Augustine v. Vannoy et al, No. 2:2016cv01191 - Document 30 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 27 Motion for Relief from Judgment. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 11/27/2017. (clc)
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Augustine v. Vannoy et al Doc. 30 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A ED W ARD AU GU STIN E CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 16 -119 1 D ARRYL VAN N OY, ET AL. SECTION “E” ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Now before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Relief from J udgm ent pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b). 1 For the reasons below, Petitioner’s Motion for Relief from J udgm ent is D EN IED . BACKGROU N D On Novem ber 28 , 20 12, Edward Augustine (the “Petitioner”) was convicted of second degree m urder and attem pted second degree m urder. 2 On J anuary 3, 20 13, Petitioner was senten ced on the form er conviction to a term of life im prisonm ent, and to a con current term of thirty years im prisonm ent on the latter conviction. 3 On J anuary 22, 20 14, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirm ed the Petitioner’s convictions and senten ces. 4 The Louisiana Suprem e Court then den ied his related writ application on Septem ber 26, 20 14. 5 Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief with the state district court in Novem ber 20 15, which was denied on Decem ber 2, 20 15. 6 Petitioner 1 R. Doc. 27. R. Doc. 17 at 1. 3 Id. 4 State v. Augustine, 133 So.3d 148 (La. App. 4th Cir. 20 14). 5 State v. Augustine, 149 So.3d 260 (La. 20 14). 6 R. Doc. 17 at 2. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com failed to seek supervisory review of that denial, due allegedly to the incom petence of his collateral attorney. 7 On February 5, 20 16, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 8 The state filed a response conceding that his application was tim ely, but argued that Petitioner’s claim s were without m erit. 9 Petitioner filed a reply to the state’s response. 10 Magistrate J udge J anis van Meerveld then issued a Report and Recom m en dation (“R&R”) on March 7, 20 17, recom m ending that that the federal application for habeas corpus relief be dism issed with prejudice. 11 On March 20 , 20 17, Petitioner filed an objection to the findings and conclusions in J udge van Meerveld’s R&R. 12 On J uly 10 , 20 17, this Court adopted the recom m endations in J udge van Meerveld’s R&R, 13 and issued a judgm ent dism issing Petitioner’s federal application for habeas corpus relief with prejudice. 14 The Court also denied the issuance of a certificate of appealability on the grounds that Petitioner failed to m ake a substantial showing of a violation of a constitutional right. 15 Petitioner then filed a notice to appeal J udge Morgan’s J uly 10 judgm ent and denial of the certificate of appealability, and m oved for leave to appeal in form a pauperis. 16 On J uly 25, 20 17, the Court granted Petitioner’s m otion for leave to appeal in form a pauperis. 17 7 Id. See also R. Doc. 27. R. Doc. 1 at 15. 9 R. Doc. 17 at 2. 10 Id. 11 Id. at 26. 12 R. Doc. 18 at 1. 13 See R. Doc. 19. 14 R. Doc. 20 at 1. 15 R. Doc. 21 at 1. 16 R. Doc. 22 at 1; R. Doc. 23 at 1. 17 R. Doc. 24 at 1. 8 2 On August 1, 20 17, Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 18 On Septem ber 8, 20 17, Petition filed m otions for (1) Rule 60 (b) relief from judgm ent 19 and (2) a tem porary stay and obey order. 20 In his Rule 60 (b) m otion, Petitioner alleges that his post-conviction collateral counsel, J ason R. William s, failed to act during the one-year window for federal habeas relief, and that as a result m ovant was forced to file his petition pro se. 21 Further, Petitioner alleges that Mr. William s failed to appeal the denial of Petitioner’s state collateral relief, leaving Petitioner with only direct appeal claim s in his federal habeas petition. 22 Petitioner also claim s that Mr. William s never enrolled with the court as counsel in the case, allowed Petitioner’s habeas tim e to nearly expire, and failed to create work product after nearly two years. 23 Petitioner m oves for relief from the Court’s denial of his habeas petition so that his claim s of ineffective counsel can be exhausted and reviewed. 24 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS Rule 60 (b) provides that a court, “[o]n m otion and just term s,” m ay “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgm ent, order, or proceedin g” due to: (1) m istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in tim e to m ove for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), m isrepresentation, or m isconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgm ent is void; (5) the judgm ent has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgm ent that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. 25 18 R. Doc. 25 at 1. R. Doc. 27. 20 R. Doc. 26. The Rule 62(b) m otion is addressed in a separate Order and Reasons. 21 R. Doc. 27 at 1. 22 R. Doc. 27 at 6. 23 R. Doc. 26 at 24. 24 R. Doc. 27 at 9. 25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b)(1)-(6). 