Lee v. Forest River, Inc. et al, No. 2:2017cv02103 - Document 16 (E.D. La. 2017)

Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiff's claims for redhibition, lender liability, and violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff has 21 days to ame nd his complaint. Plaintiff's Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim against Defendant Forest River, Inc. is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE insofar as this claim relates to an express warranty as to the defects identified in the original complaint. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 9/14/2017. (cg)

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Lee v. Forest River, Inc. et al Doc. 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA DAVID E. LEE CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 17-210 3 FOREST RIVER, INC., ET AL. SECTION “R” (4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants Forest River, Inc., Dixie Motors, Inc., and Bank of Am erica, National Association, m ove to dism iss plaintiff’s com plaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of the sale of an allegedly defective recreational vehicle (RV). 2 On Septem ber 14, 20 13, plaintiff bought a new 20 14 Coachm an Leprechaun from Defendant Dixie Motors, LLC. 3 The purchase was financed by Defendant Bank of Am erica, National Association. 4 Defendants Forest River, Inc. and General Motors, LLC each allegedly 1 2 3 4 R. Doc. 10 . R. Doc. 1. Id. at 3 ¶ 9. Id. at 7 ¶ 33. Dockets.Justia.com m anufactured components of the vehicle. 5 Plaintiff asserts that the Coachm an Leprechaun was defective in m aterials and workm anship at the tim e of delivery, and that these defects were discovered within the warranty periods. 6 Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the RV has experienced problem s with the engine not starting and dying out, water leaks from the air conditioner, electrical defects, and engine defects. 7 According to the com plaint, plaintiff returned the vehicle to defendants for warranty repairs on m ultiple occasions, but the defects have not been remedied. 8 On March 14, 20 17, plaintiff filed a com plaint against defendants alleging negligent repair, lender liability and violations of both the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Louisiana redhibition laws. 9 Plaintiff seeks damages, rescission of the sales contract, and attorneys’ fees and costs. 10 Defendants Forest River, Dixie Motors, and Bank of Am erica now m ove to dism iss plaintiff’s com plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 11 Defendant General Motors has not joined this m otion. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Id. at 5 ¶ 23; R. Doc. 15 at 7-8. R. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 17. Id. at 5 ¶ 17. Id. at 5 ¶ 18. Id. at 5-9. Id. at 9-11. R. Doc. 10 . 2 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead “sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Lorm and v. US Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elem ents of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each elem ent of the plaintiff’s claim. Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. The claim m ust be dism issed if there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is 3 apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (20 0 7). III. D ISCU SSION Defendants m ove to dism iss the complaint on the grounds that the alleged defects are not subject to warranty, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim s and redhibition claim s are prescribed on the face of the complaint, and Bank of Am erica is not liable as a m atter of law. 12 The Court considers each issue in turn. A. W arran ty Co ve rage The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act “creates a statutory cause of action for consum ers damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to com ply with any obligation im posed by the Act or established by a written warranty, im plied warranty, or service contract.” W alton v. Rose Mobile Hom es, LLC, 298 F.3d 470 , 474 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (citation and quotation m arks om itted). “The Act does not require that a seller give a warranty on a consum er product, but if a warranty is given, it m ust com ply with the terms of the Act.” Boelens v. Redm an Hom es, Inc., 748 F.2d 10 58, 10 61 (5th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff alleges that defendants Forest River and 12 R. Doc. 10 -1 at 1. 4 General Motors are “suppliers” and “warrantors” under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and that the express warranties pertaining to the vehicle are a “written warranty” under the Act. 13 Defendants argue that the defects alleged in the com plaint do not give rise to a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act because the defects are not covered by a warranty. 14 In support of their m otion, defendants attach Forest River’s lim ited warranty for recreational vehicles. 