Mark v. Sunshine Plaza, Inc., No. 2:2016cv00455 - Document 43 (E.D. La. 2016)

Court Description: ORDER and REASONS granting 31 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. IT IS ORDERED that MUSIC's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED and all claims against MUSIC are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 11/22/2016. (cg)

Download PDF
Mark v. Sunshine Plaza, Inc. Doc. 43 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A YAD I MARK, Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 16 -4 55 SU N SH IN E PLAZA, IN C. D e fe n d an t SECTION : “E” ( 2 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is a m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings 1 filed by Third-Party Defendant, Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Co. (“MUSIC”). Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff, Sunshine Plaza, Inc. (“Sunshine”), opposes this m otion. 2 For the reasons that follow, the m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings 3 is GRAN TED . BACKGROU N D On J anuary 19, 20 16, Plaintiff, Yadi Mark, filed her com plaint against Defendant, and Third-Party Plaintiff, Sunshine under the Am ericans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1218 1 et seq (“ADA”). 4 According to her com plaint, Ms. Mark alleges Sunshine owns and operates com m ercial property that does not com ply with the regulatory requirem ents established under the ADA. 5 As a result of the alleged infractions, Ms. Mark seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs pursuant to Title III of the ADA. 6 1 R. Doc. 31. R. Doc. 32. 3 R. Doc. 31. 4 R. Doc. 1. 5 Id. at 2-3. 6 Id. at 1. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com On J uly 18, 20 16, Defendant, and Third-Party Plaintiff, Sunshine filed a ThirdParty Com plaint against MUSIC. 7 Sunshine alleges MUSIC is liable for defense an d indem n ity as a result of the insurance policy MUSIC provided to Sunshine. 8 Sunshine argues it notified MUSIC of the claim s m ade by Ms. Mark in this m atter, and dem an ded its defense, indem nity, and coverage for any dam ages as a result of claim s alleged by Plaintiff but MUSIC denied coverage. 9 Sunshine alleges it has sustained expenses an d dam ages for which MUSIC is liable, including without lim itation all attorneys’ fees, costs, interest, an d penalties that m ay or m ust be assessed under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:1892 and/ or section 22:1973. 10 In response, Third-Party Defendant, MUSIC, filed its m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings 11 arguing Ms. Mark’s claim s fall outside the coverage of the policy12 in question and that MUSIC has no obligation to defend or indem n ify Sunshine against non-covered claim s. 13 Sunshine opposes MUSIC’s m otion. 14 Coverage A of the Policy extends to “sum s that the insured becom es legally obligated to pay as dam ages” because of “bodily injury” or “property dam age” “caused by an ‘occurrence.’”15 Coverage A excludes dam age to Sunshine’s own property. 16 Coverage 7 R. Doc. 26. Id. at 2. 9 Id. 10 Id. at 2-3. 11 R. Doc. 31. 12 MUSIC issued two successive policies of com m ercial general liability insurance coverage to Sunshine. R. Doc. 31-1, at 2. In its Third-Party Com plaint, Sunshin e alleges the policy in question is Policy No. MP0 0 170 0 80 0 0 466. R. Doc. 26, at 2. As MUSIC explains in its m em orandum in support of its m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings, “Although Sunshin e alleges that the claim s are covered under Policy No. MP0 0 0 170 0 80 0 0 466, this contract was not issued until after this action was filed. It is therefore unclear whether Sunshine has sought or intends to seek coverage under the Policy No. MP0 0 0 170 0 80 0 0 242. Aside from the policy period, the Policies are substantively identical.” R. Doc. 31-1, at 2 n.1. The Court will assum e the Third-Party Plaintiff is pursuing coverage under Policy No. MP0 0 0 178 0 0 0 242 (the “Policy”) as this was the active policy during the tim e when the Ms. Mark filed her in itial com plaint. 13 R. Doc. 31-1. 14 R. Doc. 32. 15 R. Doc. 31-2, at 25. 16 R. Doc. 31-2, at 28 . 8 2 B of the Policy encom passes “sum s that the insured becom es legally obligated to pay as dam ages because of ‘personal an d advertising injury’ . . .”17 The Policy defines “bodily injury” as “bodily injury sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at any tim e.”18 The term “property dam age” m eans either “physical dam age to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deem ed to occur at the tim e of the physical in jury that caused it” or “loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deem ed to occur at the tim e of the ‘occurrence’ that caused it.”19 The term “Occurrence” m eans an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the sam e general harm ful conditions. 