MC Bank & Trust Company v. Suard Barge Service, Inc. et al, No. 2:2016cv14311 - Document 23 (E.D. La. 2017)

Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 11 Motion for Entry of Default as to Louis O'Neil Suard Jr. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 9/11/2017. (tm)

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MC Bank & Trust Company v. Suard Barge Service, Inc. et al Doc. 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA M C BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-14311 SUARD BARGE SERVICE, INC., ET AL SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is plaintiff’s m otion for entry of default judgm ent. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a loan provided by Plaintiff M C Bank & Trust Com pany to Defendant Suard Barge Service, Inc. 2 On J anuary 12, 20 10 , Suard Barge Service, as borrower, executed a term loan agreement for $ 3,950 ,0 0 0 , 3 a prom issory note, 4 two com m ercial security agreem ents, 5 an assignment of life insurance policy, 6 and a preferred fleet m ortgage. 7 The 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 R. Doc. 11. R. Doc. 1 at 2-3. R. Doc. 11-3. R. Doc. 11-4. R. Doc. 11-6; R. Doc. 11-7. R. Doc. 11-13 at 3. R. Doc. 11-14. Dockets.Justia.com preferred fleet m ortgage granted plaintiff a continuing security interest in certain collateral, including the vessels the M/ V Captain Suard and the Suard XXI. 8 Defendant Prem ier Services, Inc. served as a guarantor of the J anuary 12, 20 10 loan agreem ent between plaintiff and Suard Barge Service. 9 As guarantor, Prem ier Services executed the term loan agreement, 10 a com m ercial security agreement, 11 a com m ercial guaranty, 12 and a preferred fleet m ortgage. 13 The preferred fleet m ortgage was executed by Prem ier Services and granted plaintiff a continuing security interest in certain collateral, including the vessels the Suard 70 , the Suard 71, the Suard 72, the Suard 73, the Suard 76, and the Suard XV. 14 Plaintiff’s J anuary 12, 20 10 loan to Suard Barge Service was also guaranteed by Defendant Louis O’Neil Suard, J r. in his individual capacity. 15 Mr. Suard served as president of Suard Barge Service and Prem ier Services at the tim e of the loan. 16 Mr. Suard signed the term loan agreem ent as 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Id. at 2-3. R. Doc. 1 at 9. R. Doc. 11-3 at 13. R. Doc. 11-7. R. Doc. 11-17. R. Doc. 11-15. Id. at 1-2. R. Doc. 1 at 9; R. Doc. 11-3 at 13. R. Doc. 11-3 at 13. 2 guarantor 17 and executed a separate com m ercial guaranty. 18 Under the term s of the com mercial guaranty, Mr. Suard guaranteed payment of the full indebtedness of Suard Barge Service to plaintiff. 19 At the tim e of the J anuary 12, 20 10 loan, Mr. Suard had already executed another com m ercial security agreement to secure an earlier loan from plaintiff to Suard Barge Service. 20 This agreem ent grants plaintiff a continuing security interest in Mr. Suard’s boat, Aw esom e, bearing Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries registration num ber LA-1345-EX and decal num ber 0 870 39-0 4. 21 Plaintiff alleges that Suard Barge Service defaulted on the J anuary 12, 20 10 loan by failing to m ake any required m onthly paym ents due on or after April 12, 20 15, failing to provide required financial statements, and failing to provide proof of insurance coverage on certain collateral. 22 On May 20 , 20 15, plaintiff notified Suard Barge Service and Mr. Suard that the loan was in default. 23 On February 1, 20 16, plaintiff notified Suard Barge Service, Prem ier Services, and Mr. Suard by letter of its decision to accelerate the loan 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 R. Doc. 1 at 9; R. Doc. 11-3 at 13. R. Doc. 1-14. Id. at 1. R. Doc. 11-5. Id. R. Doc. 1 at 13-14. Id.; R. Doc. 1-16. 3 and declare all am ounts im m ediately due and payable. 24 Suard Barge Service, Prem ier Services, and Mr. Suard allegedly failed to pay the loan balance. 25 On August 30 , 20 16, plaintiff filed a com plaint against Suard Barge Service, Prem ier Services, and Mr. Suard in his individual capacity. 26 Plaintiff also nam ed as defendants eight vessels included as collateral in the preferred fleet m ortgages. 27 Plaintiff requests dam ages in the am ount of the unpaid loan principal and interest, as well as costs, attorneys’ fees, expenses, and charges associated with the loans. 28 Plaintiff further requests a judgm ent recognizing its right to enforce the loan agreement, the prom issory note, the preferred fleet m ortgages, the security agreem ents, the life insurance assignment, and the com mercial guarantees. 29 Plaintiff also seeks a writ of sequestration. 30 Mr. Suard executed waivers of service on behalf of all defendants, 31 but defendants did not file a tim ely answer or responsive pleading in this m atter. 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 R. Doc. 1 at 14-15; R. Doc. 1-17. R. Doc. 1 at 15. R. Doc. 1. Id. at 2-3. Id. at 19. Id. at 19-20 . Id. at 20 . R. Doc. 6. 4 On November 30 , 20 16, the clerk entered default against all defendants. 32 On August 30 , 20 17, Mr. Suard filed an answer generally denying the allegations in the com plaint. 