Dubuisson v. Industrial Economics, Inc. et al, No. 2:2017cv04883 - Document 41 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS Granting 31 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Party Industrial Economics, Inc. is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 7/16/2018. (ajn)
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Dubuisson v. Industrial Economics, Inc. et al Doc. 41 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA RICHARD DUBUISSON CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 17-4883 INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC. AND RYAN TOLBERT SECTION “R” (3) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendant Industrial Econom ics, Inc. (IE) m oves to dismiss plaintiff Richard Dubuisson’s second amended com plaint. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a m aritim e accident that allegedly occurred on November 23, 20 15. Plaintiff alleges he was injured while working on a vessel owned and operated by defendant Ryan Tolbert. 2 Though not explicitly stated, plaintiff appears to assert that Tolbert was also the captain of the vessel on the day of the accident. 3 Plaintiff states that he was on the vessel in connection with his work as an em ployee of AIS Inc. of 1 2 3 R. Doc. 31. R. Doc. 30 at 2 ¶ 5, 3 ¶ 9. See id. at 3 ¶¶ 9-10 . Dockets.Justia.com Massachusetts. 4 According to plaintiff, the vessel was “under the control” of IE, “pursuant to a contract” between IE and Tolbert. 5 Plaintiff further states that IE “controlled the operations of the vessel” by “hiring th[e] vessel, directing the route and locations at which the vessel would operate,” and “approving captains.”6 Plaintiff states that he was injured when a large wave hit the vessel. 7 Plaintiff alleges that Tolbert failed to advise him and the other AIS em ployees that the wave was going to hit. 8 Plaintiff also alleges that Tolbert failed to “keep the boat in place while on location,” which he says contributed to the “m ovement” that ultim ately threw him to the deck. 9 Plaintiff states that he has suffered a serious lower back injury as a result of this fall. 10 On May 11, 20 17, plaintiff sued Tolbert and IE for negligence under general m aritim e law. 11 IE m oved to dism iss the first com plaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 12 Before that m otion was fully 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Id. at 2 ¶ 4. Id. ¶ 5. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Id. at 3 ¶ 9. Id. Id. ¶ 10 . Id. R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 10 . 2 briefed, plaintiff sought leave to am end his com plaint, 13 which Magistrate J udge Knowles granted. 14 Plaintiff’s first am ended complaint added only two additional substantive paragraphs. 15 Before any additional m otions were filed, Chief J udge Engelhardt denied IE’s initial m otion to dism iss as m oot. 16 J udge Engelhardt noted that plaintiff’s allegations in the am ended com plaint were “overly conclusory” and lacked sufficient factual support. He ordered plaintiff to subm it a second amended com plaint. 17 On May 18, 20 18, the case was transferred to this Section. 18 IE now m oves to dism iss the second am ended com plaint, arguing that plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to allege that IE (1) owed plaintiff a duty and (2) was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries. 19 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead “sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 R. Doc. 16. R. Doc. 19. R. Doc. 21. R. Doc. 27. Id. R. Doc. 36. R. Doc. 31-1 at 3-4. 3 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elem ents of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each elem ent of the plaintiff’s claim. Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. The claim m ust be dism issed if there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (20 0 7). III. D ISCU SSION To state a claim for m aritim e negligence, a plaintiff m ust “dem onstrate that there was a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, breach of that 4 duty, injury sustained by the plaintiff, and a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 20 1, 211 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (internal quotations and m odifications om itted). As to causation, a party’s negligence is actionable only if it is the “legal cause” of the plaintiff's injuries. Id. The Fifth Circuit defines legal cause as “som ething m ore than but for causation,” m eaning that “the negligence m ust be a substantial factor” in causing the injuries. Id. Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that IE was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries. IE’s connection to plaintiff’s alleged injuries rests on the allegations that IE had the ability to “approv[e] captains”20 and “knew or should have known” that Tolbert was operating the vessel in an unsafe m anner. 21 These allegations are akin to a claim for negligent hiring or retention under general m aritim e law. See In re Marquette Transp. Co. Gulf-Inland, LLC, No. 13-5114, 20 16 WL 1587382, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 20 , 20 16) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent hiring or retention under general m aritime law, and applying the sam e four elements as a general claim for negligence). In Marquette, the Court granted the defendant’s m otion for judgment on the pleadings when the plaintiffs alleged, without 20 21 R. Doc. 30 at 2 ¶ 8. Id. at 3 ¶ 11. 5 factual support, that the defendant’s “negligent hiring of” the captain caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. The Court noted that the plaintiffs “provide[d] no facts dem onstrating how [the defendant’s] hiring process failed to conform to the applicable standard of care.” Id. The plaintiffs also failed to plead facts to support the conclusion that the captain was incom petent at the tim e the defendant hired him . Id (citing Patterson v. Om ega Protein, Inc., No. 136293, 20 14 WL 4354461, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 20 14)). Here, plaintiff sim ilarly alleges in conclusory fashion that IE failed “to provide adequate personnel for the job in question.”22 Plaintiff fails to allege how IE’s process for approving Tolbert as captain was negligent, or why plaintiff should have known that Tolbert was operating the vessel in an unsafe m anner. In fact, plaintiff’s complaint is even m ore deficient than the com plaint in Marquette, because plaintiff alleges only that IE was responsible for “approving” the vessel’s captains, rather than hiring them. 23 Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations therefore do not rise to the level of plausibility required by Tw om bly and Iqbal. IE separately argues that plaintiff fails to allege that IE acted negligently within a sphere of activity over which it exercised control. 24 This 22 23 24 Id. at 3-4 ¶ 12. Id. at 2 ¶ 8. R. Doc. 31-1 at 3. 6 line of attack addresses whether IE owed plaintiff a duty that IE can be held liable for breaching. See Callahan v. Gulf Logistics, L.L.C., 456 F. App’x 385, 390 (5th Cir. 20 11). Because plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently allege causation alone requires dismissal, the Court will not address this argum ent. Finally, IE asks the Court to dism iss plaintiff’s claim with prejudice because plaintiff has already been given two opportunities to am end his com plaint. 25 In his opposition, plaintiff does not address this aspect of IE’s m otion, and does not seek leave to am end his complaint in the event the Court grants IE’s motion. The Court will “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Suprem e Court has held that “[i]f the underlying facts or circum stances relied upon by a plaintiff m ay be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the m erits.” Fom an v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to am end, however, “is by no m eans autom atic.” Halbert v. City of Sherm an, 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court considers m ultiple factors, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory m otive on the part of the m ovant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendm ents previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 25 R. Doc. 31-1 at 5. 7 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of am endment.” Fom an, 371 U.S. at 182. J udge Engelhardt ordered plaintiff to file this second am ended com plaint after calling plaintiff’s previous attem pt “overly conclusory and lacking factual inform ation sufficient to support a reasonable inference of negligence.”26 Given plaintiff has previously been noticed of these defects but has failed to cure them, the Court finds that further am endment is not warranted. Fom an, 371 U.S. at 182. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, IE’s m otion to dism iss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claim against IE is DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. 16th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ _ day of J uly, 20 18. __________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITES STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 26 R. Doc. 27. 8
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