Jason v. Plaquemines Parish et al, No. 2:2016cv02728 - Document 30 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting MOTION 20 for Summary Judgment filed by Christopher Thomas. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 9/6/16.(jjs)
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Jason v. Plaquemines Parish et al Doc. 30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ANDREW J ASON, III CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 16-2728 PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES, ET AL SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is a m otion by defendant Christopher Thom as for sum m ary judgm ent on plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claim s. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendant’s m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This civil action arises out of plaintiff Andrew J ason’s arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and child endangerm ent. On April 3, 20 15, at about 7:40 p.m ., plaintiff was driving with his six-year-old son when his car was rear-ended by another driver.1 Plaquem ines Parish Sheriff’s Office Deputy Christopher Thom as arrived at the scene of the accident shortly thereafter and interviewed both drivers.2 Upon speaking with plaintiff, Deputy Thom as sm elled alcohol on plaintiff’s breath and observed 1 2 R. Doc. 26-1 at 1 && 1-2. R. Doc. 20 -1 at 2. Dockets.Justia.com signs of im pairm ent, as plaintiff was swaying and his speech was slurred.3 Plaintiff was also not wearing shoes.4 Deputy Thom as asked plaintiff if he had consum ed alcohol, and plaintiff responded that he had.5 Based on plaintiff’s appearance and adm ission, Deputy Thom as adm inistered a Standardized Field Sobriety Test.6 Plaintiff could not follow Deputy Thom as’s instructions, turning right when instructed to turn left, and plaintiff failed the test.7 Deputy Thom as placed plaintiff under arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Louisiana law.8 Upon discovering that plaintiff was driving with his six-year-old son, Deputy Thom as also charged plaintiff with child endangerm ent in violation of Louisiana law.9 Thom as brought plaintiff back to the station, where plaintiff was given a chem ical breathalyzer test, which yielded a .0 22%.10 On October 22, 20 15, Plaquem ines Parish dism issed the charges against plaintiff. On April 3, 20 16, plaintiff filed this lawsuit against 3 Id. R. Doc. 20 -4 at 5. 5 R. Doc. 20 -1 at 2; see also R. Doc. 26-1 at 1 & 6 (Plaintiff’s Statem ent of Uncontested Facts). 6 R. Doc. 20 -1 at 2. 7 R. Doc. 20 -4 at 5. 8 R. Doc. 20 -1 at 2. 9 Id. At no point throughout this litigation has plaintiff denied that he was driving with his six-year-old son. 10 Id. 2 4 Plaquem ines Parish, the Plaquem ines Parish Sherriff’s Office, Deputy Thom as, and the Plaquem ines Parish District Attorney’s Office.11 Plaintiff’s com plaint alleges that his false arrest and the resulting consequences violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also alleges state law claim s of false arrest or im prisonm ent, m alicious prosecution, intentional infliction of em otional distress, defam ation, and negligent hiring and/ or supervision.12 On J une 23, 20 16, defendant Thom as filed this m otion for sum m ary judgm ent,13 arguing that there was no constitutional violation because probable cause existed for plaintiff’s arrest.14 Additionally, Deputy Thom as argues he is entitled to the defense of qualified im m unity.15 Plaintiff filed a m em orandum in opposition to defendant’s m otion,16 and Deputy Thom as filed a reply.17 11 R. Doc. 1 at 2. Plaintiff voluntarily dism issed Plaquem ines Parish from the suit. R. Doc. 7. Plaintiff’s am ended com plaint nam es as defendants Lonnie J . Greco, Sr., individually and in his capacity as the Sheriff of Plaquem ines Parish; Deputy Thom as; Charles J . Ballay, individually and in his official capacity as the District Attorney of Plaquem ines Parish; and one or m ore unnam ed Assistant District Attorneys of Plaquem ines Parish. R. Doc. 22 at 1-2. 12 R. Doc. 1 at 6-7. 13 R. Doc. 20 . 14 R. Doc. 20 -1 at 6. 15 Id. at 12. 16 R. Doc. 26. 17 R. Doc. 29. 3 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgm ent is warranted when “the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322– 23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any m aterial fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. N ationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398– 99 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonm oving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ultim ate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent.” Galindo v. Precision Am . Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 198 5); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75. If the dispositive issue is one on which the m ovant will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m ovant “m ust com e forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally 's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264– 65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonm oving party can then defeat the m otion by either countering with 4 evidence sufficient to dem onstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of m aterial fact, or “showing that the m oving party's evidence is so sheer that it m ay not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the m oving party.” Id. at 1265. If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonm oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party m ay satisfy its burden by m erely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential elem ent of the nonm oving party’s claim . See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonm oving party, who m ust, by subm itting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonm ovant m ay not rest upon the pleadings, but m ust identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75 (“Rule 56 m andates the entry of sum m ary judgm ent, after adequate tim e for discovery and upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elem ent essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)). 5 III. D ISCU SSION A. Pro bable Cau s e Plaintiff contends that defendant violated his constitutional right to be free from false arrest when Thom as arrested him for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and child endangerm ent. For a warrantless arrest to be valid under the Fourth Am endm ent, it m ust be based on probable cause. See United States v. Ho, 94 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996). Therefore, to prevail on a false arrest claim under Section 1983, plaintiff m ust prove that defendant lacked probable cause to arrest him . Though the Suprem e Court has noted that “articulating precisely what . . . ‘probable cause’ m ean[s] is not possible,” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 695 (1996), the standard is a practical conception that deals with the considerations, both factual and practical, that cause reasonable people, not legal technicians, to act. See Mary land v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (20 0 3). The Fifth Circuit has held that probable cause exists for a warrantless arrest “when the totality of the facts and circum stances within a police officer’s knowledge at the m om ent of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had com m itted or was com m itting an offense.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (citation om itted). Furtherm ore, if probable cause exists for any of the charges m ade, then probable cause exists for the arrest, 6 and the claim for false arrest fails. W ells v. Bonner, 45 F. 3d 90 , 95 (5th Cir. 1995). Under Louisiana law, one is guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated when he or she operates any m otor vehicle while “under the influence of alcoholic beverages.” La. Stat. Ann. § 14:98(A)(1)(a). Here, though plaintiff disputes Deputy Thom as’s account that plaintiff adm itted to drinking six beers within three hours of the accident, plaintiff does not dispute that he adm itted to drinking alcohol on the day of the accident, that he was operating a vehicle, that Deputy Thom as could sm ell alcohol on plaintiff’s breath, that plaintiff had trouble standing, that plaintiff couldn’t follow sim ple directions, and that plaintiff failed the Field Sobriety Test. Under these circum stances, Deputy Thom as had probable cause to believe that plaintiff had operated a vehicle while intoxicated. Therefore, the arrest of plaintiff was valid, and there can be no claim for false arrest. Plaintiff’s opposition to Thom as’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent presents two argum ents to suggest there was no probable cause, neither of which is sufficient to raise an issue of m aterial fact as to the existence of probable cause. First, plaintiff points to the result of his breathalyzer test, which was .0 22%. According to plaintiff, this establishes that he was not drunk when he was driving, which m eans that “probable cause did not exist 7 for his arrest.”18 This argum ent rests on a m isconception of the requirem ents of the Louisiana operating while intoxicated offense and the probable cause standard. Under section 98 of the Louisian a Revised Statutes, the crim e of operating a vehicle while intoxicated exists when any of the following conditions exist: “(a) [t]he operator is under the influence of alcoholic beverages. (b) The operator’s blood alcohol concentration is 0 .0 8 percent or m ore by weight . . . .” La. Stat. Ann. § 14:98. Thus, a blood alcohol concentration of .0 8% is sufficient grounds for a violation, but having a blood alcohol concentration of below .0 8% does not m ean one cannot com m it the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Louisiana courts have m ade clear that a specific blood alcohol level is not a required elem ent for the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, see, e.g., State v. Hendon, 654 So. 2d 447, 449 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1995), and that probable cause for an arrest based on intoxication can be grounded in the arresting officer’s observations. State v. W ells, 45 So. 3d 577, 582-3 (La. 20 10 ). Further, plaintiff acknowledges in his com plaint that the breathalyzer test occurred back at the police station, after he was already arrested.19 This 18 19 R. Doc. 26 at 8. R. Doc. 1 at 4. 