20 “Personal and advertising injury” is defined to include injuries arising out of seven specific acts of wrongful conduct: (a) false arrest, detention or im prisonm ent; (b) m alicious prosecution; (c) the wrongful eviction from , wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room , dwelling or prem ises that a person occupies, com m itted by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor; (d) oral or written publication, in any m atter, of m aterial that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services; (e) oral or written publication, in any m atter, of m aterial that violates a person’s right or privacy; (f) the use of another’s advertisin g idea in your “advertisem ent”; (g) infringing upon another’s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your “advertisem ent.”21 LEGAL STAN D ARD Rule 12(c) provides: “After the pleadings are closed but within such a tim e as to not delay the trial, any party m ay m ove for judgm ent on the pleadings.”22 “A m otion brought pursuant to [Rule] 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the m aterial facts 17 R. Doc. 31-2, at 30 . R. Doc. 31-2, at 37; R. Doc. 31-3, at 37. 19 R. Doc. 31-2, at 39; R. Doc. 31-3, at 39. 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 F ED . R. CIV. P. 12(c). 18 3 are not in dispute and a judgm ent on the m erits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.”23 The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings is the sam e as the standard for deciding a m otion under Rule 12(b)(6). 24 Under Rule 12(b)(6), and thus under Rule 12(c), “[t]o avoid dism issal, a com plaint m ust contain sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”25 “To be plausible, the com plaint’s ‘[f]actual allegations m ust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”26 “In deciding whether the com plaint states a valid claim for relief, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the com plaint in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff.”27 “We do not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”28 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS I. D u ty to D e fe n d The parties agree Louisiana law applies. 29 “Under Louisiana law, ‘[a]n insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed by using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code.”30 “The Louisiana Civil Code provides that ‘[t]he judiciary’s role in interpreting insurance contracts is to ascertain 23 Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean W itter & Co., 313 F.3d 30 5, 312 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (quotin g Herbert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd. 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990 )). 24 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 20 5 (5th Cir. 20 0 7). See also Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540 , 543– 44 (5th Cir. 20 10 ). See also, Great Plains Trust Co., 313 F.3d at 312 (“[T]he central issue is whether, in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff, the com plaint states a valid claim for relief.”) 25 In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., LLC, 624 F.3d 20 1, 210 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9)). 26 Id. (quotin g Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 0 7)). 27 Id. (quoting Doe v. M y Space, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 20 0 8)) (internal quotation m arks om itted). 28 Id. (citations and internal quotation m arks om itted). 29 See R. Doc. 26 (alleging dam ages under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:1892 and/ or section 22:1973); R. Doc. 31-1, at 3 n.2 (“The policy was issued in Louisiana to a Louisiana insured and is therefore governed by Louisiana law.”). 30 W isznia Co. v. Gen. Star Indem . Co., 759 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 20 14) (quotin g May o v. State farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 0 3-180 1, p. 3 (La. 2/ 25/ 0 4); 869 So.2d 96, 99). 4 the com m on intent of the parties to the contract’ by construing words and phrases ‘using their plain, ordinary and generally prevailing m eaning.’”31 “Insurance policies generally provide that the insurer has the right and, in deed, the duty to defend the insured.”32 As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “When the insurance policy clearly provides coverage for dam ages allegedly caused by the insured, the insurer is usually eager to defend the insured to lim it its liabilities; difficulties arise when the insurer concludes there is no coverage.”33 In W isznia, the Fifth Circuit explained: Under Louisiana law, the insurer’s duty to defend suits against its insured is broader than its liability for dam age claim s. Thus, Louisiana courts decide the scope of the insurer’s duty to defend by com paring the insurance policy to the allegations in the injured plaintiff’s petition, with the insurer being obligated to furnish a defense unless the petition unam biguously excludes coverage. Under the “eight-corners rule,” courts com pare the four corners of the petition with the four corners of the insurance policy without resort to extrinsic eviden ce. In applying the eight-corners rule, am biguous term s in the insurance policy are strictly construed against the insurer. Although the allegations in the petition are “liberally interpreted” in favor of the insured, it is well settled that the allegations of fact, and not conclusions, contained in the petition determ ine the obligation to defend. 