Seals et al v. Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Citizens with Developmental Disabilities, No. 2:2015cv06876 - Document 12 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting defendant's MOTION 9 to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/20/16. (jjs)
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Seals et al v. Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Citizens with Developmental Disabilities Doc. 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA DEROME A. SEALS and J ESSIE WRIGHT CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO: 15-6876 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS, OFFICE OF CITIZENS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES SECTION: R ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendant, the State of Louisiana, through the Departm ent of Health and Hospitals, m oves to dism iss plaintiffs' com plaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This m atter arises out of a dispute between plaintiffs Derom e Seals and J essie Wright and "Superior Options of LA," a vendor for defendant, the Louisiana Departm ent of Health and Hospitals (DHH). The facts, as alleged in plaintiffs' com plaint, are as follows. 1 R. Doc. 9. Dockets.Justia.com Seals and Wright are father and son.2 Wright participates in the "New Opportunities Waiver" (NOW) program and receives services from DHH's Office for Citizens with Developm ental Disabilities.3 Superior Options is a vendor that provides NOW-related services at the "direct[ion]" of DHH.4 On April 5, 20 14, "the defendant"--apparently a reference to Superior Options--drove Wright from his hom e to a doctor's appointm ent.5 During the return trip, an argum ent ensued between Wright and the driver of the vehicle, Anastasia Young.6 Young shouted obscenities, and Wright becam e upset and exited the vehicle.7 According to plaintiffs' com plaint, Wright contends that Young "put him out of her auto," while Young m aintains that Wright jum ped out of the vehicle while it was traveling at a low rate of speed.8 Young called Seals to inform him of the situation and reported the incident to the local 2 R. Doc. 1 at 2. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 3. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Id. 2 police.9 Later that day, police officers located Wright.10 A scuffle ensued and, according to a police report that plaintiffs subm it as an exhibit to their com plaint, Wright shoved one officer and fled on foot.11 Eventually, officers apprehended Wright and arrested him for battery, flight from an officer, and resisting arrest.12 Seals posted a cash bond on Wright's behalf, paid various court fees, and retained an attorney to represent Wright in the crim inal case.13 On April 7, Seals and possibly Wright m et with "the defendant"--again, apparently m eaning Superior Options--to discuss the altercation between Wright and Young.14 Young did not show up to the m eeting.15 Although Seal dem anded to see the "policy" docum ents that supported Young's decision to call the police, "the defendant" did not produce the docum ents.16 On August 9 Id. at 3-4 10 Id. 11 R. Doc. 1-1 at 4. 12 R. Doc. 1 at 4; R. Doc. 1-1 at 4. 13 R. Doc. 1 at 4-5. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. 3 14, Seals asked Superior Options for its investigation results and/ or its file on the incident, and Superior Options refused to provide the docum ents.17 As a result of these events, Seal and Wright allegedly sustained psychological and em otional traum a, loss of appetite, and other injuries.18 Wright, who had no prior arrests or convictions, also obtained a crim inal record.19 Plaintiffs seek monetary dam ages from DHH for these injuries under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent, the cruel and unusual punishm ent clause of the Eighth Amendm ent, the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986, Titles II and IV of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act, and the Developm ental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 20 0 0 .20 Plaintiffs also assert claim s under Louisiana tort law, including negligence and intentional infliction of em otional distress.21 DHH m oves to dism iss plaintiffs' claim s under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiffs have failed to plead a claim against DHH upon which relief m ay be granted. Plaintiffs oppose the m otion on the 17 Id. at 5-6. 18 Id. at 6. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Id. 4 grounds that "but for defendants' negligence," plaintiffs would not have sustained various injuries.22 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged." Id. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A legally sufficient com plaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elem ents of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable 22 R. Doc. 11 at 1-2. 5 expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each elem ent of the plaintiff's claim . Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, the claim m ust be dism issed. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. Finally, courts construe briefs subm itted by pro se litigants liberally, and a court will "apply less stringent standards to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel." Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam ); see also see Abdul– Alim Am in v. Universal Life Ins. Co. of Mem phis, Tenn., 70 6 F.2d 638, 640 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1983). This does not m ean, however, that a court "will invent, out of whole cloth, novel argum ents on behalf of a pro se plaintiff in the absence of m eaningful, albeit im perfect, briefing." Jones v. Alfred, 353 Fed. App' x 949, 951– 52 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). III. D ISCU SSION To begin, plaintiffs fail to state a claim as a m atter of law under either the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 ("PAIMI Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 10 80 1 et seq., or the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 20 0 0 ("DD Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 150 0 1, et seq., because neither statute creates privately enforceable federal rights. See 6 Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc, 961 F.2d 987, 994 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that Restatem ent of Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients, 42 U.S.C. § 10 841, creates no enforceable federal rights); Darnell v. Jones, No. CIV-12-10 65-M, 20 14 WL 4792144, at *3 n. 4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 24, 20 14), aff'd, 610 F. App'x 720 (10 th Cir. 20 15) ("[T]he PAIMI Act authorizes certain protection and advocacy system s to bring suit regarding access to patient records; its provisions do not provide a private cause of action to an individual such as Plaintiff."); Dow dell v. Love's Travel Stop, No. 7:12CV0 0 516, 20 13 WL 3655666, at *1 (W.D. Va. J uly 12, 20 13), aff'd, 544 F. App'x 199 (4th Cir. 20 13) ("The DD Act does not confer privately enforceable substantive rights."); Sm ith v. Au Sable Valley Cm ty . Mental Health Servs., 431 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (E.D. Mich. 20 0 6) (finding the DD Act does not create an individual federal right that can be enforced in a Section 1983 action). Plaintiffs also fail to state a claim under Title II of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act. Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrim ination in the provision of public services. See Fram e v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 20 11). Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, program s, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrim ination by any such 7 entity." Plaintiffs do not allege that DHH treated Seal or Wright differently than others because of any disability. Nor do they allege that any of the incidents described in their com plaint resulted from discrim ination in the provision of public services. Although the Court construes plaintiffs' com plaint broadly because of their pro se status, see Davison v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 712 F.3d 884, 885 (5th Cir. 20 13), the Court cannot discern from plaintiffs' pleadings any possible exam ples of disability-based discrim ination in violation of Title II of the ADA. Plaintiffs' claim s also fail under Title IV of the ADA, which requires com m on carriers to follow federal regulations that are designed to ensure that individuals who are "deaf, hard of hearing, deaf-blind, or who ha[ve] a speech disability" have the ability to "engage in com m unication by wire or radio . . . in a m anner that is functionally equivalent to the ability" of a non-disabled person to engage in such com m unication. 47 U.S.C. § 225; see also Roque v. AT & T's Inc., No. CIV.A. 13-434, 20 13 WL 3832692, at *1 (E.D. La. J uly 23, 20 13). Although plaintiffs allege that Wright has m oderate learning and developm ental disabilities, they have not alleged that Wright or Seal have a disability addressed by Title IV or that DHH failed to ensure that they could com m unicate by wire or radio. 8 Turning to plaintiffs' constitutional claim s, plaintiffs' charge DHH with violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent, as well as the Eighth Am endm ent's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishm ent. The Court infers that plaintiffs' claim s against DHH fall under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The elem ents of a Section 1983 cause of action are: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by federal law (2) that occurred under color of state law, and (3) was caused by a state actor. See Victoria W . v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 20 0 4). Plaintiffs' claim s fail under the first elem ent because they have not alleged that DHH deprived Seal or Wright of rights secured by either of the cited constitutional provisions. The Fourteenth Am endm ent prohibits state actors from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process." U.S. Const. am end. XIV. Although plaintiffs allege, in a conclusory m anner, that DHH "fail[ed] to exercise due process," there is no allegation that DHH deprived plaintiffs of a right to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection applies.23 Nor do plaintiffs plead facts from which the Court can infer a foundation for 23 Although the nam ed defendant in this suit is DHH, plaintiffs level m ost of their allegations against Superior Options and its em ployee, Young. The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in Section 1983 suits. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1327 (5th Cir. 1996). To the extent plaintiffs rest their constitutional claim s against DHH on allegations that Superior Options failed to adequately perform services that DHH retained it to perform , they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 9 their due process claim . Instead, plaintiffs appear to ground their claim s against DHH in allegations that Superior Options and/ or Young were negligent in their provision of NOW-related services to plaintiff Wright. These allegations fail to state a Section 1983 claim against DHH for two reasons. First, the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in Section 1983 suits. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1327 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, plaintiffs' allegations that Superior Options and/ or Young failed to adequately perform services that DHH "direct[ed]" them to perform fail to state a Section 1983 claim against DHH. Second, as the Suprem e Court and the Fifth Circuit have held, "the Due Process Clause is sim ply not im plicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property." Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Daniels v. W illiam s, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)). Plaintiffs' allegations of negligent conduct therefore fail to state a Section 1983 claim against DHH sounding in the due process. See Shadley v. Grim es, 40 5 F. App'x 813, 815 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (affirm ing sum m ary judgm ent dism issal of Section 1983 claim s against police officer whose conduct constituted no m ore than negligence). As to the Eighth Am endm ent, that am endm ent provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, no excessive fines im posed, nor cruel 10 and unusual punishm ent inflicted." U.S. Const. am end. VIII. The Eighth Am endm ent protects only those who have been convicted of a crim e. See Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 333– 34 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Ingraham v. W right, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 671– 72 (1977)). Because plaintiffs do not allege that Seal or Wright were convicted of crim es at the tim e of Wright's verbal altercation with Young--m uch less punished unconstitutionally by DHH, a public health agency--their Section 1983 Eighth Am endm ent claim s fail as well. Each of the rem aining claim s alleged in plaintiffs' com plaint arise under Louisiana law, particularly under the tort of negligence. The Court dism isses those claim s for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c) (noting that a district court m ay decline to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction over a claim once the court dism isses all claim s over which it had original jurisdiction); Noble v. W hite, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993). IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's m otion to dism iss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Ordinarily, "a court should grant a pro se party every reasonable opportunity to am end." Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 50 3 n. 36 (5th Cir. 20 11) 11 (quoting Pena v. United States, 157 F.3d 984, 987 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1998)). When it is apparent, however, that am endm ent would be futile, dism issal without leave to am end is appropriate. Here, it is apparent from the allegations in plaintiffs' com plaint that am endm ent will be futile. Plaintiffs' opposition m em orandum reinforces this conclusion, as it dem onstrates that plaintiffs' claim s against DHH sound in negligence and therefore present issues of state, not federal law. Accordingly, this dism issal is entered without leave to am end. 20th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ day of April, 20 16. _______________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 12
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