Dotson et al v. Edmonson et al, No. 2:2016cv15371 - Document 200 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS re 185 Motion for New Trial - IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for a new trial is hereby GRANTED. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
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Dotson et al v. Edmonson et al Doc. 200 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A LYLE D OTSON , ET AL., Plain tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 16 -153 71 COL. MICH AEL ED MON SON , ET AL., D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E” ( 1) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Plaintiffs Lyle Dotson and Olon Dotson brought an action in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Fourth Am endm ent to the United States Constitution and Louisiana state law against Defendants Michael Edm onson, Donovan Archote, Huey McCartney, Calvin Anderson, Rene Bodet, and Tagee J ournee. 1 After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Defendants on all claim s except on e. 2 Plaintiff Lyle Dotson now m oves for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. 3 Plaintiff argues the Court erred in denying Plaintiff’s Batson 4 challenges, that the jury’s responses to the verdict form are irreconcilable, and that the jury’s verdict is against the great weight of the eviden ce. 5 Defendants oppose the m otion. 6 Plaintiff filed a reply. 7 For the reasons that follow, the m otion is GRAN TED . 1 The parties stipulated to the dism issal of Donovan Archote on Novem ber 8, 20 17. R. Doc. 64. On Decem ber 4, 20 18, the Court granted Defendants’ m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent with regard to Plaintiff Olon Dotson’s claim s. R. Doc. 10 9. On J anuary 22, 20 18 , the Court granted Defendants’ m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent as to Plaintiffs’ claim s against Defendant Edm onson . R. Doc. 150 . 2 R. Doc. 179. 3 R. Doc. 185. F ED . R. CIV. P. 59(a). 4 Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 10 6 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). 5 R. Doc. 185. 6 R. Doc. 195. 7 R. Doc. 199. 1 Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROU N D This case involves the investigatory detention and arrest of Lyle Dotson in New Orleans, Louisiana, on October 7, 20 15. 8 On that day, Dotson was touring the French Quarter with a student group led by his father, Ball State University professor Olon Dotson. After Lyle becam e separated from the rest of the group, he was stopped by Louisiana State Police troopers Huey McCartney, Calvin Anderson, and Tagee J ournee, who suspected Lyle of surveilling undercover police officers. 9 The troopers handcuffed Lyle while they verified his driver’s license, and then, after his identity was confirm ed, McCartney tried to take a photograph of Lyle before releasing him . Lyle did not consent to having his photograph taken, but McCartney persisted, and Lyle becam e agitated. 10 In the subsequent struggle, McCartney claim ed he was struck by Lyle’s knee, and he arrested Lyle for battery of a police officer. Whether the alleged kick occurred, and whether it was intentional, is disputed by the parties. 11 Lyle and Olon Dotson filed suit on October 7, 20 16. 12 Lyle asserted causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Am endm ents to the United States Constitution. 13 Lyle claim s the troopers (1) unlawfully stopped him without reasonable suspicion; (2) used handcuffs during the investigatory stop, thereby converting the stop into unlawful arrest without probable cause; (3) exceeded the scope of the stop by continuing to detain him after his identify had been 8 R. Doc. 1. For a full account of Plaintiff’s allegations and the facts disputed by the parties, see Dotson v. Edm onson, 20 18 WL 50 5512 (E.D. La. J an. 22, 20 18 ). 9 Defendants McCartn ey, Anderson, and J ournee were acting upon inform ation provided by another Louisiana State Police trooper, Defendant Rene Bodet. 10 This sum m ary is based on the undisputed facts presented by the parties in Defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. See R. Doc. 73-3 and R. Doc. 10 8. 11 Com pare R. Doc. 75-3 at ¶42, w ith R. Doc. 10 8 at ¶¶ 22, 42. 12 R. Doc. 1. 13 R. Doc. 1. See also R. Doc. 112-1. 