34 “When determ ining whether or not a policy affords coverage for an incident, it is the burden of the insured to prove the incident falls within the policy’s term s.”35 The duty to defend “arises when ever the pleadings again st the insured disclose even a possibility of liability under the policy.”36 The insurer has a duty to defend unless the allegations in the 31 Id. 32 Id. at 449 (citin g Hartford Accident & Indem . Co. v. United Gen . Ins. Co., 855 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1988 )). 33 Id. (internal citations om itted). 34 Id. (internal citations and quotations om itted). 35 Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 0 0 -0 947 (La. 12/ 19/ 0 0 ), 774 So. 2d 119, 124. 36 Steptore v. Masco Const. Co., 93-20 64 (La. 8/ 18/ 94), 643 So. 2d 1213, 1218. See also United N at’l Ins. Co. v. Paul and Mar’s Inc., No. 10 -799, 20 10 WL 2690 615, at *2 (E.D. La. J uly 11, 20 11). 5 petition for dam ages, as applied to the policy, unam biguously preclude coverage. 37 “On ce a com plaint states one claim within the policy’s coverage, the insurer has a duty to accept defense of the entire lawsuit, even though other claim s in the com plaint fall outside the policy’s coverage.”38 A. Alle gatio n s o f th e U n d e rlyin g Co m p lain t Ms. Mark filed suit against Sunshin e seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs pursuant to the ADA. 39 The Plaintiff’s com plaint alleges Sunshine is the “owner and lessor of the real properties and im provem ents which are subject of this action, to wit: a shopping center called the Sunshine Plaza generally located at 298 0 Highway 190 , Mandeville, Louisiana 70 471” (the “Property”). 40 The Property is alleged to be a place of public accom m odation subject to regulation under the ADA. 41 Plaintiff alleges she is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA42 and that the Property is not accessible due to a num ber of “m obility-related architectural barriers” and other features that are non-com pliant with ADA Regulations. 43 B. W h e th e r th e Co m p lain t Alle ge s a Se t o f Facts th at W o u ld Fall W ith in th e Po licy’s Co ve rage As Defendant, and Third-Party Plaintiff, Sunshine explains, “There is no dispute that MUSIC issued the Policy to Sunshine Plaza, Inc. Nor is there any dispute over the term s of the Policy – just over how to interpret it.”44 Third Party Defendant, MUSIC, argues the Policy does not cover Ms. Mark’s com plaint against Sunshine. 45 Under the 37 Martco Ltd. P’ship v. W ellons, Inc., 588 F.3d 8 64, 872 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). Treadw ay v. Vaughn, 633 So. 2d 626, 628 (La. Ct. App. 1993), w rit denied, 635 So. 2d 233 (La. 1994). 39 R. Doc. 1, at 1. 40 Id. at 2 ¶ 8 . 41 Id. at 3, ¶ 13. 42 Id. at 2, ¶ 4. 43 Id. at 3-4, ¶ 21. 44 R. Doc. 32, at 3. 45 See R. Docs. 31, 41. 38 6 Policy, MUSIC is required to pay for dam ages that occur as a result of “bodily injury”, “property dam age” or “personal and advertising injury” as defined in the agreem ent. 46 i. Pro p e rty D am age The Policy specifies that it will apply, inter alia, “to ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property dam age’ . . . caused by an ‘occurrence’ that takes place in the ‘coverage territory’ . . . during the policy period.”47 “Property dam age” is defined as follows: a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use that property. All such loss of use shall be deem ed to occur at the tim e of the physical injury that caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deem ed to occur at the tim e of the “occurrence” that caused it. 48 “Occurren ce” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the sam e general harm ful conditions.”49 In addition, the exclusion j(1) of the Policy bars coverage of “property dam age” to property owned by Sunshine, including “an y costs or expenses . . . for repair, replacem ent, enhancem ent, restoration or m aintenan ce of such property for any reason, including prevention of injury to person or dam age to another’s property.”50 Sunshine argues Ms. Mark alleges property dam age in her com plaint. 