Coastal Drilling Company LLC v. Creel, No. 2:2017cv00188 - Document 36 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/4/2017. (Reference: 17-188)(cg)
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Coastal Drilling Company LLC v. Creel Doc. 36 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA COASTAL DRILLING COMPANY, LLC VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-188 BRANDON CREEL SECTION “R” (3) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is Defendant Brandon Creel’s m otion to dism iss Plaintiff Coastal Drilling Com pany, LLC’s com plaint for declaratory judgm ent. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants defendant’s m otion. I. BACKGROU N D Coastal Drilling Com pany em ployed Creel as a floorhand on Rig 20 , an inland waters drill barge operating in the navigable waters of Louisiana. 2 On J uly 17, 20 16, Creel reported that he was involved in an accident on the drill floor, and alleged that he sustained injuries to his neck, right shoulder, m ultiple sections of his spine, and his hips. 3 On J uly 21, 20 16, Coastal received a notice of representation from Creel’s attorney in regard to the 1 2 3 R. Doc. 7. R. Doc. 1 at 2 ¶ 5. Id. ¶ 6. Dockets.Justia.com assertion of a Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act claim . 4 The following week, Creel’s attorney requested that Coastal authorize follow up care with a physician of Creel’s choice, which Coastal approved. 5 When Creel did not return to work, Coastal began m aintenance payments to Creel. But Coastal also began surveilling Creel to determ ine if his activities were consistent with his com plained-of injuries. 6 According to Coastal, Creel was observed and docum ented engaging in physical activity inconsistent with his alleged injuries. 7 For exam ple, on October 20 , 20 16, Creel’s doctor recom m ended arthroscopic surgery on Creel’s right shoulder because of its alleged lack of response to conservative treatm ent, but Coastal alleges that it docum ented Creel lifting a spare tire out of a car with his right arm within hours of the doctor’s recomm endation. 8 Creel sought authorization from Coastal for the right shoulder surgery. 9 Based on its surveillance, Coastal scheduled an independent m edical evaluation to take place on November 22, 20 16. During the IME, Creel allegedly m ade statements inconsistent with the physical activity 4 5 6 7 8 9 Id. at 3 ¶ 9. Id. ¶ 10 . Id. at 4 ¶ 13. Id. ¶ 14. R. Doc. 9 at 2. R. Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 17. 2 observed through surveillance. 10 The IME report stated that there was no evidence that Creel required right shoulder surgery, and after reviewing the surveillance footage, the IME physician stated that he would not recom m end surgery. 11 Based on the IME report and recomm endation, Coastal declined to authorize the surgery. According to Coastal, Creel intends to proceed with the surgery and to m ake a claim against Coastal for cure and/ or dam ages, punitive dam ages, and attorney’s fees. 12 Coastal filed this action seeking declaratory relief that Creel is not entitled to m aintenance and cure, dam ages, punitive dam ages, or attorney fees, and that Creel is obligated to reim burse Coastal for the m aintenance already paid to Creel. 13 Creel now m oves to dism iss Coastal’s action, arguing that as a J ones Act seam an he has the right to have a jury decide his m aintenance and cure claim , and that granting Coastal’s declaratory judgment would deprive Creel 10 Id. ¶ 17. Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 17, 18. The IME physician also recom mended that Creel undergo a neuropsychological evaluation to consider a diagnosis of som atoform disorder or possible m alingering. R. Doc. 9-4 at 2. Coastal filed a m otion to com pel this m ental exam ination, which is currently pending before Magistrate J udge Knowles. R. Doc. 10 . 12 R. Doc. 1 at 7 ¶ 21. 13 Id. at 8 ¶ 24. 3 11 of his right to a trial. 14 Coastal filed a response in opposition, 15 and Creel replied. 16 Additionally, on March 16, 20 17, Creel filed a J ones Act com plaint against Coastal and Peak Energy, LLC, seeking m aintenance and cure, dam ages, punitive dam ages, and attorney’s fees. 17 II. D ISCU SSION When “considering a declaratory judgment action, a district court m ust engage in a three-step inquiry.” Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. W olfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). First, the court m ust determ ine whether the declaratory action is justiciable. Or, in other words, whether an “actual controversy” exists between the parties to the action. Id. Second, if the court has jurisdiction, it m ust determ ine whether it has the “authority” to grant declaratory relief. Id. Finally, the court m ust determ ine whether to exercise its discretion to decide or dism iss the declaratory action. Id. There is no question that the dispute at issue is justiciable because the issue of whether m aintenance and cure is owed is an actual controversy. See, e.g., Row an Com panies, Inc. v. Blanton, 764 F. Supp. 10 90 (E.D. La. 1991) 14 R. Doc. 7-1 at 3-4. R. Doc. 9. 16 R. Doc. 20 . 17 R. Doc. 1 in 2:17-cv-220 7. That action has been consolidated with this case. R. Doc. 35. 4 15 (citing Row an Com panies Inc., v. Griffin, 876 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1989)). Nor is the Court’s authority to grant relief in question. Rather, the Court m ust decide whether to exercise its discretion to grant the requested relief. Federal courts have great discretion to entertain, stay, or dism iss a declaratory judgm ent action. W ilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995). In exercising this discretion, the Court m ust balance on the record the purposes of the Declaratory J udgment Act and the factors relevant to the abstention doctrine. