Knight v. Gulfmark Offshore, Inc., No. 2:2016cv02993 - Document 31 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 21 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 2/14/2017. (cg)
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Knight v. Gulfmark Offshore, Inc. Doc. 31 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A D ON KN IGH T, Pla in tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 16 -2 9 9 3 GU LFMARK OFFSH ORE, IN C., ET AL., D e fe n d an ts SECTION “E” ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Sum m ary J udgm ent filed by Defendant Gulfm ark Am ericas, Inc. (“Gulfm ark”). 1 Plaintiff, Don Knight, opposes Gulfm ark’s m otion. 2 For the following reasons, Gulfm ark’s m otion is D EN IED . BACKGROU N D Plaintiff filed suit on April 13, 20 16 seeking dam ages under the J ones Act an d General Maritim e Law for injuries he sustained while working aboard the M/ V Orlean s. 3 On October 18, 20 16, Plaintiff filed an am ended com plaint nam ing Gulfm ark Am ericas, Inc. as a Defendant. 4 On J anuary 9, 20 17, Gulfm ark filed its Motion for Partial Sum m ary J udgm ent seeking dism issal of Plaintiff’s J ones Act claim s on the basis that Gulfm ark was not Plaintiff’s em ployer. 5 In respon se, Plaintiff argues genuin e issues of m aterial fact still exist as to whether he was Gulfm ark’s borrowed em ployee. 6 LEGAL STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate only “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter 1 R. Doc. 21. R. Doc. 273 3 R. Doc. 1. 4 R. Doc. 13. 5 R. Doc. 21. 6 R. Doc. 27. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com of law.”7 “An issue is m aterial if its resolution could affect the outcom e of the action.”8 When assessing whether a m aterial factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the eviden ce in the record but refrains from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.”9 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonm oving party. 10 There is no genuine issue of m aterial fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonm oving party, thus entitling the m oving party to judgm ent as a m atter of law. 11 If the dispositive issue is on e on which the m oving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the m oving party “m ust com e forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’”12 If the m oving party fails to carry this burden, the m otion m ust be denied. If the m oving party successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonm oving party to direct the Court’s attention to som ething in the pleadings or other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of m aterial fact does indeed exist. 13 If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonm oving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the m oving party m ay satisfy its burden of production by either (1) subm itting affirm ative eviden ce that negates an essential elem ent of the nonm ovant’s claim , or (2) dem onstrating there is no evidence in the record to establish an essential 7 F ED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322– 23 (1986). DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 20 0 5). 9 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. N ationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 20 0 8); see also Reeves v . Sanderson Plum bing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 – 51 (20 0 0 ). 10 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). 11 Sm ith v. Am edisy s, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). 12 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally ’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263– 64 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)). 13 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322– 24. 8 2 elem ent of the nonmovant’s claim . 14 When proceeding under the first option, if the nonm oving party cannot m uster sufficient eviden ce to dispute the m ovant’s contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the m oving party is entitled to sum m ary judgm ent as a m atter of law. 15 When, however, the m ovant is proceeding under the second option and is seeking sum m ary judgm ent on the ground that the nonm ovant has no evidence to establish an essential elem ent of the claim , the nonm oving party m ay defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent by “calling the Court’s attention to supporting eviden ce already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the m oving party.”16 Under either scenario, the burden then shifts back to the m ovant to dem onstrate the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the nonm ovant. 17 If the m ovant m eets this burden, “the burden of production shifts [back again] to the nonm oving party, who m ust either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the m oving party’s papers, (2) produce additional eviden ce showing the existence of a genuin e issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) subm it an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).”18 “Sum m ary judgm ent should be granted if the nonm oving party fails to respond in one or m ore of these ways, or if, after the nonm oving party responds, the court 14 Id. at 331– 32 (Brennan, J ., dissenting); see also St. Am ant v. Benoit, 80 6 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing J ustice Brennan’s statem ent of the sum m ary judgm ent standard in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322– 24 (1986), and requirin g the m ovants to subm it affirm ative evidence to negate an essential elem ent of the nonm ovant’s claim or, alternatively, dem onstrate the nonm ovant’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential elem ent); Fano v. O’N eill, 80 6 F.2d 1262, 1266 (citing J ustice Bren nan’s dissent in Celotex, and requiring the m ovant to m ake an affirm ative presentation to n egate the non m ovant’s claim s on sum m ary judgm ent); 10 A CHARLES ALAN W RIGHT, ARTHUR R. M ILLER & M ARY KAY KANE , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE §2727.1 (20 16) (“Although the Court issued a five-to-four decision , the m ajority and dissent both agreed as to how the sum m ary-judgm ent burden of proof operates; they disagreed as to how the standard was applied to the facts of the case.” (internal citations om itted)). 