Hughes III v. Johnson et al, No. 2:2015cv07165 - Document 57 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 40 Motion to Alter Judgment; and denying 42 Motion to Amend/Correct. For the foregoing reasons, Justice Hughes' motion to alter or amend a judgment and motion for leave to file amended complaint are DENIED. Intervenors' motion to alter judgment, for relief from judgment, and for leave to amend complaint is also DENIED. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/3/2017. (cg)
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Hughes III v. Johnson et al Doc. 57 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA J EFFERSON D. HUGHES, III ASSOCIATE J USTICE OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-7165 BERNETTE J . J OHNSON, CHIEF J USTICE OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT, ET AL. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Plaintiff J ustice J efferson D. Hughes of the Louisiana Supreme Court m oves to alter or am end 1 this Court’s order 2 dism issing his claim s against Chief J ustice of the Louisiana Suprem e Court Bernette J . J ohnson and Associate J ustices Greg G. Guidry, Marcus R. Clark, and J ohn L. Weim er (collectively, Defendant J ustices) on grounds of Eleventh Am endment im m unity. Intervening plaintiffs—Clean Water and Land PAC, LLC, Vincent Charles Bundrick, and Cajun Pride, Inc.—m ove to alter or am end the same order and the related judgm ent. 3 J ustice Hughes and intervenors also m ove 1 R. Doc. 41. R. Doc. 38. 3 R. Doc. 40 . Robert Walton, Bonnie Walton, J ohn Keith Lam m, and Deborah Broussard Lam m, formerly intervening plaintiffs, have settled their underlying state court claim s and therefore do not join the m otion. Id. 2 Dockets.Justia.com for leave to amend their respective com plaints. 4 For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ m otions are denied. I. BACKGROU N D J ustice Hughes’ com plaint centers around two cases that the Louisiana Suprem e Court declined to hear—Robert L. W alton, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., No. 20 15-C-0 569 (La.), and Vincent Charles Bundrick, et al., v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., et al., No. 20 15-C-0 569 (La.). In both cases, J ustice Hughes was recused from ruling on plaintiffs’ applications for writs of certiorari by order of his fellow J ustices, pursuant to La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 159. 5 J ustice Hughes alleges that, in voting to recuse him from W alton and Bundrick, the four Defendant J ustices violated J ustice Hughes’ rights 4 5 R. Doc. 40 ; R. Doc. 42. Article 159 provides: When a written m otion is filed to recuse a justice of the supreme court, he m ay recuse him self or the m otion shall be heard by the other justices of the court. When a justice of the suprem e court recuses him self, or is recused, the court m ay (1) have the cause argued before and disposed of by the other justices, or (2) appoint a judge of a district court or a court of appeal having the qualifications of a justice of the suprem e court to act for the recused justice in the hearing and disposition of the cause. 2 under the First and Fourteenth Amendm ents to the U.S. Constitution. J ustice Hughes sues Defendant J ustices in their official capacities. 6 Intervenors are Citizens for Clean Water and Land PAC, LLC and the two plaintiffs in Bundrick: Vincent Charles Bundrick and Cajun Pride, Inc. 7 Clean Water, a political action com m ittee, spent $ 487,0 0 0 supporting J ustice Hughes’ election to the Louisiana Supreme Court. 8 Intervenors’ allegations substantially m irror J ustice Hughes’. On October 20 , 20 16, this Court issued an Order and Reasons dism issing plaintiffs’ claim s on grounds of Eleventh Am endm ent im m unity. 9 In its order, the Court found that plaintiffs had failed to plausibly allege an ongoing violation of federal law and that the exception to sovereign im m unity articulated in Ex parte Young, 20 9 U.S. 123 (190 8), was therefore inapplicable. 10 Plaintiffs now m ove to alter or amend the dism issal order, and assert that the Court m isapplied the ongoing violation requirement. To support their assertion that the alleged violation of federal lawn rem ains ongoing, plaintiffs rely heavily on m otions to recuse J ustice Hughes filed in two cases before the Louisiana Suprem e Court: Agri-South Group, LLC, et 6 7 8 9 10 R. Doc. 1 at 1. R. Doc. 28; R. Doc 40 . R. Doc. 1 at 10 . R. Doc. 38. Id. 3 al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al., No. 20 16-C-1856 (La.), and Global Marketing Solutions v. Blue Mills Farm s, Inc., et al., No. 20 16-C-1963 (La.). On J anuary 31, 20 17 the Louisiana Suprem e Court denied both recusal m otions. 11 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD A district court has considerable discretion to grant or deny a m otion under Rule 59(e). See Edw ard H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350 , 355 (5th Cir. 1993). Reconsideration of an earlier order is an extraordinary remedy, which should be granted sparingly. See Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 1998 WL 43217, *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 1998); Bardw ell v. George G. Sharp, Inc., 1995 WL 517120 , *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 30 , 1995). The Court m ust “strike the proper balance between the need for finality and the need to render a just decision on the basis of all the facts.” Edw ard H. Bohlin Co., 6 F.3d at 355. A m oving party m ust satisfy at least one of the following criteria to prevail on a Rule 59(e) m otion: (1) the m otion is necessary to correct a m anifest error 11 R. Doc. 56 at 3-4. The Court m ay take judicial notice of these denials. See Brow n v. Lippard, 350 Fed. Appx. 879, 883 n.2 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (taking judicial notice of state courts records); see also 11 Wright & Miller, 21B Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 510 6.4 (2d ed.) (“J udicial records are a source of ‘reasonably indisputable accuracy’ when they record som e judicial action such as dism issing an action, granting a m otion, or finding a fact.”). 