Bridges v. Tanner, No. 2:2017cv01925 - Document 14 (E.D. La. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 . Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 8/12/2019.(sbs)
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Bridges v. Tanner Doc. 14 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A D W IGH T A. BRID GES, Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 17-19 2 5 ROBERT TAN N ER, W ARD EN , D e fe n d an t SECTION : “E” ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is a Report and Recom m endation issued by Magistrate J udge J anis van Meerveld recom m ending that Petitioner Dwight A. Bridge’s petition for federal habeas corpus relief be dism issed with prejudice. 1 Petitioner objects. 2 For the reasons that follow, the Court adopts the Report and Recom m endation as its own and hereby D EN IES Petitioner’s application for relief. BACKGROU N D Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Rayburn Correctional Center in Angie, Louisiana. On J anuary 5, 20 13, Petitioner was stopped for exceeding the speed lim it. 3 During the traffic stop, the officer sm elled m arijuana and asked to search the vehicle. 4 Petitioner declin ed. 5 The officer called a K-9 unit, which detected narcotics in the glove com partm ent. 6 The officer searched the glove com partm ent and found contraband that tested positive for m arijuana. 7 1 R. Doc. 12. This Order refers to docum ents on this Court’s CM/ ECF docket as “R. Doc. [# ]” and refers to the record before the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, which consists of a paper docket only, as “R. Vol. [# ]” For reference, the paper docket is split into six volum es; the bottom right corner of each page has been m arked for citation purposes. 2 R. Doc. 13 3 State v. Bridges, No. 20 14 KA 0 777, 20 15 WL 997162, at *1 (La. App. 1st Cir. Mar. 6, 20 15). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Id. 1 Dockets.Justia.com On March 12, 20 13, Petitioner was charged with possession of m arijuana. 8 On Septem ber 18, 20 13, Petitioner was found guilty after a jury trial. 9 He was adjudicated to be a second felony habitual offender and sentenced to fifteen years of im prisonm ent at hard labor. 10 On March 6, 20 15, Petitioner’s conviction an d sentence was affirm ed by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal. 11 On February 26, 20 16, the Louisiana Suprem e Court denied his application for a writ of review. 12 Petitioner did not petition the United States Suprem e Court for a writ of certiorari. 13 Petitioner has not sought collateral review in state court. 14 On March 3, 20 17, Petitioner, pro se, filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 15 Petitioner raises six grounds for relief: (1) the prosecutor exercised his perem ptory challenges in a racially discrim inatory m anner against three black fem ale potential jurors, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky 16 ; (2) the trial judge im properly denied his request to recreate the scen e of the traffic stop during trial; (3) the prosecutor im properly elicited testim ony that Petitioner refused to consent to a search of his vehicle and com m ented on that refusal during closing argum ent; (4) the trial judge im properly refused to hold a hearing on the officer’s ability to detect the odor of m arijuana; (5) Petitioner was not a second-felony habitual offender; and (6) Petitioner’s sentence is constitutionally excessive. 17 Petitioner raised the sam e claim s in his prior appeal to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, which found all six claim s to be without m erit. 18 8 R. Vo. 1 at 42 (bill of inform ation). R. Vol. 1 at 20 7 (jury verdict form ), Vol. 4 at 773 (trial transcript). 10 R. Vol. 1 at 38 (m inute entry). 11 Bridges, 20 15 WL 997162; R. Vol. 5 at 962– 81. 12 State v. Bridges, 15-0 675, 187 So. 3d 467 (La. Feb. 26, 20 16); R. Vol. 6 at 98 2. 13 R. Doc. 1 at 2. 14 Id. at 3. 15 Id. 16 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 17 R. Doc. 1 at 13– 43. 18 Bridges, 20 15 WL 997162, *2– 10 ; R. Vol. 5 at 961– 79. 9 2 Respondent Robert Tanner, the warden of the Rayburn Correctional Center, opposes the petition. 19 After reviewing the record, the Magistrate J udge issued a Report and Recom m en dation recom m ending each of the six claim s be denied. 20 On April 19, 20 18 , Petitioner tim ely filed objections to the Report and Recom m endation. 21 He raises objections to the recom m endation of denial of each of his six claim s. 22 AN ALYSIS I. Sta n d ard o f Re vie w In reviewing the Magistrate J udge’s Report and Recom m en dations, the Court m ust review de novo any of the Magistrate J udge’s conclusions to which a party has specifically objected. 