affirm atively show the absence of evidence in the record, its m otion for sum m ary judgm ent m ust be denied. 16 Thus, the non-m oving party m ay defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent by “calling the Court’s attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the m oving party.”17 “[U]nsubstantiated assertions are not com petent sum m ary judgm ent evidence. The party opposing sum m ary judgm ent is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise m anner in which that eviden ce supports his or her claim . ‘Rule 56 does not im pose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to sum m ary judgm ent.’”18 14 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322– 24. Id. at 331– 32 (Bren nan, J ., dissentin g). 16 See id. at 332. 17 Id. at 332– 33. The burden would then shift back to the m ovant to dem onstrate the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the non-m ovant. Once attacked, “the burden of production shifts to the non m oving party, who m ust either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the m ovin g party’s papers, (2) produce additional evidence showin g the existence of a genuin e issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) subm it an affidavit explain in g why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).” Id. at 332– 33, 333 n .3. 18 Ragas v. Ten n. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Forsy th v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) and quotin g Skotak v. Tenn eco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 90 9, 915– 15 3 FACTS It is undisputed that (1) at all relevant tim es, the Plaintiff, J oseph Taylor, was em ployed as a deckhand on the M/ V AUDREY PEARSON, a vessel owned and operated by Marquette; 19 (2) the vessel operated out of the United Bulk Term inal (“UBT”), shifting barges within the facility; 20 (3) “on J une 10 , 20 17, while serving as a deckhand on the Marquette towing vessel, M/ V AUDREY PEARSON, [Plaintiff] injured him self while attem pting to tie off two em pty barges;”21 and (4) “Plaintiff was actually standing on UBT’s piling when he slipped and fell into the Mississippi River. 22 The parties dispute whether the M/ V AUDREY PEARSON conducted safety m eetings and whether the vessel’s captain provided adequate safety training or warnings to his crew. 23 Plaintiff points to Captain Mulvehill’s deposition testim ony, stating he would “just tell them what we’re about to do, as far as the job that we’re about to do,” instead of conducting a job safety m eeting about the specifics of a job. 24 Additionally Captain Mulvehill’s deposition testim ony reveals he was “written up” for a failure to have a “pre-safety.”25 Defendant contends that adequate safety trainings and warnings were in place, as Plaintiff testified in deposition that he received safety training when hired by Marquette, 26 along with an observation and shadowing opportunity on a Marquette boat. 27 Defendant also argues the routineness of the m aneuver of shifting barges m ade 16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)). 19 R. Doc. 43-1 at 1; R. Doc. 49 at 1. 20 R. Doc. 43-1 at 1; R. Doc. 49 at 10 . 21 R. Doc. 43-3 at 1; R. Doc. 49-1 at 1. 22 R. Doc. 43-3 at 1; R. Doc. 49-1 at 1. 23 R. Doc. 49-1 at 1. 24 R. Doc. 43-3 at 2. 25 Id. at 8. 26 R. Doc. 56-1 at 7-10 , 13. 27 Id. at 13. 4 certain safety m eetings unnecessary. 28 The parties also dispute whether the vessel was outfitted with proper equipm ent for the job. 29 Plaintiff contends a pike pole would not have allowed him to unfoul this particular line. 30 Instead, he claim s he needed to board the piling to unfoul the line. 31 Defendant points to Captain Mulvehill's testim ony that had he known Plaintiff was unable to reach the line, he would have told him to get the pike pole. 32 Additionally, it is disputed whether the captain failed to check the tie-off lines utilized by the crew. 33 Plaintiff’s expert subm its that Captain Mulvehill should have observed the lin es and that it is the responsibility of both captain and crew to notice when the lines n eed replacing. 