Zeringue v. Monster Energy Company, No. 2:2017cv06023 - Document 22 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS regarding 3 Motion to Compel Arbitration. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 11/6/2017. (cg)
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Zeringue v. Monster Energy Company Doc. 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA PAGE ZERINGUE CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 17-60 23 MONSTER ENERGY COMPANY SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is defendant’s m otion to com pel arbitration and to dism iss, or in the alternative, to stay litigation pending arbitration. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the m otion to com pel arbitration and to dism iss. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a claim of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 2 Plaintiff Page Zeringue was em ployed by Defendant Monster Energy Company between February 20 0 8 and October 20 15. 3 On February 20 , 20 0 8, and again on Septem ber 11, 20 14, plaintiff 1 2 3 R. Doc. 3. R. Doc. 1. Id. at 2-9. Dockets.Justia.com signed an em ployment contract that included an agreement to subject any controversy or claim arising out of her em ploym ent to binding arbitration. 4 Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in J uly 20 14, her supervisor, J ohn Kenneally, began making unwelcome sexual advances toward her. 5 Plaintiff further alleges that another Monster Energy manager, Ted Cook, made com m ents about her breasts and grabbed her inappropriately. 6 Plaintiff alleges that she experienced retaliation after rejecting Kenneally’s sexual advances and filing a sexual harassment com plaint against Cook, and she was eventually term inated on October 16, 20 15. 7 On J une 22, 20 17, plaintiff filed a com plaint for dam ages alleging violations of Title VII because of a sexually hostile work environm ent and unlawful retaliation. 8 Defendant now m oves to com pel arbitration, and to dism iss, or alternatively stay, these proceedings. 9 II. D ISCU SSION The Federal Arbitration Act expresses a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (20 11). 4 5 6 7 8 9 R. Doc. 3-2; R. Doc. 18-1. R. Doc. 1 at 3 Id. at 5 ¶ 14. Id. at 8-9. Id. at 10 -11. R. Doc. 3. 2 As a result, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem orial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). To determ ine whether to compel parties to arbitrate, the Court conducts a two-step inquiry. The Court first determ ines whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute, nam ely whether there is a valid agreem ent to arbitrate and whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that agreement. See JP Morgan Chase & Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 20 0 7). The Court next considers “whether any federal statute or policy renders the claim s nonarbitrable.” Id. (citations om itted). The Court finds that the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement, and that plaintiff’s Title VII claim s fall within the scope of that agreement. On September 11, 20 14, plaintiff signed an em ployment agreement that states, in relevant part, that “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to Em ployee’s em ploym ent or other relationship with Com pany or any agents of Com pany shall be settled by binding arbitration.”10 This provision is unam biguous, and plaintiff’s argum ent that the arbitration provision does not expressly include claim s of sexual harassment or retaliatory term ination is without m erit. 10 R. Doc. 3-2 at 3. 3 Moreover, the agreement specifically refers to “claims relating to or arising out of any state or federal statute or public policy (‘public policy claim s’).”11 Under the agreement, “the substantive and rem edial provisions of the statute[s] applicable to the public policy claim s shall be available to any party required to arbitrate if those provisions would be otherwise available in court,” and a party required to arbitrate a public policy claim “shall be entitled to the full range of discovery provided under applicable law.”12 The arbitration agreement is clearly intended to apply to statutory claim s, including plaintiff’s Title VII claim s. Plaintiff further contends that this arbitration agreement should not apply to events that occurred before the agreem ent was signed in Septem ber 20 14. 13 But the language of the arbitration clause includes no temporal lim itation. See Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 20 2, 20 6-0 7 (5th Cir. 20 12) (noting that silence about the retroactive effect of a change in arbitration policy is interpreted to allow retroactive application); Lakeland Anesthesia, Inc. v. United Healthcare of La., Inc., 871 So. 2d 380 , 392 (La. App. 4 Cir. 20 0 4). Additionally, defendant has produced an arbitration 11 12 13 Id. Id. at 3-4. R. Doc. 10 at 5. 