Serrano et al v. Otis Elevator Company et al, No. 2:2016cv15460 - Document 44 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting in part 26 Motion for Summary Judgment as per herein. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/26/2017. (cg)
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Serrano et al v. Otis Elevator Company et al Doc. 44 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ANGIE SERRANO, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 16-15460 OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, ET AL. SECTION “R” (4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendant Interstate Management Com pany, LLC m oves for sum m ary judgm ent on plaintiffs Angie Serrano and Nelly Briceno’s claims. 1 In addition to responding to defendant’s m otion, plaintiffs m ove the Court to delay or defer consideration of defendant’s m otion so that plaintiffs can obtain additional discovery. 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) governs requests for additional tim e for discovery before consideration of a pending m otion for sum mary judgment. It perm its a district court to deny or defer consideration of a m otion for summ ary judgm ent, allow tim e to take discovery, or “issue any other appropriate order” when “a nonm ovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” 1 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Nonetheless, the R. Doc. 26. R. Doc. 32 at 4-5. Dockets.Justia.com party seeking a continuance “m ay not sim ply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts.” Raby v. Livingston, 60 0 F.3d 552, 561 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (quoting Sec. & Exch. Com m ’n v. Spence & Green Chem . Co., 612 F.2d 896, 90 1 (5th Cir. 1980 )). Instead, the party seeking to continue a motion for sum m ary judgm ent to obtain further discovery must dem onstrate (1) “why he needs additional discovery” and (2) “how the additional discovery will create a genuine issue of m aterial fact.” Krim v. BancTexas Grp., Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th Cir. 1993). In other words, the plaintiff m ust identify specific facts, susceptible of collection, and indicate how those facts “‘will influence the outcome of the pending summ ary judgm ent m otion.’” McKay v. Novartis Pharm . Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 70 0 (5th Cir. 20 14) (quoting Raby , 60 0 F.3d at 561)). Defendant Interstate asserts it is entitled sum m ary judgment because it argues it is im mune to plaintiffs’ claim s pursuant to the “two-contract theory” under the Louisiana Workers’ Com pensation Act. Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) m otion points out that plaintiffs have not been given the full contracts at issue, and plaintiffs argue that once they have the full contracts they will have evidence creating a dispute of material fact. Interstate has not subm itted the full Hotel Managem ent Agreement between itself and Canal Place Borrowers, the entity that owns the hotel. In 2 its previous opposition to plaintiffs’ m otion to rem and, Interstate acknowledged that it had not subm itted the full copy, but stated that it did not do so because the agreement contained “financial and proprietary inform ation” which is “confidential in light of the competitive nature of the hotel m anagement industry.”3 The Court finds that the full copy of the Hotel Management may contain inform ation that could create an issue of m aterial fact as to the applicability of the two-contract theory to this case. Therefore, the Court grants plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) m otion in part and will defer consideration of Interstate’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. Interstate is ordered to subm it to plaintiffs, and to file in the record within seven days of the date of entry of this order, a full copy of the Hotel Managem ent Agreement. Interstate may redact confidential financial and proprietary inform ation regarding rates charged, but the rest of the contract, in particular provisions on defense, indem nity, and insurance obligations, m ust be subm itted. As to the rem ainder of plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion, plaintiffs also argue that “depositions of fact witnesses fam iliar with plaintiffs’ job duties and with the use of the elevator at issue” will dem onstrate a genuine issue of fact on whether plaintiffs were injured in the course and scope of their 3 R. Doc. 9 at 3 n.4. 3 em ploym ent. 4 As explained in the Court’s order on plaintiffs’ rem and m otion, plaintiffs’ own statements indicate that their injuries occurred while they were in the course and scope of their em ploym ent. 5 But even if the evidence were am biguous on this issue, plaintiffs not only fail to identify these fact witnesses or what specific inform ation they would testify to that would create an issue of fact, but also plaintiffs surely possess within their own personal knowledge inform ation on their job duties and the use of the elevator. Plaintiffs have made no argum ent as to what inform ation these unidentified witnesses possess that plaintiffs do not, or why their testim ony, but not an affidavit from either plaintiff, would create an issue of fact. As such, plaintiffs’ argum ent that additional discovery will create an issue of fact on course and scope of em ploym ent is nothing m ore than a vague, speculative assertion. Because Rule 56(d) “does not condone a fishing expedition where a plaintiff m erely hopes to uncover some possible evidence of [value],” Duffy v. W olle, 123 F.3d 10 26, 10 41 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation om itted), the Court will not defer or delay consideration of Interstate’s m otion so that plaintiffs can depose these unidentified fact witnesses. See Jason v. Parish 4 5 R. Doc. 32 at 5. See. R. Doc. 19 at 13-15. 4 of Plaquem ines, No. 16-2728, 20 16 WL 46230 50 , at *4-5 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 20 16) (denying plaintiff’s request to defer consideration of m otion for sum m ary judgm ent because plaintiff gave “nothing m ore than a ‘speculative hope’ that discovery m ight provide plaintiff with inform ation supporting his claim s”) (quoting Sw eats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560 , 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Thus, plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) m otion is GRANTED IN PART solely as to the undisclosed portions of the Hotel Management Agreement. After Interstate subm its the full agreement, plaintiffs shall have seven days to brief any new argum ents that arise from the subm ission of the full agreement, but plaintiffs will not be perm itted to rehash arguments it has already subm itted before the Court. Interstate shall have seven days from the date of plaintiffs’ brief to respond. There will be no replies. The rem ainder of plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) m otion is DENIED. 26th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of April, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 5
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