Torrence v. New Orleans Electrical Pension and Annuity Plan et al, No. 2:2017cv01500 - Document 34 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's claim for denial of benefits is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff has 21 days from the date of entry of this order to amend his claim for denial of benefits. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 7/25/2017. (cg)
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Torrence v. New Orleans Electrical Pension and Annuity Plan et al Doc. 34 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ROBERT G. TORRENCE VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-150 0 NEW ORLEANS ELECTRICAL PENSION AND ANNUITY PLAN, ET AL. SECTION “R” (5) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendant New Orleans Electrical Pension Plan (NOEPP) m oves the Court to dism iss plaintiff Robert Torrence’s com plaint. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants NOEPP’s m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises under the Em ployee Retirement Incom e Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 10 0 1, et seq. (ERISA). Plaintiff Robert Torrence joined the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) in 1972 and becam e a J ourneym an/ Wirem an out of Local 10 77 in Bogalusa, Louisiana in 1 R. Doc. 11. Defendant Southern Benefit Adm inistrators, Inc. (SBA) joined NOEPP’s m otion. On May 4, 20 17, plaintiff voluntarily dism issed SBA. R. Docs. 22, 25. Dockets.Justia.com 1976. 2 At that tim e, Local 10 77 was a sm all chapter, and did not have a welfare benefits plan or a pension plan. 3 According to plaintiff, he began working in New Orleans in 1976, and all of his contributions were paid to New Orleans Local 130 . 4 The NOEPP is Local 130 ’s pension plan. Plaintiff alleges that though he worked over the years in different states, he signed reciprocity agreem ents whereby his benefits would be paid to Local 130 . 5 In 1991, plaintiff moved back to New Orleans and began working as an electrician for Transit Management of Southeast Louisiana. 6 Plaintiff alleges that during this tim e his pension contributions should have been m ade to Local 130 . 7 Plaintiff further alleges that for m any years he received statements from Local 130 stating that he was fully vested in the NOEPP. 8 Plaintiff alleges that in 20 15, he applied for pension benefits under the pension plan but was denied benefits. 9 On May 3, 20 16, his adm inistrative 2 R. Doc. 1 at 2 ¶ 8. Id. 4 Id. ¶ 9. 5 Id. at 2-3 ¶¶ 9-11. Plaintiff’s benefits were paid to Local 130 , and not plaintiff’s Local 10 77, because Local 10 77 did not have a benefits plan. Id. 6 Id. at 5 ¶ 18. 7 Id. 8 Id. at 3 ¶ 13. 9 Id. at 5 ¶ 20 . 2 3 appeal of the denial of benefits was denied. 10 On February 21, 20 17, plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Plaintiff alleges that NOEPP’s denial of his benefits was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion, and that NOEPP breached its fiduciary duty to plaintiff. 11 Plaintiff’s com plaint seeks equitable relief for NOEPP’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA section 50 2(a)(3). 12 In addition to NOEPP, plaintiff’s complaint also nam ed SBA, Southern Electrical Retirem ent Fund, IBEW Local 10 77, and IBEW Local 3 as defendants. 13 Plaintiff has since voluntarily dism issed his claim s against all of these defendants. 14 Defendant NOEPP now m oves to dismiss plaintiff’s com plaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed a brief response in opposition, 15 and defendant replied. 16 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead “sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Id. at 6 ¶ 21. Id. at 6-7 ¶¶ 25, 33. Id. at 7 ¶ 35. ERISA section 50 2 is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Id. at 2 ¶¶ 4-7. R. Docs. 25, 27, 31, 33. R. Doc. 23. R. Doc. 29. 3 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 20 12) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 20 5 (5th Cir. 20 0 7)). But a court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Id. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each elem ent of the plaintiff’s claim . Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, see Jones v. Bock, 4 549 U.S. 199, 215 (20 0 7); Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 20 0 7), the claim must be dism issed. III. D ISCU SSION A. Bre ach o f Fid u ciary D u ty Plaintiff’s com plaint asserts that NOEPP breached its fiduciary duty and is therefore liable under ERISA section 50 2(a)(3). In Varity Corp. v. How e, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), the Supreme Court recognized that ERISA section 50 2(a)(3) is a “catchall provision” that “act[s] as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 50 2 does not elsewhere adequately remedy.” Id. at 512. Accordingly, in certain instances, ERISA plaintiffs can bring claim s for breach of fiduciary duty under section 50 2(a)(3). The Fifth Circuit has interpreted the language in Varity Corp. to mean that ERISA plaintiffs cannot sue for breach of fiduciary duty for personal recovery if other “adequate relief [is] available.” Tolson v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 141 F.3d 60 4, 610 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Musm eci v. Schw egm ann Giant Super Markets, Inc., 332 F.3d 339, 349 n.5 (20 0 3) (“Because we have found a rem edy is available at law under Section 50 2(a)(1)(B), the Plaintiffs are foreclosed from equitable relief under Section 5 50 2(a)(3).”) (citing Great-W est Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 20 4 (20 0 2)); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Palm er, 238 F. Supp. 2d 831, 835 (E.D. Tex. 20 0 2). 