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Fed’n, Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993). Am ong the factors that are relevant to this consideration are: 1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the m atters in controversy m ay be fully litigated; 2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the defendant; 3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing the suit; 4) whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to change forum s exist; 5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the parties and witnesses; and 6) whether retaining the lawsuit in federal court would serve the purpose of judicial economy. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590 -91 (5th Cir. 1994). 18 18 Trejo’s seventh factor, whether the federal court is being called on to construe a state judicial decree involving the sam e parties and entered by the court before whom the parallel state suit between the sam e parties is pending, is not applicable to the facts of this case. 5 First, although there is no pending state court action, Creel’s subsequent J ones Act lawsuit in this Court is an action in which all of the m atters in controversy may be fully litigated. That it is a federal court action, and not a state court action, is not determ inative. See Eldridge v. Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., No. 0 6-10 744, 20 0 8 WL 148310 , at *3 n.2 (E.D. La. J an. 11, 20 0 8); Hercules Liftboat Co. v. Jones, No. 0 7-1236, 20 0 7 WL 43550 45, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 15, 20 0 7). Additionally, that Creel did not file his action first does not counsel against dism issal, as courts have dismissed declaratory actions in sim ilar situations even with no J ones Act com plaint filed at all. See, e.g., GlobalSantaFe Drilling Co. v. Quinn, No. 12-1987, 20 12 WL 4471578, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 20 12) (citing Sherw in-W illiam s Co. v. Holm es Cty ., 343 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 20 0 3)); Offshore Liftboats, L.L.C. v. Bodden, No. 12-70 0 , 20 12 WL 20 64496, at *1 (E.D. La. J une 7, 20 12). Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of dism issal. Second, Coastal adm its it filed its action in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by Creel. 19 The third factor is m oot at this point because Creel filed his suit in this Court. The fourth factor weighs heavily in favor of dism issal. Allowing this action to be resolved by way of declaratory judgm ent would deprive Creel of his right to have a jury decide the issues of m aintenance and 19 R. Doc. 1 at 7 ¶ 21; R. Doc. 9 at 5-6. 6 cure. See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 21-22 (1963); see also Blanton, 764 F. Supp. at 10 92 (noting that if m aintenance and cure were determ ined in declaratory judgment action, “the principles espoused in Fitzgerald would be offended”). As to the fifth factor, since Creel has filed his action in this Court, the Court can assume that this is a convenient forum for the parties and witnesses. Finally, allowing the declaratory action to rem ain would clearly not serve the purposes of judicial econom y, as the Court would be faced with resolving the sam e issues at the same tim e through two separate judicial m echanism s. 20 See Chet Morrison Offshore, L.L.C. v. Hey den, No. 0 6-8282, 20 0 7 WL 1428697, at *1-2 (E.D. La. May 10 , 20 0 7). Coastal’s argument is based on Creel’s then-failure to file his J ones Act claim , an argument that is now m oot. 21 Further, as m entioned above, even if Creel had not filed his action, this would not change the overall analysis. See, e.g., Quinn, 20 12 WL 4471578, at *2; Bodden, 20 12 WL 20 64496, at *1. 20 The Court notes that dism issing Coastal’s action could arguably not serve judicial econom y in that Coastal will likely be required to refile its pending m otion to com pel a m ental exam ination. But Creel’s action is before this Court, and any new m otion to com pel would again be before Magistrate J udge Knowles. Therefore any additional resources necessitated by dism issing Coastal’s action will be m inim al. 21 R. Doc. 9 at 8 -9. 7 Coastal also attem pts to stave off dism issal by analogizing this case to Row an v. Griffin, 876 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1989), and Torch, Inc. v. Theriot, 727 F. Supp. 10 48 (E.D. La. 1990 ). The analogy is m isplaced. In Row an, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dism issal of an em ployer’s declaratory judgm ent action on m aintenance and cure because the district court did not assign reasons for its dism issal. Row an, 876 F.2d at 29-30 . Further, Row an acknowledged that its conclusion that the declaratory judgm ent com plaint presented “a justiciable controversy does not m ean that the district court is obliged to entertain the action.” Id. at 28. Theriot does not save defendant’s action either. Though Theriot denied a m otion to dism iss an employer’s declaratory judgm ent action on the issue of whether the em ployer’s m aintenance and cure obligations required it to pay for a specific surgery, 727 F. Supp. at 10 52, Theriot has not been followed. Accordingly, the Court finds that the factors articulated by Trejo warrant the dism issal of Coastal’s declaratory action and that Coastal’s arguments against dism issal are unavailing. The Court’s conclusion is consistent with the well-established practice of courts in this district to dism iss preem ptive declaratory judgm ent actions in m aritim e personal injury cases. See, e.g., Torch, Inc. v. Leblanc, 947 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1991); Quinn, 20 12 WL 4471578, at *2; Bodden, 20 12 WL 20 64496, at *2-4; 8 Eldridge, 20 0 8 WL 148310 , at *2-3; Hey den, , 20 0 7 WL 1428697, at *1-2; Specialty Diving of Louisiana, Inc. v. Mahoney , No. 0 5-120 2, 20 0 6 WL 410 1325, at *3 (E.D. La. J an. 31, 20 0 6); Blanton, 764 F. Supp. at 10 92. The Court sees no reason to depart from this longstanding practice on the facts presented here. III. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s m otion to dism iss is GRANTED. 4th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of April, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 9
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