51 Sunshine m aintains, “While an individual’s actual interactions with discrim inatory barriers has been found to be considered undoubtedly an injury, courts have additionally found that the ADA expressly contem plates loss of opportunity as an actionable injury.”52 Although 46 See R. Doc. 31-2. Id. at 25. 48 Id. at 39. 49 Id. 50 Id. at 28 . 51 R. Doc. 32, at 7. 52 Id. (citing Betancourt v. Federated Dep’t Stores, 732 F. Supp. 2d 693, 70 7 (W.D. Tex. 20 10 ). 47 7 loss of opportunity is an actionably injury, with respect to Article III standing requirem ents, 53 in exam ining Ms. Mark’s Com plaint, it is clear there is no allegation of any property dam age. 54 As MUSIC correctly identifies, “The only ‘property’ referenced in the Com plaint is Sunshine’s own prem ises.”55 In addition, Sunshine argues the underlying suit is covered because there was an “occurrence.”56 Sunshine argues the Policy defines an “occurrence” as “an accident”57 and therefore Sunshine is covered because its alleged noncom pliance with the ADA was unintentional. Sunshine m aintains, “Under no circum stance can it be argued that Sunshine Plaza, Inc., intended to cause harm to Yadi Mark, or prevent access to its property,” and it believed the Property com plied “with ADA standards as it was granted a Certificate of Occupancy by the Fire Marshal.”58 “Louisiana courts interpret ‘occurrence’ to include ‘an unforeseen and unexpected loss.’”59 Federal courts have held ADA violations are not an “occurrence,” because the conduct giving rise to liability – the failure to accom m odate the disabled – is intentional, not som e fortuitous circum stance. 60 As MUSIC correctly identifies: The harm allegedly sustained by Ms. Mark – the inability to access the property – is the expected and foreseeable consequence of Sunshine’s alleged failure to operate an ADA-com pliant facility. The statue and accom panying regulations exist to ensure that those with physical lim itations will have full use of public accom m odations. If Sunshine has failed to adhere to its obligations under these regulations, it was im m inently 53 See, e.g., Betancourt, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 70 7. See R. Doc. 1. 55 R. Doc. 31-1, at 7. 56 See R. Doc. 41, at 1-2. 57 Id. at 2. 58 Id. (arguing “Therefore, an y ‘defects Yadi Mark alleges in her Petition, is an ‘accident’ as defin ed by the term s of the policy.’”). 59 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am . V. Univ. Facilities, In c., No. CIV.A. 10 -1682, 20 12 WL 1198611, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 10 , 20 12) (quoting N orth Am er. Treat. Sy s. V. Scottsdale Ins., 20 0 5-0 0 81 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 23/ 0 6), 943 So. 2d 429, 444). 60 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v . Martin, 34 F. Supp. 3d 955 (W.D. Ark. 20 14); 54 8 foreseeable that those with disabilities would sustain the exact harm s alleged by Ms. Mark in this lawsuit. 61 Furtherm ore, as explained above, Ms. Mark does not allege any dam age of property as defined by the Policy. As a result, after exam ining both the four corners of the Com plaint and the Policy, it is clear that the claim s against Sunshine is not covered under either definition of “property dam age” as defined by the Policy. ii. Pe rs o n al an d Ad ve rtis in g In ju ry The Policy specifies that it will apply, inter alia, “to ‘personal and advertising injury; caused by an offense arising out of [Sunshine’s] business but only if the offense was com m itted in the ‘coverage territory’ during the policy period.”62 “Personal and advertising in jury” is defined to include injuries arising out of seven specific acts of wrongful conduct: (a) false arrest, detention or im prisonm ent; (b) m alicious prosecution; (c) the wrongful eviction from , wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room , dwelling or prem ises that a person occupies, com m itted by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor; (d) oral or written publication, in any m atter, of m aterial that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services; (e) oral or written publication, in any m atter, of m aterial that violates a person’s right or privacy; (f) the use of another’s advertisin g idea in your “advertisem ent”; (g) infringing upon another’s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your “advertisem ent.”63 In its opposition, Sunshine states it believes Ms. Mark alleges personal and advertising injury as defined by the Policy. 64 Sunshine provides no further explanation to substantiate this claim . Of the seven specific acts of wrongful conduct that fall under the policy coverage for “personal and advertising injury,” only wrongful eviction seem s to have any 61 R. Doc. 31-3, at 8. R. Doc. 31-2, at 30 . 63 Id. 64 R. Doc. 32, at 4. 