Mire v. LSU Health Sciences Center, No. 2:2015cv06965 - Document 77 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER & REASONS granting 65 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 3/1/2017. (mmm)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Mire v. LSU Health Sciences Center Doc. 77 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA KRISTINA MIRE, MD CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-6965 BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE, ET AL. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants Dr. Bonnie C. Desselle and Dr. Ricardo Sorenson m ove for sum m ary judgment on plaintiff Kristina Mire’s claim for reinstatem ent into LSU Health Sciences Center’s pediatric residency program . In support, Desselle and Sorenson argue that Mire has failed to show that either defendant has the authority to reinstate Mire into LSU Health’s residency program . Because the Court finds that Mire has failed to meet her burden to show that she has standing to pursue her claim against these defendants, the Court grants sum mary judgment. Dockets.Justia.com I. BACKGROU N D In her Second Am ended Com plaint, Kristina Mire, MD alleges that the LSU Health Sciences Center (LSU Health), 1 Dr. Bonnie Desselle, and Dr. Ricardo Sorenson discrim inated against her based on her disability, and that this conduct violated Titles I and II of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the ADA Am endm ents Act of 20 0 8 (ADAAA). Desselle and Sorenson are sued in their official capacities as Program Director and Chair of LSU Health’s Departm ent of Pediatrics. 2 According to the complaint, Mire enrolled as a m edical resident at LSU Health in J uly 20 0 6. 3 Shortly after enrolling, Mire sought treatment from a psychiatrist for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. 4 She also developed insom nia, which im paired her effectiveness as a resident. 5 By December 20 0 6, Mire’s supervisors described Mire as inefficient and prone to oversleeping and tardiness. 6 Mire 1 The Court has previously found that the LSU Board, rather than LSU Health, is the proper defendant, R. Doc. 44 at 7-9, and the Board has been substituted as defendant in this case. 2 R. Doc. 27 at 2. 3 Id. at 1. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 3. 6 Id. 2 was inform ed of these concerns in J anuary 20 0 7. 7 In response, Mire revealed her insomnia to her program director at LSU Health. 8 By March 20 0 7, Mire’s psychiatrist suspected that Mire had an Adjustm ent Disorder and prescribed antidepressant and antipsychotic m edications. 9 Mire, however, reacted negatively to the m edications and soon stopped taking them . 10 In J une 20 0 7, Mire received m ore unfavorable perform ance reviews. 11 Mire disclosed her Adjustment Disorder to the Chief Resident at LSU Health in J uly 20 0 7. 12 Following this disclosure, Mire was placed in a disciplinary program designed to remediate deficiencies in her perform ance. 13 As part of the disciplinary program , Mire was reevaluated by her psychiatrist. 14 Following this evaluation, Mire was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and was once again prescribed m edication. 15 Although Mire continued to respond negatively to her m edication, Mire’s program director at LSU Health told Mire that she was required under the disciplinary 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Id. Id. Id. at Id. at Id. at Id. Id. Id. at Id. 4-5. 5. 6. 7. 3 program to take all her prescribed medication. 16 In response, Mire requested and received perm ission to visit another psychiatrist. 17 The second psychiatrist confirm ed Mire’s diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, adjusted her medication, and recom mended a leave of absence. 18 Following this diagnosis, Mire was placed on a m odified schedule until Novem ber 20 0 7, when she was placed on a m ore rigorous “in-patient call schedule.”19 From J anuary to April 20 0 8, Mire took a leave of absence from the residency program. 20 When she returned, LSU Health did not assign her duties gradually, but instead placed Mire on “full on-call duty.”21 Following her return, Mire once again had trouble perform ing her duties, and she was placed on probation. 22 Mire appealed LSU Health’s decision to place her on probation to an internal review body. 23 This appeal was denied on J une 19, 20 0 8, and Mire was suspended from the residency program in August 20 0 8. 24 LSU Health cited several reasons for the suspension, including Mire’s alleged violation of the term s of her probation and unprofessional 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. at 8. Id. Id. Id. Id. at 10 . 4 behavior. 25 Following a com petency hearing and an adm inistrative appeal process, Mire was term inated by LSU Health. 26 The Dean of the LSU Health Sciences Center School of Medicine “accepted and confirm ed” Mire’s term ination on March 21, 20 0 9. 27 Mire filed her initial com plaint in this action, alleging violations of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act, on December 21, 20 15. 28 Ten days later, Mire am ended her com plaint. 29 On March 30 , 20 16, after being granted leave to am end her com plaint once again, 30 Mire filed a Second Am ended Com plaint. 31 In her Second Amended Com plaint, Mire (1) added Desselle and Sorenson as defendants in their official capacities, (2) clarified that she was asserting claims under both Title I and Title II of the ADA, and (3) made m odest changes to her factual allegations. 