Serrano et al v. Otis Elevator Company et al, No. 2:2016cv15460 - Document 67 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 26 defendant Interstate's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 6/20/2017. (cg)
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Serrano et al v. Otis Elevator Company et al Doc. 67 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ANGIE SERRANO, ET AL. VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-15460 OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, ET AL. SECTION “R” (4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is defendant Interstate Managem ent Com pany, LLC’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent on plaintiffs Angie Serrano and Nelly Briceno’s claim s.1 Because there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact as to Interstate’s im m unity for plaintiffs’ claim s under the Louisiana Workers’ Com pensation Act, the Court grants defendant’s m otion. I. BACKGROU N D The following factual allegations from plaintiffs’ com plaint are not disputed. On April 3, 20 16, plaintiffs Angie Serrano and Nelly Briceno were injured at the Westin New Orleans Canal Place hotel when the service elevator in which they were riding m alfunctioned and dropped m ultiple floors.2 At the tim e, plaintiffs were em ployees of Staff Pro Workforce, LLC, 1 2 R. Doc. 26. R. Doc. 1-1 at 2 ¶¶ 2, 3. Dockets.Justia.com which was under contract to provide workers for the hotel to perform hotel operations.3 According to plaintiffs, the drop was forceful enough that Briceno broke her leg and a vertebrae in her back, and Serrano was thrown to the ground where she struck her head.4 On August 19, 20 16, plaintiffs filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Plaintiffs nam ed as defendants the Otis Elevator Com pany, Interstate Managem ent Com pany, LLC (the entity that provided hotel m anagem ent services for the hotel), Canal Place Borrower, LLC (the owner of the hotel, d/ b/ a The Westin New Orleans Canal Place), and Dacia Paz.5 Paz was plaintiffs’ supervisor at the tim e of their injuries, and plaintiffs alleged that they notified Paz of sim ilar incidents of elevator m alfunctions before they were injured.6 Plaintiffs’ suit alleged that defendants’ negligence was the cause of the elevator accident and their injuries.7 On October 12, 20 16, defendants Canal Place and Interstate rem oved the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.8 3 4 5 6 7 8 Id. at 2 ¶ 2. Id. ¶ 3. Id. at 1-2. Id. at 3 ¶ 5. Id. at 3-4. R. Doc. 1. 2 On Novem ber 9, 20 16, plaintiffs m oved to rem and, arguing that the defendants were not com pletely diverse.9 On February 6, 20 17, the Court denied plaintiffs’ m otion to rem and, finding that defendant Dacia Paz was im properly joined and, therefore, com plete diversity did exist.10 In m aking this determ ination, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ argum ent that their injuries did not occur in the course and scope of their em ploym ent, and found that Paz was an em ployee of plaintiffs’ statutory em ployer, Interstate, m aking Paz im m une from tort liability under the Louisiana Workers’ Com pensation Act (LWCA), La. Stat. Ann. § 23:10 32, et seq.11 Interstate now m oves for sum m ary judgm ent, arguing that there is no dispute of m aterial fact as to Interstate’s im m unity for plaintiffs’ claim s.12 Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition,13 and alternatively m oved the Court to delay or defer consideration of Interstate’s m otion so that plaintiffs can obtain additional discovery.14 The Court granted plaintiffs’ m otion for additional discovery in part, ordering Interstate to subm it the full copy of the Hotel Managem ent Agreem ent between Canal Place (through its predecessor 9 10 11 12 13 14 R. Doc. 7-2 at 3. R. Doc. 19. Id. at 13-17. R. Doc. 26-1 at 2-4. R. Doc. 32. Id. at 4-5. 3 in ownership of the hotel) and Interstate.15 After Interstate subm itted the contract in com pliance with the Court’s order,16 plaintiffs filed supplem ental briefing,17 and Interstate replied.18 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgm ent is warranted when “the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any m aterial fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. N ationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonm oving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth 15 R. Doc. 44 at 3. The Court denied plaintiffs’ request for additional tim e to depose unidentified fact witnesses regarding whether plaintiffs were injured in the course and scope of their em ploym ent because plaintiffs did not explain what inform ation these unidentified witnesses m ay have that plaintiffs them selves did not, or how this inform ation would create an issue of m aterial fact. Id. at 3-5. 16 R. Doc. 50 . 17 R. Doc. 51. 18 R. Doc. 53. 4 ‘ultim ate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent.” Galindo v. Precision Am . Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 198 5); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-m oving party.” EEOC v. Sim baki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 20 14). If the dispositive issue is one on which the m oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party “m ust com e forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally ’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonm oving party can then defeat the m otion by either countering with evidence sufficient to dem onstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of m aterial fact, or “showing that the m oving party’s evidence is so sheer that it m ay not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the m oving party.” Id. at 1265. If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonm oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party m ay satisfy its burden by m erely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential elem ent of the nonm oving party’s claim . See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonm oving party, who m ust, 5 by subm itting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonm ovant m ay not rest upon the pleadings, but m ust identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75 (“Rule 56 m andates the entry of sum m ary judgm ent, after adequate tim e for discovery and upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elem ent essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)). III. D ISCU SSION A. Lo u is ia n a W o rke rs ’ Co m p e n s a tio n Act The LWCA provides the exclusive rem edy for an em ployee injured by the negligent acts of his or her co-em ployees or em ployer when those injuries arise out of and in the course of em ploym ent. See La. Stat. Ann. §§ 23:10 31 and 23:10 32; Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861, 863 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1995); Chafflin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc., No. 96-2127, 1998 WL 19624, at *7 (E.D. La. J an. 20 , 1998). Therefore, the LWCA provides a statutory defense to tort claim s from em ployees injured on the job. The LWCA covers direct em ployers and em ployees, but also includes “statutory em ployers.” Coverage of statutory em ployees is m eant to ensure 6 that injured contracted em ployees have an effective rem edy by m aking it m ore difficult for an entity to avoid workers’ com pensation liability by operating through interm ediaries. See Berthelot v. Murphy Oil, Inc., No. 0 94460 , 20 10 WL 10 3871, at *3 (discussing history of LWCA). But the “statutory em ployer” concept also operates as a defense to tort actions for em ployers who use contracted em ployees. The Act includes two types of statutory em ployer defenses, the “trade, business or occupation” defense, and the “two-contract” defense. La. Stat. Ann. § 23:10 61(A)(1). 19 The “two-contract” theory creates a statutory em ployer relationship between a general contractor and the em ployees of its subcontractors, regardless of the general contractor’s trade or business. See Allen v. State ex rel. Ernest N . Moral-N ew Orleans Exhibition Hall Auth., 842 So. 2d 373, 378 (La. 20 0 3). The “two-contract” defense applies when: “(1) the principal enters into a contract with a third party; (2) pursuant to that contract, work m ust be perform ed; and (3) in order for the principal to fulfill its contractual obligation to perform the work, the principal enters into a subcontract for all or part of the work perform ed.” Id. at 379. With this defense, it is “irrelevant whether the subcontractor’s work is part of the work ordinarily perform ed 19 The “trade, business or occupation” defense is not relevant to this case. 7 by the principal.” Id. at 378-79. Thus, under the “two-contract” defense, an em ployer is im m une from liability for tort claim s from subcontracted em ployees. Interstate relies on the two-contract defense in asserting im m unity under the LWCA.20 In doing so, Interstate subm its the Hotel Managem ent Agreem ent between Patriot Mortgage Borrower, L.L.C., and Interstate, in which Interstate agreed to operate the hotel.21 Patriot owned the hotel before Canal Place, and assigned its rights and duties under the Agreem ent to Canal Place.22 Defendants also subm it an Agreem ent for the Supply of Contract Labor between Interstate (as agent for Canal Place) and Staff Pro Workforce.23 Finally, Interstate subm its the affidavit of David Bilbe, the General Manager of the hotel. Bilbe attests that the copies of the Hotel Managem ent Agreem ent and the Supply of Contract Labor Agreem ent are true and correct, that housekeeping was a service provided by Interstate for the operation of the hotel, that Interstate entered into the contract with Staff Pro in order to fulfill its obligations to operate the hotel, and that plaintiffs 20 21 22 23 R. Doc. 26-1 at 3. R. Doc. 9-1 at 4; see also R. Doc. 50 -1. R. Doc. 9-1 at 10 . Id. at 12. 