23 The Court needs only to review the portions of the report to which there are no objection s to determ in e whether they are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 24 Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Pen alty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court m ust defer to the decision of the state court on the m erits of a pure question of law or a m ixed question of law and fact unless the decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determ ined by the Suprem e Court of the United States.”25 A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if: “(1) the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law announced in Suprem e Court cases, or (2) the state court decides a case differently 19 R. Doc. 8. R. Doc. 12. 21 R. Doc. 13. 22 Id. 23 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall m ake a de novo determ ination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findin gs or recom m en dations to which an objection is m ade.”). 24 Id. 25 Id. at § 2254(d)(1). 20 3 than the Suprem e Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”26 AEDPA requires that a federal court “accord the state trial court substantial deference.”27 II. Ba t s o n Ch alle n ge Petitioner claim s the prosecutor struck three jurors, Mary White, Alice Cousin, and Shannon Doughty, on the basis of race. The trial judge sustained the Batson challenge to Cousin and did not allow the State to exercise a backstrike; Cousin ultim ately sat on the jury. 28 As a result, the Court need only determ ine whether Petitioner has shown the strikes again st White and Doughty were racially m otivated. In Batson, the Suprem e Court held that a prosecutor violates the Equal Protection Clause if he “challenge[s] potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assum ption that black jurors as a group will be unable im partially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.”29 Batson established a three-step process for analyzing claim s of racially discrim inatory perem ptory challenges. First, a defendant m ust m ake a prim a facie showing that a perem ptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. 30 Second, the prosecution m ust offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. 31 Third, in light of the parties’ subm issions, the trial court m ust determ ine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrim ination. 32 A. Ba t s o n Ste p On e The first step of the Batson analysis requires a prim a facie showing of discrim ination by the defendant. In the instant case, the trial court im plicitly found a 26 N elson v. Quarterm an, 472 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 20 0 6) (en banc) (quotin g M itchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15– 16 (20 0 3)). 27 Brum field v. Cain , 135 S.Ct. 2269 (20 15). 28 Id. 29 476 U.S. at 89 (1986). 30 Sny der v . Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476– 77 (20 0 8 ) (quotation m arks and brackets om itted). 31 Id. 32 Id. 4 prim a facie case had been established when she required the prosecutor to state his reasons for the perem ptory strikes. The first step of Batson is m oot and review by this Court is lim ited to the second and third steps. 33 B. Ba t s o n St e p Tw o At the second step of the Batson analysis, the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the jurors in question. 34 The prosecutor’s “explanation need not rise to the level of justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”35 “Unless a discrim in atory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deem ed race neutral.”36 In this case, the prosecutor stated he struck White because she had sat on two juries in the past that had returned verdicts for defendants. 37 The prosecutor stated he struck Doughty because she expressed the view that m arijuan a should be legalized, and he presum ed the next two potential jurors would be m ore favorable to the prosecution. 38 The prosecutor’s explanation is facially valid. Discrim inatory intent is not inherent in these explanations and, as a result, they are deem ed race-neutral. C. Ba t s o n Ste p Th re e At the third step of the Batson analysis, the burden shifts to the petitioner to show the strike was racially m otivated. 39 In Reed v. Quarterm an, the Fifth Circuit has laid out the following principles to guide a Batson step three analysis: 33 United States v. W illiam s, 264 F.3d 561, 571 (5th Cir. 20 0 1) (“Where . . . the prosecutor tenders a raceneutral explanation for his perem ptory strikes, the question of Defendant’s prim a facie case is rendered m oot and our review is lim ited to the second and third steps of Batson analysis.”); see also United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 220 n .4 (5th Cir. 1993). 34 Sny der, 552 U.S. at 476. 