Green v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, et al, No. 2:2016cv02827 - Document 17 (E.D. La. 2016)

Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 2 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than Tuesday, April 26, 2016, at 5:00 p.m., Plaintiff shall submit supplemental briefing. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)

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Green v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, et al Doc. 17 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A D R. D AVID GREEN , Pla in tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 16 -2 8 2 7 U N ITED S TATES D EPARTMEN T OF H EALTH & H U MAN SERVICES AN D CEN TERS FOR MED ICARE & MED ICAID SERVICES, D e fe n d an ts SECTION "E"( 2 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is a m otion for tem porary restraining order filed by the Plaintiff, Dr. David Green. 1 For the reasons that follow, the m otion is D EN IED . On April 5, 20 16, Dr. David Green (“Plaintiff”) filed a verified com plaint for injunctive relief again st the United States Departm ent of Health & Hum an Services an d Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2 Also on April 5th Plaintiff filed into the record a m otion for tem porary restraining order, seeking to enjoin “the United States Departm ent of Health & Hum an Services and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (hereinafter collectively, ‘DHH-CMS’), and all those in active concert or participation with them , from revoking Dr. Green’s CLIA certificate, as set forth in a letter from DHH-CMS, dated April 1, 20 16.”3 The Court held several status conferences with the parties in an effort to resolve the issues raised in Plaintiff’s request for a tem porary restraining order. 4 On April 13, 20 16, Plaintiff sent a proposed tem porary restraining order to the Court, as well as to all 1 R. Doc. 2. R. Doc. 1. 3 R. Doc. 2 at 1. 4 See R. Docs. 10 , 11, 12, 13. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com counsel, via em ail. 5 The proposed tem porary restraining order subm itted by the Plaintiff seeks four specific actions: (1) That DHH-CMS be restrained from “sanctioning Dr. Green related to the revocation of the Lonseth Laboratory’s CLIA certificate”; (2) That DHH-CMS be restrained from “publishing any notice of said revocation and sanctions that m ention Dr. Green’s nam e”; (3) That DHH-CMS be restrained from “preventing Dr. Green from representing that he has not been sanctioned pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 263a(i)(3)”; and (4) That the tem porary restraining order be retroactive to March 14, 20 16. 6 The Court, aware the Governm ent objects to the Court’s jurisdiction over this m atter an d otherwise objects to the entry of a tem porary restraining order, ordered the Governm ent to file a written opposition to Plaintiff’s request no later than April 18, 20 16. 7 The Governm ent tim ely filed its opposition, in the form of a m otion to dism iss, on April 18 th. 8 The Governm ent’s m otion is based, in principle, on two grounds. First, the Governm ent argues the Court lacks subject-m atter jurisdiction over this action, as the Plaintiff has not identified a waiver of sovereign im m unity allowing him to file suit against the federal governm ent, 9 nor has Plaintiff exhausted his adm inistrative rem edies, a jurisdictional prerequisite to federal judicial review. 10 The Governm ent further notes, even had the Plaintiff exhausted his adm in istrative rem edies, the proper forum for any grievance at that tim e, if a grievance rem ain ed, would be before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, not a federal district court. 11 5 R. Doc. 16-7. R. Doc. 16-7. 7 R. Doc. 13. 8 R. Doc. 16. 9 R. Doc. 16-1 at 10 . 10 R. Doc. 16-1 at 15. 11 R. Doc. 16-1 at 16. 6 2 Second, the Governm ent argues this m atter lacks a justiciable case or controversy, and, as a result, the Plaintiff lacks the constitutional prerequisite of standing. 