19 3 The purpose of Rule 60 (b) “is to balance the principle of finality of a judgm ent with the interest of the court in seeing that justice is done in light of all the facts.”26 As the m oving party, Petitioner has the burden to show why the Court should vacate the Court’s prior judgm ent. 27 The determ ination of whether the Petitioner has satisfied their burden lies within this Court’s sound discretion. 28 Granting relief under Rule 60 is “an extraordinary rem edy which should be used sparingly.”29 Consequen tly, the “scope of relief that m ay be obtained under Rule 60 (b) is strictly lim ited.”30 A m otion to vacate a judgm ent is “not the proper vehicle for rehashing eviden ce, legal theories, or argum ents that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgm ent.”31 Rule 60 (b) “does not provide for relief from a judgm ent in a crim in al case.”32 Rather, a Rule 60 (b) m otion enables a m ovant to attack “som e defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings[,]” and not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the m erits. 33 A. Rule 60 (b) Pending Appeal As a threshold m atter, this Court m ust determ ine whether it has jurisdiction to rule on Petitioner’s Rule 60 (b) m otion. Generally, district courts lack the power to issue a Rule 60 (b) m otion after an appeal has been docketed and is pending before the Court of Appeals. 34 “Once the notice of appeal has been filed, while the district court m ay consider 26 Hesling v. CSX Transp., In c., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 20 0 5). See League of United Latin Am . Citizens, Dist. 19 v. City of Boerne, 659 F.3d 421, 438 (5th Cir. 20 11). 28 Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 40 0 (5th Cir. 20 10 ). 29 Tem plet v . Hy droChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 20 0 4); see also Pease v. Pakhoed, 980 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Courts are disinclined to disturb judgm ents under the aegis of Rule 60 (b).”). 30 12 Moore’s Federal Practice § 60 .0 2 (3d ed. 20 10 ). 31 Tem plet, 367 F.3d at 478. 32 United States v. O'Keefe, 169 F.3d 281. 289 (5th Cir.1999). 33 Gonzalez v. Crosby , 545 U.S. 524, 532 (20 0 5). 34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1 (Advisory Com m ittee Notes) (“After an appeal has been docketed and while it rem ains pending, the district court cannot grant a Rule 60 (b) m otion without a rem and”). 27 4 or deny a Rule 60 (b) m otion . . . it no longer has the jurisdiction to grant such a m otion while the appeal is pending.”35 The Fifth Circuit recognizes a lim ited exception to this rule, however. 36 “When a Rule 60 (b) m otion is filed while an appeal is pending, [the Fifth Circuit] has expressly recognized the power of the district court to consider on the m erits and deny a 60 (b) m otion filed after a notice of appeal, because the district court’s action is in furtherance of the appeal.”37 In the event that the district court is inclined to grant the Rule 60 (b) m otion, “the appellant should then m ake a m otion in the Court of Appeals for a rem and of the case in order that the district court m ay grant such m otion.”38 Plaintiff has a pending appeal in this case. 39 If the Court determ ines that Plaintiff's m otion raises a substantial issue or that it intends to grant the m otion, it will instruct Plaintiff to request a rem and. 40 If however, the Court finds no substantial issue exists, it will deny the m otion. B. Rule 60 (b) Motions as Successive Habeas Applications A petitioner m ay file a Rule 60 (b) m otion in habeas proceedings, but only in conform ity with the lim it on successive federal petitions established in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 41 “Under [AEDPA], a petitioner’s failure to obtain authorization from an appellate court to file a second or successive 35 Shepherd v. Int’l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 20 0 4). Id. 37 W illow v. Cont’l Oil Co., 746 F.2d 10 41, 10 46 (5th Cir. 1984), on reh’g, 78 4 F.2d 70 6 (5th Cir. 1986) (em phasis added). 38 Id. at 329. 39 R. Doc. 25. 40 See, e.g., Lairsey v. Advan ce Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928 , 930 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[T]his circuit, alon g with other circuits and the com m entators, has expressly recognized power in the district court to consider on the m erits, and deny, a 60 (b) m otion filed after a notice of appeal, because the court's action is in furtherance of the appeal.”). 41 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b). See Gonzalez v. Crosby , 545 U.S. 524, 529 (20 0 5). 36 5 habeas petition is a jurisdictional bar.”42 In this case, Petitioner did not seek authorization from an appellate court to file a second or successive habeas petition. Thus, if the Rule 60 (b) m otion is in reality a second or successive habeas petition, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the m otion. In Gonzales v. Crosby , the Suprem e Court held that district courts have jurisdiction to consider Rule 60 (b) m otions in habeas proceedings so long as the m otion “attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the m erits, but som e defect in the integrity of the habeas proceedings.”43 In other words, a Rule 60 (b) m otion should be den ied if it challenges an earlier denial of habeas relief on the m erits 44 or if it seeks to add a new ground for relief. 