35 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 36 Hernandez v. N ew York, 50 0 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opin ion). 37 R. Vol. 3 at 625. 38 R. Vol. 4 at 632. 39 Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (20 0 6). 5 If the State asserts that it struck a black juror with a particular characteristic, and it also accepted nonblack jurors with that sam e characteristic, this is evidence that the asserted justification was a pretext for discrim ination, even if the two jurors are dissim ilar in other respects. Second, if the State asserts that it was concerned about a particular characteristic but did not engage in m eaningful voir dire exam ination on that subject, then the State's failure to question the juror on that topic is som e evidence that the asserted reason was a pretext for discrim ination. Third, we m ust consider only the State's asserted reasons for striking the black jurors and com pare those reasons with its treatm ent of the nonblack jurors. 40 State court findings regarding Batson step three are findings of fact and therefore analyzed under the clearly erroneous standard. 41 Under AEDPA, a federal court m ust accord deference to state court findings of fact an d grant relief only if the state court’s conclusion was “an unreasonable determ ination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”42 “[A] state-court factual determ ination is not unreasonable m erely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”43 1. W h ite During voir dire, White stated: “I served on two juries—well, two juries. One was a m edical m alpractice. Excuse m e. And one was a crim inal case, and they ended up settling before we actually went to trial. The m edical m alpractice, the verdict cam e back for the defendant, not guilty.”44 The State exercised a perem ptory strike on White. 45 In response 40 555 F.3d 364, 376 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (citin g Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (20 0 5)). c.f., United States v. Branch, 989 F. 2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1993) (establishing a claim for prim a facie discrim ination under Batson is reviewed for clear error); See Sny der v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (20 0 8) (“On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discrim inatory intent m ust be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.”); See Brew er v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 993, 10 0 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (“because a Batson determ ination is particularly fact sensitive, it will be accepted unless shown to be clearly erroneous”). 42 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 43 W ood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290 , 30 1 (20 10 ). 44 R. Vol. 3 at 561. 45 Id. at 622. 41See, 6 to Petitioner’s Batson challenge at trial, the prosecutor stated he struck White because she had sat on one civil jury and one crim inal jury, both of which returned verdicts for defendants. 46 Defense counsel corrected him , stating White had been on one civil jury in a m edical m alpractice case, which returned a verdict for the defendant, and one crim inal jury, for which there was no vote. 47 The trial court clarified, “But she did indicate that there was a verdict, I believe, in a m edical m alpractice case for the defen dant.”48 The prosecutor responded: “[t]hat’s not what I understood her to m ean, but be that as it m ay.”49 The trial court found the prosecutor “provided a sufficient explanation for his strike of Ms. White.”50 The trial court’s findin g was not clearly erroneous. Under Reed, evidence that the State struck a black juror with a particular characteristic, but accepted nonblack jurors with that sam e characteristic, m ay show pretext for discrim ination. 51 In this case, no other juror who was em paneled or struck stated during voir dire that he or she had returned a verdict for a defendant in a civil or crim inal trial. 52 Eviden ce that the State did not engage in m eaningful voir dire exam ination on the subject m ay show pretext for discrim ination. 53 In this case, the prosecutor questioned ten potential jurors about prior jury service, asking questions about the disposition of each case. 54 The Court finds the State’s reason for striking White was not pretextual. 55 Moreover, because defen se counsel corrected the 46 Id. at 625. Id. at 626. 48 Id. 49 Id. at 626. 50 R. Vol. 4 at 629. 51 555 F.3d at 376 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). 52 R. Vol. 3 at 558 – 64. Nancy Thom pson , who was not identified as a black juror, stated she had been on a crim inal jury that returned a verdict of not guilty, but jury selection was com pleted before she was considered, and she was not em pan eled. 53 Reed, 555 F.3d at 376 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). 