62 9 possible connection to Ms. Mark’s claim s. As MUSIC correctly identifies, “Wrongful eviction requires ‘actual im pingem ent’ of the plaintiff’s ‘possessory rights.’”65 Ms. Mark does not allege a possessory interest in Sunshine’s property. 66 Instead, Ms. Mark alleges the property in question violates federal regulations governing accessibility. As a result, after exam ining both the four corners of the Com plaint and the Policy, it is clear that the claim s against Sunshine are not claim s for “personal and advertising injury” as defined by the Policy. II. D u ty to In d e m n ify An insurer’s duty to indem nify, however, generally cannot be determ ined until after the underlying suit has been resolved and the insurer is found liable. 67 The duty to indem n ify is “triggered by actual facts that establish liability in the underlying lawsuit.”68 As a result, courts have found the duty to indem nify is often not ripe when the underlying lawsuit has not yet been com pleted. 69 The exception to this general rule is that the duty to indem nify is justiciable before the insurer’s liability is determ ined if “the insurer has no duty to defend and the sam e reasons that n egate the duty to defen d will likewise negate any possibility the insurer will ever have a duty to indem nify.”70 65 R. Doc. 35, at 3 (quoting Regency Motors of Metairie, L.L.C. v. Hibernia-Rosenthal Ins. Agency , L.L.C., 0 3-1312 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/ 23/ 0 4), 868 So. 2d 90 5, 90 9). 66 See R. Doc. 1. 67 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Em p. Liab. Assurance Corp., 445 F.2d 1278 , 1281 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Corgeis Ins. Co. v . Sch. Bd. of Allen Parish, No. 0 7-30 844, 20 0 8 WL 2325632, at *2– 3 (5th Cir. J un e 6, 20 0 8) (“[A]fter the district court concludes that the insurer has a duty to defend, the indem nity issue is non justiciable pending resolution of the liability suit.”). Unlike the duty to defend, the duty to indem nify “is triggered by the actual facts that establish liability in the underlyin g lawsuit. Guar. N at’l Ins. Co. v. Azrock Indus. Inc., 211 F.3d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ), overruled on other grounds as recognized by OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Don's Bldg. Supply Inc., 553 F.3d 90 1, 90 3 (5th Cir. 20 0 8) (per curiam ). 68 Guar. N at’l Ins. Co. v. Azrock Indus. Inc., 211 F.3d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ), overruled on other grounds as recognized by OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Don's Bldg. Supply Inc., 553 F.3d 90 1, 90 3 (5th Cir. 20 0 8) (per curiam ). 69 Travelers Cas. And Sur. Co. of Am erica, 20 12 WL 1198611, at *11 (citing Coregis Ins. Co. v. Sch. Bd. Of Allen Parish, No. 0 7-30 844, 20 0 8 WL 2325632, at *2 (5th Cir. J un e 6, 20 0 8) (applying Louisiana law)). 70 N orthfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Hom e Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 20 0 4); Med. Protective Co. v . Turner, No. 15-0 366, 20 15 WL 363170 1, at *4 (N.D. Tex. J une 10 , 20 15). 10 With respect to the case currently before this Court, the Court finds it is clear that the sam e reasons that negate the duty to defend likewise n egate any possibility MUSIC will ever have a duty to indem n ify Sunshine for paym ents related to the claim s alleged by Ms. Mark. Therefore, the Court finds MUSIC owes Sunshine no duty to indem nify. CON CLU SION The Court finds it is unam biguously clear under the eight-corner rule that the Policy issued by MUSIC does not include coverage regarding Ms. Mark’s claim s against Sunshine for violations of the ADA. As a result, MUSIC owes no duty to defend. The Court also finds it is clear that the sam e reasons MUSIC has no duty to defend likewise negate any possibility MUSIC will ever have a duty to indem nify. As a result, the Court finds that Sunshine, Defen dant and Third-Party Plaintiff, has not stated a claim for defense an d indem n ity upon which relief m ay be granted. 71 For the foregoing reasons; IT IS ORD ERED that MUSIC’s m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings 72 is GRAN TED and all claim s against MUSIC are hereby D ISMISSED W ITH PREJU D ICE. N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is 2 2 n d d ay o f N o ve m be r, 2 0 16 . ______________ ________ ________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 71 Under Louisiana law, the duty to defend is broader than its liability for dam age claim s. See e.g., W isznia Co., 769 F.3d at 449. As the Court has found MUSIC owes no duty to defend in the case currently before this Court, the Court need not further address Sunshine’s claim s that MUSIC im properly denied coverage or the viability of Sunshine’s claim s against MUSIC un der Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 22:18 92 and 22:1973. 72 R. Doc. 31. 11

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.