Adams v. Deville, No. 2:2017cv00506 - Document 15 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS - The Court, having considered the record, the applicable law, relevant filings, and the magistrate judge's 12 Report and Recommendation finds the magistrate judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law are correct an d hereby approves the United States Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and ADOPTS it as its opinion in this matter. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Kenneth Adams' petition against Respondent Keith Deville be and hereby is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan.(bwn)
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Adams v. Deville Doc. 15 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A KEN N ETH AD AMS, Pe titio n e r CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 17-5 0 6 KEITH D EVILLE, W ARD EN Re s p o n d e n t SECTION : “E” ( 5) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is a Report and Recomm endation issued by Magistrate J udge Michael North recom mending that Petitioner Kenneth Adam s’ petition for federal habeas corpus relief be dism issed with prejudice. 1 Petitioner tim ely objected to the Magistrate J udge’s Report and Recom m endation. 2 For the reasons that follow, the court ADOPTS the Report and Recomm endation as its own, and hereby D EN IES Petitioner’s application for relief. BACKGROU N D Petitioner is an inm ate currently incarcerated at the David Wade Correctional Center in Hom er, Louisiana. 3 Petitioner seeks relief from his state court conviction for attempted aggravated rape. 4 The facts underlying Petitioner’s conviction are as follows. On J anuary 6, 2013, Petitioner broke into the home of an 83-year-old woman. 5 When the woman returned hom e, Petitioner knocked her to the ground, dragged her to a bedroom, removed her clothing, and attempted to rape her. 6 Petitioner then fled the scene, taking 1 R. Doc. 12. R. Doc. 13. 3 R. Doc. 14. 4 State Rec., Vol. 1 of 4, Bill of Inform ation , 4/ 30 / 13. Petitioner was also convicted of aggravated burglary, and sim ple robbery. Id. In his habeas petition, however, Petitioner challenges only his conviction for attem pted aggravated rape. R. Doc. 1. 5 R. Doc. 12 at 5. 6 Id. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com various items of jewelry. The victim notified the police, who apprehended Petitioner approximately one-half of a m ile from the victim’s hom e. 7 On March 10 , 20 14, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charges against him pursuant a plea agreem ent, and was sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor. 8 On J anuary 6, 20 15, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief with the state district court, which was denied. 9 He then filed an application for a writ of error with the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, which was also den ied. 10 On Septem ber 30 , 20 15, Petitioner filed a writ application with the Louisiana Suprem e Court. 11 The Louisiana Suprem e Court denied Petitioner’s application on Decem ber 16, 20 16. 12 On J anuary 19, 20 17, Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas corpus relief. 13 In his petition, Petitioner contends his trial counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally deficient. 14 Petitioner also m aintains his guilty plea was obtained unconstitutionally. 15 Petitioner’s application was referred to the U.S. magistrate judge who issued his Report and Recomm endation on September 14, 2017. 16 In his Report and Recom mendation, 7 Id. State Rec. Vol. 1 of 4, Waiver of Constitutional Rights Plea of Guilty Form , 3/ 10 / 14; Minute Entry, 3/ 10 / 14; Com m itm ent Order, 3/ 10 / 14; Sentencing Transcript, 3/ 10 / 14. For his other two counts, aggravated robbery sim ple robbery, Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor and seven years at hard labor, respectively. Id. The Court ordered all of Petitioner’s term s to run concurrently. Id. 9 State Rec., Vol. 1 of 4, Uniform Application for Post-Conviction Relief and Mem orandum in Support of Petition. Federal habeas courts m ust apply Louisiana’s “m ailbox rule” when determ ining the filin g date of a Louisiana state court filing, and therefore, such a docum ent is considered “filed” as of the m om ent the prison er “placed it in the prison m ail system .” Causey v . Cain, 450 F.3d 60 1, 60 7 (5th Cir. 20 0 6). The postconviction application m ade a part of the state record is dated J anuary 6, 20 15. 10 State Rec., Vol. 3 of 4, State v. Adam s, 15-KH-467 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/ 17/ 15) (un published). 11 State Rec., Vol. 4 of 4, La. Suprem e Court Writ Application, 15 KH 1897, 10 / 16/ 15 (dated 9/ 30 / 15). 12 State ex rel. Adam s v. State, 20 15– KH– 1897 40 (La. 12/ 16/ 16), 20 7 So. 3d 10 (per curiam ). 13 R. Doc. 1. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 R. Doc. 12 8 2 Magistrate J udge North concluded Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on either claim. 17 Petitioner filed a timely notice of objection on Septem ber 27, 20 17. 