8 m eans that before the test showed that plaintiff’s blood alcohol concentration was below the legal lim it, plaintiff had already told Deputy Thom as that he consum ed alcohol, his breath already sm elled of alcohol, and he already failed a field sobriety test. These circum stances were enough to establish probable cause for his arrest, and the subsequent breathalyzer test does not negate this. Next, plaintiff argues that he was swaying and failed the field sobriety test not because he was intoxicated, but because he recently had knee surgery.20 In a sworn affidavit, plaintiff attests that he told Deputy Thom as about his recent surgery and that that was why he was having trouble standing.21 Even if plaintiff’s recent knee surgery caused him problem s with standing, Deputy Thom as reported on the field sobriety test that plaintiff failed in part because he turned right instead of left when instructed.22 Plaintiff’s knee injury is irrelevant to his ability to follow sim ple instructions. Further, plaintiff does not dispute that he adm itted to consum ing alcohol, and had breath sm elling of alcohol. Plaintiff tries to get around this adm ission by pointing to an allegedly false statem ent in Deputy Thom as’s 20 R Doc. 26 at 8. Plaintiff subm its no inform ation on when this surgery occurred or what specific type of surgery it was. 21 R. Doc. 26-2 at 2. 22 R. Doc. 20 -4 at 5. 9 affidavit.23 Thom as’s affidavit states that plaintiff adm itted to drinking a sixpack of Michelob beer between 5:0 0 p.m . and 7:30 p.m . 24 Plaintiff now attests that he does not drink Michelob beer and that he only had one or two beers “during the early afternoon hours.”25 Plaintiff’s attestation conflicts with the results of the breathalyzer test, which read .0 22%.26 According to the report of plaintiff’s arrest, plaintiff is 6’ 0 2” and weight 225 pounds. 27 Plaintiff does not explain how som eone of his size would have a blood alcohol content of .0 22% four or five hours after having had only one or two beers. Plaintiff has not contested that he consum ed alcohol, sm elled of alcohol, and failed a field sobriety test based in part on his inability to follow sim ple directions. These facts and circum stances are sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. See Hendon, 654 So. 2d at 449-50 ; State v. Pitre, 532 So. 2d 424, 428 (La. App. 1 Cir. 198 8). Therefore, plaintiff’s knee injury, and Deputy Thom as’ alleged 23 R. Doc. 26 at 2. R. Doc. 26-1 at 2 & 1. 25 Id. at 1 & 6. The Court notes that plaintiff’s response is am biguous as to what he is actually adm itting. The response itself states that plaintiff “freely adm itted that he had ‘had a few beers,’” R. Doc. 26 at 3, but plaintiff’s sworn affidavit attests that he adm itted to drinking only “one to two beers.” R. Doc. 26-1 at 1 & 6. 26 R. Doc. 20 -4 at 4. 27 Id. at 1. 10 24 knowledge of that injury, are insufficient to create a question of m aterial fact as to probable cause or to defeat Thom as’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. B. Qu alifie d Im m u n ity Qualified im m unity shields public officials from suit and liability under section 1983, “unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Babb v. Dorm an, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations om itted); see also Gibson v. P.A. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Therefore, in order to defeat a qualified im m unity defense, the plaintiff m ust establish both a constitutional or statutory violation and that the right violated was clearly established. See Michalik v. Herm ann, 422 F.3d 252, 257-58 (5th Cir. 20 0 5); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (20 0 9). “Clearly established” m eans the “contours of the right m ust be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The Fifth Circuit has established that when a plaintiff asserts a claim for wrongful arrest, qualified im m unity will defeat the claim so long as “a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest at issue to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the inform ation the arresting officers possessed.” Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (alterations om itted). Even law 11 enforcem ent officers who “‘reasonably but m istakenly conclude that probable cause is present’ are entitled to im m unity.” Id. (internal citation om itted) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). In other words, to overcom e qualified im m unity, “pre-existing law m ust dictate, that is, truly com pel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every likesituated, reasonable governm ent agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circum stances.” Pierce v. Sm ith, 117 F.3d 866, 882 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotation om itted). Under this standard, it is clear that even if Thom as arrested plaintiff without probable cause, Thom as’s conduct was objectionably reasonable. Any reasonably com petent law enforcem ent official who heard from the driver of a vehicle that he had consum ed alcohol, sm elled alcohol em anating from the driver’s breath, and observed other signs of intoxication could form a reasonable belief that probable cause existed to arrest the driver for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Therefore, plaintiff has put forward no evidence tending to show that Deputy Thom as knowingly violated plaintiff’s rights, or that pre-existing law com pels the conclusion that Deputy Thom as’ conduct violated plaintiff’s rights. Additionally, plaintiff does not respond to Thom as’ argum ent on qualified im m unity, nor does he point to any law 12 suggesting that Thom as would not be entitled to qualified im m unity even if plaintiff could establish that Thom as violated his rights. C. Ad d itio n al Tim e Fo r D is co ve ry In addition to his substantive argum ents in opposition to defendant’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, plaintiff also argues that sum m ary judgm ent at this stage would be prem ature because discovery has not yet occurred. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) perm its a district court to deny or defer consideration of a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, allow tim e to take discovery, or "issue any other appropriate order" when "a nonm ovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Nonetheless, a nonm oving party "m ay not sim ply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts." Raby v. Livingston, 60 0 F.3d 552, 561 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (quoting Sec. & Exch. Com m 'n v. Spence & Green Chem . Co., 612 F.2d 896, 90 1 (5th Cir. 1980 )). Instead, the party seeking to continue a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent to obtain further discovery m ust indicate to the court (1) "why he needs additional discovery" and (2) "how the additional discovery will create a genuine issue of m aterial fact." Krim v. BancTexas Grp., Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th Cir. 1993). 13 Plaintiff has not established that the discovery he seeks is likely to create an issue of m aterial fact sufficient to defeat defendant’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. Plaintiff argues that the only evidence subm itted in support of defendant’s m otion is Thom as’ affidavit, which according to plaintiff is self-serving and not based on personal knowledge.28 However, Deputy Thom as’s affidavit is based on personal knowledge, as it attests to the veracity of the report Deputy Thom as him self filled out about the observations he him self m ade.29 Plaintiff further alleges that the inform ation referred to in Thom as’s affidavit is false as to the num ber and type of beers to which plaintiff adm itted drinking.30 Nevertheless, plaintiff has not shown what discovery he seeks or how it will create a genuine issue of m aterial fact as to probable cause. Because plaintiff gives nothing m ore than a “speculative hope” that discovery m ight provide plaintiff with inform ation supporting his claim s, his Rule 56(d) m otion m ust be denied. See Sw eats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560 , 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("Sum m ary judgm ent need not be denied m erely to satisfy a litigant's speculative hope of finding som e evidence [through discovery] that m ight tend to support a com plaint."); see also Duffy v. W olle, 123 F.3d 10 26, 10 41 28 29 30 R. Doc. 26 at 7. R. Doc. 20 -5 at 1 && 1-2. R. Doc. 26 at 2. 14 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that Rule 56(d) "does not condone a fishing expedition where a plaintiff m erely hopes to uncover som e possible evidence of [unlawful conduct]"); Spence & Green, 612 F.2d at 90 1 (finding "vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts" insufficient to warrant Rule 56(d) relief). D. Re m ain in g State Law Cla im s In addition to his section 1983 claim s, plaintiff also brings claim s under Louisiana law. Specifically, plaintiff seeks dam ages based on defendant’s torts of false im prisonm ent, m alicious prosecution, defam ation and slander, intentional infliction of em otional distress, and negligent hiring and/ or supervision. Defendant’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent addresses plaintiff’s state law claim s as well, but plaintiff’s m em orandum in opposition to defendant’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent does not address defendant’s argum ents on the state law claim s. 1. Fa ls e Im p r is o n m e n t a n d M a licio u s P r o s e cu t io n Plaintiff’s first two state law claim s, false im prisonm ent and m alicious prosecution, fail for the sam e reason that his section 1983 claim fails—the