54 R. Vol. 3 at 558– 64. 55 The prosecutor’s m isunderstanding of White’s prior jury service also does not support a finding of a Batson violation. Although the prosecutor erron eously believed White had been on a crim inal jury that 47 7 prosecutor, the trial court correctly understood White’s prior jury service when fin ding no Batson violation. Under these circum stances, the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor’s striking of White did not violate Batson was not clearly erroneous. 2. D o u gh ty During voir dire, the prosecutor asked if any potential jurors had “a problem with m arijuana being prosecuted as a felony.”56 One potential juror, Terry Fontenette, stated he believed m arijuana should be legalized. 57 Doughty stated she “kind of agree[d]” and that she believed m arijuana possession should not be prosecuted as a felony, but she would give the prosecutor a “fair chance.”58 Steve Conravey stated: “[i]f I was in a position to change the law, I probably would, but I respect the law.” 59 The State did not strike Conravey, but the defense did. 60 J ulie Young and Craig Rachel also expressed that they did not believe m arijuana possession should be a felony. 61 J ury selection was com pleted before Young, Rachel, and Fontenette were considered. 62 After six jurors were selected, Doughty was set to be the alternate. 63 The State exercised a perem ptory strike on Doughty. 64 The prosecutor stated he struck Doughty returned a verdict of not guilty, a prosecutor’s good faith m istake does not violate Batson. Alem an v. Uribe, 723 F.3d 976, 98 2 (9th Cir. 20 13) (“[I]f a prosecutor m akes a m istake in good faith, . . . then that m istake does not support the conclusion that the prosecutor’s explanation is clearly not credible.”); see also Lee v . Com m issioner, Alabam a Dept. of Corrections, 726 F.3d 1172, 1226 (11th Cir. 20 13) (“The conclusion that an honestly m istaken but race-neutral reason for strikin g a black ven ire m em ber did not violate Batson was not unreasonable.”). Nothing in the record indicates the prosecutor’s m istake was m ade in bad faith. To the contrary, in light of White’s characterization of the civil jury verdict for the defendant as a “not guilty” verdict, R. Vol. 3 at 561, an d the prosecutor’s statem ent that “[t]hat’s not what I understood her to m ean , but be that as it m ay,” id. at 626, the Court finds the prosecutor’s m istake was in good faith. 56 R. Vol. 3 at 572. 57 Id. 58 Id. at 574. 59 Id. at 578. 60 Id. at 623. 61 Id. at 576, 584. 62 R. Vol. 4 at 633. 63 Id. at 632. 64 Id. 8 because he believed the next two jurors would be m ore favorable to the prosecution an d because of her response that m arijuana possession should not be prosecuted as a felony. 65 He stated he had struck Young for the sam e reason, and was intending to strike Fontenette and “Mr. Thom pson,” presum ably referring to Craig Rachel, not Nancy Thom pson. 66 The trial court found, based on this explanation, that the “challenge was racially neutral.”67 The State did engage in m eaningful voir dire exam ination on the subject of views on m arijuana possession, asking each potential juror for his or her opinion. 68 Under Reed, the Court considers whether the State struck a black juror with a certain views on m arijuana, but accepted nonblack jurors with sim ilar views. 69 Because jury selection was com pleted before Young, Rachel, and Fontenette were considered, the only candidate for a com parative analysis under Reed is Conravey. Doughty stated she believed m arijuana possession should not be prosecuted as a felony, but she would give the prosecutor a “fair chan ce.”70 Steve Conravey stated: “[i]f I was in a position to change the law, I probably would, but I respect the law.”71 The State did not strike Conravey, but the defense did. 72 The Magistrate found “it is possible that the state could have used a backstrike on Conravey if he had not already been struck by the defense.”73 Petitioner’s Objection does not address this argum ent directly. 74 The Court notes Conravey was the eighth potential juror considered. 75 When 65 Id. Id. Craig Rachel and Nancy Thom pson were seated n ext to each other, R. Vol. 3 at 543. 67 R. Vol. 4 at 633. 68 R. Vol. 3 at 572– 84. 69 Reed, 555 F.3d at 376 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). 70 R. Vol. 3 at 574. 71 Id. at 578. 72 Id. at 623. 73 R. Doc. 12 at 14. 74 R. Doc. 13. 75 R. Vol. 3 at 623. 66 9 the trial court was initially perm itting strikes for the first twelve potential jurors, the State used only one strike, but then used two backstrikes. 