2 verified; (4) arrested him for battery on an officer without probable cause; and (5) used excessive force in tightly handcuffing Lyle during the walk to the police station. 14 Lyle also raised Louisiana state law claim s for assault and battery and false im prisonm ent against the Defendant troopers. 15 After considerable m otion practice, 16 trial com m enced on J anuary 24, 20 18. 17 At the conclusion of four days of testim ony, the jury returned a verdict that Lyle Dotson had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) Defendants violated Dotson’s rights by stopping Dotson without reasonable suspicion; (2) Defendants Anderson or J ournee violated Dotson’s rights by handcuffing/ seizing Dotson without probable cause; (3) Defendant Anderson, J ournee, or Bodet violated Dotson’s rights by continuing to detain Dotson after any reasonable suspicion had dissipated; and (4) Defendants McCartney, Anderson, or J ournee violated Dotson’s rights by falsely arresting Dotson for battery against an officer. 18 The jury also found for Defendants on Plaintiff’s state law claim s. However, the jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff on one count, finding that Defendant McCartney violated Dotson’s rights by continuing to detain Dotson after any reasonable suspicion for the stop had ended. 19 The jury further found that “no reasonable 14 See R. Doc. 112. R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 112-1. 16 On J anuary 22, 20 18, the Court issued an Order an d Reasons granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent based on qualified im m un ity. R. Doc. 150 . First, the Court granted Defendants’ m otion with respect to Dotson’s § 1983 claim against Defendants McCartney, Anderson, and J ournee for the use of excessive force. Second, the Court denied Defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent with respect to Dotson’s § 1983 claim s against Bodet, McCartney, Anderson, and J ournee for unlawful stop and unlawful arrest. Third, the Court den ied Defendants’ m otion with respect to Plaintiff’s state law claim s against Bodet, McCartney, Anderson, and J ourn ee. Lastly, the Court found that Defendant Edm onson was entitled to qualified im m un ity as to Plaintiff’s claim s against him . 17 R. Doc. 158 . 18 R. Doc. 166. 19 Id. at 5. 15 3 officer could have believed Defendant McCartney’s actions were lawful.”20 The jury found that McCartney’s actions were not the cause of Plaintiff’s dam ages, however. 21 Plaintiff now m oves for a n ew trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. 22 Plaintiff asserts four grounds for granting a new trial. First, Plaintiff contends the Court erred by denying Plaintiff’s Batson challenges to Defendants’ perem ptory strike of J uror Marcus Henderson and Defen dants’ waiver of their two rem aining perem ptory strikes. 23 Second, Plaintiff argues the jury’s verdict in favor of Defendant McCartney on the unreasonable arrest claim is irreconcilable with the jury’s answers to the verdict form regarding the Plaintiff’s continued detention. 24 Third, Plaintiff asserts the jury’s verdict in favor of McCartney, Anderson, and J ournee on the unreasonable arrest claim is contrary to the weight of the eviden ce. 25 Fourth, Plaintiff challenges the jury’s verdict in favor of Defendants Anderson and J ournee on the handcuffing claim as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 26 LEGAL STAN D ARD A m otion for new trial under Rule 59(a) is an extraordinary rem edy that should be used sparingly. 27 Rule 59(a) provides, specifically, that the district court m ay grant a n ew jury trial “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.”28 Although Rule 59(a) does not delineate the precise grounds for granting a new trial, the Fifth Circuit has held that Rule 59(a) allows the district court to 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 R. Doc. 185. F ED. R. CIV. P. 59. R. Doc. 185 at 4-15. 24 Id. at 15-20 . 25 Id. at 20 -26. 26 Id. at 26-28 . 27 Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 783, 784 (E.D. La. 20 0 0 ) (citing Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Bd. of Com m ’rs of the Port of N ew Orleans, No. 94-2786, 1996 WL 413645, at *2 (E.D. La. J uly 24, 1996)). 