33 On May 9, 20 17, Suard Barge Service and Prem ier Services each filed notices of bankruptcy. 34 The Court stayed this m atter as to Suard Barge Service and Prem ier Services only. 35 On May 19, 20 17, the Suard 70 , the Suard 71, the Suard 72, the Suard 73, and the Suard 76 were sold and the bankruptcy trustee distributed proceeds from this sale to plaintiff in the am ount of $ 254,587.50 . 36 Plaintiff now seeks a default judgm ent against Mr. Suard. 37 Mr. Suard has not filed an opposition to this m otion. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, the Court m ay enter a default judgm ent against a party when it fails to plead or otherwise respond to the plaintiff’s complaint within the required tim e period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. A 32 33 34 35 36 37 R. Doc. 9. R. Doc. 20 . R. Doc. 13; R. Doc. 14. R. Doc. 15. R. Doc. 19 at 2. R. Doc. 11; R. Doc. 19. 5 plaintiff who seeks a default judgm ent against an unresponsive defendant m ust proceed through two steps. First, the plaintiff m ust petition the court for an entry of default, which is sim ply “a notation of the party’s default on the clerk’s record of the case.” Dow Chem . Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Hansen, 795 F.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir. 1986). Before the clerk m ay enter the default, the plaintiff m ust show “by affidavit or otherwise” that the defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After the defendant’s default has been entered, the plaintiff m ay request a default judgm ent from the court. At this stage, the court deems the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations adm itted. See N ishim atsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Hous. N at’l Bank, 515 F.2d 120 0 , 120 6 (5th Cir. 1975). At the same tim e, “the defendant is not held to adm it facts that are not well-pleaded or to adm it conclusions of law.” Id. The default judgm ent “m ust be supported by well-pleaded allegations and m ust have a sufficient basis in the pleadings.” W ooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs, Inc., 788 F.3d 490 , 498 (5 th Cir. 20 15) (internal quotation om itted). No party is entitled to a default judgm ent as a m atter of right. Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 20 7, 212 (5th Cir. 1996). The disposition of a m otion for entry of default judgm ent rests within the sound discretion of the district 6 court. Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977). In deciding whether to grant default judgm ent, the court will consider factors such as the existence of disputed m aterial facts, the clarity of the grounds for default, whether there has been substantial prejudice, the harshness of a default judgm ent, whether default was caused by a good faith m istake or excusable neglect, and whether the court would feel obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s m otion. See Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 10 Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2685 (2d ed. 1983)). III. D ISCU SSION A. Effe ct o f Ban kru p tcy Stay This m atter is autom atically stayed as to defendants Suard Barge Service and Prem ier Services because they are in bankruptcy proceedings. 38 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (providing for autom atic stay of judicial proceedings after bankruptcy petition is filed). This stay also extends to actions to obtain possession of property of the estate or to enforce liens against property of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (a)(5). The preferred fleet m ortgages subm itted to the Court indicate that the vessels the M/ V Captain Suard and 38 R. Doc. 15. 7 the Suard XXI are property of Suard Barge Service 39 and that the vessels the Suard 70 , the Suard 71, the Suard 72, the Suard 73, the Suard 76, and the Suard XV are property of Prem ier Services. 40 Plaintiff’s claim s relating to these vessels are therefore also stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings. This m atter has not been stayed as to Defendant Louis O’Neil Suard. See In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) does not stay proceedings against nonbankrupt codefendants); In re Babcock & W ilcox Co., No. 0 0 -340 8, 20 0 1 WL 53630 5, at *2-3 (E.D. La. 20 0 1). The Court will consider plaintiff’s m otion for default judgm ent against Mr. Suard in his individual capacity. B. Ju ris d ictio n Before entering a default judgm ent, a district court m ust “look into its jurisdiction both over the subject matter and the parties.” Sy s. Pipe & Supply , Inc. v. M/ V Viktor Kurnatovskiy , 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 20 0 1) (internal citations om itted). J udgment entered in the absence of jurisdiction 39 R. Doc. 11-14 at 1-2. R. Doc. 11-15 at 1-2. As noted above, plaintiff represents that the Suards 70 , 71, 72, 73, and 76 have been sold as part of Prem ier Services’ bankruptcy proceedings. See R. Doc. 19-1. at 3. 8 40 is void, and the Court m ust therefore refrain from entering judgment if its jurisdiction is uncertain. Id. