Hughes III v. Johnson et al, No. 2:2015cv07165 - Document 38 (E.D. La. 2016)

Court Description: ORDER & REASONS granting 31 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 13 Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, Justice Hughes' and Intervenors' claims are dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 10/20/2016. (mmm)

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Hughes III v. Johnson et al Doc. 38 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA J EFFERSON D. HUGHES, III ASSOCIATE J USTICE OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-7165 BERNETTE J . J OHNSON, CHIEF J USTICE OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT, ET AL. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Chief J ustice of the Louisiana Supreme Court Bernette J . J ohnson and Associate J ustices Greg G. Guidry, Marcus R. Clark, and J ohn L. Weim er (collectively, Defendant J ustices) m ove to dism iss plaintiff J ustice J efferson D. Hughes’ com plaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 Defendant J ustices move separately to dism iss the com plaint brought by intervening plaintiffs—Citizens for Clean Water and Land PAC, LLC, Vincent Charles Bundrick, Cajun Pride, Inc., Robert L. Walton, Bonnie Walton, J ohn Keith Lam m , and Deborah Broussard Lam m (collectively, Intervenors). 2 For the following reasons, the Court finds that 1 2 R. Doc. 13. R. Doc. 28. Dockets.Justia.com plaintiffs’ claim s are barred by the Eleventh Am endment to the United States Constitution. Defendant J ustices’ m otions to dism iss are therefore granted, and J ustice Hughes and Intervenors’ claim s are dism issed without prejudice. I. BACKGROU N D A. Ju s tice H u gh e s J ustice Hughes’ com plaint centers arounds two cases that the Louisiana Suprem e Court declined to hear—Robert L. W alton, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., No. 20 15-C-0 569 (La.), and Vincent Charles Bundrick, et al., v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., et al., No. 20 15-C-0 569 (La.). In both cases, J ustice Hughes was recused from ruling on plaintiffs’ applications for writs of certiorari by order of his fellow J ustices, pursuant to La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 159. 3 J ustice Hughes alleges that, in voting to recuse him from 3 Article 159 provides: When a written m otion is filed to recuse a justice of the supreme court, he m ay recuse him self or the m otion shall be heard by the other justices of the court. When a justice of the suprem e court recuses him self, or is recused, the court m ay (1) have the cause argued before and disposed of by the other justices, or (2) appoint a judge of a district court or a court of appeal having the qualifications of a justice of the suprem e court to act for the recused justice in the hearing and disposition of the cause. 2 W alton and Bundrick, the four Defendant J ustices violated J ustice Hughes’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Am endments to the U.S. Constitution. J ustice Hughes sues Defendant J ustices in their official capacities. 4 J ustices of the Louisiana Supreme Court are elected to their posts by popular vote. J ustice Hughes was elected in 20 12. 5 According to J ustice Hughes’ com plaint, Clean Water, a political action com m ittee, spent $ 487,0 0 0 supporting J ustice Hughes’ bid for a seat on the Court. 6 This m oney was not given directly to J ustice Hughes or his campaign com m ittee, but instead took the form of “independent expenditures” in support of J ustice Hughes’ candidacy. 7 In accordance with federal election regulations, J ustice Hughes did not coordinate or com m unicate with Clean Water during the 20 12 election. 8 The $ 487,0 0 0 Clean Water spent in support of J ustice Hughes constituted 16 percent of all cam paign spending in the eightcandidate race. 9 Clean Water is, according to J ustice Hughes’ com plaint, devoted to educating the public about land and water pollution problems. 10 The law 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 R. Doc. 1 at 1. Id. at 8. Id. at 10 . Id. Id. at 3. Id. at 5 Id. 3 firm Talbot Carm ouche, & Marcello—which represents the plaintiffs in both W alton and Bundrick—contributed $360 ,0 0 0 to Clean Water in 20 12. 11 The com plaint alleges, however, that $ 275,0 0 0 of this $360 ,0 0 0 was spent on “issue advocacy” designed to influence public opinion on environmental issues, rather than on candidate-specific spending. 12 J ustice Hughes won his election in Decem ber 20 12 and began service as a Louisiana Supreme Court J ustice. 13 In March 20 15, following unfavorable rulings at the trial and appellate levels, plaintiffs in both W alton and Bundrick filed applications for writs of certiorari to the Louisiana Suprem e Court. 14 Approxim ately a m onth later, defendants in both cases filed m otions to recuse J ustice Hughes. 15 The four Defendant J ustices voted to grant the W alton and Bundrick defendants’ recusal m otions on November 12, 20 15. 16 The order recusing J ustice Hughes was entered without written reasons, and it prevented the J ustice from hearing argum ent in the two cases. 