28 F ED . R. CIV. P. 59(a). See Sm ith v. Transw orld Co., 773 F.2d 610 , 613 (5th Cir. 1985). 23 4 grant a n ew trial if it “finds the verdict is against the weight of the eviden ce, the dam ages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was com m itted in its course.”29 Still, the decision whether to grant a new trial under Rule 59(a) is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the court’s authority is broad. 30 AN ALYSIS I. Th e Ba t s o n Stan d ard The Suprem e Court held in Batson v. Kentucky that purposeful discrim ination in the use of perem ptory strikes of prospective jurors violates the Equal Protection Clause. 31 “Discrim ination in jury selection . . . causes harm s to the litigants, the com m unity, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process.”32 Although Batson was a crim inal case, the doctrine has sin ce extended to cover jury selection in private civil litigation. 33 In considering a Batson challenge to a perem ptory strike, a court m ust conduct a three-step inquiry. 34 First, the trial court m ust determ ine whether the defen dant has m ade a prim a facie showing that the striking party exercised a perem ptory challenge on the basis of race. 35 Second, if the showing is m ade, the burden shifts to the striking party to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. 36 “Although the [striking party] m ust present a com prehensible reason, the second step of this process does not dem and an explanation that is persuasive, 29 See Sm ith, 773, F.2d at 613 (citing Reed Bros., Inc. v. M onsato Co., 525 F.2d 486, 499– 50 (8th Cir. 1975)). In re Om ega Protein, Inc., No. 0 4 CV 0 20 71, 20 0 7 WL 197430 9, at *2 (W.D. La. J uly 2, 20 0 7). See also Thom as v. Concerned Care Hom e Health, Inc., No. 13-5912, 20 16 WL 930 943, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 20 16). 31 476 U.S. 79, 10 6 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). 32 J.E.B. v. Alabam a ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994). 33 Edm onson v. Leesville Con crete Co., 50 0 U.S. 614, 628 (1991). 34 Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (20 0 6) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97). 35 Id. 36 Id. 30 5 or even plausible; so long as the reason is n ot inherently discrim inatory, it suffices.”37 Third, the court m ust then determ ine whether the defen dant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrim ination. 38 This final step involves evaluating the persuasiveness of the justification proffered by the striking party, but “the ultim ate burden of persuasion regarding racial m otivation rests with, and never shifts from , the opponent of the strike.”39 In evaluating the third step, the m oving party “m ay rely on all relevant circum stances to raise an inferen ce of purposeful discrim in ation.”40 “The critical question in determ in ing whether the [challenging party] has proved purposeful discrim ination at step three is the persuasiveness of the [striking party’s] justification for his perem ptory strike.”41 The ultim ate question of discrim inatory intent under Batson’s third step is a question of fact, 42 and a district court’s assessm ent of the parties’ credibility is accorded strong deference. II. 43 J u ry Se le ctio n at Trial The Court allowed each party three perem ptory strikes during jury selection. 44 Plaintiff’s counsel exercised all three strikes. Defense counsel exercised only one, striking J uror Num ber 8, Marcus Henderson, a 49-year-old African-Am erican teacher. 45 Defendants waived their two rem aining strikes. 46 37 Id. Id. 39 Id. 40 Fields v. Thaler, 58 8 F.3d 270 , 274 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke (“Miller-El II”), 545 U.S. 231, 240 (20 0 5)). 41 Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 338-39. 42 Hernandez v. N ew York, 50 0 U.S. 352, 364 (1991). 43 See W oodw ard v . Epps, 58 0 F.3d 318, 336 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (“Whether a defendant has carried his burden under Batson’s third step to prove purposeful discrim in ation is based on the persuasiven ess and credibility of the prosecutor’s justification for his exercise of the perem ptory strike. Because of the im portance of dem eanor and credibility evidence in m aking such determ inations, we give strong deference to the determ ination of the trial judge, consistent with AEDPA.”). 