Coupel et al, No. 2:2016cv01075 - Document 7 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 5 Motion for Recusal. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 5/2/2016. (bwn)
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Coupel et al Doc. 7 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A IN RE: COU PEL, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION N O. 16 -10 75 SECTION : “E”( 4 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is a m otion for recusal and disqualification filed by Larry L. Coupel and Natalie A. Coupel (collectively, “the Coupels”), the appellants and debtors in the above-captioned m atter. 1 The Coupels seek the recusal of the undersigned judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). For the reasons that follow, the m otion is D EN IED . BACKGROU N D On February 8, 20 16, the Coupels filed two Notices of Appeal and Statem ents of Election, appealing to the district court two Orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 2 Both appeals were allotted to the undersigned. In sum , the Coupels appeal (1) the Bankruptcy Court’s Order denying their m otion for contem pt for violation of the autom atic stay and for dam ages, costs, and attorney’s fees and to void and cancel judgm ents; 3 and (2) the Bankruptcy Court’s Order granting in part and denying in part a m otion to determ ine that the autom atic stay does not apply to postpetition acts, filed by Eli Kfoury, the appellee. 4 Apparently, Kfoury’s attorney in a related state-court action is Martin Triche, the brother of United States District Court J udge J ane Triche Milazzo, a judge on this Court. According to the Coupels, they “m ay have” a direct cause of action against Martin Triche under Section 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code, as 1 No. 16-10 75, R. Doc. 5. See No. 16-10 70 , R. Doc. 1; No. 16-10 75, R. Doc. 1. 3 No. 16-10 70 , R. Doc. 1. 4 No. 16-10 75, R. Doc. 1. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com the Coupels argue Triche willfully and knowingly violated an autom atic stay im posed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 5 The Coupels seek to have the undersign ed judge recused under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), arguing that because Martin Triche is the brother of another federal judge in this district, the im partiality of the undersigned “could reasonably be questioned.”6 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS Title 28, United States Code, Section 455(a) requires the disqualification of a judge in any proceeding in which his or her im partiality m ight reasonably be questioned. 7 “In order to determ ine whether a court’s im partiality is reasonably in question, the objective inquiry is whether a well-inform ed, thoughtful and objective observer would question the court’s im partiality.”8 Moreover, “the purpose of § 455(a), and the principle of recusal itself, is not just to prevent actual partiality, but to avoid the appearance of partiality.”9 In assessing a m otion to recuse under section 455(a), the court should be guided “by an independent exam ination of the facts and circum stances of the particular claim .”10 In this case, recusal under section 455(a) is not warranted. 11 Section 455(a) requires that a judge be recused “in any proceeding in which his [or her] im partiality 5 No. 16-10 75, R. Doc. 5 at 2– 3. No. 16-10 75, R. Doc. 5 at 3. 7 See 28 U.S.C. § 455. 8 Trust Co. v. N .N .P., 10 4 F.3d 1478, 1491 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 155– 58 (5th Cir. 1995)). 9 Republic of Panam a v. Am erican Tobacco Co. Inc., 217 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (quotin g Jordan, 49 F.3d at 155). 10 Id. 11 Neither is recusal otherwise warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 144. Section 144 requires the disqualification of a judge when he or she has a personal bias or prejudice against a party. See 28 U.S.C. § 144. In pertinent part, section 144 states, specifically, that upon a m ovant’s “tim ely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the m atter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice against either him or in favor of any adverse party, the judge shall proceed no further.” Id. For the affidavit to be sufficient, “[t]he facts m ust be such that, if true, they would convince a reasonable person that bias exists,” and “[t]he facts m ust show the bias is personal, as opposed to judicial in nature.” Phillips v. Joint Legislative Com m . on Perform ance & Expenditure Review of Miss., 637 F.2d 10 14, 10 19 (5th Cir. 1981). The fact that the brother of another judge in this Court is counsel for an opposin g party is not evidence of “personal” or “extrajudicial” bias. 6 2 m ight reasonably be questioned.”12 Section 455(a) claim s m ust be analyzed in light of the particular facts at hand. The Court finds that her im partiality could not reasonably be questioned by a well-inform ed, thoughtful, and objective observer in this case. CON CLU SION Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the m otion to recuse filed by Debtor-Appellants Larry L. Coupel and Natalie A. Coupel is D EN IED . N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 2 n d d ay o f May, 2 0 16 . ________________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 12 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 3
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