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to enter this default judgm ent. The Court’s subject m atter jurisdiction is founded upon federal adm iralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 41 Preferred ship m ortgages fall within federal adm iralty jurisdiction. See United States v. Trident Crusader, 366 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 20 0 4); Jack N eilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy , 428 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir. 1970 ). The Court has supplem ental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claim s under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Suard. Mr. Suard waived service of process, 42 and is a resident of Houm a, Louisiana. 43 C. En try o f D e fau lt Ju d gm e n t The Court finds that default judgm ent against Mr. Suard is warranted. The record indicates that Mr. Suard waived service of process 44 but did not tim ely “plead or otherwise defend him self” in this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The clerk entered default against him on November 30 , 20 16. 45 Plaintiff 41 42 43 44 45 R. Doc. 1 at 3. R. Doc. 6. R. Doc. 1 at 2; R. Doc. 1-14 at 1. R. Doc. 6. R. Doc. 9. 9 m oved for entry of default judgm ent on April 13, 20 17. 46 Mr. Suard did not file an answer until August 30 , 20 17, one year after the filing of plaintiff’s com plaint. 47 Because the clerk has entered default against Mr. Suard, he cannot contest plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations unless his default is set aside. See Hous. N at’l Bank, 515 F.2d at 120 6 (“Attem pts by a defendant to escape the effects of his default should be strictly circum scribed; he should not be given the opportunity to litigate what has already been considered adm itted in law.”). Mr. Suard has neither filed a m otion to set aside the entry of default nor otherwise responded to plaintiff’s m otion for entry of default judgm ent. In deciding whether default judgment is appropriate, the Court considers whether it “would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion.” Lindsey , 161 F.3d at 893. The Court has discretion to set aside a clerk’s entry of default for “good cause.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). Factors relevant to good cause include “whether the default was willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether a m eritorious defense is presented.” CJC Holdings, Inc. v. W right & Lato, Inc., 979 F.2d 60 , 63-64 (5th Cir. 1992). The Court need not consider all of these 46 47 R. Doc. 11. R. Doc. 20 . 10 factors, and “[w]illful failure alone m ay constitute sufficient cause for the court to deny” a m otion to set aside an entry of default. Matter of Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 184-185 (5th Cir. 1992); see also CJC Holdings, Inc., 979 F.2d at 64. The Court perceives no good cause to set aside Mr. Suard’s default. Mr. Suard personally executed a waiver of service that clearly stated that he was required to file an answer or motion within 60 days from September 2, 20 16, or risk default. 48 The record before the Court does not reveal any excuse for Mr. Suard’s delay in answering the complaint. The Court therefore finds that his failure to tim ely answer was willful and not the result of excusable neglect. See CJC Holdings, Inc., 979 F.2d at 63-64 (affirm ing district court’s finding of willful failure to answer where defendant m issed deadline to answer by less than one m onth). Additionally, although Mr. Suard’s answer generally denies plaintiff’s allegations, he does not present any specific disputed facts or meritorious legal defenses. 49 Finally, the plaintiff will be prejudiced by any further delay in its ability to recover the am ount due on its loan to Suard Barge Service. Although judgm ents by default are generally disfavored, Mr. Suard’s failure to tim ely defend has m ade it im possible to 48 49 R. Doc. 6 at 3. R. Doc. 20 . 11 achieve a “just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition” of this case on the m erits. Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Hom estead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989). As described above, after entry of default, plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations are deem ed adm itted. See Hous. N at’l Bank, 515 F.2d at 120 6. In a suit on a prom issory note under Louisiana law, “the plaintiff m ust m erely produce the note in question to m ake out a prim a facie case.” Long v. Long, 895 So. 2d 34, 39 (La. App. 5 Cir. 20 0 5). Plaintiff has provided the Court with the prom issory note executed by Suard Barge Service on J anuary 12, 20 10 , prom ising to repay plaintiff the principal and interest on a $ 3,950 ,0 0 0 loan. 50 The com plaint further outlines and docum ents Suard Barge Service’s default on the loan agreem ent. 51 The Court therefore finds that plaintiff has adequately dem onstrated that Suard Barge Service owes it a valid debt. Plaintiff has also provided satisfactory docum entation that Mr. Suard personally guaranteed plaintiff’s loan to Suard Barge Service. 