Hall v. Bergeron et al, No. 2:2016cv15589 - Document 11 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim. As such, the claims asserted against Patrick Forbes are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims against Defendants Bergeron and Sweazy are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and therefore must also be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 1/9/2017. (cg) (Copy of Doc. 10 mailed to plaintiff with order, per chambers)
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Hall v. Bergeron et al Doc. 11 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A GREGORY M. H ALL Pla in tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 16 -15 58 9 PATRICK W . FORBES, ET AL D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E” ( 5) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is Defendant Patrick W. Forbes’ m otion to dism iss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 Plaintiff opposes the Defendant’s m otion. 2 For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s m otion to dism iss is GRAN TED . BACKGROU N D On October 5, 20 16, pro se Plaintiff Gregory Marcus Hall filed a com plaint nam ing “Liza Bergeron + The State of Louisiana State Program Manager,” “Patrick W. Forbes, PE Office of Com m unity Developm ent” (“OCD”) and “Bradley Sweazy of the Road Hom e Sm all Rental Program .”3 Plaintiff alleges he was im properly withheld access to funding allocated by The Louisiana Road Hom e Sm all Rental Property Program (“SRPP”) for renovations for two properties he owns in New Orleans, Louisiana. 4 As the court in Blanchard v. N ew ton explain ed: Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, federal funds were appropriated to the State of Louisiana by the federal governm ent for the purpose of disaster recovery and com pensation for those property owners affected by the 1 R. Doc. 9. R. Doc. 10 . 3 R. Doc. 1. Defendant Forbes states in his m otion, “As of the date of filing this m otion, Defendants Bergeron and Sweazy have been served with Plaintiff’s Com plaint. This m otion is filed on behalf of Defendant Forbes, however, the argum ents herein would apply equally to Defendants Bergeron and Sweazy and will be reasserted on their behalf in the event they are served.” R. Doc. 9-1, at 1 n.1. 4 See R. Doc. 1. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com storm s. The Road Hom e Program was developed by the State of Louisiana and approved by the United States Departm ent of Housing an d Urban Developm ent (“HUD”) as a plan for disbursem ent of Comm unity Developm ent Block Grant (“CDBG”) funds to property owners. The Road Hom e Program was developed by the Louisiana Recovery Authority and its successor, Office of Com m unity Developm ent (“OCD”), both offices in the Division of Adm in istration for the State of Louisiana. In accordance with federal statute, the state created the Louisiana Recovery Authority (“LRA”) to oversee the disbursem ent of federal funds. The state authorized the OCD within the Division to adm inister the Road Hom e Program . There is no dispute that the OCD is a state agency. 5 The SRPP is a part of the Road Hom e Program and specifically provides loans to rental property owners to help restore dam aged units and offer them at affordable rents. In his m otion to dism iss, Forbes argues the Court lacks subject m atter jurisdiction to hear this case as a result of Eleventh Am endm ent sovereign im m unity. 6 Additionally, Forbes argues the Plaintiff has exhausted his appeal rights and, under the SRPP program , no further rem edies are available. 7 LEGAL STAN D ARD “Federal courts are courts of lim ited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claim s.”8 A m otion to dism iss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court’s subject-m atter jurisdiction. 9 Under Rule 12(b)(1), “[a] case is properly dism issed for lack of subject m atter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”10 “Lack of subject-m atter jurisdiction m ay be found in the com plaint alone, the com plaint 5 865 F. Supp. 2d 70 9, 712 (M.D. La. 20 12) (internal citations om itted). R. Doc. 9-1, at 5. 7 Id. 8 In re FEMA Trailer Form aldehy de Products Liab. Litig. (Mississippi Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 20 12). 9 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 10 Hom e Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 10 0 6, 10 10 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 6 2 supplem ented by the undisputed facts as evidenced in the record, or the com plaint supplem ented by the undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of the disputed facts.”11 “When, as here, grounds for dism issal m ay exist under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), the Court should, if necessary, dism iss only under the form er without reaching the question of failure to state a claim .”12 AN ALYSIS The Court begins by noting its cognizance of Plaintiff’s pro se status. “It is wellestablished that ‘pro se com plaints are held to less stringent standards than form al pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”13 “Despite [the] general willingness to construe pro se filings liberally, [the courts] still require pro se parties to fundam entally ‘abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.’”14 Am ong other requirem ents, Plaintiffs proceeding pro se “m ust properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, [and] obey discovery orders.”15 Even construing the am ended com plaint liberally, it is clear this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s com plaint. The Eleventh Am endm ent serves as a jurisdiction al bar depriving federal courts of the jurisdiction to adjudicate claim s against a state. 16 Both federal and state law claim s are barred from being asserted against a state in a federal court. 17 “Though the language of the Eleventh Am endm ent does not specifically address suits against the State by its own citizens, the Suprem e Court has consistently held that 11 In re FEMA, 668 F.3d at 287. Valdery v. Louisiana W orkforce Com m ’n , No. CIV.A. 15-0 1547, 20 15 WL 530 7390 , at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 10 , 20 15). 13 Tay lor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (quotin g Miller v. Stanm ore, 636 F.2d 986, 98 8 (5th Cir. 1981)). 14 E.E.O.C. v. Sim baki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 20 14), as revised (Sept. 18, 20 14) (quotin g Frazier v. W ells Fargo Bank, N .A., 541 F. App’x 419, 421 (5th Cir. 20 13) (internal quotation m arks om itted)). 15 Id. (citations om itted). 16 Union Pac. R. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv . Com m ’n, 662 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 20 11). 17 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderm an , 465 U.S. 89, 119-21 (1984). 