Brady, et al v. Global Hawk Insurance Company Risk Retention Group, et al, No. 2:2017cv00433 - Document 26 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER granting 14 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 10/16/2017. (cg)
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Brady, et al v. Global Hawk Insurance Company Risk Retention Group, et al Doc. 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA J IMMIE BRADY, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 17-433 GLOBAL HAWK INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. SECTION “R” (5) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is plaintiffs’ m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a m otor vehicle collision on the I-10 highway in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. 2 On Decem ber 4, 20 15, Defendant Lukas Maelissa was driving a tractor-trailer owned by Defendant DAT Trucklines, Inc., when the front of Maelissa’s vehicle struck the rear of a vehicle driven by Plaintiff J im m ie Brady. 3 Plaintiff Acharm bi Berry was a guest passenger 1 2 3 R. Doc. 14. R. Doc. 2-2 at 1 ¶ 2. R. Doc. 14-4; R. Doc. 14-8 at 2-3. Dockets.Justia.com in Brady’s car at the tim e of the accident. 4 Defendant Global Hawk Insurance Com pany provides insurance coverage to DAT Trucklines and Maelissa. 5 On J uly 7, 20 16, plaintiffs filed a petition for dam ages in Louisiana state court. 6 Brady and Berry allege that they each suffered personal injuries because of the traffic accident. 7 Defendants rem oved the m atter to this Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 8 Plaintiffs now m ove for partial sum m ary judgm ent on the issues of liability, com parative fault, vicarious liability, and insurance coverage. 9 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgment is warranted when “the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any m aterial fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] 4 5 6 7 8 9 R. Doc. 14-8 at 2. R. Doc. 15 at 1. R. Doc. 2-2. Id. at 2 ¶ 6-7. R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 7. R. Doc. 14. 2 from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonm oving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultim ate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am . Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-m oving party.” EEOC v. Sim baki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 20 14). If the dispositive issue is one on which the m oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party “m ust come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally ’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citation om itted). The nonm oving party can then defeat the motion by either countering with evidence sufficient to dem onstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of m aterial fact, or “showing that the m oving party’s evidence is so sheer that it m ay not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the m oving party.” Id. at 1265. 3 If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonm oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party m ay satisfy its burden by pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonm oving party’s claim . See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonm oving party, who m ust, by subm itting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonm ovant m ay not rest upon the pleadings, but m ust identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75 (“Rule 56 m andates the entry of sum m ary judgment, after adequate tim e for discovery and upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elem ent essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). III. D ISCU SSION A. Re qu e s t to Strike Exh ibits Defendants ask the Court to strike as inadm issible certain exhibits attached to plaintiffs’ m otion. 10 As an initial m atter, the Court notes that “[a]t the sum mary judgm ent stage, materials cited to support or dispute a 10 R. Doc. 15 at 5-6. 4 fact need only be capable of being ‘presented in a form that would be adm issible in evidence.’” LSR Consulting, LLC v. W ells Fargo Bank, N .A., 835 F.3d 530 , 534 (5th Cir. 20 16) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). Defendants first ask the Court to strike evidence of a settlement agreement between Global Hawk and Brady regarding the property dam age to Brady’s vehicle arising out of the December 4, 20 15 accident. 