12 As the Governm ent acknowledges, the “irreducible constitutional m inim um of standing contains three elem ents:” (1) the plaintiff m ust have suffered an injury in fact; (2) there m ust be a causal connection between the injury and the com plained of conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the alleged injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 13 In this case, the Governm ent argues, specifically, that the actions requested by the Plaintiff “went into effect by operation of law on the date Plaintiff filed his request for hearing with the ALJ .”14 According to the Governm ent, “all four of Plaintiff’s requests have been satisfied, [and] any need for this Court to issue a TRO . . . is m oot.”15 The Governm ent further notes that the April 12, 20 16 letter which DHH-CMS sent to the Plaintiff, as well as the Court’s April 7, 20 16 Minute Entry, verified that each requested action had been satisfied: In the April 12, 20 16 letter, Federal Defendants confirm ed that they had “stayed the im position of revocation” against Plaintiff until after the ALJ renders a decision, retroactive to March 14, 20 16. Federal Defendants also confirm ed that no notices would be published regarding Plaintiff. This Court’s April 7, 20 16 Minute Entry m em orialized that Plaintiff could represent that he had not been sanctioned pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 263a(i)(3) pending the ALJ ’s determ in ation. Therefore, no later than April 12, 20 16, Plaintiff had received all rem edies he requests in his proposed TRO. This status quo will rem ain in place un til the ALJ rules on Plaintiff’s proceedings. 16 It is axiom atic that, to obtain a tem porary restraining order, the party seeking injunctive relief m ust show that a justiciable case or controversy exists. 17 Federal courts 12 R. Doc. 16-1 at 20 – 21. R. Doc. 16-1 at 20 – 21 (quoting Rivera v. W y eth-Ay erst Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of W ildlife, 50 4 U.S. 555, 559– 60 (1992))). 14 R. Doc. 16 at 21. 15 R. Doc. 16 at 22. 16 R. Doc. 16 at 22 (citations om itted). 17 See, e.g., Goosby v. Osser, 40 9 U.S. 512, 515– 16 (1973) (recognizing that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirem ent applies in context of action seekin g tem porary restrain ing order and prelim inary and perm anent injunctive relief); Trinity USA Operating, LLC v. Barker, 844 F. Supp. 2d 781, 789 (S.D. Miss. 13 3 enjoy only lim ited jurisdiction, and under Article III of the Constitution, “[a] federal court is without power . . . to give advisory opinions which cannot affect the rights of the litigants in the case before it.”18 “[T]he party seeking relief m ust have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”19 In this case, each action requested by the Plaintiff in his proposed tem porary restraining order already has been achieved. For those reasons, the Court finds that there exists no case or controversy in need of redressing by the Court at this tim e, and, as a result, IT IS ORD ERED that the m otion for tem porary restraining order is D EN IED . 20 In the com plaint for injunctive relief, in addition to a tem porary restraining order, the Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a prelim inary injunction “enjoinin g DHH-CMS an d/ or its agents from revoking Dr. Green’s CLIA certificate, until such tim e as after a full hearing a perm anent injunction be entered.”21 Plaintiff also seeks a perm anent injunction enjoining DHH-CMS and/ or its agents from “revoking Dr. Green’s CLIA certificate, without due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Am endm ent to the United States Constitution.”22 Considering the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s request for a tem porary restraining order, it is unclear whether Plaintiff believes he is entitled to, and is requesting, additional relief in the form of a prelim inary or perm anent injunction. Accordingly, IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that, no later than Tu e s d ay, Ap ril 2 6 , 20 11) (denyin g m otion for tem porary restrain ing order for the lack of “a live case or controversy”); see also Google, Inc. v . Hood, 96 F. Supp. 3d 584, 594 (S.D. Miss. 20 15), vacated and rem anded on other grounds, No. 15-60 20 5, 20 16 WL 1397765 (5th Cir. Apr. 8 , 20 16). 18 St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42 (1943). 19 Spencer v. Kem na, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citations om itted). 20 Because the Court finds that there is no justiciable case or controversy, the Court need not address the additional objections raised by the Governm ent at this tim e. 21 R. Doc. 1 at 19. 22 R. Doc. 1 at 20 . 4 2 0 16 , at 5:0 0 p .m ., Plaintiff shall submit supplem ental briefing addressing the following issues: (1) whether Plaintiff seeks a hearing on his request for a prelim inary injunction and a trial on the m erits on his request for a perm anent injunction; (2) if so, what relief is requested in connection with such proceedings; and (3) whether the Court has subject-m atter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim s. N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is 19 th d ay o f Ap ril, 2 0 16 . _____________ _______________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 5

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