32 On September 12, 20 16, the Court dismissed Mire’s claim s against the LSU Board arising under Title I of the ADA and ADAAA on grounds of 25 Id. Id. 27 Id. 28 R. Doc. 1. 29 R. Doc. 7. 30 R. Doc. 31 R. Doc. 27 32 Id. Mire’s original and First Amended com plaints alleged violations of the ADA and ADAAA generally, but did not specify any Titles. 5 26 sovereign im m unity. 33 On February 17, 20 17 the Court dism issed Mire’s rem aining Title II claim s against the LSU Board, but found that Mire had stated Title I claims for prospective injunctive relief against Desselle and Sorenson. 34 Defendants now m ove for sum m ary judgm ent on these rem aining claim s. 35 In support, Desselle and Sorenson argue that Mire has failed to m eet her burden to show either defendant has the authority to reinstate Mire into LSU Health’s residency program . 36 In addition, defendants argue that Mire has failed to show that she m eets Am erican Board of Pediatrics and National Resident Matching Program requirements for reinstatement. 37 The Court finds that Desselle and Sorenson’s authority to reinstate Mire im plicates Mire’s standing to bring this suit, and therefore the Court’s subject m atter jurisdiction. The Court therefore begins its inquiry by considering its own jurisdiction. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Before the Court may determ ine whether Desselle and Sorenson are proper defendants under Ex parte Young, it m ust first determ ine whether it 33 34 35 36 37 R. Doc. 44. R. Doc. 76. R. Doc. 65. Id. Id. 6 has subject m atter jurisdiction over this case. In re Canion, 196 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Federal courts m ust be assured of their subject m atter jurisdiction at all tim es.”); In re Bass, 171 F.3d 10 16, 10 21 (5th Cir.1999) (“Federal courts . . . m ay question [jurisdiction] sua sponte at any stage of judicial proceedings”). “[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defs. of W ildlife, 50 4 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Standing ensures that a plaintiff has “‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcom e of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” W arth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 , 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 20 4 (1962)). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing three elem ents. Lujan, 50 4 U.S at 561. “First, the plaintiff m ust have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or im m inent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 560 . Second, “there m ust be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct com plained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. Third, it 7 m ust be “likely,” as opposed to m erely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561. At the sum m ary judgm ent stage “the plaintiffs’ burden on standing is only to raise an issue of m aterial fact.” Croft v. Governor of Texas, 562 F.3d 735, 746 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). When assessing whether a dispute as to any m aterial fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. N ationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonm oving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultim ate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am . Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-m oving party.” EEOC v. Sim baki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 20 14). If the dispositive issue is one on which the m oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party “m ust come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally ’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 8 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonm oving party can then defeat the m otion by either countering with evidence sufficient to dem onstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of m aterial fact, or “showing that the m oving party’s evidence is so sheer that it m ay not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the m oving party.” Id. at 1265. If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonm oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party m ay satisfy its burden by m erely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential elem ent of the nonm oving party’s claim . See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonm oving party, who m ust, by subm itting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonm ovant m ay not rest upon the pleadings, but m ust identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75 (“Rule 56 m andates the entry of sum m ary judgment, after adequate tim e for discovery and upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elem ent essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)). 