11 Federal Rule of Evidence 40 8 provides that evidence of a settlement is inadm issible “either to prove or disprove the validity or am ount of a disputed claim .” Fed. R. Evid. 40 8(a). Plaintiffs’ references to the property dam age settlement appear designed to establish the validity of their claim , and plaintiffs have not indicated that this evidence could be adm issible for any perm issible purpose. 12 Cf. Belton v. Fibreboard Corp., 724 F.2d 50 0 , 50 5 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence of a settlement m ay be adm issible for purposes other than to prove liability or the validity or am ount of a claim ). Evidence of a purported property dam age settlement is therefore not capable of being presented in adm issible form , and the Court will not consider it on sum m ary judgment. Accordingly, the Court strikes plaintiffs’ Exhibit 6. 13 11 R. Doc. 15 at 5. R. Doc. 14-1 at 2; R. Doc. 14-2 at 3. 13 R. Doc. 14-9. Defendants ask the Court to strike plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5, which is the defendants’ responses to plaintiffs’ request for adm ission. See R. Doc. 14-8. But Exhibit 5 does not reference a settlem ent. 5 12 Defendants further request that the Court strike plaintiffs’ photographic and video evidence. 14 Defendants argue that these exhibits lack foundation and are inadm issible under Federal Rule of Evidence 90 1. 15 Plaintiffs represent that the photograph 16 and video 17 were captured by a police officer’s body camera during the officer’s investigation of the traffic accident. 18 As noted above, evidence need not be fully authenticated and adm issible to constitute com petent sum m ary judgment evidence so long as it is capable of being presented in adm issible form at trial. See Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., LLC, 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 20 17); LSR Consulting, LLC, 835 F.3d at 533-34. But the Court finds it unnecessary to consider the video and still photograph because plaintiffs have presented sufficient alternative evidence to warrant partial sum m ary judgm ent. B. Mae lis s a’s Liability Plaintiffs argue that the uncontested facts establish that Maelissa is solely at fault for the dam ages they sustained as a result of the m otor vehicle Defendants’ objection therefore appears to be directed at the property dam age release attached as Exhibit 6. See R. Doc. 14-9. 14 R. Doc. 15 at 5-6. 15 Id. 16 R. Doc. 14-10 . 17 R. Doc. 14-5. 18 R. Doc. 18 at 8. 6 collision. 19 Brady testified in his deposition that he was driving in traffic on the right lane of the highway preparing to exit on Claiborne Avenue when his vehicle was suddenly hit by a truck driving behind him. 20 Berry sim ilarly testified that Brady’s vehicle was traveling in the right lane in stop and go traffic when the vehicle was struck from behind. 21 Defendants do not offer any deposition testim ony to rebut plaintiffs’ accounts of the accident. Further, defendants adm it that the front of Maelissa’s truck collided with the rear of Brady’s vehicle. 22 In Louisiana, drivers of m otor vehicles have a duty “not [to] follow another vehicle m ore closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” La. R.S. 32:81(A). The Louisiana Suprem e Court has explained that “a following m otorist in a rear-end collision is presum ed to have breached the standard of conduct prescribed in La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 32:81 and hence is presum ed negligent.” Mart v. Hill, 50 5 So. 2d 1120 , 1123 (La. 1987). To rebut the presum ption of negligence, the rear driver “m ust establish that he kept his vehicle under control, closely observed the forward vehicle and followed at a safe distance under the 19 20 21 22 R. Doc. 14 at 1. R. Doc. 14-7 at 62-63, 71-72. R. Doc. 14-6 at 49. R. Doc. 14-8 at 2-3. 7 circum stances.” Eubanks v. Brasseal, 310 So. 2d 550 , 553 (La. 1975); see also Dom ingo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 54 So. 3d 74, 80 -81 (La. App. 5 Cir. 20 10 ). A following driver can avoid liability by dem onstrating “that the unpredictable driving of the preceding m otorists created a sudden em ergency that the following m otorists could not reasonably have anticipated.” See Eubanks, 310 So. 2d at 555. Defendants have not presented the Court with Maelissa’s description of the accident. Nor do they offer any evidence that Maelissa was driving safely under the circum stances. Additionally, the police traffic crash report includes a violation by Maelissa for failure to yield and concludes that he was at fault for the accident. 23 The police report indicates no violations by Brady. 