8 were payroll em ployees of Staff Pro as housekeepers at the tim e of their injuries.24 For the sam e reasons that the Court found the two-contract defense applicable in rejecting plaintiffs’ m otion to rem and, the two-contract defense applies here. Canal Place had a contract with Interstate, and under that contract, Interstate had to perform the work necessary to operate the hotel. Specifically, the contract states that Interstate would supply, as operator, “other services . . . as are custom arily perform ed by m anagem ent com panies of first-class, full-service hotels or are necessary for the day-to-day operation, m anagem ent, and supervision of the Hotel.”25 In order to do so, Interstate entered into a subcontract with Staff Pro, in which Staff Pro agreed to perform part of the work. This is a clear exam ple of statutory em ploym ent under the two-contract defense. See, e.g., Collins v. Brice Bldg. Co., LLC, No. 12-2319, 20 12 WL 60 49149, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 20 12); Groover v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 10 12, 10 15 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). Plaintiffs concede that they were em ployees of Staff Pro at the tim e of their accident.26 Thus, there is no dispute of m aterial fact that Interstate is the statutory em ployer 24 Id. at 1-2 ¶¶ 3-6. Id. at 8 ¶ 3.1L; see also id. at 9 ¶ 4.2. 26 R. Doc. 1-1 at 2 ¶ 2; R. Doc. 32 at 11 (stating “Staff Pro em ployees, such as plaintiffs . . .”). 9 25 of plaintiffs, and thus there is no dispute that Interstate is entitled to im m unity under the LWCA. Plaintiffs attem pt to resist this conclusion in three ways. First, they argue that Interstate cannot prevail on its two-contract defense because the Hotel Managem ent Agreem ent is am biguous. Second, plaintiffs argue that Interstate’s contract with Staff Pro is invalid under Louisiana law. According to plaintiffs, both argum ents require denial of sum m ary judgm ent on Interstate’s statutory em ployer defense. Third, and alternatively, plaintiffs argue that the even if Interstate is their statutory em ployer, the LWCA is inapplicable because plaintiffs were not in the course and scope of their em ploym ent with their injuries occurred. All three argum ents fail. 1. The Hotel Managem ent Agreem ent Plaintiffs argue that because the Hotel Managem ent Agreem ent does not specifically m ention “housekeeping services,” the agreem ent is am biguous and therefore sum m ary judgm ent is inappropriate. This argum ent is m eritless. First, the agreem ent refers to “services that are custom arily perform ed by m anagem ent com panies of first-class, full-service hotels” or “services that are necessary for the day-to-day operation” of a fullservice hotel. Housekeeping is obviously a service that is custom arily perform ed in and necessary for the day-to-day operation of a full-service 10 hotel like the one at issue here, and plaintiffs point to nothing suggesting otherwise. Further, Bilbe attests, without contradiction, that housekeeping is a service provided by Interstate under its contract. Moreover, Attachm ent A to the contract between Interstate and Staff Pro lists the services (and the corresponding positions) that Staff Pro was to provide for Interstate, and includes “turndown” and “houseperson,” both of which are related to housekeeping.27 In both their opposition to sum m ary judgm ent and their supplem ental response, plaintiffs rely on Grant v. Sneed, 155 So. 3d 61 (La. App. 2 Cir. 20 14), and LFI Fort Pierce, Inc. v. Acm e Steel Buildings, Inc., 20 0 So. 3d 939 (La. App. 3 Cir. 20 16), to argue that sum m ary judgm ent should be denied.28 Neither helps plaintiffs’ argum ent. In Grant, the court found the twocontract defense inapplicable because the record was unclear that the principal entered into a contract with a third-party in the first place, a necessary precondition to the two-contract defense. 155 So. 3d at 69-70 . There, the only evidence that could be interpreted as a written contract was an unsigned purchase order, which did not specify that work was to be perform ed under the order. The court also found that defendant did not 27 28 R. Doc. 53-1 at 1. R. Doc. 32 at 9; R. Doc. 51 at 2-3. 11 m eet his burden in proving the existence of a verbal contract. Id. Therefore, as relevant here, all Grant stands for is the unobjectionable proposition that a principal m ust have a contract with a third-party in order for the twocontract defense to apply, and that disputed issues of fact as to the existence of such a contract will preclude sum m ary judgm ent. Grant is inapposite here, as there is no dispute that a contract to operate the hotel between Canal Place and Interstate existed, and that work was to be perform ed under that contract. LFI Fort Pierce is inapplicable as well. There, the court denied sum m ary judgm ent on the two-contract defense because the first contract between the defendant and the third-party was verbal and am biguous, and it did not appear that the subsequent subcontract that the defendant entered into covered its obligations under the first contract. 20 0 So. 3d at 946-47. That is not the case here, where Interstate’s contract with Staff Pro clearly indicates that Staff Pro is to provide contract workers for services for the hotel.29 Finally, plaintiffs argue that the Hotel Managem ent Agreem ent is a contract “to provide,” as opposed to a contract “to perform ,” and that 29 R. Doc. 9-1 at 12. 