15 The Court m ay consider a docum ent attached to a m otion to dism iss if it is referenced in plaintiff’s com plaint and central to his claim . See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 20 5 (5th Cir. 20 0 7); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean W itter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). Plaintiff’s com plaint alleges an express warranty by Forest River, and this warranty is central to plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss claim against Forest River. 16 Moreover, plaintiff has expressed no objection to the introduction of the warranty. See Scanlan v. Tex. A & M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 20 0 3). The Court m ay therefore consider the terms of the lim ited warranty. 13 14 15 16 R. Doc. 1 at 7. R. Doc. 10 -1 at 6. R. Doc. 10 -2 at 2. R. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 15-16. 5 The Forest River lim ited warranty provides coverage for a period of one year from the date of purchase or 12,0 0 0 m iles, whichever occurs first. 17 Plaintiff purchased the RV on Septem ber 14, 20 13. 18 The lim ited warranty covers “the body structure of th[e] recreational vehicle” and expressly disclaim s any warranty for “the m otorhom e chassis including without lim itation, the engine and drivetrain, any m echanical parts or systems of the chassis, tires, tubes, batteries and gauges, optional generators, routine m aintenance, equipm ent and appliances, or audio and/ or video equipm ent.”19 Plaintiff does not contest the authenticity of this lim ited warranty, nor does he argue that the warranty is otherwise invalid. As required by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the one-page warranty is conspicuously designated as a “lim ited warranty,” and its term s are “fully and conspicuously disclose[d] in sim ple and readily understood language.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 230 2-0 3. The warranty also clearly lim its the duration of any im plied warranties to the one year or 12,0 0 0 m ile express warranty period. See 15 U.S.C. § 230 8(b). The defects com plained of by plaintiff include electrical 17 18 19 R. Doc. 10 -2 at 2. R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 9. R. Doc. 10 -2 at 2. 6 defects, engine defects, and problem s with the air conditioning. 20 These alleged defects do not relate to the body structure of the RV and are expressly excluded by the term s of the lim ited warranty. Accordingly, plaintiff has not stated a claim against Forest River under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The com plaint also asserts that General Motors provided additional warranties on the RV. 21 General Motors has not joined this m otion to dism iss, and any alleged General Motors warranty is not before the Court. The Court therefore m akes no finding at this time as to whether the com plained of defects are covered by a General Motors warranty. B. Statu te o f Lim itatio n s The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not supply a statute of lim itations, and federal courts apply the lim itations period of the analogous state law claim . See Hardin v. Forest River, No. 17-2132, 20 17 WL 3311260 , at *2 (E.D. La. 20 17); N aquin v. Berry land Cam pers, No. 14-2133, 20 14 WL 6981944, at *3 (E.D. La. 20 14). In Louisiana, the analogous claim is an action for redhibition. Hardin, 20 17 WL 3311260 , at *2; N aquin, 20 14 WL 6981944, at *3; see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bow er, 589 So. 2d 571, 573 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991) (explaining that breach of warranty actions in Louisiana 20 21 Id. at 5 ¶ 17. Id at 4 ¶ 16. 7 are brought in redhibition). The same lim itations period therefore applies to plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and redhibition claim s. Under Louisiana law, the prescriptive period for redhibition claim s against a seller who did not know of the existence of a defect runs four years from the date of delivery. La. Civ. Code art. 2534(A)(1). Regardless of whether the seller knew of the existence of the defect, a redhibition claim prescribes no later than one year from the day the defect was discovered by the buyer. La. Civ. Code art. 2534. But “prescription is interrupted when the seller accepts the thing for repairs and com m ences anew from the day he tenders it back to the buyer or notifies the buyer of his refusal or inability to m ake the required repairs.” La. Civ. Code art. 2534(C). In Louisiana, “[t]he burden of proof is norm ally on the party pleading prescription; however, if on the face of the petition it appears that prescription has run . . . the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove a suspension or interruption of the prescriptive period.” Younger v. Marshall Indus., Inc., 618 So. 2d 866, 869 (La. 1993); see also Bourque v. Olin Corp., 253 F.3d 70 1 (5th Cir. 20 0 1); Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 865 So. 2d 49, 54 (La. 20 0 4). Plaintiff purchased the RV on September 14, 20 13. 22 He filed his 22 R. Doc. 1 at 3. 8 com plaint on March 14, 20 17. 23 Defendants assert that plaintiff’s claim s are facially prescribed. 24 The Court finds that it is apparent from the allegations in the complaint that plaintiff discovered the alleged defects over one year before filing suit. Plaintiff does not contest that he was aware of the defects m ore than one year before he filed his com plaint. 