17 On Novem ber 16, 20 15, with J ustice Hughes recused, the Louisiana Suprem e Court denied plaintiffs’ writ applications in both W alton and 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Id. Id. at 11. Id. at 10 . Id. at 12. Id. Id. Id. 4 Bundrick. See W alton v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 184 So.3d 25 (La. 20 15); Bundrick v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 184 So.3d 24 (La. 20 15). J ustice Hughes alleges that, in forcing his recusal, the Defendant J ustices violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Am endm ents. According to J ustice Hughes, the recusal orders violated his First Am endm ent rights by preventing him from com m unicating his electoral m essage to the public, for fear that the people he comm unicates with will contribute to political action com m ittees that support J ustice Hughes, leading to m ore recusals. 18 J ustice Hughes argues that his Fourteenth Am endm ent rights have been violated because the Defendant J ustices have “singl[ed] him out for unfavorable treatm ent without adequate justification” and “arbitrarily recus[ed] him from two cases without explanation or recourse.”19 J ustice Hughes brings his claim s under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 In his prayer for relief, J ustice Hughes seeks four rem edies: 1) a declaratory judgment that the recusal orders are unconstitutional and unenforceable; 2) a declaratory judgment that the recusals violated J ustice Hughes’ First Am endm ent rights; 3) an order enjoining Defendant J ustices from recusing J ustice Hughes in W alton and Bundrick; and 4) an order 18 19 20 Id. at 14. Id. at 15. Id. at 1, 4. 5 enjoining Defendant J ustices from recusing J ustice Hughes or any other Louisiana Supreme Court J ustice based on contributions to political action com m ittees. 21 B. In te rve n o rs Intervenors are Clean Water and the six plaintiffs in W alton and Bundrick: Vincent Charles Bundrick, Cajun Pride, Inc., Robert L. Walton, Bonnie Walton, J ohn Keith Lam m, and Deborah Broussard Lamm. Intervenors’ allegations substantially m irror J ustice Hughes’, with two exceptions. First, intervenors allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated by J ustice Hughes’ recusal. Second, besides challenging J ustice Hughes’ recusal, intervenors challenge the alleged recusal of J ustice J eannette Theriot Knoll in the sam e cases. 22 Intervenors, like J ustice Hughes, bring their claim s under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and seek both injunctive and declaratory relief. 23 C. Mo tio n s to D is m is s Defendant J ustices have m oved to dism iss J ustice Hughes’ com plaint and, separately, to dism iss Intervenors’ com plaint pursuant to Federal Rules 21 22 23 Id. at 15. J ustice Hughes also seeks attorney’s fees. Id. at 21. Id. at 21-22. 6 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 24 Because the Court finds that plaintiffs’ claim s are barred by Eleventh Am endm ent im m unity, the Court does not reach Defendant J ustices’ argum ents under Rule 12(b)(6). II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires dism issal of an action if the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject m atter of the plaintiff’s claim . Motions subm itted under Rule 12(b)(1) allow a party to challenge the court’s subject m atter jurisdiction based upon the allegations on the face of the com plaint. Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Lopez v. City of Dallas, Tex., No. 0 3-2223, 20 0 6 WL 1450 420 , at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 20 0 6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) m otion to dism iss, the court m ay rely on (1) the com plaint alone, presum ing the allegations to be true; (2) the com plaint supplem ented by undisputed facts; or (3) the com plaint supplemented by undisputed facts and by the court’s resolution of disputed facts. Den N orske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 , 424 (5th Cir. 20 0 1); see also Barrera-Montenegro, 74 F.3d at 659. The plaintiff bears the burden of dem onstrating that subject 24 R. Doc. 13; R. Doc. 31. 7 m atter jurisdiction exists. See Paterson v. W einberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981). When exam ining a factual challenge to subject m atter jurisdiction that does not im plicate the m erits of plaintiff’s cause of action, the district court has substantial authority “to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Arena v. Gray bar Elec. Co., 669 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 20 12). Accordingly, the Court may consider m atters outside the pleadings, such as testim ony and affidavits. See Superior MRI Servs., Inc. v. All. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 50 2, 50 4 (5th Cir. 20 15). A court’s dism issal of a case for lack of subject m atter jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits, and the dism issal does not necessarily prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in another forum . See Cox, Cox, Filo, Cam el & W ilson, L.L.C. v. Sasol N . Am ., Inc., 544 F. App’x 455, 456 (5th Cir. 20 13). III. D ISCU SSION Although no party has raised the issue of Eleventh Am endment im m unity, this Court m ay raise it sua sponte. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. State of Tex., 36 F.3d 1325, 1336 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The State’s om ission, however, does not m ean we are precluded from raising the issue sua sponte, because the Eleventh Amendm ent operates as a jurisdictional bar.”); see also 8 Jefferson v. Louisiana State Suprem e Court, 46 F. App’x 732, 732 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (“[E]leventh am endment im munity is a jurisdictional issue that cannot be ignored, for a meritorious claim to that im m unity deprives the court of subject m atter jurisdiction of the action.”). “The Eleventh Am endm ent bars citizens of a state from suing their own state or another state in federal court unless the state has waived its sovereign im m unity or Congress has expressly abrogated it.” Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 20 13) (internal citations om itted). Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Am endm ent im m unity, Khan v. S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 0 3-30 169, 20 0 5 WL 199430 1, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 20 0 5), and Louisiana has explicitly asserted its sovereign im m unity by statute. La. Rev. Stat. § 13:510 6(A) (20 10 ) (“No suit against the state or a state agency or political subdivision shall be instituted in any court other than a Louisiana state court.”). The Louisiana Supreme Court, as an agency of the state, enjoys the benefits of Louisiana’s Eleventh Am endm ent protection. See Jefferson, 46 F. App’x at 732 (“The Eleventh Am endm ent clearly bars J efferson’s § 1983 claim s against the Louisiana Supreme Court, which is a branch of Louisiana’s state government.”). And the Suprem e Court’s im m unity extends to its J ustices when they are, as here, sued in their official capacity. See W allace 9 v. Texas Tech University , 80 F.3d 10 42, 10 47 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Suits against state officials in their official capacity are considered to be suits against the individual office, and so are generally barred as suits against the state itself.”); Sum m ers v. Louisiana, No. 13-4573, 20 13 WL 3818560 , at *4 (E.D. La. J uly 22, 20 13) (holding that an official capacity claim against a state court judge “would in reality be a claim against the state itself, and . . . would be barred by the Eleventh Am endm ent”); see also Davis v. Tarrant Cty ., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (“Texas judges are entitled to Eleventh Am endment im m unity for claim s asserted against them in their official capacities as state actors.”). Because the Defendant J ustices are protected by Eleventh Am endm ent im m unity—and that im m unity is underm ined by neither abrogation nor consent—plaintiffs’ claim s m ay proceed only if they fall under the lim ited exception articulated in Ex parte Young, 20 9 U.S. 123 (190 8). “In determ ining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Am endm ent bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the com plaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Mary land, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Com m ’n of Mary land, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (20 0 2) (internal quotations and m odifications om itted). 10 The Court begins with the second question: is the relief requested by plaintiffs prospective? As noted, J ustice Hughes and Intervenors each list four item s in their prayers for relief, 25 and the lists are substantially sim ilar. Both parties request declaratory judgm ents that the W alton and Bundrick recusal orders were unconstitutional and violated the parties’ rights. As noted, however, neither W alton nor Bundrick is presently before the Louisiana Suprem e Court. See W alton v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 184 So.3d 25 (La. 20 15) (denying application for writ of certiorari); Bundrick v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 184 So.3d 24 (La. 20 15) (sam e). In other words, plaintiffs seek declarations that Defendant J ustices’ past conduct violated federal law. These claim s are therefore retrospective, and Young will not save them . See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sew er Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy , Inc., 50 6 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (“[T]he [Young] exception is narrow: It applies only to prospective relief, [and] does not perm it judgm ents against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past.”); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“We have refused to extend the reasoning of Young, however, to claims for retrospective relief.”); see also W alker v. Livingston, 25 J ustice Hughes also seeks attorney’s fees under section 1983. R. Doc. 1 at 16. 11 381 F. App’x 477, 479 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (“Declaratory relief is within Young’s purview, but only when violations of federal law are threatened or ongoing.”). Plaintiffs’ first requested injunction (to enjoin defendants from recusing J ustice Hughes in W alton and Bundrick) fails for the sam e reason: the proposed injunction concerns past conduct. Therefore—to the extent the controversy is not sim ply m oot—the claim is barred by Eleventh Am endm ent im m unity. Plaintiffs’ final request for relief is different. Plaintiffs ask for a permanent injunction preventing the Defendant J ustices from recusing any Louisiana Supreme Court J ustice from a case “based on contributions to political action com m ittees that supported” that J ustice’s election. 