76 The prosecutor m ay have been planning to use another backstrike on Conravey. The Magistrate further found “Conravey’s com m ents concerning his belief were not equivalent to Doughty’s.”77 “When the prosecutor first asked the panel whether any prospective juror had ‘a problem with m arijuana being prosecuted as a felony,’ Conravey voiced no opin ion.”78 “It was only after a prospective juror raised a question about ‘the third strike rule’ that Mr. Conravey first spoke up.”79 Conravey stated “[i]f I was in a position to change the law, I probably would, but I respect the law,” and then, unprom pted, he quickly added: “I’d follow the law.”80 As a result, “Conravey never suggested that he would be unwilling to convict som eone for possession of m arijuana; Doughty did, although she retreated from that position upon subsequent questioning.”81 Accordingly, in light of the deferential standard of review due to state court findings with respect to Batson step three, the Court finds Petitioner has not shown to be clearly erroneous the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor’s stated reason for striking Doughty was not a pretext for discrim in ation. As a result, the Court denies the petition for habeas relief on Batson grounds. III. D e n ial o f Righ t to Pre s e n t a D e fe n s e At trial, Petitioner requested perm ission to recreate the traffic stop leading to his arrest. The trial judge denied his request. Petitioner argues this den ial constitutes a denial 76 Id. at 621– 25. R. Doc. 12 at 14. 78 Id. 79 Id. at 15. 80 R. Vol. 3 at 559-60 . 81 R. Doc. 12 at 15-16. 77 10 of his right to present a defense under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent. 82 “Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent, crim inal prosecutions m ust com port with prevailing notions of fundam ental fairness. [T]his standard of fairness [r]equires that crim inal defendants be afforded a m eaningful opportunity to present a com plete defense.”83 “While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitim ate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to prom ote, well-established rules of eviden ce perm it trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to m islead the jury.”84 The trial court found perm itting Petitioner to recreate the conditions of the traffic stop would have been m ore prejudicial than probative because a significant am ount of tim e had passed between the incident and trial, and how the vehicle was handled in the interim was unknown. 85 The trial court also found “the parties would be unable to recreate the condition of the vehicle and the condition of the m arijuana on the night of the incident,” and “there was no indication that the jurors had experience sm elling m arijuana.”86 The Court is aware of no cases, and Petitioner provides none, in which a court’s refusal to perm it a recreation of a traffic stop was found to violate due process. The trial court’s refusal to perm it a recreation of a traffic stop in this case com ported with federal 82 Id. at 17– 20 . California v. Trom betta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); accord Boy er v. Vannoy , 863 F.3d 428 , 451 (5th Cir. 20 17). 84 Holm es v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (20 0 6). 85 Bridges, 20 15 WL 997162, at *3– 5. 86 R. Vol. 5 at 939. 83 11 law. Petitioner has not shown the state court decisions were contrary to clearly established federal law or were an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. IV. Te s tim o n y a n d Argu m e n t Co n ce rn in g Pe titio n e r’s Re fu s al to Co n s e n t to th e Se arch o f th e Ve h icle Petitioner argues his Fourth Am endm ent due process rights were violated when the prosecutor elicited testim ony during trial that Petitioner refused to consent to a search of his vehicle and com m ented on that refusal during closing argum ent. 87 The state appellate court found the prosecution “elicited the testim ony in response to defendant’s suggestion that he was entirely cooperative.”88 The appellate court found the testim ony explain ed why a K-9 unit was called. 89 Petitioner argues the state court’s analysis of this claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 90 To determ in e whether a state court’s analysis was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, courts “m easure state-court decisions against [the Suprem e] Court's precedents as of the tim e the state court renders its decision.”91 The Fifth Circuit “has not directly addressed the question whether a prosecutor com m its constitutional error by invoking a defendant's refusal to consent to a warrantless search to support an inference of guilt.”92 However, the Fifth Circuit has noted: “the circuit courts that have directly addressed this question have unanim ously held that a defendant's refusal to consent to a warrantless search m ay not be presented as evidence of guilt.”93 87 R. Doc. 12 at 20 . Id. 89 Id. 90 R. Doc. 13 at 18 . 