12 3 an unconsenting State is im m une from suits brought in federal court by her own citizens as well as citizen s of other states.”18 Furtherm ore, the Eleventh Am en dm ent “extends to actions against state agencies or entities that are classified as ‘arm s of the state.’”19 “Pursuant to the sem inal case of Ex Parte Young and its progeny, an exception to Eleventh Am en dm ent im m unity exists when a suit is brought against a state officer, in his official capacity, seekin g prospective relief to enjoin an ongoing violation of federal law.”20 However, “the doctrine of Ex Parte Young is of no aid to a plaintiff seeking dam ages from the public treasury.”21 Additionally, “[r]elief that in essence serves to com pensate a party injured in the past by an action of a state official in his official capacity that was illegal under federal law is barred even when the state official is the nam ed defendant.”22 As the court in Stroebel stated, “This is true if the relief sought is equivalent to an award of dam ages for a past violation of federal law although set forth as som ething else; thus, courts will consider the substance rather than the form of the relief sought in determ ining whether the Ex Parte Young exception applied.”23 “It is additionally well-settled that [t]he Eleventh Am endm ent bars a suit against state officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest.”24 To determ ine the party at interest, the Court m ust look beyond “the m ere nam es of the titular parties” and instead look to the “essential nature and effect of the proceeding.”25 “The gen eral rule is 18 Id. (internal quotation m arks om itted) (citin g Edelm an v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662– 63 (1974)). Id. (citin g Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. John Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 30 7 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 20 0 2)). 20 Stroebel v. United States, 742 F. Supp. 2d 870 , 873 (E.D. La. 20 10 ) (citing Ex Parte Young, 20 9 U.S. 123 (190 8). 21 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974) (citing Edelm an, 415 U.S. 651; Kenn ecott Copper Corp v. State Tax Com m ’n , 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury , 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great N orthern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944)). 22 Papasan v. Allain, 378 U.S. 265, 278 (1986). 23 Stroebel, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 873 (citin g Papasan, 378 U.S. at 278-79). 24 Id. (citing Pennhurt State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderm an , 465 U.S. 8 9, 10 1 (1984); Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464) (alteration in original). 25 Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 237. 19 4 that relief sought nom inally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.”26 “This occurs, for exam ple, ‘if the judgm ent sought would expend itself on the public treasury or dom ain, or interfere with the public adm in istration,’ or if the effect of the judgm ent would be ‘to restrain the Governm ent from acting, or to com pel it to act.’”27 Like the plaintiff in Stroebel, Hall’s request for relief m erely seeks com pensation for funds he alleges were wrongfully withheld from him in the past. 28 Therefore, the effect of a judgm ent in favor of Hall would operate against the State of Louisiana through the Louisiana Recovery Authority, i.e., the state agency responsible for im plem enting and adm in istering the Road Hom e Program and specifically the funds allocated to it. 29 As a result, because Plaintiff’s suit is barred by Eleventh Am endm ent sovereign im m unity, his claim m ust be dism issed. 30 LEAVE TO AMEN D The Court should “freely give” leave to am end “when justice so requires.”31 Ordin arily, “a court should grant a pro se party every reasonable opportunity to am end.”32 “When it is apparent, however, that am endm ent will be futile, dism issal without leave to am end is appropriate.”33 The Court finds the Plaintiff’s claim s are clearly barred by the 26 Haw aii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963). Stroebel, 742 F. Supp. 2d. at 873 (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 10 2 n.11). 28 See id. at 874. 29 See id. As an agency of the State of Louisiana, the Louisiana Recovery Authority qualifies as the ‘state’ for purposes of Eleventh Am endm ent im m unity. See Robinson v. Road Hom e Corp., 20 10 WL 148364, at *2 (E.D. La. J an . 12, 20 10 ). 30 As this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case, the Court need not, and cannot, address the Defendant’s 12(b)(6) claim s. See Valdery , 20 15 WL 530 7390 , at *2. 31 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 40 5, 417 (5th Cir. 20 13). 32 Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 50 3 n .36 (5th Cir. 20 11) (quoting Pena v. United States, 157 F.3d 98 4, 987 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988 )). 33 Valdery , 20 15 WL 530 7390 , at *2 (citing Form an v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Sm ith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590 , 595 (5th Cir. 20 0 4)). 27 5 Eleventh Am endm ent and therefore am endm ent will be futile. Accordingly, leave to file an am ended com plaint is not warranted. 34 OTH ER D EFEN D AN TS The Court has an obligation to exam in e its subject m atter jurisdiction sua sponte at any tim e. 35 Although the other n am ed Defendants, Liza Bergeron and Bradley Sweazy, have not yet been properly served, the Court finds the reasoning of Defendant Forbes’ m otion to dism iss, and the analysis described above, apply equally to Defendants Bergeron and Sweazy. 36 CON CLU SION Accordingly; IT IS ORD ERED that the Defendant’s m otion to dism iss 37 based on lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is GRAN TED . As such, the claim s asserted against Patrick Forbes are D ISMISSED W ITH OU T PREJU D ICE. IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that the claim s against Defendants Bergeron and Sweazy are barred by the Eleventh Am endm ent and therefore m ust also be D ISMISSED W ITH OU T PREJU D ICE. N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is 9 th d ay o f Jan u ary, 2 0 17. _____________________ __________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 34 The Plaintiff did not request leave to file a second am ended com plaint. See, e.g., FW / PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230 -31 (1990 ). 36 As stated above, Defendant Forbes, in his m otion to dism iss, states, “As of the date of filing this m otion, Defendants Bergeron and Sweazy have not been served with Plaintiff’s Com plaint. This m otion is filed on behalf of Defendant Forbes, however, the argum ents herein would apply equally to Defendants Bergeron and Sweazy and will be reasserted on their behalf in the even they are served.” R. Doc. 9-1, at 1 n .1. 37 R. Doc. 9. 35 6
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