Reynolds v. LeBlanc et al, No. 2:2016cv00342 - Document 30 (E.D. La. 2017)

Court Description: ORDER & REASONS denying with Prejudice 28 Motion to Alter Judgment. To the extent that Reynolds seeks to collaterally attack his future resentencing, this is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 1/6/2017. (mmm)

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Reynolds v. LeBlanc et al Doc. 30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA RONALD REYNOLDS CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 16-342 J AMES LEBLANC SECTION “R” (5) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is Ronald Reynolds’ m otion 1 to alter or am end the Court’s September 12, 20 16 judgm ent 2 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the following reasons, Reynolds’ m otion is denied. I. BACKGROU N D Reynolds is a state prisoner incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. On April 20 , 1993, Reynolds was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for a crim e he com m itted when he was seventeen (17) years old. 3 Reynolds was sentenced to m andatory life im prisonment without the possibility of parole. 4 After the Suprem e Court decided in Miller v. Alabam a, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (20 12), that m andatory life 1 2 3 4 R. Doc. 28. R. Doc. 27. R. Doc. 18 at 1. Id. Dockets.Justia.com without parole for juvenile offenders was unconstitutional, Reynolds filed a petition for habeas corpus. 5 Once the Suprem e Court held in Montgom ery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (20 16), that Miller was retroactive, Magistrate J udge North recomm ended that Reynolds’ habeas petition be granted. 6 The Court adopted Magistrate J udge North’s recomm endation as its opinion and granted Reynolds’ petition. 7 The Court also ordered that Reynolds be resentenced in conform ity with Miller within one-hundred twenty (120 ) days of the Court’s judgm ent. 8 Nine days later, on Septem ber 23, 20 16, Reynolds filed this m otion seeking to alter and am end the Court’s judgm ent. 9 II. D ISCU SSION Though Reynolds captions his m otion as a m otion to alter and am end the Court’s judgm ent under Rule 59(e), his m otion is essentially an objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recomm endation which this Court adopted as its opinion. 10 5 6 7 8 9 10 Reynolds argues that the Magistrate’s Report and R. Doc. 4. R. Doc. 18. R. Doc. 26. Id. R. Doc. 28 Id. at 4. 2 Recom mendation is “a manifest error of law” because it did not respond to Reynolds’ argum ents that allowing the State of Louisiana to potentially resentence Reynolds to a sentence that was not available at the tim e of his crim e would violate the Due Process Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause. 11 The Magistrate J udge’s Report and Recom mendation is clear that failure to object to the Report and Recom mendation within fourteen (14) days will bar that party, except on grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to findings of fact or conclusions of law. 12 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 13 Reynolds did not file any objection to the Magistrate J udge’s Report and Recom mendation, so any objection to the report is waived unless Reynolds can establish that the Magistrate com m itted plain error. Reynolds’ motion fails to establish that the Magistrate J udge com m itted plain error, or any error for that m atter. Reynolds’ argum ent is that the new sentence he m ay receive from the State of Louisiana would possibly be unconstitutional. Therefore, Reynolds argues the Magistrate 11 Id. at 6, 9-10 . R. Doc. 18 at 13. 13 Douglass referenced the previously applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective Decem ber 1, 20 9, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was am ended to extend that period to fourteen days. 3 12 (and this Court) com m itted plain error by not determ ining the constitutionality of a sentence that had not yet been im posed. But this cannot be plain error because it is no error at all. In fact, it would be erroneous for the Magistrate to opine on the constitutionality of any potential sentence not yet im posed because the issue would not be ripe for adjudication. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 30 0 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated.”) (internal quotation om itted); United States v. Magana, 837 F.3d 457, 458-59 (5th Cir. 20 16) (finding defendant’s challenge to portion of sentence not ripe for review because challenged portion was contingent on future events). Because Reynolds did not tim ely file an objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recom mendation and because Reynolds has failed to establish that the Report and Recom m endation was plainly erroneous, Reynolds has waived his objection and the objection m ust be dism issed with prejudice. Further, to the extent that Reynolds’ motion should be considered as a collateral attack on his new state sentence, this would clearly be not ripe. The record does not indicate that Reynolds has been resentenced, and any challenge Reynolds has to that sentence can be adequately addressed after the sentence is im posed through the proper channels. Because the Court 4 does not have jurisdiction to consider challenges that are not ripe for review, see, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), any argument that Reynolds’ future resentencing is unconstitutional m ust be denied for lack of jurisdiction. See Magana, 837 F.3d at 460 . III. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, Reynolds’ Rule 59(e) motion is DENIED WITH PREJ UDICE. To the extent that Reynolds seeks to collaterally attack his future resentencing, this is DENIED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _6th _ day of J anuary, 20 17. __ _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 5

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