Lafrance v. New Orleans City et al, No. 2:2016cv14439 - Document 28 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 23 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim with Respect to Count One of the Complaint. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 5/31/2017. (cg)
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Lafrance v. New Orleans City et al Doc. 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA J OSEPH T. LAFRANCE VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-14439 CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendant Sheriff Marlin Gusm an m oves to dism iss Plaintiff J oseph T. LaFrance’s individual capacity claim s under Count One. The Court finds that LaFrance’s allegations, taken as true, cannot overcom e Gusm an’s qualified im m unity from suit. Accordingly, Gusm an’s m otion to dism iss is granted. I. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff J oseph T. LaFrance alleges that he was arrested on an invalid warrant for unpaid fines and fees and held for three weeks in Orleans Parish Prison without being brought before a judge. 1 LaFrance further alleges that no bond was ever set in his case. 2 While incarcerated, LaFrance allegedly suffered several seizures and lost his job. 3 LaFrance names the City of New 1 2 3 R. Doc. 1 at 8. Id. Id. at 9. Dockets.Justia.com Orleans, the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court (OPCDC), J udicial Adm inistrator Robert Kazik, and Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusman as defendants. 4 LaFrance challenges his arrest and incarceration on several grounds. Specifically, LaFrance alleges that: 1. LaFrance had, in fact, paid all fines and fees due to the court, and his warrant was therefore issued in error. 5 2. Defendants have a policy of issuing and enforcing such nonpaym ent warrants without inquiry into the subject’s ability to pay, and this practice violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Am endm ents to the U.S. Constitution. 6 3. LaFrance was “indefinitely” jailed in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent, and LaFrance’s incarceration constitutes wrongful arrest and im prisonm ent under Louisiana law. 7 4. LaFrance was deprived of his right to a neutral tribunal because the prosecutor and judicial officer that seek and approve 4 5 6 7 Id. at Id. at Id. at Id. at 6-7. 32. 33. 33, 35. 2 nonpaym ent warrants, and conduct subsequent hearings, are financially interested in the outcom e of such cases. 8 5. Defendants im posed unduly restrictive m ethods of collection on LaFrance in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent. 9 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Lorm and v. US Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 20 0 9); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 , 196 (5th Cir. 1996). A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need 8 9 Id. at 33-34. Id. at 34-35. 3 not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elem ents of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiff’s claim. Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, the claim m ust be dism issed. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. III. D ISCU SSION As a state law enforcement officer sued in his individual capacity, Gusm an m ay raise the defense of qualified im m unity. See W alker v. How ard, 517 F. App’x 236, 237 (5th Cir. 20 13). Accordingly, Gusm an is im m une unless LaFrance’s allegations, taken as true, dem onstrate that (1) Gusm an violated LaFrance’s constitutional rights and (2) Gusm an’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the alleged violation. Hinojosa v. Livingston, 80 7 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 20 15). “A Governm ent official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are 4 sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al– Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (20 11) (internal quotations and m odifications om itted); see also Manis v. Law son, 585 F.3d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (“Qualified im m unity shields from civil liability ‘all but the plainly incom petent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, (1986)). As to the first prong, LaFrance has plainly alleged that Gusm an violated his constitutional rights. LaFrance alleges that he was arrested without probable cause to believe he com m itted a crim e. The Fourth Am endm ent of the United States Constitution provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirm ation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “An arrest is unlawful unless it is supported by probable cause,” Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 40 2 (5th Cir. 20 0 4), and “[a]n individual’s right to be free from such unlawful arrest and detention is a federally protected right, the violation of which m ay be grounds for a suit under section 1983.” Dennis v. W arren, 779 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1985). Merely alleging a constitutional violation is, however, insufficient to overcome qualified im m unity. Gusm an rem ains im m une unless LaFrance has raised a plausible inference that LaFrance’s incarceration was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Absent