45 If, however, the Rule 60(b) m otion “m erely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a m erits determ ination was in error—for exam ple, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-oflim itations bar.”46 Where the Rule 60 (b) m otion challenges the district’s court’s denial of habeas relief on the m erits, however, it m ust be considered a second or successive petition, and the district court has no authority to consider it prior to rem and. 47 Petitioner asserts a single ground for his Rule 60 (b) m otion: ineffective counsel during his state post-conviction relief and federal habeas application. 48 Petitioner argues that Mr. William s’ conduct “inhibited him from exercising his full Due Process rights to have his viable claim s heard, both in state an d federal habeas proceedings.”49 42 United States v. N kuku, 60 2 F. App’x 183, 185 (5th Cir. 20 15). 545 U.S. 524, 532 (20 0 5). 44 Balentine v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 842, 846 (5th Cir. 20 10 ). 45 In re Colem an , 768 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 20 14). 46 Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 532 n.4. 47 Id. at 532. 48 R. Doc. 27 at 1. 49 Id. at 4-5. 43 6 The Court finds that under Gonzales, it does not have the authority to consider Petitioner’s Rule 60 m otion. Petitioner’s m otion does not challenge “som e defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,” but only seeks to add additional claim s to his original habeas application. In his habeas application, Petitioner argued (1) that the state suppressed m aterial eviden ce in violation of Brady v. Mary land, 50 and (2) that his rights under the Sixth Am en dm ent’s Confrontation Clause were violated by the adm ission of hearsay testim ony at trial. 51 The Magistrate J udge’s Report and Recom m endation, which this Court adopted, dism issed these claim s on the m erits. 52 In the Rule 60 (b) m otion, Petitioner argues that the in com peten ce of his post-conviction counsel disadvantaged his federal habeas application by forcing him to file the application pro se, and by lim iting his federal application to direct appeal claim s. As the Fifth Circuit has explain ed, however, claim s such as these are “fundam entally substantive,” in that they seek to ask the Court to reconsider its own determ ination on the m erits. 53 In In re Colem an, the Fifth Circuit considered a Rule 60 (b) m otion in which the petitioner argued that her counsel failed to discover and present certain evidence, and that because this eviden ce was unavailable to the federal district court, the integrity of the habeas proceedings was flawed. 54 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding that her claim “sounds in substance, not procedure,” and that the Rule 60 (b) m otion would be treated as a successive habeas application. 55 This case is sim ilar. Petitioner does not “m erely assert[] that a previous ruling which precluded a m erits determ ination was in error—for exam ple, a denial for such 50 373 U.S. 83 (1963) Doc. 3-1 at 28 , 35. 52 R. Doc. 17. 53 In re Colem an , 768 F.3d 367, 371-72 (5th Cir. 20 14). 54 Id. 55 Id. at 372. 51 R. 7 reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-lim itations bar.”56 Rather, the Court has m ade a determ ination on the m erits that Petitioner’s habeas application does not entitle him to relief, and Petitioner seeks to present additional argum ents in favor of habeas relief. Further, the narrow exception for procedural defects does not include “an attack based on the m ovant’s own conduct, or his habeas counsel’s om issions,” which “do not go to the integrity of the proceedings, but in effect ask for a second chance to have the m erits determ ined favorably.”57 In support, Petitioner cites to Maples v. Thom as, in which the Suprem e Court held that a federal court may entertain a state prisoner’s habeas claim s despite a procedural default in state habeas proceedings, when the prisoner’s post-conviction attorney abandon s his client without notice and thereby occasions the default. 58 However, Maples sim ply stands for the proposition that in the rare case that an attorney totally abandons his client, the client can rely on the attorney’s negligence to establish cause for a procedural default in state court. 59 Maples does not address the treatm ent of Rule 60 (b) m otions in post-judgm ent habeas cases, and in any event, Petitioner’s habeas claim s, unlike those in Maples, were decided on the m erits. Accordingly, this Court shall treat Petitioner’s Rule 60 (b) m otion as a successive application for federal habeas relief. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), Petitioner m ust m ove for an order in the Fifth Circuit authorizing this Court to consider the successive 56 Ruiz v. Quarterm an, 50 4 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 20 0 7). Id. at 372 (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n. 5). 58 565 U.S. 266, 281 (20 12). 59 Id. at 57 8 application. Because he has not, this Court does not have jurisdiction to resolve Petitioner’s claim s. CON CLU SION For the above reason s, Petitioner’s Rule 60 (b) m otion is H EREBY D EN IED . N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 2 7th d ay o f N o ve m be r, 2 0 17. ________________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 9
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