Angelin v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, No. 2:2016cv15189 - Document 21 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 11 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Angelin's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/26/2017. (cg)
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Angelin v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania Doc. 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA RAYMOND ANGELIN CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 16-15189 INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA SECTION “R” (3) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court are cross m otions for sum m ary judgment filed by Plaintiff Raym ond Angelin and defendant The Insurance Com pany of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSP). Because the Court finds that Angelin’s em ployer executed a valid waiver of uninsured motorist coverage, ICSP’s m otion is granted and Angelin’s m otion is denied. Accordingly, Angelin’s claim s are dism issed with prejudice. I. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Raym ond Angelin works for Cross Road Centers Transportation, Inc. 1 As part of his job, Angelin drives Cross Road’s 20 15 Volvo tractor trailer truck. 2 Cross Road m aintained an auto insurance policy 1 2 R. Doc. 1-1 at 4. Id. Dockets.Justia.com with defendant The Insurance Com pany of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSP) for the period of March 1, 20 15 to March 1, 20 16. 3 Angelin alleges that he was injured on August 2, 20 15 when an uninsured or underinsured m otorist sideswiped the Volvo truck. 4 According to Angelin, he was driving the truck within the course and scope of his work for Cross Road at the tim e of the accident. 5 Angelin alleges that, under Cross Road’s auto insurance policy, ICSP is to liable Angelin for the m otorist’s negligence. 6 Angelin seeks compensation for dam ages including m edical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. 7 Angelin sued ICSP in the 24th J udicial District Court for the Parish of J efferson. 8 ICSP rem oved to this Court on October 13, 20 16. 9 The parties have filed dueling m otions for sum mary judgment on the issue of whether Cross Road’s auto insurance policy with ICSP includes uninsured m otorist coverage. 10 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 R. Doc. 11-5 at 3; R. Doc. 18-5 at 2. R. Doc. 1-1 at 4. Id. Id. at 5-6. Id. at 5. Id. at 4. R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 11; R. Doc. 18. 2 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgment is warranted when “the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any m aterial fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonm oving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultim ate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am . Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-m oving party.” EEOC v. Sim baki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 20 14). If the dispositive issue is one on which the m oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party “m ust come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went 3 uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally ’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonm oving party can then defeat the m otion by either countering with evidence sufficient to dem onstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of m aterial fact, or “showing that the m oving party’s evidence is so sheer that it m ay not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the m oving party.” Id. at 1265. If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonm oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party m ay satisfy its burden by m erely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential elem ent of the nonm oving party’s claim . See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonm oving party, who m ust, by subm itting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonm ovant m ay not rest upon the pleadings, but m ust identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75 (“Rule 56 m andates the entry of sum m ary judgment, after adequate tim e for discovery and upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elem ent essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)). 4 III. D ISCU SSION The parties’ dispute is a narrow one. Both sides agree that Cross Roads, through its legal representative Robert Gadola, executed an “Uninsured/ Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage Form .”11 Gadola initialed in the space next to the sentence “I do not want UMBI coverage” and signed and dated the bottom of the page. 12 Despite this clear evidence of intent to waive uninsured motorist coverage, Angelin argues that the waiver is ineffective because the waiver form does not state the relevant policy num ber. Under Louisiana Law, every autom obile liability policy offers im plicit coverage for uninsured m otorists, even if the contract does not explicitly address the issue. Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 950 So. 2d 544, 547 (La. 20 0 6). A m otorist m ay waive uninsured m otorist coverage, but the waiver m ust be “clear and unm istakable” and “the insurer bears the burden of proving any insured nam ed in the policy rejected in writing the coverage.” Id. Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1295 provides that uninsured m otorist coverage may be waived only by way of “a form proscribed by the 11 12 R. Doc. 18-4. Id. 5 com m issioner of insurance.” The Louisiana Suprem e Court has held that, for a waiver to be effective, the contracting parties m ust com plete six “tasks”: (1) initialing the selection or rejection of coverage chosen; (2) if lim its lower than the policy lim its are chosen (available in options 2 and 4), then filling in the am ount of coverage selected for each person and each accident; (3) printing the nam e of the nam ed insured or legal representative; (4) signing the nam e of the named insured or legal representative; (5) filling in the policy num ber; and (6) filling in the date. Duncan, 950 So. 2d at 551. The Louisiana Suprem e Court has, however, recognized an exception to these requirements. In Carter v. State Farm Mutual Autom obile Insurance Com pany , an insured executed an uninsured m otorist waiver form before the insurer had generated a policy num ber. 964 So. 2d 375, 376 (La. 20 0 7). The court held that the waiver was valid and lawful because “the Com m issioner of Insurance’s regulations specifically allow om ission of the policy num ber if it does not exist at the tim e the [uninsured m otorist] waiver form is com pleted.” Id.; see also Kurz v. Milano, 6 So. 3d 916, 920 (La. App. 4 Cir. 20 0 9) (“[S]ince Duncan, the Louisiana Supreme Court has concluded that filling in the policy num ber is not essential to a valid UM coverage waiver where the evidence establishes that no policy number was available at the tim e of the execution of the UM coverage form .”). 6 Here, the evidence before the Court shows that no policy num ber was available when Gadola signed the waiver form. ICSP subm its an affidavit from Sherri Wright, a Business Insurance Account Manager with AWS insurance. 13 Wright attests that AWS is Cross Road’s insurance agent, and that “at the tim e that Robert Gadola executed the [waiver form ], no policy num ber was available as the coverage had not yet been bound, and neither the [auto insurance] policy nor the [auto insurance] policy num ber had been issued or m ade available by the insurer.”14 Angelin provides no evidence tending to contradict this assertion. Furtherm ore, in accordance with Local Rule 56.1, ICSP included a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts with its m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. 15 The Statement sim ilarly asserts that no policy num ber existed at the tim e the waiver was signed. 16 Angelin offers no statement challenging this factual assertion, and it is therefore deem ed adm itted. See Local Rule 56.2. Accordingly, the Court finds that no policy num ber was available when Gadola executed the uninsured motorist waiver. Therefore, as m ade clear in Carter, no policy num ber was required. Because the form fulfills the rest of 13 14 15 16 R. Doc. 18-4 at 1-2. Id. at 2. R. Doc. 18-5. Id. 7 the Duncan requirem ents, it is a valid waiver of uninsured m otorist coverage under Louisiana law. ICSP is therefore entitled to summ ary judgment on Angelin’s uninsured m otorist claim . IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, defendant The Insurance Com pany of the State of Pennsylvania’s motion for sum m ary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff Raym ond Angelin’s partial m otion for summ ary judgm ent is DENIED. Angelin’s claim s are DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. 26th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of April, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 8
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