52 Under Louisiana law, guaranty agreements m ust be clearly expressed but “are subject to the same rules of interpretation as contracts in general.” Com ar 50 51 52 R. Doc. 11-4. R. Doc. 1 at 13-15; R. Doc. 1-16; R. Doc 1-17. R. Doc. 1-14; R. Doc. 11-3. 12 Marine, Corp. v. Raider Marine Logistics, L.L.C., 792 F.3d 564, 578 (5th Cir. 20 15) (quoting Ferrell v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 40 3 So. 2d 698, 70 0 (La. 1981)). Courts m ust give legal effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in their written agreem ent. Id. The com m ercial guaranty signed by Mr. Suard in his individual capacity expresses a clear intent to be bound to repay all Suard Barge Service’s debts to plaintiff “arising from any and all present and future loans,” and including but not lim ited to the principal am ount, “accrued unpaid interest thereon and all collection costs and legal expenses.”53 The guaranty agreem ent perm its plaintiff to enforce the guaranty against Mr. Suard before exhausting its remedies against Suard Barge Service, other guarantors, or any collateral securing its loan. 54 Further, plaintiff has shown that Mr. Suard granted it a valid security interest in Mr. Suard’s boat nam ed Aw esom e, bearing Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries registration num ber LA-1345-EX and decal num ber 0 870 39-0 4. 55 Plaintiff provided the Court with the com m ercial security agreement, which nam es Mr. Suard as the grantor and is signed by Mr. Suard in his individual capacity. 56 Because Mr. Suard has not challenged plaintiff’s docum ents, the 53 54 55 56 R. Doc. 1-14 at 1. Id. R. Doc. 11-5. Id. at 1, 5. 13 Court presumes his signature on these agreem ents to be authentic. See La. R.S. 10 :3-30 8 (providing that the validity of a signature on a negotiable instrum ent is adm itted unless specifically denied). Accordingly, the Court finds sufficient basis in the pleadings to enter default judgm ent against Mr. Suard. D. Re lie f Re qu e s te d Under the terms of Mr. Suard’s personal guaranty, plaintiff is entitled to recover from him the full am ount of Suard Barge Service’s indebtedness, including the principal of the loan, accrued interest, and costs of collection and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 57 Plaintiff requests damages against Mr. Suard in the principal am ount of $ 3,0 0 6,0 77.0 3, accrued interest in the am ount of $ 789,468.17, interest of $535.33 per day from August 24, 20 17, life insurance premium paym ents in the am ount of $ 3,50 7.30 , vessel survey costs in the am ount of $ 8,50 0 .0 0 , and costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. 58 After granting default judgm ent, it is the Court's duty “to fix the am ount which the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to recover and to give judgm ent accordingly.” Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944). The plaintiff is not entitled to have its allegations regarding dam ages accepted as 57 58 R. Doc. 1-14 at 1. R. Doc. 19 at 2-3. 14 true. See United States v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 10 11, 10 14 (5th Cir. 1987) (“After a default judgm ent, the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true, except regarding damages.”). In the default judgm ent context, the Fifth Circuit has stated that “unliquidated dam ages norm ally are not awarded without an evidentiary hearing,” but this rule “is subject to an exception where the am ount claim ed is a liquidated sum or one capable of m athematical calculation.” Jam es v. Fram e, 6 F.3d 30 7, 310 (5th Cir. 1993). A sum capable of m athematical calculation is one that can be “com puted with certainty by reference to the pleadings and supporting docum ents alone.” Id. at 311 (internal citation om itted). The district court has “wide latitude” to determ ine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Id. at 310 . The Court finds that the am ount owed by Mr. Suard is capable of m athem atical calculation. Plaintiff provided the Court with docum entation of the original $3,950 ,0 0 0 loan agreem ent, 59 plaintiff’s dem and letters to defendants regarding default on the loan, 60 updates on proceeds received by plaintiff from the sale of vessels owned by Suard Barge Service and Prem ier Services, 61 and the affidavits of Barton Blanco, plaintiff’s Executive Vice 59 60 61 R. Doc. 11-3; R. Doc. 11-4. R. Doc. 1-16, 1-17. R. Doc. 1 at 15; R. Doc. 19-1 at 3. 15 President, outlining the am ounts still due under the loan. 62 Mr. Blanco represents that he has reviewed the loan docum ents and plaintiff’s business records and that, as of August 24, 20 17, Mr. Suard owed plaintiff $ 3,0 0 6,0 77.0 3 in principal, $ 789,468.17 in accrued interest, interest of $ 535.33 per day from August 24, 20 17, and costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. 63 Plaintiff also requests reim bursem ent of life insurance prem ium payments and vessel survey costs. 