24 Given this report and plaintiffs’ unrebutted accounts of the accident, the Court finds that plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence to “entitle [them ] to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1264-65 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). In response to this evidence of Maelissa’s negligence, defendants argue that plaintiffs provided inconsistent statem ents about the circum stances 23 24 R. Doc. 14-4 at 2-3, 7. Id. at 4-5. 8 surrounding the accident. 25 But none of these purported inconsistencies give rise to genuine issues of m aterial fact regarding liability. Defendants first point out that Berry told m edical providers that the accident occurred as Brady’s car was m erging into traffic. 26 Berry later testified that Brady’s car did not change lanes before the collision, and she explained that she had used the wrong term when she said the car was m erging into traffic. 27 Defendants present no other evidence to suggest that Brady’s car was m erging into traffic before the accident. The police report does not indicate any lane change by Brady. 28 Even if the Court were to accept as true defendants’ suggestion that the accident m ay have occurred as Brady m erged into traffic, defendants have not raised an issue of fact indicating that Brady acted abruptly or m erged into traffic without exercising due care. Defendants further contend that Brady m ay have been driving unreasonably slowly in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 32:64(B). 29 But defendants fail to point to any facts indicating that Brady was driving “at such a slow speed as to im pede the norm al and reasonable m ovement of traffic.” La. R.S. 32:64(B). Brady testified that he was driving in “stop and 25 26 27 28 29 R. Doc. 15 at 4. Id.; R. Doc. 15-2 at 4. R. Doc. 15-2 at 4-5. R. Doc. 14-4 at 7. R. Doc. 15 at 4-5, 7-8. 9 go” traffic, and at som e m oments the vehicle was stopped and at other tim es he was able to m ove 10 to 15 m iles an hour. 30 The police report indicates that Brady stated he was rear ended “as traffic gradually m oved.”31 In light of plaintiffs’ uncontradicted testim ony about the traffic situation, defendants have failed to raise any genuine issue of fact as to whether Brady was driving too slowly. Heavy traffic does not in itself constitute a sudden emergency, and the following driver has an obligation to slow down to adjust to traffic conditions. See Fuller v. Hilly ard, Nos. 0 0 2791, 0 0 -2953, 20 0 2 WL 10 524, at *5 (E.D. La. 20 0 2); Ebarb v. Matlock, 69 So. 3d 516, 521-22 (La. App. 2 Cir. 20 11). Defendants’ reliance on Rudd v. United Services Auto Ass’n, 626 So. 2d 568 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993), is inapposite. The Rudd court found a genuine issue of m aterial fact because the defendant driver testified that the lead driver slamm ed on her brakes. Id. at 570 -71. Defendants present no testim ony from Maelissa that could create 30 R. Doc. 15-1 at 4-5, 8. Brady initially testified that he was driving about 25 to 30 m iles an hour, but later in his deposition he stated that he was not m oving that fast. See R. Doc. 15-1 at 3, 5. Given the traffic conditions, som e uncertainty about the speed of the vehicle is not unusual. 31 R. Doc. 14-4 at 7. 10 a sim ilar issue of fact. Accordingly, the Court finds that Maelissa’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the traffic collision. 32 C. Vicario u s Liability an d In s u ran ce Co ve rage Defendants adm it that Maelissa was perform ing work for DAT Trucklines at the tim e of the accident 33 and concede that DAT Trucklines is vicariously liable for any liability assigned to Maelissa. 34 See La. Civ. Code art. 2320 . Defendants further concede that Global Hawk provides insurance coverage to DAT Trucklines and Maelissa. 35 There is therefore no genuine issue of fact as to either vicarious liability or insurance coverage. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Lukas Maelissa’s negligence was the sole proxim ate cause of the December 4, 20 15 m otor vehicle collision and that DAT Trucklines is vicariously liable for Maelissa’s negligent acts or om issions. Further, the Court finds that Global Hawk Insurance Com pany provided autom obile liability coverage to DAT 32 This m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent is lim ited to the question of liability, and the Court expresses no opinion as to the scope of plaintiffs’ dam ages. 33 R. Doc. 14-8 at 3. 34 R. Doc. 15 at 1-2. 35 Id. 11 Trucklines and Lukas Maelissa at the tim e of the accident. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent is GRANTED. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _16th _ day of October, 20 17. ___ _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 12
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