26 Here, plaintiffs ask the Court to restrain future conduct, and the claim therefore m eets Young’s “prospective relief” requirem ent. However, plaintiffs have failed to allege an “ongoing” violation of federal law, and Young therefore rem ains inapplicable. By their own terms, plaintiffs dispute the outcom e of two decisions m ade on the same day to recuse a single J ustice from considering two related writ applications, neither of which remained before the Louisiana Supreme 26 R. Doc. 1 at 15; R. Doc. 28 at 22. 12 Court at the tim e this suit was filed. 27 The Young exception is lim ited, however, to “cases in which a violation of federal law by a state official is ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal law has been violated at one tim e or over a period of tim e in the past . . . .” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1986); see also Cantu Servs., Inc. v. Roberie, 535 F. App’x 342, 345 (5th Cir. 20 13) (Under Young, plaintiff m ust show that the alleged violation of federal law “was not a ‘one-tim e, past event’ but an ongoing violation.” (quoting S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 50 0 , 510 (6th Cir. 20 0 8)). The lim ited past conduct alleged in the complaints is insufficient to m eet plaintiffs’ burden to plausibly show an ongoing violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. In Cantu Servs., Inc. v. Roberie, 535 F. App’x 342, 345 (5th Cir. 20 13), the Fifth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff failed to allege an ongoing violation for purposes of Young. In that case, Cantu, a vendor who lost a bid for a food-service contract, alleged that defendant state officials violated its 27 Although Intervenors also allege that J ustice Knoll was recused, this recusal was allegedly based on her husband’s work as a plaintiff’s attorney in “legacy” litigation that m ay be im pacted by a ruling W alton and Bundrick. R. Doc. 28 at 15. J ustice Knoll’s recusal therefore has no bearing on whether plaintiffs have alleged an ongoing violation of federal law under Young to support “a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from recusing J ustice Hughes and Knoll, and any other [Louisiana Suprem e Court] J ustice from a case based on contributions to political action com m ittees that supported their respective elections.” Id. at 28. 13 constitutionally-protected right to a fair bidding process. Id. at 345. Cantu sought an injunction, that would, am ong other things, prevent state officials from entering into future food service contracts that excluded Cantu. Id. Although the proposed injunction was clearly prospective, the court found that Cantu failed to dem onstrate an ongoing violation because it dem onstrated no “constitutionally protected interest that was continuing to be infringed by the State officials.” Id. Instead, the court found that “[t]he award process term inated with the issuance of a new contract.” Id. “Consequently, there [was] no ongoing violation of law remediable by prospective relief under Ex Parte Young.” Id. As in Cantu, the alleged constitutional violation at issue in this case has term inated; it ended when the Louisiana Suprem e Court denied the writ applications in W alton and Bundrick. This conclusion is buttressed by plaintiffs’ requested relief. Plaintiffs seek an injunction barring all recusals based on independent expenditures, no m atter the size or context. Even assum ing that a rule or practice of forced recusals based on independent expenditures violates the First Am endm ent, plaintiffs provide scant allegations—aside from recusal orders in these two linked cases, which were entered without written reasons—to support an inference that Defendant J ustices have instituted such a rule, or that future recusals are likely. The 14 allegation of a lone, past violation of plaintiffs’ rights is therefore insufficient to m eet Young’s “ongoing” prong. See Green, 474 U.S. at 68 (“[D]eterrence interests are insufficient to overcom e the dictates of the Eleventh Am endm ent.”). Because Young does not apply to any of plaintiffs’ claim s, they are barred by the Eleventh Am endm ent and m ust be dism issed. 28 28 The Court notes that it lacks jurisdiction over at least some of the claim s brought in this case by the six plaintiffs in W alton and Bundrick for a separate, independent reason. The Rooker-Feldm an doctrine bars this court from deciding “cases brought by state-court losers com plaining of injuries caused by state-court judgm ents rendered before the district court proceedings com menced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 , 284 (20 0 5). This doctrine has been repeatedly applied to bar suit by state-court litigants seeking review in federal court of a state judge’s recusal determ ination. See, e.g., Price v. Porter, 351 F. App’x 925, 926 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (upholding dism issal under Rooker-Feldm an of suit by state-court litigant claim ing state judge should have been recused); Sm ith v. Bender, 350 F. App’x 190 , 193 (10 th Cir. 20 0 9) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldm an doctrine bars Mr. Sm ith from relitigating the refusal of the J ustices of the Colorado Suprem e Court to recuse from his appeal.”). 15 IV. CON CLU SION For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS defendants’ Motions to Dism iss. Accordingly, J ustice Hughes’ and Intervenors’ claim s are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ 20th _ day of October, 20 16. ___ _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 16

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