64 The assignment of life insurance policy between plaintiff and Suard Barge Service states that any prem ium paid by plaintiff as assignee “shall become a part of the Liabilities hereby secured.”65 Mr. Blanco attests that the assignment of life insurance policy presented to the Court is a true and accurate copy of the insurance assignm ent agreement and that plaintiff is due $ 3,50 7.30 in life insurance prem ium s. 66 Under the term loan agreement, Suard Barge Service is also responsible for any reasonable expenses, costs, and charges related to a default on the agreement. 67 The preferred fleet m ortgages allow plaintiff to survey the 62 63 64 65 66 67 R. Doc. 1 at 22-24; R. Doc. 11-2; R. Doc. 19-1. R. Doc. 19-1 at 3-4. Id. R. Doc. 11-13 at 3. R. Doc. 11-2 at 5, 7. R. Doc. 11-3 at 10 . 16 m ortgaged vessels. 68 Mr. Blanco attests that plaintiff is owed $ 8,50 0 .0 0 in vessel survey costs. 69 Defendant has not specifically contested plaintiff’s calculations of the am ount due, and the Court finds sufficient evidence in the record to support the am ounts requested by plaintiff. See In re The Hom e Rests., Inc., 285 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 20 0 2) (finding no uncertainty about am ounts due where com plaint included specific dollar figures that were supported by affidavits); Int’l Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund v. Brighton Painting Co., 267 F.R.D. 426, 428 (D.D.C. 20 10 ) (“In ruling on such a m otion [for a default judgm ent], the court m ay rely on detailed affidavits or docum entary evidence to determ ine the appropriate sum for the default judgm ent.”). Plaintiff is also entitled to recover its collection costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees from Mr. Suard. 70 Plaintiff has indicated that it plans to file a m otion after judgm ent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) to establish the am ount of its attorneys’ fees. 71 The Court will therefore defer its consideration of the am ount of attorneys’ fees at this tim e. 68 69 70 71 R. Doc. 11-14 at 4; R. Doc. 11-15 at 3. R. Doc. 11-2 at 7. R Doc. 1-14. R. Doc. 21. 17 E. Partial Fin al Ju d gm e n t Plaintiff requests partial final judgm ent against Mr. Suard under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 72 When m ultiple parties are involved in a civil action, Rule 54(b) perm its a court to enter final judgm ent “as to one or m ore, but fewer than all, claim s or parties only if the court expressly determ ines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The determination of whether “there is no just reason for delay” is within the sound discretion of the district court. See Ackerm an v. FDIC, 973 F.2d 1221, 1224 (5th Cir.1992). The district court m ust weigh “the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.” Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union v. Continental Sprinkler Co., 967 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir.1992) (internal quotation om itted). The Court finds that partial final judgm ent is appropriate in this m atter. Plaintiff filed its com plaint over one year ago. 73 Defendants Suard Barge Service and Prem ier Services have filed petitions for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, 74 which provides for a liquidation of assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 70 4(a). Moreover, Mr. Suard’s guaranty agreement expressly allows plaintiff to 72 73 74 R. Doc. 19-2 at 6. R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 13; R. Doc. 14. 18 enforce the guaranty against Mr. Suard before exhausting its remedies against Suard Barge Service. 75 Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no just reason for delay. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s m otion for entry of default judgm ent. IT IS ORDERED that there be a judgm ent in favor of plaintiff against Defendant Louis O’Neil Suard, J r. in the am ount of $ 3,0 0 6,0 77.0 3 in principal, $ 789,468.17 in accrued interest, $3,50 7.30 in reim bursement for life insurance prem ium s, $ 8,50 0 .0 0 for vessel survey costs, and interest in the sum of $535.33 per day from August 24, 20 17. Plaintiff is also entitled to costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys’ fees in an am ount to be determ ined by the Court at a later date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there be a judgment in favor of plaintiff against Louis O’Neil Suard, J r. recognizing plaintiff as the holder of a valid and enforceable com mercial security agreement dated December 20 , 20 0 1, under which plaintiff was granted a security interest in a certain 28foot pleasure boat nam ed Aw esom e and bearing Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries registration num ber LA-1345-EX and decal num ber 0 870 39-0 4. 75 R. Doc. 1-14 at 1. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because there is no just reason for delay, this judgm ent constitutes a final judgm ent against Louis O’Neil Suard J r. under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s claim s against Suard Barge Service, Inc., Prem ier Services, Inc. and the vessels named as defendants in this matter are reserved and preserved. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ 11th _ day of September, 20 17. ___ _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 20

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