Brown v. Williams et al, No. 2:2016cv15251 - Document 18 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER & REASONS granting 6 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Party Jimmie Thorns, Jr, Erroll G. Williams, Lawrence E. Chehardy and Robert D Hoffman, Jr dismissed. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 1/12/2017. (mmm)
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Brown v. Williams et al Doc. 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA HOWARD BROWN CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 16-15251 ERROLL G. WILLIAMS, ET AL SECTION “R” (1) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants Erroll G. William s, Lawrence E. Chehardy, J imm ie Thorns, J r., and Robert D. Hoffm an, J r. m ove 1 the Court to dism iss plaintiff Howard Brown’s com plaint. 2 Because the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff’s com plaint, the m otions to dism iss are GRANTED. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a tax dispute. Plaintiff believes that the application of Louisiana’s ad valorem tax scheme to plaintiff’s property is unconstitutional under both the United States and Louisiana constitutions. On October 5, 20 16, Plaintiff Howard Brown filed this pro se lawsuit alleging that defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of his rights. At the tim e the com plaint was filed, defendant William s was the Assessor of Orleans Parish, 1 2 R. Doc. 6; R. Doc. 13. R. Doc. 1. Dockets.Justia.com Chehardy and Thorns were m em bers of the Louisiana Tax Com m ission, and Hoffm an was special counsel for the Com m ission. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that, in imposing an ad valorem tax on Brown’s property, the defendants conspired to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff seeks $ 20 ,80 0 ,0 0 0 and costs for his suit. 3 On October 13, 20 16, defendant William s filed a m otion to dism iss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On October 31, the rem aining defendants filed a motion to dism iss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) as well as a m otion to strike under Rule 12(f). 4 Plaintiff filed a response on Novem ber 15, 20 16, 5 and defendants replied three days later. 6 Defendants’ m otions to dism iss argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act, and possibly under the Eleventh Am endment. The m otions also argue that even if this Court had jurisdiction, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 3 4 5 6 R. Doc. 1 at 16. R. Doc. 13-1 at 2. R. Doc. 14. R. Doc. 17. 2 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD A. Ru le 12 ( b) ( 1) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) requires dism issal of an action if the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject m atter of the plaintiff’s claim . Motions subm itted under that rule allow a party to challenge the court’s subject m atter jurisdiction based upon the allegations on the face of the com plaint. Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 0 3-2223, 20 0 6 WL 1450 420 , at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 20 0 6). If the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a claim , the claim must be dism issed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Hom e Builders Ass’n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 10 0 6, 10 10 (5th Cir. 1998). A court has federal question jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s claim arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A claim arises under federal law when federal law creates the cause of action. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 30 8, 312 (20 0 5). When “a private citizen relies on a federal statute as the basis of federal question jurisdiction, that statute m ust provide a private cause of action, or else a federal court will not have subject m atter jurisdiction to hear the dispute.” Low e v. View Point Bank, 3 972 F. Supp. 2d 947, 954 (N.D. Tex. 20 13) (citing Merrell Dow Pharm aceuticals Inc. v. Thom pson, 478 U.S. 80 4, 817 (1986)). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) m otion to dism iss, the court m ay rely on (1) the com plaint alone, presum ing the allegations to be true, (2) the com plaint supplem ented by undisputed facts, or (3) the com plaint supplem ented by undisputed facts and by the court’s resolution of disputed facts. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 , 424 (5th Cir. 20 0 1); see also Barrera-Montenegro, 74 F.3d at 659. A court’s dism issal of a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not a decision on the m erits, and the dism issal does not necessarily prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in another forum . See Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 60 6, 60 8 (5th Cir. 1977). B. Ru le 12 ( b) ( 6 ) When a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim , Rule 12(b)(6) provides the appropriate challenge. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, plaintiffs must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 547 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 4 liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all wellpleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232-33 (5th Cir. 20 0 9); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 , 196 (5th Cir. 1996). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that plaintiffs’ claim is true. Id. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each elem ent of the plaintiffs’ claim . Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 255-57. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (20 0 7); Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 20 0 7), the claim m ust be dism issed. Finally, because plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court will apply “less stringent standards to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented 5 by counsel. Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam ). This does not m ean, however, that a court “will invent, out of whole cloth, novel arguments on behalf of a pro se plaintiff in the absence of m eaningful, albeit im perfect, briefing.” Jones v. Alfred, 353 F. App’x 949, 951-52 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). Therefore, even a liberally construed pro se com plaint “m ust set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief m ay be granted.” Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 10 0 (5th Cir. 1993). III. D ISCU SSION The Tax Injunction Act provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient rem edy m ay be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. As the Fifth Circuit holds, “[s]ection 1341 reflects ‘the fundam ental principle of com ity between federal courts and state governments that is essential to Our Federalism, particularly in the area of state taxation.’” W ashington v. N ew Orleans City , 424 F. App’x 30 7, 30 910 (5th Cir. 20 11) (quoting Fair Assessm ent in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McN ary , 454 U.S. 10 0 , 10 3 (1981)). Federal courts interpret section 1341’s text to advance its purpose of “confin[ing] federal-court intervention in state governm ent.” ANR Pipeline Co. v. Louisiana Tax Com m ’n, 646 F.3d 940 , 6 946 (5th Cir. 20 11) (quoting Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 826-27 (1997)). Here, plaintiff seeks $ 20 ,80 0 ,0 0 0 in dam ages arising out of the allegedly unconstitutional application of Louisiana’s ad valorem tax scheme to his property. As the text of section 1341 instructs courts not to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax,” 28 U.S.C. § 1341, plaintiff argues that Act does not apply here because he has never “asked [the] court or intend[ed] to ask a jury to enjoin, suspend, restrain, levy or collect any tax under Louisiana state law.”7 Plaintiff’s argum ent ignores the breadth of the Tax Injunction Act. The Fifth Circuit has m ade clear that the Tax Injunction Act “is not a narrow statute aim ed only at injunctive interference with tax collection, but is rather a broad restriction on federal jurisdiction in suits that im pede state tax administration . . . .” United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. W hitm an, 595 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 1979). Consistent with this broad interpretation, the Fifth Circuit has previously found that the Tax Injunction Act also applies to federal suits for dam ages against state tax adm inistrators based on theories that the enforcement of the tax is unconstitutional, because the suit “would have m any of the same detrim ental effects that actions for tax refund, declaratory, or injunction 7 R. Doc. 14-1 at 3. 7 relief would have.” A Bonding Co. v. Sunnuck, 629 F.2d 1127, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1980 ). Further, that the suit alleges civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not preclude the application of the Tax Injunction Act. Moss v. State of Ga., 655 F.2d 668, 669 (5th Cir. 1981). Thus, the Court m ay not exercise jurisdiction unless Louisiana fails to provide a “plain, speedy, and efficient rem edy” for plaintiff’s claim s. 28 U.S.C. § 1341. “State courts are equipped to furnish a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy if they provide a procedural vehicle that affords taxpayers the opportunity to raise their federal constitutional claim s.” Hom e Builders Ass’n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 10 0 6, 10 12 (5th Cir. 1998). A state’s remedy is therefore adequate when it provides taxpayers with a com plete judicial determ ination, with ultim ate review available in the United States Suprem e Court. Sm ith v. Travis Cnty . Educ. Dist., 968 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Rosew ell v. LaSalle N at. Bank, 450 U.S. 50 3, 514 (1981)). Im portantly, “the state remedy need not be the best of all remedies. [I]t need only be adequate.” Hom e Builders, 143 F.3d at 10 12 (quoting Alnoa G. Corp. v. City of Houston, Tex., 563 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1977)). Here, Louisiana provides a procedural vehicle for raising constitutional challenges to state taxation schemes: paym ent under 8 Louisiana’s payment-under-protest statute and a refund suit in state court. As the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held, these procedures provide an adequate means of asserting constitutional claim s in Louisiana courts. See W ashington, 424 F. App’x at 310 ; ANR Pipeline, 646 F.3d at 947; MRT Expl. Co. v. McN am ara, 731 F.2d 260 , 263 n.5 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he Louisiana refund procedure provides taxpayers with a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Louisiana courts.”). Plaintiff’s response to the m otions to dism iss does not contest that Louisiana provides taxpayers who wish to challenge Louisiana’s ad valorem taxation schem e with a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. Thus, the relief that plaintiff seeks in this case would dispute Louisiana’s tax adm inistration, and a plain, speedy and efficient remedy is available in state court. Accordingly, the Tax Injunction Act precludes the Court from exercising jurisdiction over this case. 8 IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ m otions to dism iss. Plaintiff’s com plaint is DISMISSED under Federal Rule of Civil 8 Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint, the Court need not address whether plaintiff’s suit is barred by the Eleventh Am endm ent or if plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 9 Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject m atter jurisdiction. Since this dism issal is for lack of subject m atter jurisdiction, it is without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to pursue his claim s in state court. 12th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of J anuary, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 10
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