existence of probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest. The tort of false arrest and im prisonm ent occurs when “one arrests and restrains another against his will without a warrant or other statutory authority.” Ky le v. City of New 15 Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 971 (La. 1977). Under Louisiana Code of Crim inal Procedure Article 213, a peace officer m ay m ake a warrantless arrest when the “peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has com m itted an offense, although not in the presence of the officer.” La. Code Crim . Proc. art. 213(3). Louisiana courts have held that reasonable cause to arrest without a warrant is the equivalent of probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant. See, e.g., State v. Pow ell, 598 So.2d 454, 460 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1992), w rit denied, 60 5 So. 2d 10 89 (La. 1992). As explained above, Deputy Thom as had probable cause to arrest plaintiff without a warrant. Because there was probable cause to arrest, there can be no false arrest cause of action. See Ky le, 353 So.2d at 972; Dy as v. Shreveport Police Dep’t, 136 So. 3d 897, 90 3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 20 14). The sam e is true of plaintiff’s m alicious prosecution claim . In order to recover for m alicious prosecution, a plaintiff m ust establish that there was no probable cause for the underlying prosecution. Robinson v. Goudchaux’s, 30 7 So. 2d 287, 289 (La. 1975); Hibernia N at. Bank of N ew Orleans v. Bolleter, 390 So. 2d 842, 843 (La. 1980 ). Because Thom as had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, there can be no m alicious prosecution action. 16 2. D e fa m a t io n a n d Sla n d e r In order to m ake out a defam ation claim under Louisiana law, a plaintiff m ust establish four necessary elem ents: (1) a false and defam atory statem ent concerning another person; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) injury. Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669, 674 (La. 20 0 6). Plaintiff’s com plaint m erely states that defendants defam ed him by falsely accusing him of crim es.31 Plaintiff has the burden to establish the elem ents of defam ation at trial, and has failed to respond to defendant’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent on the defam ation claim . Further, the Court has held there was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest. Under Louisiana law, defendant, a police officer, enjoys a qualified privilege against defam ation actions under these circum stances. See Trentecosta v. Beck, 70 3 So. 2d 552, 562-64 (La. 1997) (accusation of crim e in arrest report based on probable cause is privileged against defam ation absent bad faith or m alice). Moreover, any statem ent m ade by a law enforcem ent official in the context of charging a defendant in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged without regard to the speaker’s notion of the truth or falsity of the statem ent. See W illiam s v. DiVittoria, 777 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (E.D. La. 1991) 31 R. Doc. 1 at 6 & 17. 17 (statem ents m ade in the course of filing charges in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged) (citing Goldstein v. Serio, 496 So. 2d 412, 414 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986)). 3. In t e n t io n a l In flict io n o f Em o t io n a l D is t r e s s Plaintiff’s com plaint alleges that defendants’ conduct caused him em otional distress and that the actions constitute the tort of intentional infliction of em otional distress. Louisiana courts have held that any em otional distress arising from claim s of false im prisonm ent and arrest, m alicious prosecution, and defam ation do not give rise to a separate cause of action apart from those claim s, and instead are sim ply elem ents of dam ages. Kelly v. W est Cash & Bldg. Materials Store, 745 So. 2d 743, 760 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1999). And because plaintiff’s claim s of false im prisonm ent and arrest, m alicious prosecution, and defam ation fail, there is no need to consider plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress separately. Id. 4. N e g lig e n t H ir in g / Su p e r v is io n Finally, plaintiff brings a state law negligent hiring/ supervision claim . Though Deputy Thom as addresses this claim in his m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, plaintiff’s negligent hiring/ supervision claim is asserted against the Sheriff of Plaquem ines Parish and the District Attorney of Plaquem ines 18 Parish, not defendant Thom as. As the claim is not asserted against Deputy Thom as, the Court will not address it. VI. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, defendant Thom as’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent is GRANTED. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ 6th _ day of Septem ber, 20 16. __ _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 19
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