4 of fact or law; (2) the m ovant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) the m otion is necessary in order to prevent m anifest injustice; and (4) the m otion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Om ni Bank, 1999 WL 970 526, *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 1999); Fields, 1998 WL 43217 at *2; see also Com pass Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Rule 59 and Rule 60 (b)(2) share the same standard for granting relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence.”). III. D ISCU SSION Plaintiffs advance three argum ents: (1) the Court m isapplied the ongoing violation requirement of the Ex parte Young exception; (2) new evidence dem onstrates that plaintiffs’ alleged constitutional injury is ongoing; and (3) even if the Court’s denies plaintiffs’ m otions to am end its order, the Court should grant plaintiffs leave to am end their com plaints. The Court considers each argument in turn. A. Th e On go in g Vio latio n Re qu ire m e n t U n d e r Ex Pa r t e Young Defendant J ustices offered no written reasons for recusing J ustice Hughes in W alton and Bundrick. Nonetheless, plaintiffs’ com plaints assert that: (1) these recusals were based on Clean Water’s support for J ustice 5 Hughes’ election cam paign; and (2) that the recusals dem onstrated that Defendant J ustices have instituted a policy of “preventing [a] judicial candidate from hearing any suit involving persons, or their attorneys, who contribute m ore than som e undeterm ined amount to a political action com m ittee.”12 In its order dism issing plaintiffs’ claim s, the Court found that plaintiffs’ well-pleaded facts could not support this latter assertion. Plaintiffs’ failure to plausibly assert an ongoing violation was fatal to their claim s because the Young exception to Eleventh Amendm ent im m unity is lim ited to “cases in which a violation of federal law by a state official is ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal law has been violated at one tim e or over a period of tim e in the past . . . .” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1986). Plaintiffs cannot m eet their burden under Young through bare assertions that the alleged violation of federal law is ongoing. See Cantu Servs., Inc. v. Roberie, 535 F. App’x 342, 345 (5th Cir. 20 13) (“Despite its facial pleading, the question rem ains whether Cantu alleged an ongoing federal law violation. Cantu m ust establish that it has a constitutionally protected interest that was continuing to be infringed by the State officials.”). Accordingly, the Court found that Defendant J ustices are 12 R. Doc. 1 at 13. 6 protected by Eleventh Am endment im m unity, and this case m ust be dism issed. Plaintiffs attem pt to underm ine the Court’s conclusion by citing several cases in which courts have found an ongoing violation under Young. But plaintiffs’ cases are all factually dissimilar to the case before the Court and therefore do not underm ine the Court’s reasoning. Several of the cases cited by plaintiffs concern challenges to written statutes or policies that explicitly govern the future conduct of the challenging party. See Verizon Mary land, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Com m ’n of Mary land, 535 U.S. 635, 638 (20 0 2) (challenge to written order of a state utility com m ission requiring reciprocal com pensation for telephone calls to Internet Service Providers); AT&T Com m c’ns v. BellSouth Telecom . Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 647 (5th Cir. 20 0 1) (challenge to interconnection agreement determ ination that bound “present and future relations between AT&T Com m unications and BellSouth”); Sum m it Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pry or, 180 F.3d 1326, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 1999) (constitutional challenge to statutes im posing crim inal and civil penalties on the perform ance of certain types of abortion procedures, where appellants had adm itted intent to enforce statutes in the future); Hall v. Louisiana, 974 F. Supp. 2d 978, 990 (M.D. La. 20 13) (challenging “J udicial Election Plan, as written, m aintained, and 7 enforced, and presently im plem ented by the Secretary of State”) (internal quotations and m odification om itted). These cases do not support an inference of an ongoing violation in this case. Plaintiffs assert the existence of an unwritten policy of recusing Louisiana Supreme Court J ustices based on the political activities of attorneys and parties before the court. The only facts pled to support the existence of such a policy are two decisions m ade on the sam e day to recuse a single J ustice from considering two related writ applications. Plaintiffs’ attem pted analogy to cases involving written policies therefore fails. The rest of plaintiffs’ supporting cases are sim ilarly distinguishable. In Vickery v. Jones, 10 0 F.3d 1334, 1335-36 (7th Cir. 1996), plaintiffs alleged that defendants operated a long-running political patronage system to give governm ent jobs to political supporters. Another case, W ard v. City of N orw alk, 640 F. App’x 462, 462 (6th Cir. 20 16), concerned a putative class action challenging defendants’ alleged policy of lengthening jail