91 Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 44 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (20 11)) (internal quotation m arks and em phasis om itted). 92 United States v. Run y an, 290 F.3d 223, 249 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). 93 Id. (citin g United States v. Moreno, 233 F.3d 937, 940 – 41 (7th Cir. 20 0 0 ); United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 794 (10 th Cir.1999); United States v. Tham e, 846 F.2d 20 0 , 20 5– 0 8 (3d Cir. 198 8); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978)). 88 12 However, this Court is unaware of no Suprem e Court opinion, and Plaintiff cites none, addressing the issue, let alone a Suprem e Court opinion addressing the issue as of the tim e of the state court’s decision. Habeas relief is warranted only if a petitioner establishes a state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determ ined by the Suprem e Court of the United States.”94 Circuit precedent does not constitute “clearly established Federal law” for purposes of habeas relief. 95 Further, the Suprem e Court has rejected argum ents that “circuit precedent c[an] help determ ine what law is clearly established” where the Suprem e Court has “not opine[d]” on an issue and the circuit precedent does not arise under the AEDPA. 96 Because the Suprem e Court had not held unconstitutional a prosecutor’s eliciting testim ony concerning a defendant’s refusal to consent to a search as of the tim e of the state court’s decision, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. V. D a u b e r t H e arin g Petitioner claim s his rights were violated by the trial court’s refusal to hold a Daubert hearing on the ability of the officer to detect the odor of m arijuana. 97 On direct appeal, the state appellate court held the district court did not err in adm itting the officer’s testim ony. The appellate court found that, because the officer had training in identifying and sm elling sm oked and unsm oked m arijuana, no Daubert hearing was required 98 under Louisiana Code of Evidence article 70 2, which perm its an officer to “testify as to 94 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (em phasis added). Glebe v. Frost, 135 S.Ct. 429, 431 (20 14) (quotin g 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 96 Id. (internal quotation m arks, ellipses, and citations om itted). 97 R. Doc. 1 at 32. 98 Bridges, 20 15 WL 997162, at *7– 9; R. Doc. 12 at 25; R. Vol. 5 at 973. 95 13 m atters within his personal knowledge acquired through experience without first being qualified as an expert.”99 The United States Suprem e Court’s decision in Daubert interprets the Federal Rules of Evidence an d, as a result, does n ot bind the states. 10 0 Noncom pliance with Daubert is not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. 10 1 When a state prisoner seeks habeas relief based on purportedly erroneous evidentiary rulings by a state court, the errors m ust be so extrem e as to constitute “a denial of fundam ental fairness.”10 2 The question before a federal court reviewing an evidentiary ruling is whether the purported evidentiary error “played a crucial, critical, and highly significant role in the trial.”10 3 The standard for granting habeas corpus relief is “not whether the testim ony satisfied the Daubert test, [but] whether the wrongful adm ission of evidence rendered the trial fundam entally unfair.”10 4 The state courts found no error in the adm ission of the officer’s testim ony. State courts are the final arbiters of state law, 10 5 and this Court m ay not question the Louisian a Suprem e Court’s interpretation of the Louisiana Code of Evidence. 99 Id. (State v. W aldrop, 11-2363, 93 So.3d 780 , 784 (La. App. 1st Cir. J un . 8, 20 12). See Kinder v . Bow ersox, 272 F.3d 532, 545 n.9 (8th Cir. 20 0 1) (“Daubert is an exegesis of Rule 70 2 of the Federal Rules of Eviden ce and governs the adm ission of expert evidence in federal trials only. Daubert does not bind the states, which are free to form ulate their own rules of evidence subject only to the lim its im posed by the Constitution.”); see also N orris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 335 (6th Cir. 1998). 10 1 Schm idt v. Hubert, Civ. Action No. 0 5-2168 , 20 0 8 WL 4491467, at *13 (W.D. La. Oct. 6, 20 0 8) (“Daubert did not set a constitutional standard for the adm ission of testim ony; the case sim ply exam ined the standard for the adm issibility of scientific evidence in federal trials conducted in federal courts under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, a claim ed violation of Daubert does not equal a constitutional violation .”). 10 2 Little v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 855, 862 (5th Cir. 1998). 10 3 Id. 10 4 Schm idt, 20 0 8 WL 4491467, at *14. 