4 agreement signed and initialed by plaintiff on February 20 , 20 0 8, which specifically provides for the arbitration of Title VII claim s. 14 Plaintiff also asserts that the arbitration agreement is in conflict with defendant’s other policies on harassm ent, which do not reference arbitration. 15 But plaintiff does not show that these general com pany policies displace or supersede her individual agreement to arbitrate. 16 Plaintiff also points out that her m ost recent written em ployment agreem ent, a Decem ber 20 14 letter regarding a prom otion, does not include any reference to arbitration. 17 But there is no indication that this letter altered any conditions of plaintiff’s em ployment beyond her job description. By contrast, the September 20 14 agreement containing the arbitration clause specifically provides that “[t]his agreement will supersede your previous terms of em ploym ent with Monster Energy Com pany . . . and will govern your em ploym ent from the date of this change.”18 14 R. Doc. 18-1 at 4-5. R. Doc. 10 at 6-7. 16 Plaintiff points to com pany policies that perm it employees to file a com plaint with the EEOC and DFEH. See R. Doc. 10 at 6-7. But the arbitration clause specifically provides that the agreement does not prevent em ployees “from initially subm itting a dispute to the applicable state agency, the EEOC, or the National Labor Relations Board.” See R. Doc. 3-2 at 3. 17 R. Doc. 10 at 4; R. Doc. 10 -6. 18 R. Doc. 3-2 at 1. 5 15 Plaintiff’s argum ents that the arbitration agreem ent is invalid because she did not previously discuss the arbitration provision with her supervisor and did not intend to agree to anything except a prom otion are m eritless. 19 Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed the September 20 14 agreement. Regardless of her oral discussions regarding her employm ent conditions, plaintiff had an obligation to read the written agreement before signing it. See Colem an v. Jim W alter Hom es, Inc., 6 So. 3d 179, 183 (La. 20 0 9) (holding that written arbitration agreem ent was enforceable even though prior oral negotiations did not m ention arbitration). Further, the Court finds that the arbitration provision is not an unenforceable contract of adhesion. The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “the real issue in a contract of adhesion analysis is not the standard form of the contract, but rather whether a party truly consented to all the printed term s.” Aguillard v. Auction Mgm t. Co., 90 8 So. 2d 1, 10 (20 0 5). Here, the arbitration provision appears under its own subheading, covers several paragraphs, and states in bold text that “[y]ou agree to waive the right to a jury and instead subm it disputes arising out of or related to this agreement or your em ploym ent to neutral, binding arbitration.”20 Like the 19 20 R. Doc. 6-7. R. Doc. 3-2 at 3-4. 6 arbitration agreement upheld by the Louisiana Suprem e Court in Aguillard, the arbitration provision in plaintiff’s contract appears in the same print size as the other contract term s, is clearly visible, and applies to both parties. See 90 8 So. 2d at 16-17; cf. Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC, -- So. 2d. --, 20 16 WL 6123820 , at *5 (La. 20 16) (finding arbitration clause unenforceable when arbitration language was concealed within a long paragraph and lacked m utuality). Plaintiff does not point to any federal statute or policy that renders her claim s non-arbitrable. On the contrary, her argum ents are inconsistent with the federal policy favoring arbitration and the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion. See 563 U.S. at 346-47 (holding that federal policy favoring arbitration preem pted a state rule regarding unconscionability of contracts of adhesion). Plaintiff’s unsupported assertion that she did not agree to the arbitration provision is insufficient to defeat the m otion to com pel arbitration. Because all of plaintiff’s claim s are subject to arbitration, the Court finds it appropriate to dism iss the com plaint. See Alford v. Dean W itter Rey nolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Fedm et Corp. v. M/ V BUYALYK, 194 F.3d 674, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1999). 7 III. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s m otion to com pel arbitration. Plaintiff’s com plaint is DISMISSED. 6th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of November, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 8
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