Bean v. American General Life Insurance Company, No. 2:2017cv00057 - Document 23 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 6 Motion to Dismiss Case. Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and statutory interest are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff has 21 days to amend her complaint. Plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees arising out of a breach of contract claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 6/30/2017. (cg)
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Bean v. American General Life Insurance Company Doc. 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA PAMELA BEAN CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 17-57 AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY SECTION “R” (4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendant American General Life Insurance Com pany (AIG) m oves to dism iss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant asks the Court to dism iss plaintiff Pam ela Bean’s claim s. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendant’s m otion. I. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Pam ela Bean alleges that defendant is liable for breach of a life insurance policy issued to her husband, Daniel Clinton Bean, before his death. 1 In 1999, Mr. Bean entered into a life insurance contract with Old Line 1 R. Doc. 1-2 at 1. Dockets.Justia.com Life Insurance Com pany of Am erica, which later merged with AIG. 2 The contract nam ed plaintiff as the prim ary beneficiary. 3 In November 20 13, defendant sent a letter to Mr. Bean inform ing him that his current contract was ending and providing instructions to renew his policy. 4 Neither the plaintiff nor Mr. Bean received this letter because it was m ailed to an old address. 5 Mr. Bean’s life insurance contract term ended on December 29, 20 13. 6 In September 20 14, defendant m ailed a letter to Mr. Bean at his correct address with a reinstatement application. 7 Mr. Bean com pleted the application and m ade a tim ely payment to renew the policy. 8 According to the com plaint, defendant received the application and applied Mr. Bean’s payment to his life insurance contract account. 9 Mr. Bean died days later on October 8, 20 14. 10 After Mr. Bean’s death, defendant sent a letter to Mr. Bean’s old address stating that it had reviewed the reinstatement application and was 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Id. at 6 ¶ 5-7. Id. at 7 ¶ 12. Id. at 7 ¶ 13-14. Id. Id. at 7 ¶ 9. R. Doc. 1-2 at 8 ¶ 16. Id. at 8 ¶ 17. Id. Id. at 8 ¶ 20 . 2 awaiting m edical records from Mr. Bean’s physicians. 11 The letter stated that defendant would notify Mr. Bean of its decision on whether to reinstate his policy after receipt and review of the records. 12 Weeks later, a com pany working on behalf of defendant m ailed a letter to Mr. Bean requesting that he sign a medical release form . 13 Plaintiff signed and returned this form to the defendant. 14 In her return letter, plaintiff stated that it was her understanding the policy was reinstated because defendant had cashed the check included with the reinstatement application. 15 Months later, defendant m ailed another letter to Mr. Bean’s old address stating that defendant was closing the application because it had not received the requested additional inform ation. 16 Defendant m ailed the sam e letter the next day to the correct address. 17 Mr. Bean’s doctor allegedly indicated to plaintiff that neither he nor his office ever received a m edical records request from defendant. 18 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Id. at 9 ¶ 21. Id. R. Doc. 1-2 at 9 ¶ 22. Id. Id. at 9 ¶ 23. Id. at 9-10 ¶ 25-26.. Id. at 10 ¶ 27. Id. at 10 ¶ 30 . 3 Plaintiff asserts that she and Mr. Bean perform ed every act required under the contract and performed every act requested and required in the reinstatem ent process. 19 She further alleges that, despite tim ely notification of Mr. Bean’s death, defendant has not settled her life insurance claim . 20 Plaintiff argues that defendant violated its contractual and statutory obligations by canceling and failing to renew the life insurance contract. 21 Plaintiff seeks damages for breach of contract in the am ount of $ 40 0 ,0 0 0 , statutory interest, and attorney’s fees. 22 Defendant now moves to dism iss plaintiff’s com plaint for failure to state a claim . 23 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead “sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” 19 20 21 22 23 R. Doc. 1-2 at 11 ¶ 31. Id. at 11 ¶ 34. Id. at 11 ¶ 32. Id. at 11 ¶ 32-35. R. Doc. 6-1 at 3-5. 4 Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Lorm and v. US Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elem ents of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each elem ent of the plaintiff’s claim. Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. The claim m ust be dism issed if there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (20 0 7). III. D ISCU SSION Defendant m oves to dism iss plaintiff’s petition for failure to state a claim for breach of contract, attorney’s fees, or statutory interest. 24 Plaintiff concedes that she is not entitled to attorney’s fees on her current claim s 24 R. Doc. 6. 5 under the contract or Louisiana law. 25 The Court considers the rem aining arguments. A. Bre ach o f Co n tract Claim Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached the life insurance contract when it failed to pay her $ 40 0 ,0 0 0 following her husband’s death. 