18 AN ALYSIS A. Standard of Review In reviewing the magistrate judge’s Report and Recomm endations, the Court must conduct a de novo review of any of the m agistrate judge’s conclusions to which a party has specifically objected. 19 As to the portions of the report that are not objected to, the Court needs only review those portions to determine whether they are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 20 Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court must defer to the decision of the state court on the merits of a pure question of law or a m ixed question of law and fact unless that decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Suprem e Court of the United States.”21 A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if: “(1) the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law announced in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”22 Further, AEDPA requires that a federal court give state trial courts substantial deference. 23 17 Id. R. Doc. 13. 19 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“[A] judge of the court shall m ake a de novo determ in ation of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recom m endations to which an objection is m ade.”). 20 Id. 21 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 22 N elson v. Quarterm an, 472 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 20 0 6) (en banc) (quotin g M itchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (20 0 3)). 23 Brum field v. Cain , 135 S.Ct. 2269 (20 15). 18 3 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In his petition, Petitioner contends his trial counsel’s performance was ineffective. He argues, inter alia, that his trial counsel failed to sufficiently investigate evidence. 24 According to Petitioner, had his counsel investigated sufficiently, she would have noted that the victim refused medical treatm ent, 25 which Petitioner argues demonstrates he did not actually harm her. 26 Additionally, Petitioner contends his counsel should have conducted additional investigation when the prosecution determined there was not enough evidence to charge Petitioner with rape and instead charged him with attempted rape. 27 Lastly, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for not filing certain pre-trial motions on his behalf, including a motion to suppress his custodial statements. 28 In Strickland v. W ashington, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show his (1) counsel’s perform ance was deficient and (2) that deficient perform ance prejudiced the petitioner. 29 Regarding a guilty plea, a petitioner must prove there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, petitioner would not have pleaded guilty. 30 Additionally, counsel “has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”31 Courts must give counsel heavy deference when reviewing counsel’s decision to not investigate. 32 24 R. Doc. 1. Id. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Strickland v. W ashington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 30 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 31 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 32 Id. 25 4 In this case, Magistrate J udge North recomm ended this Court deny Petitioner relief because Petitioner failed to prove his counsel’s performance was ineffective. 33 This Court agrees with the m agistrate judge’s recom mendation. First, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, Petitioner’s counsel did not fail to investigate the charges against him. Rather, the record indicates counsel actively participated in discovery. Petitioner offers nothing to support his claim that counsel inadequately investigated any evidence. 34 Petitioner largely challenges his counsel’s failure to further investigate the prosecution’s evidence, or lack thereof, following the prosecution’s decision to charge Petitioner with attempted aggravated rape instead of aggravated rape. Petitioner apparently argues that, if his counsel had investigated further, the evidence would have demonstrated Petitioner did not actually rape the victim. 35 As Magistrate North explained in his report, Petitioner was charged with attem pted aggravated rape; 36 therefore, any evidence he claim s counsel should have discovered to show a rape did not occur is irrelevant. 37 Moreover, Petitioner’s claim he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to further investigate evidence is legally erroneous, as “the victim’s testimony alone, if believed by the trier-of-fact, is sufficient to convict a defendant of a sexual offense.”38 Thus, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Petitioner was not prejudiced thereby. Second, Petitioner’s argument that his counsel was ineffective for not filing m otions to suppress certain evidence is meritless. The record indicates counsel filed various pretrial motions, including motions to suppress Petitioner’s statement, the evidence gathered, and 33 R. Doc. 12. Id. 35 R. Doc. 1 36 R. Doc. 12. 37 Id. 38 R. Doc. 12; see State v. Alexander, 119 So. 3d 120 , 126 (5th Cir. 20 13). 34 5 the victim’s identification of Petitioner. 39 Counsel’s motion to suppress Petitioner’s custodial statem ents was not ruled only because Petitioner accepted the plea bargain on the day the motion was set for submission. 