10 5 See Levy Gardens Partners 20 0 7, L.P. v. Com m on w ealth Land and Title Insurance Co., 70 6 F.3d 622, 629 (5th Cir. 20 13) (quotation m arks om itted) (brackets om itted); Charles v. Thaler, 629 F.3d 494, 50 0 – 0 1 (5th Cir. 20 11) (“A federal court lacks authority to rule that a state court incorrectly interpreted its own law. When , as here, a state court’s legal conclusions are affirm ed by the highest court in that state, those conclusions are state law.”); Dickerson v. Guste, 932 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We will not review a state’s interpretation of its own law in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. We do not sit as a ‘super’ state suprem e court in such a proceeding to review errors under state law.”). 10 0 14 The Court finds the adm ission of the officer’s testim ony did not render the trial fundam entally unfair. The officer’s testim ony was subject to cross exam in ation. Defense counsel had am ple opportunity to challenge the officer’s assertion that he could sm ell and identify m arijuana stored in Petitioner’s glove com partm ent. Witnesses routinely testify to m atters they perceive through their sen ses, and factfinders m ust determ ine the credibility of those witnesses and whether they could have perceived the action, event, or substance. The claim is denied. VI. H abitu al Offe n d e r Ad ju d icatio n Petitioner argues he was wrongly held to be a second-felony habitual offender. Petitioner argues the guilty plea entered in his prior offense was invalid because (1) it was pleaded pursuant to a group guilty plea, (2) he was not advised of his post-conviction rights, and (3) he was not advised his guilty plea could be used to enhance a subsequent felony offense. 10 6 On direct appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal denied the claim . 10 7 The appellate court held the entry of a group guilty plea was valid. The appellate court further found the trial court in the prior offense did advise Petitioner of his postconviction rights. 10 8 The appellate court also held that, although Petitioner was not advised his guilty plea could be used to enhance a subsequent felony offense, “such advice has never form ed part of the Suprem e Court’s Boy kin requirem ents.”10 9 For these reasons, the appellate court found that the record established that the challenged 10 6 R. Doc. 1 at 34– 36. Bridges, 20 15 WL 997162, at *7-9; R. Doc. 12 at 28 – 30 ; R. Vol. 5 at 973– 76. 10 8 Id. 10 9 Id. (State v. Guzm an, 99-1528 , 99-1753 (La. May 16, 20 0 0 ), 769 So.2d 1153, 1164; State v. Underdonk, 11-1598 (La. App. 1 Cir. Mar. 23, 20 12), 92 So.3d 369, 378, writ den ied, 12—0 910 (La. Oct. 8 , 20 12), 98 So.3d 848. 10 7 15 predicate guilty plea was validly entered with a “knowing an d voluntary waiver of Boy kin rights.”110 For the reasons found by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, Petitioner has failed to show his predicate conviction was invalid. Regarding this claim , the Court is aware of no Suprem e Court cases, and Petitioner cites none, establishing a group colloquy violates the Constitution. 111 A court’s failure to advise a defendant his guilty plea could be used to en hance a subsequent felony offense does not ren der his guilty plea invalid under federal law. 112 Petitioner’s com plaint that the trial court failed to advise him of his right to seek post-conviction relief also is m eritless, as noted earlier, because the state court found that petitioner was advised of his rights as part of a group entering guilty pleas. Petitioner’s claim that his predicate conviction was invalid is without m erit. VII. Exce s s ive Se n te n ce Petitioner claim s his sentence is excessive and violates the Eighth Am endm ent an d Louisiana state law. On direct appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal denied the claim and the Louisiana Suprem e Court denied Petitioner’s related writ application without assigning additional reasons. Petitioner’s claim that his sentence is excessive under Louisiana law is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 113 Federal habeas corpus relief is available only to correct violations of federal constitutional law and 110 Id. United States v. W illiam s, 20 F.3d 125, 133 n.9 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no fixed colloquy, no set sequence or num ber of questions and answers, no m inim um length of the hearing, and no talism anic language that is required to be used in guilty-plea hearings.”) (citation and internal quotation om itted). 112 W right v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1980 ) (“[A] plea’s possible enhancing effect on a subsequent sentence is m erely collateral consequence of conviction; it is not the type of consequence about which a defendant m ust be advised before the defendant enters the plea.”); State v. Jackson, 734 So.2d 54, 56) (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999) (“A court is not required to inform a defendant that his guilty plea m ay be used as a basis for the filin g of a future m ultiple offender bill.”). 