26 To state a valid claim for breach of contract under Louisiana law, the plaintiff m ust allege: “(1) the obligor’s undertaking an obligation to perform , (2) the obligor failed to perform the obligation (the breach), and (3) the failure to perform resulted in dam ages to the obligee.” Favrot v. Favrot, 68 So. 3d 10 99, 110 80 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 20 11). Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a breach of a contract. Under the provisions of Mr. Bean’s life insurance contract, his insurance term ended on December 29, 20 13. 27 The com plaint alleges that defendant failed to renew or reinstate the life insurance contract even though plaintiff and Mr. Bean perform ed every act required of them in the renewal and reinstatem ent process. 28 25 26 27 28 R. Doc. 19 at 9. R. Doc. 1-2 at 11 ¶ 33. Id. at 7 ¶ 9. Id. at 11. 6 Yet plaintiff has not identified any provision of the underlying contract that obliges defendant to renew or reinstate the life insurance policy. See Louque v. Allstate Ins. Co., 314 F.3d 776, 782-83 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (affirm ing m otion to dism iss where plaintiff failed to identify specific provision of contract allegedly breached). The allegation in the com plaint that defendant breached its contractual obligations by failing to reinstate the life insurance policy is thus a legal conclusion without factual support. 29 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s reliance on Louisiana statutes governing the perform ance of contracts is unavailing because plaintiff has not specified defendant’s obligations under the contract. See La. Civ. Code art. 1772 (“A condition is regarded as fulfilled when it is not fulfilled because of the fault of a party with an interest contrary to the fulfillm ent.”); La. Civ. Code art. 1983 (obligation to perform in good faith). Moreover, the complaint does not allege that the contract should be deemed renewed as a m atter of law. The plaintiff asserts that she told defendant that she believed the policy was reinstated because defendant cashed the check accom panying Mr. Bean’s reinstatement application. 30 But the com plaint cites no facts or law to support the proposition that an 29 30 R. Doc. 1-2 at 11 ¶ 32. Id. at 9 ¶ 23. 7 insurance contract is autom atically renewed when an insurance com pany deposits a paym ent received with an application for renewal. Plaintiff’s m em orandum in opposition argues that defendant had a statutory obligation under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:90 5 to provide written notice before cancelling a life insurance policy after a default in payment. 31 This statute appears to have no application to the facts alleged here. Thus, plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a breach of contract claim . B. Statu to ry In te re s t Claim Defendant also m oves to dism iss plaintiff’s claim for statutory interest under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:1811. The statute provides that all death claim s under policies issued within the state shall be settled by the insurer within sixty days after receipt of proof of death. La. R.S. 22:1811. If the insurer fails to do so without just cause, the am ount due shall bear interest. Id. Plaintiff has not stated a claim for statutory interest. For the reasons explained above, the com plaint does not allege that Mr. Bean had a valid life insurance policy at the tim e of his death. Nor does plaintiff specifically allege that she m ade a claim for insurance proceeds or indicate whether and when she provided defendant with proof of death. 31 R. Doc. 19 at 7-8. 8 C. Le ave to Am e n d The plaintiff has requested the opportunity to am end her com plaint if defendant’s m otion is granted. 32 The Court will “freely give leave [to am end] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Suprem e Court has held that “[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff m ay be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the m erits.” Fom an v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to am end, however, is not autom atic. Halbert v. City of Sherm an, 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court considers m ultiple factors, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory m otive on the part of the m ovant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendm ents previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the am endment, [and] futility of am endm ent.” Fom an, 371 U.S. at 182. This is plaintiff’s first complaint and the Court finds no indication of bad faith, dilatory m otive, or undue prejudice to the defendant. After consideration of these factors, the Court grants plaintiff leave to amend her com plaint. IV. 32 CON CLU SION R. Doc. 19 at 5. 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s m otion to dism iss plaintiff’s com plaint. Plaintiff’s claim s for breach of contract and statutory interest are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE. Plaintiff has 21 days to am end her com plaint. Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees arising out of a breach of contract claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. 30th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of J une, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 10
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