44 R. Doc. 130 at 3. 45 R. Doc. 158 at 1. Defendants do not dispute this description of Mr. Henderson . See R. Doc. 173 at 78 -80 . 46 Id. 38 6 Plaintiff’s counsel asserted two Batson challenges to Defendants’ use of their perem ptory strikes. 47 First, Plaintiff objected to the strike of Mr. Hen derson. 48 The Court, finding that Plaintiff had m ade a prim a facie case, asked defense counsel to articulate a race-neutral reason for the strike. Defense counsel explain ed: He’s an educational adm inistration graduate from the University of Kentucky. As he told us, he’s a teacher of English. In fact, this case involves a professor who brought his students down to New Orleans for an architectural tour. My clients were concerned that the scholastic connection would tend to m ake Mr. Henderson favor the plaintiff in this case over the defense. It’s that sim ple. 49 Plaintiff’s counsel then responded: First of all, with respect to the concern, the witness—of course, it’s not referring to Lyle Dotson, it’s referring to Olon Dotson, and so we think that’s exceptionally peripheral to this case as it played out. The Court granted sum m ary judgm ent as to Olon Dotson. There are also other people certainly in education. Perhaps not college education, but Mr. Murphy has been a teacher for years. Ms. McKinley is starting to tutor as a teacher—as a person at Delgado Com m unity College. And we think that this is a m atter of concern. Mr. Henderson appears well qualified, and we would ask the Court to set aside the challenge. 50 After consideration of the parties’ argum ents, the Court concluded: The cases say that when looking at whether a race-neutral reason has been articulated, the explanation has to be clear and reasonably specific. Unless its discrim inatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deem ed race-neutral. And that’s Hernandez v. N ew York, 476 U.S. 352. And I think that the defendants have articulated a reasonable reason for excluding this juror, so the Batson challen ge is denied. Plaintiff asserted a second Batson challenge to Defendants’ waiver of its two rem aining perem ptory strikes. Plaintiff argued that by failing to exercise its rem aining perem ptories on any other jurors, the Defendants deliberately kept J uror No. 20 , Kevin 47 R. Doc. 173 at 78 . R. Doc. 173 at 78 . 49 Id. at 81. 50 Id. at 81-8 2. 48 7 Arnold, an African-Am erican m ale, from sitting on the jury. 51 Plaintiff contends the Defendants’ waiver is therefore the “functional equivalence” of a discrim in atory strike. 52 III. Mo tio n fo r N e w Trial Plaintiff asserts in his m otion for a new trial that the Court erred by den ying Plaintiff’s Batson challenge to the exclusion of Mr. Henderson. 53 According to Plaintiff, the Court failed to properly conduct the third step of the Batson inquiry and ignored eviden ce of Defendants’ purposeful discrim ination. Specifically, Plaintiff contends Defendants’ proffered reason for striking Mr. Henderson—the “scholastic connection” which m ight bias Mr. Henderson toward the Plaintiff—applied with equal force to two other white jurors, Heidi McKinley and Sean Murphy, whom the Defendants did not strike. Plaintiff also argues the Defendants did not ask any follow-up questions to any jurors about potential bias related to their educational background, and Defendants did not subm it any questions to the Court in advance of trial asking for this topic to be included in the voir dire exam in ation. After reviewing the record, that portion of the trial transcript that was certified, 54 the case law, and the parties’ argum ents, the Court concludes that Defendants’ perem ptory strike of J uror Henderson evin ced purposeful racial discrim ination. Although at trial the Court found that Defendant had articulated “a reasonable reason” for excluding J uror Henderson, upon further consideration, the Court finds that it gave insufficient weight to the com parative juror analysis offered by the Plaintiff. 55 As a result, 51 R. Doc. 173 at 78-79. Id. at 78. 53 R. Doc. 185-3 at 4-15. 54 R. Doc. 173. 55 R. Doc. 173 at 8 2. 52 8 the Court erred in overruling Plaintiff’s Batson challenge, and Plaintiff is entitled to a n ew trial. The Fifth Circuit identifies three prin ciples to guide a district court’s com parative juror analysis. 