40 Petitioner’s statem ent to the police notwithstanding, the evidence against Petitioner with respect to this claim is substantial. 41 Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. C. Factual Findings In his objection to Magistrate North’s Report and Recomm endation, Petitioner largely challenges the state district court’s factual findings. 42 Specifically, Petitioner challenges two of the state district court’s conclusions of fact: (1) that Petitioner’s DNA being found on the victim supported his conviction for attempted rape and, (2) that his statem ent to the police was reliable, despite his drug use. 43 Petitioner also asserts that his conviction was based on “conflicting statem ents.”44 Petitioner asserts that the 911 call, the police report, and the victim’s statement say the victim was raped, but that Petitioner was only charged with attem pted rape. 45 Petitioner also disputes the state’s conclusion that Petitioner had the intent to rape the victim. 46 Rather, he contends that he only entered the home to rob the victim . 47 39 State Rec., Vol. 1 of 4, Om n ibus Motions, 5/ 6/ 13. R. Doc. 12. 41 Id. Petitioner also asserts counsel only filed single motion to determ ine competency and that she was not present at prelim inary examination because Attorney Raul Guerra was originally assigned the case. R. Doc. 13. However, the record shows that counsel filed various pretrial motions and, additionally, cannot be considered ineffective before having been assigned the case. As counsel had no nonfrivolous grounds to file the additional motions suggested by Petitioner, the Court finds counsel was not ineffective for failing to do so. 42 R. Doc. 13. 43 Id. 44 Id. at 6. 45 Id. 46 Id. 47 Id. at 5. 40 6 The Court must defer to the state court’s factual findings unless the state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”48 In this case, the Court finds the state court’s factual findings are reasonable. 49 As a result, the Court finds Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on this claim. D. Guilty Plea Petitioner also claims his guilty plea was involuntary. Petitioner argues he was pressured by counsel and threatened with a longer sentence to accept the plea. 50 In Magistrate J udge North’s Report and Recom mendation, J udge North concluded Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on these claims. 51 As Magistrate North explained in his report, “[A] guilty plea will be upheld on habeas review if entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”52 The record shows the plea was voluntary. 53 Petitioner signed a written waiver of his rights and denied being coerced to enter the guilty plea in open court. 54 Petitioner failed to produce any evidence suggesting his guilty plea was coerced or that the statem ents he made during the plea colloquy were untrue. 55 Additionally, Petitioner’s claim that he was pressured to plead guilty due to threats of a longer sentence is m eritless. Threats of a longer or more severe sentence are 48 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Petitioner, in his opposition, also claim s the pre-trial motions were filed by two different attorneys. However, this fact does not provide the Petitioner relief. Petitioner offers no additional evidence to support any other claims of ineffective assistance by counsel, nor does he offer any evidence he would not have entered a guilty plea but for counsel’s alleged deficiencies. R. Doc. 12. 50 R. Doc. 1. 51 R. Doc. 12. 52 Montoy a v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 40 5 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (citin g Jam es v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995)); R. Doc. 12. 53 R. Doc. 12. 54 Id. 55 Id. 49 7 perm issible and do not amount to unconstitutional coercion. 56 In fact, counsel had a duty to inform Petitioner of possible maximum sentences. 57 As Petitioner was a fourth-felony offender, any discussion between Petitioner and counsel regarding a possible life sentence was not m isleading or coercive. 58 As a result, the Court finds Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on his claim of an unconstitutionally obtained guilty plea. The Court, having considered the record, the applicable law, relevant filings, and the magistrate judge’s Report and Recomm endation finds the m agistrate judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are correct and hereby approves the United States Magistrate J udge’s Report and Recommendation and AD OPTS it as its opinion in this m atter. 59 Accordingly; CON CLU SION IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Kenneth Adams’ petition against Respondent Keith Deville be and hereby is DISMISSED W ITH PREJUDICE. 60 N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 10 th d ay o f Au gu s t, 2 0 18 . _____ _____________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 56 Id.; see also Bordenkircher v. Hay nes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). R. Doc. 12. 58 La. Rev. Stat. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b); La. Rev. Stat. § 15:529.1(A)(4)(b). 59 Id. 60 Id. 57 8
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