sentences to offset court costs. In the Fifth Circuit’s decision in N iGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 80 4 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 20 15), plaintiff alleged that the Texas Attorney General sent a letter to retailers stating that the labeling of plaintiff’s product violated the Texas Deceptive Practices act. In response to this threat of future enforcement, the retailers “pulled the products from 8 their shelves in Texas and other states, allegedly costing [plaintiff] m illions of dollars in lost revenue. Id. Finally, in Advocacy Center for Elderly & Disabled v. Louisiana Departm ent of Health & Hospitals, 731 F. Supp. 2d 583, 587-88 (E.D. La. 20 10 ), plaintiffs alleged that at the tim e of suit dozens of crim inal defendants were being im properly held in prison. None of these cases is factually sim ilar to the case before the Court. Accordingly, they do not support a finding that the Court’s order comm its a manifest error of fact or law. B. N e w Evid e n ce As noted, the Court found that plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations did not give rise to a plausible inference that the alleged constitutional deprivations suffered by plaintiffs were ongoing. New evidence supports rather than underm ines the Court’s skepticism . Plaintiffs’ m otions to alter or am end rely heavily on m otions to recuse J ustice Hughes filed by defendants in Agri-South Group and Global Marketing Solutions. J ustice Hughes describes these m otions as “citing the exact same reasons as the [recusal] m otions in W alton and Bundrick.”13 Intervenors echo this 13 R. Doc. 40 -2 at 5. 9 sentiment, and describe the m otions as “based specifically on the recusal m otions in W alton and Bundrick.”14 The Louisiana Suprem e Court has since denied both m otions. 15 These denials underm ine plaintiffs’ argument that the Defendant J ustices have instituted an ongoing policy of forcing recusals based on political activity. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ new evidence does not provide a basis for altering or am ending the Court’s order. C. Le ave To Am e n d Co m p lain t Finally, J ustice Hughes and intervenors m ove for leave to file an am ended com plaint. Plaintiffs have filed proposed am endm ents with the Court. 16 Because the Court finds that the proposed amendm ents are futile, leave to amend is denied. Although leave to am end “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” it “is by no m eans autom atic,” and the decision “lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Parish v. Frazier, 195 F.3d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 845-46 (5th 14 R. Doc. 41-1 at 8. R. Doc. 56 at 3-4. In their replies, plaintiffs also raise a motion to recuse filed in Stephen Trahan, et al. v. BP Am erica Production Com pany , et al., No. 20 17-C-22 (La.). See R. Doc. 54; R. Doc. 55. This m otion was also denied. R. Doc. 56 at 5. 16 R. Doc. 40 -1, R. Doc. 42-1. 10 15 Cir. 1992)). A district court “acts within its discretion in denying leave to am end where the proposed amendment would be futile because it could not survive a m otion to dism iss.” Rio Grande Roy alty Co. v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 620 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (quoting Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 50 8 (5th Cir. 20 0 3)); see also Vaupel v. United States, 491 F. App’x 869, 874 (10 th Cir. 20 12) (affirm ing district court’s refusal to perm it am endment on grounds of futility where amended claims would be barred by sovereign im m unity). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires dism issal of an action if the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject m atter of the plaintiff’s claim . Motions subm itted under Rule 12(b)(1) allow a party to challenge the court’s subject m atter jurisdiction based upon the allegations on the face of the com plaint. Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Lopez v. City of Dallas, Tex., No. 0 3-2223, 20 0 6 WL 1450 420 , at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 20 0 6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) m otion to dism iss, the court m ay rely on (1) the com plaint alone, presum ing the allegations to be true; (2) the com plaint supplem ented by undisputed facts; or (3) the com plaint supplemented by undisputed facts and by the court’s resolution of disputed facts. Den N orske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 , 424 (5th Cir. 20 0 1); see also Barrera-Montenegro, 74 11 F.3d at 659. The plaintiff bears the burden of dem onstrating that subject m atter jurisdiction exists. See Paterson v. W einberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs propose to am end their com plaints by adding factual allegations concerning the m otions to recuse J ustice Hughes from AgriSouth Group and Global Marketing Solutions. Because, as described above, these m otions were denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court, they underm ine rather than support plaintiffs’ argument that any constitutional violation is ongoing. Accordingly, the Court finds that the proposed am endments are futile and plaintiffs’ m otions to am end are denied. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, J ustice Hughes’ m otion to alter or am end a judgm ent and m otion for leave to file am ended com plaint are DENIED. Intervenors’ m otion to alter judgm ent, for relief from judgm ent, and for leave to amend complaint is also DENIED. 3rd New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of April, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 12
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