56 First, “[i]f a [striking party]’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-sim ilar nonblack who is perm itted to serve, that is evidence tendin g to prove purposeful discrim ination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”57 “Second, if the [striking party] asserts that it was concerned about a particular characteristic but did not engage in m eaningful voir dire exam ination on that subject, then the [striking party’s] failure to question the juror on that topic is som e eviden ce that the asserted reason was pretext for discrim in ation.”58 “Third, we m ust consider only the [striking party’s] reasons for striking the black jurors an d com pare those reasons with its treatm ent of the nonblack jurors.”59 These considerations weigh in favor of the Plaintiff in this case. First, Defendants’ rationale for striking J uror Henderson—the alleged “scholastic connection”—applies with equal force to J uror McKinley and J uror Murphy, who are both white. Hen derson had been a teacher in New Orleans for over 24 years, and was seeking a doctorate in educational adm inistration. 60 His years as a teacher an d his experience in higher education, which ostensibly m ay give rise to passive pro-academ ic bias, are experiences he shares with McKinley and Murphy. McKinley was working towards a m aster’s degree in creative writing, and was soon to begin a position tutoring students at 56 Hebert v. Rogers, 890 F.3d 213, 222 (5th Cir. 20 18 ) (citing Reed v. Quarterm an, 555 F.3d 364, 376 (5th Cir. 20 0 9)). 57 Reed, 555 F.3d at 376 (citing Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241). 58 Id. 59 Id. 60 R. Doc. 173 at 38-39. 9 a local com m unity college. 61 Murphy worked as a technical coordinator and com puter teacher at a Catholic school. 62 Despite these qualifications, Defendants did not exercise perem ptory strikes against either of these jurors. 63 In response, Defendan ts’ attem pt to distinguish Henderson from McKinley and Murphy. Defendants argue “[n]either J urors McKinley or Murphy has pursued a Ph.D— neither had obtain ed a m aster’s degree.”64 Further, “[n]either of J urors McKinley or Murphy taught high school students, served as vice principal in a high school, or had a spouse who was a high school principal, m uch less a spouse who worked in education at all.”65 The Court fails to see how these facts would sufficiently distinguish Henderson from McKinley or Murphy such that the form er would present a risk of bias based on a “scholastic connection” while the latter would not. These “proffered reason[s] for striking a blank panelist appl[y] just as well to an otherwise-sim ilar nonblack who is perm itted to serve,” an d as a result, suggest that the asserted reason is pretext for discrim in ation. 66 Second, Plaintiff correctly asserts that Defendants did not request that the Court conduct follow-up questions from potential jury m em bers about any bias stem m ing from a “scholastic connection,” and Defendants did not propose any voir dire questions related to the jurors’ academ ic backgrounds. The Fifth Circuit counsels that “if the [striking party] presents a particular reason for striking a juror without engag[ing] in m eaningful voir dire exam ination on that subject, that is som e evidence that the asserted reason for the strike was pretext for discrim in ation.”67 In Reed v. Quarterm an, the state struck a 61 Id. at 38. Id. at 40 -41. 63 R. Doc. 158 . 64 R. Doc. 195 at 5. 65 Id. 66 Reed, 555 F.3d at 376. 67 Hebert, 8 90 F.3d at 222. 62 10 possible juror who was African -Am erican on the grounds that she was a health care professional and that health care workers are generally disfavored in cases involving m edical evidence. However, “the prosecutor did not ask her anything about her background as a health care professional or the type of patients she saw.”68 As a result, “[t]he State’s failure to question her about her job suggests that this asserted reasons for striking [the juror] was pretextual.”69 Pretrial, Defendants did not subm it any voir dire questions to the Court regarding any bias related to a possible “scholastic connection.”70 Although Defendants proposed questions about jurors’ connections to the state police, spen ding tim e in the French Quarter, perceived bias in the police com m unity generally, and the belief in the right to privacy, Defendants did not propose asking an y questions about education al background. 