17 Accordingly, plaintiff cannot bring a claim for equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty if he has another rem edy available. This includes a claim for denial of benefits under section 50 2(a)(1). Tolson, 141 F.3d at 610 . Further, that an ERISA plaintiff m ay ultim ately be unsuccessful in his or her claim for denial of benefits does not m ake a claim under 50 2(a)(3) viable. Id.; Hollingshead v. Aetna Health Inc., 589 F. App’x 732, 737 (5th Cir. 20 14) (“[T]hat [plaintiff] cannot prevail on his claim under section [50 2](a)(1) does not m ake his alternative claim under section [50 2](a)(3) viable.”) (citation om itted). The crux of plaintiff’s com plaint is that NOEPP im properly denied him benefits under the pension plan. 18 Plaintiff alleges that NOEPP m ade errors in the adm inistration of the pension plan that “caused Plaintiff to be denied pension benefits under the Plan.”19 He further alleges that the denial of benefits was an abuse of discretion, arbitrary, and based on insubstantial 17 The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Tolson is consistent with other federal courts that have addressed the question. See Larocca v. Borden, Inc., 276 F.3d 22, 28-29 (1st Cir. 20 0 2) (collecting cases). 18 See generally R. Doc. 1. 19 Id. at 5 ¶ 19. 6 evidence. 20 ERISA section 50 2(a)(1)(B) states that a civil action m ay be brought by a plan participant “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the term s of the plan.” 1132(a)(1)(B). 29 U.S.C. § Thus, to the extent plaintiff believes NOEPP im properly denied him benefits, plaintiff has an adequate remedy under section 50 2(a)(1)(B). Plaintiff is therefore precluded from bringing a claim for equitable relief under section 50 2(a)(3). Tolson, 141 F.3d at 610 ; see also Brow n v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 975 F. Supp. 2d 610 , 622-23 (W.D. Tex. 20 13) (“Because Plaintiff’s suit is, at bottom, a suit to recover plan benefits, . . . Plaintiff m ay not sim ultaneously m aintain his claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”) (internal m odifications and quotation m arks om itted); Roig v. Lim ited Long Term Disability Program , No. 99-2460 , 20 0 0 WL 1146522, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 20 0 0 ) (rejecting plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim that was “m erely a disguised claim for failure to pay benefits”). B. D e n ial o f Be n e fits Claim Although plaintiff does not explicitly assert a claim for denial of benefits, as explained above, the denial of benefits is clearly the focus of his com plaint. But even viewing plaintiff’s allegations in the light m ost favorable 20 Id. at 6 ¶¶ 25, 27-28. 7 to him , any claim for denial of benefits fails because plaintiff does not identify any portion or language of the pension plan at issue that confers his benefits. Section 50 2(a) allows plan participants to sue “to recover benefits due to him under the term s of the plan, to enforce his rights under the term s of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the term s of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (em phasis added). Without any identification of the term s of the pension plan, plaintiff’s allegation that NOEPP im properly denied him benefits is conclusory and too speculative to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the NOEPP is liable for the misconduct alleged. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for denial of benefits m ust be dism issed. See Mid-Tow n Surgical Center, L.L.P. v. Hum ana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 767, 778 (S.D. Tex. 20 14) (granting m otion to dism iss claim for denial of benefits because plaintiff failed “to identify any specific plan terms that confer the benefits it seeks); Innova Hosp. San Antonio, L.P. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 587, 60 0 -0 2 (N.D. Tex. 20 14) (“Accordingly, to assert a claim for benefits under ERISA, a plaintiff m ust identify a specific plan term that confers the benefits in question.”) (internal quotation m arks om itted) (collecting cases). 8 C. Le ave to Am e n d Plaintiff’s response in opposition asks for the opportunity to am end his com plaint if NOEPP’s m otion is granted. 21 The Court will “freely give leave [to am end] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Supreme Court has held that “[i]f the underlying facts or circum stances relied upon by a plaintiff m ay be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Fom an v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to amend, however, “is by no means automatic.” Halbert v. City of Sherm an, 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court considers m ultiple factors, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory m otive on the part of the m ovant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendm ents previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the am endment, [and] futility of am endm ent.” Fom an, 371 U.S. at 182. Because a claim for denial of benefits is available to plaintiff as a participant in the pension plan, 22 see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1), any am endm ent to assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim would be futile. But the identified deficiencies in plaintiff’s claim for denial of benefits are not incurable. 21 22 R. Doc. 23 at 3. R. Doc. 1 at 1 ¶ 2. 9 Accordingly, the Court dism isses this claim without prejudice and with leave to am end. Plaintiff has 21 days from the date of entry of this order to am end his claim for denial of benefits. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, NOEPP’s m otion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty is DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. Plaintiff’s claim for denial of benefits is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE and with leave to am end within 21 days of entry of this order. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ 25th _ day of J uly, 20 17. ___ _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 10
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