113 N arvaiz v. Johnson, 134 F.3d 688 , 695 (5th Cir. 1998). 111 16 a federal habeas court will not review the legality of a prisoner’s sentence un der state law. 114 The Court turns to Petitioner’s claim that his sentence is excessive under federal law. The United States Suprem e Court has found an Eighth Am endm ent violation when a sentence “is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crim e.”115 The United States Suprem e Court has offered little guidance on how to analyze an unconstitutionally excessive sentence claim . In Locky er v. Andrade, the Court held the “only relevant clearly established law” to excessive sentence claim s is the “gross disproportionality principle,” but stated “the precise contours of [the principle] are unclear,” and the principle is “applicable only in the exceedingly rare and extrem e case.”116 District courts in the United States Fifth Circuit m ust first m ake a threshold com parison of the gravity of the prisoner’s offenses again st the severity of the senten ce. 117 If the district court determ ines the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense, the court m ay com pare the senten ce to sentences for sim ilar crim es in the sam e jurisdiction and sentences for the sam e crim e in other jurisdictions. 118 There are additional guiding prin ciples that m ust be considered when determ ining whether a sentence is excessive. Federal courts m ust afford deference to state legislatures, which have the authority to enact crim inal laws and fix sentences. 119 The Suprem e Court 114 See, e.g., N y berg v Cain, No. 15-98 , 20 15 WL 1540 423, at *12 (E.D. La. Apr. 7, 20 15); Phillips v. Cain, No. 13-58 68 , 20 14 WL 4425751, at *10 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 20 14); adopted, 20 14 WL 50 80 246 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 20 14); Brun et v. Goodw in, No. 12-1974. 20 13 WL 62350 5, at *12 (E.D. La J an . 22, 20 13), adopted, 20 13 WL 619278 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 20 13). 115 Rum m el v . Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980 ). 116 538 U.S. 63, 73 (20 0 3). 117 McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992) (quotation m arks om itted). 118 Id. at 316 (quotation m arks om itted). 119 See Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (“Reviewing courts… should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determ inin g the types and lim its of punishm ents for crim es…”); United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 942 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he determ ination of prison sentences is a legislative prerogative that is prim arily within the province of the legislatures, not courts.”). 17 has held states m ay sentence repeat offenders to harsher sentences than first tim e offenders because they’ve been shown to be less likely to “conform [] to the norm s of society as established by crim in al law.”120 Successful federal habeas corpus relief for excessive sentence claim s is rare outside of capital punishm ent. 121 Petitioner’s sentence was enhanced because he was a second-felony offender. When assessing Petitioner’s excessive senten ce claim , a court m ust take into account his prior offense. 122 Petitioner was previously convicted of sexual battery for which he received a five-year sentence. In Rum m el v. Estelle, the United States Suprem e Court’s benchm ark decision on excessive senten ces, the defen dant’s predicate offense of fraudulent use of a credit card and forging a check was deem ed sufficient to contribute to a life senten ce for falsely obtaining $ 120 .75. 123 Petitioner’s predicate charge of sexual battery was as serious as fraudulent use of a credit card and his charge of felony possession of m arijuana was sim ilarly as serious as falsely obtaining a relatively sm all am ount of m oney. Affording the state legislature and state courts appropriate deference on habeas review, Petitioner has not shown his sentence is grossly disproportionate. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORD ERED that Petitioner Dwight A. Bridge’s petition for federal habeas corpus relief be and hereby is D ISMISSED W ITH PREJU D ICE. 124 N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is 12 th d ay o f Au gu s t, 2 0 19 . _____________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT JU D GE 120 Rum m el, 445 U.S. at 276. at 271– 72. 122 See McGruder v . Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992). 123 445 U.S. at 276. 121 Id. 18
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