34 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS To prevail on an unseaworthiness claim , a plaintiff m ust first show the vessel was unseaworthy and the unseaworthiness caused or substantially contributed to his in jury. 35 A vessel’s unseaworthiness m ay arise from several circum stances, in cluding when its crew is ill-trained, inadequate, or engaged in an unsafe m ethod of work. 36 When crewm em bers “engage in a congeries of negligent acts that are of such a character or that continue for such a length of tim e that they becom e related to the status of the vessel . . . that congeries of acts m ight create a ‘condition’ of unseaworthiness.”37 To determ ine whether a vessel is 28 R. Doc. 56-1 at 18-19, 31. R. Doc. 49 at 2; R. Doc. 56 at 3. 30 R. Doc. 49-4 at 10 . 31 Id. 32 R. Doc. 65-1 at 30 . 33 R. Doc. 49-1 at 1. 34 R. Doc. 49-5 at 2. 35 Crane v . Diam ond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 743 So. 2d 780 , 790 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Johnson v. Offshore Express Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1354 (5th Cir. 1988)). 36 Crane, 743 So. 2d at 790 ; see also Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 40 0 U.S. 494, 499 (1971). 37 Robinson v. Show a Kaiun K.K., 451 F.2d 68 8, 690 (5th Cir. 1971); Daughdrill v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co. (ODECO), 70 9 F.Supp. 710 , 712 (E.D.La. 1989) (findin g the negligent acts were not pervasive enough to render the vessel unseaworthy). 29 5 unseaworthy because its crew is engaged in an unsafe m ethod of work, courts will look to a num ber of factors, including: whether proper equipm ent is available, whether the crew is properly trained to do the work, whether the crew uses a proper m ethod and/ or equipm ent for the work, whether enough crew are available to perform the work, and whether any prior injuries occurred while perform ing the work. 38 For exam ple, in N ichols v. W eeks Marine, Inc., this Court found an unsafe m ethod of work rendered a vessel unseaworthy, when “the crew was ill-trained[,] . . . the captain ordered the crew to use an im proper procedure,” and the crew did not have the proper equipm ent to accom plish the task. 39 Conversely, in Rogers v. Eagle Offshore Drilling Services, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found a vessel was not unseaworthy and had not used an unsafe m ethod of work when there was “no eviden ce to indicate” the m ethod em ployed was unsafe and “no one had previously been injured.”40 Defendant has failed to m eet its burden of establishing that there is no disputed issue of m aterial fact and that it is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law. To determ ine whether an unsafe m ethod of work was used on the M/ V AUDREY PEARSON, there m ust be no facts in dispute regarding the proper equipm ent, training, num ber of crew, and m ethod for perform ing the job. 41 The only two undisputed facts subm itted by Defendant are (1) on J une 10 , 20 17, Plaintiff injured him self while attem pting to tie off two em pty barges and (2) Plaintiff was standing on a piling owned by UBT when he slipped and fell 38 Crane, 743 So. 2d at 790 (lack of train ing, underm an n ed); Rogers v . Eagle Offshore Drilling Servs. Inc., 764 F.2d 30 0 , 30 3 (5th Cir. 1985) (prior in juries, proper eqiupm ent); N ichols v. W eeks Marine, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 627, 636 (E.D. La. 20 17) (im proper m ethod); see Lett v . Om ega Protein, 487 Fed. App’x 839, 846 (5th Cir. 20 12) (unsafe m ethod of usin g tool). 39 513 F. Supp. 2d at 636. 40 764 F.2d at 30 3. 41 Crane, 743 So. 2d at 790 ; Rogers, 764 F.2d at 30 3; N ichols, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 636. 6 into the Mississippi River. 42 These do not encom pass all the facts m aterial to a determ ination of whether an unsafe m ethod of work was used. The m aterial facts not addressed by the Defendant are in dispute. The Court finds that genuine issues of m aterial fact exist as to whether the M/ V AUDREY PEARSON allowed its crew to engage in an unsafe work m ethod, thus rendering the vessel unseaworthy. As a result, sum m ary judgm ent is not appropriate. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORD ERED that the m otion for sum m ary judgm ent filed by Defendant Marquette Transportation Com pany Gulf-Inland, LLC, be and hereby is D EN IED . N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 2 3 rd d ay o f Se p te m be r, 2 0 18 . ________________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 42 R. Doc. 43-3 at 1; R. Doc. 49 at 2; R. Doc. 56 at 3. 7
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