som e indication that 5 a warrant is in fact invalid, executing a facially valid warrant is not objectively unreasonable. See Hart v. O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 445 (5th Cir. 1997). An officer executing such a warrant—facially valid but, unknown to the officer, issued absent probable cause—is therefore entitled to qualified im m unity. See Turner v. Ray nes, 611 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1980 ) (“It would be a strange and unworkable rule that required a sheriff, at his peril, to determ ine the ultim ate legal validity of every warrant regular on its face and issued by proper authority before serving it.”); see also Pierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (“A policem an’s lot is not so unhappy that he m ust choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, (or, as here, a warrant) and being m ulcted in dam ages if he does.”); Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Tex., 950 F.2d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 1992) (“We do not hold that police officers m ust conduct an investigation regarding the warrant's validity.”). Accordingly, because LaFrance does not allege that the warrant issued in his nam e was facially invalid, Gusm an is entitled to qualified im m unity unless LaFrance has alleged facts giving rise to a plausible inference that Gusm an knew that LaFrance’s warrant was invalid. The Court finds that LaFrance has not, and that Gusm an is therefore protected by qualified 6 im m unity. LaFrance points to several vectors by which Gusm an m ay have becom e aware of the warrants infirm ity. None is persuasive. First, LaFrance argues that Gusm an should have been aware that LaFrance’s warrant was invalid because a Collections Departm ent employee described the office’s alleged policy of forging judicial signatures in open court in 20 15. LaFrance suggests that the courtroom was staffed by a sheriff’s deputy at the tim e. LaFrance, however, does not reference this testim ony in his com plaint. Rather, in his m otion opposing Gusm an’s m otion to dism iss, LaFrance cites materials filed in Cain v. City of N ew Orleans, 15-4479 (E.D. La., filed Sep. 17, 20 15). Setting aside whether this evidence is properly before the Court on a m otion to dism iss, the Court finds that it does not give rise to plausible inference that Gusm an knew that LaFrance’s warrant was invalid. LaFrance does not argue that Gusm an him self was present for collection agent’s testim ony, or even identify which deputy was present. LaFrance cites no authority for the proposition that, even if a single identified deputy was m ade aware of the Collection Department’s warrant practices, this knowledge can be imputed to Gusm an. LaFrance’s next argum ent is that the com plaint in Cain, put Gusm an on notice that OPCDC was issuing warrants for unpaid fines and fees absent probable cause. LaFrance specifically points to a transcript of the collection 7 agent’s testim ony described above, which was attached to the Cain com plaint. This argum ent fails because Gusm an was not served with the Cain complaint until after LaFrance was released. As m ade clear by the relevant return of service, the Cain plaintiffs did not serve Gusm an until September 22, 20 15, the day after LaFrance was released. 10 Cain v. City of N ew Orleans, 15-4479 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 20 15) (proof of service of Marlin Gusm an). LaFrance pleads no facts to support a finding that Gusm an becam e aware of the suit before he was actually served. Accordingly, the filing of the Cain suit does not give rise a plausible inference that Gusman knew LaFrance’s warrant was invalid. Finally, LaFrance alleges that he com plained he was “lost in the system ” and that he needed to know what his warrant was about and why he had not been to court. 11 LaFrance also alleges that his girlfriend called the Orleans Parish Prison repeatedly to try to set a hearing before a judge. 12 LaFrance argues that these complaints were sufficient to inform Gusm an of the infirm ity of LaFrance’s warrant. But the com plaints plainly do nothing to inform Gusm an or his staff that LaFrance was arrested pursuant to warrant 10 R. Doc. 1 at 33 (alleging that “Mr. LaFrance was illegally incarcerated from September 3, 20 15 until September 21, 20 15”). 11 Id. at 9. 12 Id. at 9-10 . 8 issued absent probable cause. Accordingly, the com plaints do not support LaFrance’s argument that Gusm an knew the warrant was invalid. Because LaFrance alleges that Gusm an held him on the authority of a facially valid warrant, and pleads no facts giving rise a plausible inference that Gusm an was aware that the warrant was issued absent probable cause, Gusm an is entitled to qualified im m unity and LaFrance’s claim s under Count One against Gusm an in his individual capacity m ust be dism issed. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, defendant Sheriff Marlin Gusm an’s m otion to dism iss claim s under Count One against Gusm an in his individual capacity are DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. 31st New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of May, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 9
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