25 Instead, plaintiff asserts that the lim itations period was interrupted by repair attempts. 26 Because plaintiff bears the burden of establishing an interruption of the prescriptive period, Younger, 618 So. 2d at 869, the complaint m ust include sufficient allegations regarding the tim ing of repairs to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555; see also Heilm an v. City of Beaum ont, 638 F. App’x 363, 366-67 (5th Cir. 20 16) (explaining that plaintiff m ust plead facts sufficient to allege that relevant injuries occurred within the lim itations period); Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 23 R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 10 -1 at 5. Defendants em phasize the portion of the com plaint that states that “[f]rom the date of its purchase, the LEPRECHAUN continues to this day to exhibit som e or all of the non-conform ities described herein.” R. Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 18. Read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this allegation is not a clear adm ission that plaintiff knew of all the alleged defects on the date of purchase. But plaintiff’s other allegations m ake clear that he discovered the alleged defects before March 14, 20 16. 25 On the contrary, plaintiff’s mem orandum in opposition represents that the RV was taken in for service for an engine issue on February 2, 20 15, over two years before the date of the com plaint. See R. Doc. 15 at 8. 26 R. Doc. 15. 9 24 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 20 0 3) (affirm ing Rule 12(b)(6) dism issal where plaintiffs’ com plaint failed to sufficiently allege a basis for tolling the statute of lim itations). The com plaint fails to specify when repairs occurred or which particular defects were subject to repair attem pts. See Mouton v. Generac Pow er Sy s., Inc., 152 So. 2d 985, 992-93 (La. App. 3 Cir. 20 14) (explaining that repairs of unrelated defects do not interrupt the prescriptive period). Accordingly, plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to indicate that the prescriptive period was interrupted by repairs. Nor has plaintiff adequately alleged that he filed suit within one year of the term ination of repair attem pts. See La. Civ. Code art. 2534(C). The Court therefore finds plaintiff’s redhibition and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim s prescribed. C. Le n d e r Liability Plaintiff also asserts a lender liability claim against Bank of Am erica under the Federal Trade Com m ission’s Holder Rule. 27 As plaintiff acknowledges, the Holder Rule does not provide a separate cause of action and is derivative of plaintiff’s claim s against the other defendants. 28 See Yum ilicious Franchise, LLC v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170 , 176 (5th Cir. 20 16); 27 28 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 7; R. Doc. 15 at 15. R. Doc. 15 at 18. 10 MidFirst Bank v. Craige, No. 16-3941, 20 17 WL 2311740 , at *5 (E.D. La. 20 17). Because the Court has dism issed plaintiff’s redhibition and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims, plaintiff cannot maintain a lender liability claim against Bank of Am erica. D. Le ave to Am e n d Plaintiff has requested leave to am end his com plaint if defendant’s m otion is granted. 29 Plaintiff has not previously amended his com plaint. The Court will “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Supreme Court has held that “[i]f the underlying facts or circum stances relied upon by a plaintiff m ay be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the m erits.” Fom an v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to am end, however, “is by no m eans autom atic.” Halbert v. City of Sherm an, 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court considers m ultiple factors, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory m otive on the part of the m ovant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendm ents previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of am endment.” Fom an, 371 U.S. at 182. 29 Id. at 22. 11 After consideration of these factors, the Court denies plaintiff leave to am end his Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim against Forest River insofar as this claim relates to an express warranty as to the defects identified in the com plaint. Because these alleged defects are not covered by Forest River’s lim ited warranty, am endment would be futile. The Court grants plaintiff leave to amend his com plaint in other respects. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ m otion. Plaintiff’s claim s for redhibition, lender liability, and violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE. Plaintiff has 21 days to amend his com plaint. Plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim against Defendant Forest River, Inc. is DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE insofar as this claim relates to an express warranty as to the defects identified in the original com plaint. 14th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of Septem ber, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 12

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