12 contracts to provide cannot form the basis of a statutory em ployer defense.30 This argum ent is without m erit. First, the clear language of the Hotel Managem ent Agreem ent indicates that Interstate is not only to “provide” services but also m ust “perform ” them .31 Second, the sole case relied on by plaintiffs for the distinction between contracts to provide and contracts to perform , Duvalle v. Lake Kenilw orth, Inc., 467 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1985), addressed the “trade, business or occupation” defense, a separate defense not applicable here. Id. at 850 ; see also Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 70 F.3d 1269, 1995 WL 696863, at *1-2 (5th Cir. 1995). In sum , the contract at issue here is not am biguous, and there is no dispute that all of the elem ents of the two-contract defense are m et. 2. The Legality of the Contract Betw een Interstate and Staff Pro Next, plaintiffs argue that a provision of an attachm ent to the contract between Interstate and Staff Pro is illegal under Louisiana law and therefore Interstate is not entitled sum m ary judgm ent.32 Attachm ent B to the agreem ent between Interstate and Staff Pro is an acknowledgem ent that em ployees of Staff Pro m ust sign in order to work at the hotel.33 It requires 30 31 32 33 R. Doc. 51 at 5. See R. Doc. 50 -1 at 12-16; see also supra pp. 11-12. R. Doc. 32 at 9-11. R. Doc. 9-1 at 23. 13 em ployees to acknowledge that any workers’ com pensation they are entitled to will be provided by Staff Pro, not Interstate, and that they will not “receive any em ployee benefits from [the hotel] or any of its agents or assigns.”34 Further, the attachm ent requires the em ployees, “to the fullest extent perm itted by law, [to] decline, reject, and waive all rights, if any, to any em ployee benefits now or hereafter offered by [the hotel] . . . even if [the em ployee is] determ ined or adjudged to be a com m on or statutory law em ployee of [the hotel].”35 In asserting that Attachm ent B is invalid under Louisiana law, plaintiffs rely on Prejean v. Maintenance Enterprises, Inc., 8 So. 3d 766 (La. App. 4 Cir. 20 0 9). Prejean invalidated a provision in a contract between a direct em ployer and statutory em ployer that provided that the statutory em ployer would be liable to pay workers’ com pensation benefits only if the injured worker’s direct em ployer was unable to m eet its obligations. Id. at 774-75. In doing so, Prejean focused on the “onerous burden” the contract placed on the injured worker. Id. Prejean also observed that as long as the em ployers do not im perm issibly burden the injured worker, the statutory 34 35 Id. Id. 14 em ployer and direct em ployer are free to contract as to “rights of contribution or indem nification.” Id. at 774. Interstate argues that the contract between itself and Staff Pro does exactly this, and there is no im perm issible burden on any injured worker.36 In the contract, Staff Pro agrees to indem nify Interstate from any direct claim for workers’ com pensation by any Staff Pro em ployees,37 prom ises to carry workers’ com pensation insurance in the am ount required by law,38 and agrees that Staff Pro, not Interstate, will provide injured workers with workers’ com pensation.39 It is true that this allocation of responsibility for workers’ com pensation benefits between statutory and direct em ployers is expressly recognized as valid by the LWCA and has consistently been upheld by courts. See La. Stat. Ann. §§ 23:10 31, 10 63 (recognizing validity of contribution and indem nification actions between direct and statutory em ployers and noting that “nothing in [the LWCA] shall prevent any arrangem ent between the em ployers for a different distribution, as between them selves, of the ultim ate burden of such paym ents” to the em ployee); see also, e.g., McClain v. Motiva 36 37 38 39 See R. Doc. 9-1 at 13, 17. Id. at 17. Id. Id. at 23. 15 Enterprises, L.L.C., No. 0 9-580 6, 20 10 WL 3614310 , at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 20 10 ); Guillory v. N ew park Env’l Servs., L.L.C., No. 12-2169, 20 13 WL 5757593, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 20 13). But Interstate ignores the language in Attachm ent B, which goes beyond allocating responsibility and requires em ployees of Staff Pro to waive any rights to workers’ com pensation against Interstate that they m ay be entitled to under the LWCA. The Court finds that Attachm ent B is problem atic under Prejean because Interstate is attem pting to achieve the benefits of tort im m unity without assum ing the burdens of workers’ com pensation liability, or in other words, trying to have its proverbial cake and eat it too. See Bertholet, 20 10 WL 10 38 71, at *8. But the solution is not to find that Interstate is not entitled to the statutory em ployer defense, especially when the “basic purpose of Louisiana workers’ com pensation legislation is to broaden workers’ com pensation rem edies, not narrow them .” Id. Instead, Attachm ent B is unenforceable vis-à-vis plaintiffs, and as plaintiffs’ statutory em ployer, Interstate therefore m ay be obligated to pay plaintiffs’ workers’ com pensation benefits. See La. Stat. Ann. § 23:10 33 (“No contract, rule, regulation or device whatsoever shall operate to relieve the em ployer, in whole or in part, from any liability created by this Chapter except as herein provided.”). This solution is authorized by the language of the agreem ent 16 between Interstate and Staff Pro. That agreem ent contains a severance clause which states that if “any term or provision of this Agreem ent or the application thereof is deem ed invalid or enforceable in its entirety, such term or provision shall be severed from the Agreem ent and the rem aining provisions shall rem ain in full force and effect.”40 The Agreem ent incorporates its attachm ents,41 thus the offending provision in Attachm ent B m ay be severed and declared unenforceable. As the invalidity of Attachm ent B does not negate the agreem ent between Interstate and Staff Pro, or render the two-contract defense inapplicable, Bertholet, 20 10 WL 10 38 71, at *8; McClain, 20 10 WL 3614310 , at *3, plaintiffs have failed to create a disputed issue of fact as to Interstate’s im m unity under the two-contract theory of the LWCA. 3. Course and Scope of Em ploy m ent Plaintiffs’ final argum ent against sum m ary judgm ent repeats the argum ent they m ade in their m otion to rem and that they were not injured in the course and scope of their em ploym ent. 42 But they point to no evidence 40 Id. at 20 ¶ 15 A. Id. ¶ 15 D. In addition, the offending language in Attachm ent B itself is lim ited “to the fullest extent perm itted by law.” Id. at 23. 42 Id. at 11. Because plaintiffs’ argum ent is essentially the sam e as the one the Court already rejected, the Court need not reexam ine the course and scope precedent under Louisiana law. See R. Doc. 19 at 13. 17 41 tending to suggest that they were not injured in the course and scope of their em ploym ent. Unlike plaintiffs, Interstate does subm it evidence in support of a finding that plaintiffs were injured in the course and scope of their em ploym ent. Bilbe’s affidavit attests that when the accident occurred, plaintiffs had not yet clocked out, nor had they turned in their assignm ents, a requirem ent before one can finish his or her shift.43 Additionally, Bilbe attests that plaintiffs were still in their housekeeping uniform s when the accident occurred.44 Finally, Interstate also points to plaintiff Briceno’s answers to Interstate’s interrogatories, in which Briceno adm its that plaintiffs were injured in the hotel service elevator, and that she entered the elevator right after she finished her shift. 45 Accordingly, it is undisputed that plaintiffs were injured on the hotel prem ises, in their uniform s, in a hotel service elevator, shortly after finishing their shifts. And as addressed in the Court’s previous order, whether plaintiffs were still on-duty or had just finished their shifts and were off-duty is of no m om ent, as Louisiana courts consistently hold that em ployees injured on their em ployer’s prem ises are covered by the LWCA, even if they have com pleted their shifts. See, e.g., Sislo v. N ew Orleans Center for 43 44 45 R. Doc. 9-1 at 2 ¶ 8 . Id. R. Doc. 37-1 at 2. 18 Creative Arts, 198 So. 3d 120 2, 120 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 20 16) (noting that it has “long been well settled, . . . that [the LWCA] envision[s] extension of coverage to em ployees from the tim e they reach the em ployer’s prem ises until they depart therefrom ”) (quoting Carter v. Lanzetta, 193 So. 2d 259, 261 (La. 1966)); Mitchell v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 653 So. 2d 20 2, 20 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1995) (“Even if an em ployee has finished his day’s work and is in the act of leaving, he is entitled to a reasonable period while still on the em ployer’s prem ises which is regarded as within the course of em ploym ent.”) (citations om itted); Bosse v. W estinghouse Electric, Inc., 637 So. 2d 1157, 1159-60 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1994) (finding that injuries sustained in elevator accident which occurred approxim ately 45 m inutes before plaintiff’s shift started were covered by LWCA); see also Harris v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 5 F.3d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (finding that injury to off-the-clock em ployee caused by physical defect in em ployer’s prem ises covered by LWCA). Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, there is no dispute of fact that plaintiffs were injured in the course and scope of their em ploym ent. Because there is no dispute of fact that the two-contract defense applies and that plaintiffs were injured in the course and scope of their em ploym ent, defendant Interstate is entitled sum m ary judgm ent. 19 IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, defendant Interstate’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent is GRANTED. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ 20th _ day of J une, 20 17. ___ ____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 20
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