71 At trial in this case, as in Reed, the Defendants failed to engage in any voir dire questioning whatsoever as to possible bias connected to academ ic background. 72 During the voir dire exam ination, after all three had disclosed their educational connections, the Court gave both parties an opportunity to subm it follow-up questions of the jurors. 73 Plaintiff requested follow-up questioning on several jurors. Defense counsel did not request follow-up on any topic of any juror. 74 The Court concedes “it does not autom atically follow that absence of the questions in voir dire is indicative of pretext.”75 In W oodw ard v. Epps, the Fifth Circuit found that 68 Reed, 555 F.3d at 377. Id. 70 See R. Doc. 139. 71 Id. 72 Id. 73 R. Doc. 173 at 68 -70 . 74 Id. at 70 . 75 Pucket v. Epps, 641 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 20 11). 69 11 the plaintiff had not established that the state’s asserted reason for the perem ptory strike was pretext, despite the fact that the prosecution “asked no questions” about the issue during voir dire. 76 The Fifth Circuit denied the Batson challenge, noting that the juror questionnaire used in that case included questions on the relevant topics. As a result, an absence of questioning from the prosecution during voir dire carried less weight. There was no juror questionnaire in this case. The Court’s voir dire exam in ation elicited basic inform ation about the jurors’ academ ic backgrounds and profession al lives. 77 Multiple jurors had qualities which m ay have given rise to the “scholastic connection,” but the Defendants failed to request that the Court ask follow-up questions regarding this alleged bias. The fact that Defendants did not subm it specific questions of the jurors regarding any potential academ ic-associated bias pre-trial, and did not request that the Court ask any follow-up questions about any bias related to Olon Dotson’s academ ic career durin g voir dire, suggests m ore strongly in this case than in W oodw ard that the Defendants’ proffered reason is pretextual. Lastly, Defendants’ proffered reason for striking Henderson is only m arginally relevant to the issues presented in the case. As Plaintiff noted during jury selection, the Court granted Defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent as to Olon Dotson’s claim s. 78 As a result, Olon Dotson was a witness and not a party. 79 “The critical question in determ in ing whether the [challenging party] has proved purposeful discrim ination at step three is the persuasiven ess of the [striking party’s] justification for his perem ptory strike.”80 Upon further consideration, the Court 76 580 F.3d 318, 340 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). R. Doc. 173 at 35-68. 78 R. Doc. 10 9. 79 R. Doc. 173 at 81. 80 Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 338-39. 77 12 concludes that Defendants’ justification for striking Hen derson is sim ply not persuasive. Considering “all relevant circum stances,”81 the Court finds Plaintiff has m et his burden of proving the Defendants’ proffered reason for exercising a perem ptory strike against Henderson was pretext for unlawfully striking him based on his race. 82 As a result, the Court’s ruling at trial overruling Plaintiff’s Batson challenge was in error, and Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. Accordingly; IT IS ORD ERED that Plaintiff’s m otion for a new trial 83 is hereby GRAN TED . 84 N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 15th d ay o f Ju n e , 2 0 18 . ______________________ _________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 81 Hernandez, 50 0 U.S. at 363. As Plaintiff’s m otion for new trial is granted on the Batson challenge to Mr. Henderson, the Court need not address either the second Batson challenge or the other argum ents in favor of a new trial. 83 R. Doc. 183. 84 As Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, Plaintiff’s m otion for attorn eys’ fees, R. Doc. 18 2, and Defendant Huey McCartney’s m otion for judgm ent as a m atter of law, R. Doc. 184, are denied as m oot. 82 13
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