9 III. D ISCU SSION To m eet the “redressability” prong of the standing inquiry, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief m ust show that the defendant has authority to redress the plaintiff’s injury. McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 20 13) (“[Plaintiff] does not have standing to pursue injunctive relief because [defendant] is without authority to redress his injuries.”); see also Volk v. Gonzales, 20 7 F.3d 657, 657 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (vacating award of injunctive relief where “[n]either defendant in [the] action had the power to effect the court’s directives”). Desselle and Sorenson argue that they are not proper Ex parte Young defendants because they do not have the authority to reinstate Mire to the LSU Health residency program. Because defendants dispute their own authority to redress Mire’s injury, their argument im plicitly calls into question Mire’s standing to bring this case, and, with it, the Court’s subject m atter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court m ust determ ine whether Mire has raised an issue of m aterial fact as to whether Desselle and Sorenson have the authority to order her reinstatement. The Court considers each defendant in turn. 10 A. D r. So re n s o n Mire sues Sorenson “in his official capacity as Chair, LSUHSC Department of Pediatrics.”38 Mire concedes that Sorenson no longer holds that position, but m aintains that Sorenson’s successor as Chair should be autom atically substituted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Rule 25(d) provides that “[a]n action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Rather, “[t]he officer’s successor is autom atically substituted as a party.” Id. Therefore, if Sorenson was the Chair of the Departm ent of Pediatrics at the tim e Mire sued, the Court would im m ediately substitute the new Chair, and then ask whether that person could reinstate Mire. See Jones v. Texas Juvenile Justice Dep’t, 646 F. App’x 374, 375 n.1 (5th Cir. 20 16). Sorenson, however, was not the Chair of the Department of Pediatrics when Mire filed her suit. The unrefuted evidence before the Court suggests that Sorenson left the chairm anship in J uly 20 15, 39 and this suit was filed in December 20 15. Rule 25(d), by its own terms, applies when a party “ceases to hold office w hile the action is pending.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). It m akes 38 39 R. Doc. 27 at 1. R. Doc. 65-2 at 1. 11 no provision for when a plaintiff sues a form er official, in his formerly-official capacity. Mire cites no other authority for the proposition that the Court will autom atically correct a plaintiff’s pleading m istakes by substituting the proper official. Accordingly, the question before the Court is whether Sorenson, in his actual capacity as a Clinical Professor, has the authority to reinstate Mire. In his affidavit, Sorenson states that, as a Clinical Professor, he “does not have the authority or ability to reinstate any present or form er resident in the Pediatric Residency program at LSU Health Sciences Center-New Orleans.”40 Mire provides no evidence tending to contradict this assertion. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mire has failed to m eet her burden to show that Sorenson has the authority to redress her injury, and Mire’s claims against Sorenson therefore fail. B. D r. D e s s e lle Desselle is a closer case than Sorenson. Unlike Sorenson, Desselle never affirmatively states in her affidavit that she lacks the general authority to reinstate previously dism issed residents. 41 Instead, Sorenson focuses on the Am erican Pediatric Board’s requirement that residents who interrupt 40 41 Id. at 2. R. Doc. 65-1 at 1-3. 12 their training for m ore than 2 years m ust “petition the ABP to determ ine whether credit m ay be awarded for prior training.”42 Sorenson also asserts that before LSU Health could offer Mire her old spot, Mire would have to reapply through the National Residency Matching Program .”43 Mire seizes on Desselle’s failure to deny a general authority to reinstate residents as evidence that Desselle does, in fact, have such authority. 44 But this arguments m isplaces Mire’s burden. As noted, Desselle m ay satisfy her burden on this point by m erely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of Mire’s claim . See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Having done so, the burden shifts to Mire to point to specific adm issible evidence showing that Desselle has the authority to grant Mire’s requested relief. See id. at 324. Mire has failed to m eet this burden. The only relevant evidence that Mire attaches to her opposition is a six page excerpt of Desselle’s deposition in this case. 45 In the excerpt, Desselle discusses her role in evaluating pediatric residents, but says nothing regarding her authority to reinstate term inated residents. 46 42 43 44 45 46 Id at 1. Id. at 2. R. Doc. 72. R. Doc. 72-1. Id. 13 Desselle’s testim ony therefore does not support a finding that she has the authority to reinstate Mire. Mire’s argum ent is also underm ined by her own allegations. In her second am ended com plaint, Mire alleges that she “was specifically inform ed by LSUHSC that . . . [her] term ination would not becom e effective unless and until it was approved by the Dean of the Medical School.”47 Mire provides no explanation for why LSU Health would require the Dean of the Medical School to approve term inations, but not reinstatements. Because Mire has not m et her burden to show that Sorenson or Desselle has the authority to reinstate any term inated resident, the Court grants sum m ary judgm ent. IV. CON CLU SION For the forgoing reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mire’s claim s against Sorenson and Desselle. Accordingly, Mire’s claim s are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE. 1st New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of March, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 47 R. Doc. 27 at 10 . 14
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