15 First N ational Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 28 8 – 89 (198 0 ); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249– 50 (1986). 16 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332– 33. 17 Id. 18 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332– 33, 333 n.3. 3 determ ines that the m oving party has m et its ultim ate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact for trial.”19 “[U]nsubstantiated assertions are not com petent sum m ary judgm ent evidence. The party opposing sum m ary judgm ent is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise m anner in which that evidence supports the claim . ‘Rule 56 does not im pose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to sum m ary judgm ent.’”20 AN ALYSIS The J ones Act confers upon a seam an the right to sue his em ployer for negligence resulting in his personal injury. 21 The J ones Act is applicable only if an em ploym ent relationship exists. 22 The borrowed em ployee doctrine is the “functional rule that places the risk of a worker’s injury on his actual rather than his nom inal em ployer.”23 Whether an injured plaintiff is a borrowed em ployee is a m atter of law for the district court to decide, though som e cases involve factual disputes that m ust be resolved by the factfinder before the court can m ake its legal determ ination. 24 In ruling on a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the Court “m ust indulge every reasonable inference from those facts in favor of the party opposing the m otion.”25 For sum m ary judgm ent to be proper, the facts m ust point so overwhelm ingly in favor of one 19 Id.; see also First N ational Bank of Arizona, 391 U.S at 289. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Forsy th v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) an d quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 90 9, 915– 16 & n .7 (5th Cir. 1992)). 21 See 46 U.S.C. § 30 10 4. 22 See id. 23 Baker v. Ray m ond Intern ., Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1981). 24 See Delahoussay e v. Perform ance En ergy Services, L.L.C., 734 F.3d 389, 393 (5th Cir.20 13); Brow n v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 984 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir.1993). 25 Hall v. Diam ond M Co., 732 F.2d 1246, 1249– 50 (5th Cir. 1984) (em phasis in original) (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 20 4 party that the Court believes a reasonable fact-finder could not reach a contrary verdict. 26 When determ ining whether a person qualifies as a borrowed em ployee, courts should consider the following nine factors: (1) Who has control over the em ployee and the work he is perform ing, beyond m ere suggestion of details or cooperation? (2) Whose work is being perform ed? (3) Was there an agreem ent, understanding, or m eeting of the m in ds between the origin al and the borrowing em ployer? (4) Did the em ployee acquiesce in the new work situation? (5) Did the original em ployer term inate his relationship with the em ployee? (6) Who furnished tools and place for perform ance? (7) Was the new em ploym ent over a considerable length of tim e? (8 ) Who had the right to discharge the em ployee? (9) Who had the obligation to pay the em ployee? 27 While the critical factor is control, no single factor or com bination of factors is determ inative. 28 It is undisputed that Plaintiff was em ployed as a cook on board the M/ V Orleans by Gulf Marine Staffing, Inc. 29 Although Plaintiff adm its he was em ployed by Gulf Marine Staffing, Inc., he alleges that he was also the “borrowed em ployee” of Gulfm ark at the tim e of the accident. 30 In its statem ent of uncon tested m aterial facts, Gulfm ark alleges, “[P]laintiff, Don Knight, received no instruction or guidance from GulfMark concerning his duties in preparation of m eals aboard the M/ V Orleans.”31 In his opposition, Plaintiff specifically denies this fact and references his affidavit in which he recounts the 26 Id. at 1250 . Brow n, 984 F.2d at 676 (citing Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co., 413 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1969)); Melancon v. Am oco Prod. Co., 834 F.2d 1238 , 1244 (5th Cir. 198 8), reh’g granted on other grounds, 8 41 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1988 ). 28 See Brow n, 984 F.2d at 676. 29 See R. Doc. 21-1, at ¶¶ 1-4; R. Doc. 27-3, at ¶¶ 1-4. 30 See R. Doc. 27. 31 R. Doc. 21-1, at ¶7. 27 5 instructions and guidance he received from the relief captain, who was an em ployee of Gulfm ark. 32 After considering the nine factors set forth in Ruiz, the Court finds questions of m aterial fact still exist as to whether Plaintiff was Gulfm ark’s borrowed em ployee at the tim e he sustained his injuries. As a result, Gulfm ark’s partial m otion for sum m ary judgm ent 33 is denied. CON CLU SION Accordingly; IT IS ORD ERED that Gulfm ark Am ericas, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Sum m ary J udgm ent 34 is D EN IED . N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is 14 th d ay o f Fe bru ary, 2 0 17. ___________________ _________ S U SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 32 R. Doc. 27-3, at ¶7; R. Doc. 27-1. Plaintiff’s affidavit is com petent sum m ary judgm ent evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(1) and the Court will not discount Plaintiff’s account sim ply because he has not produced a corroboratin g witness. See Carlton v. Steele, 278 F. App’x 352, 354 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). 33 R. Doc. 21. 34 R. Doc. 21. 6
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