Robinson et al v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et al, No. 2:2015cv06871 - Document 12 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 9 Motion to Remand to State Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant John Antoon is DISMISSED from this action as a defendant. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
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Robinson et al v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et al Doc. 12 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A MICH ELLE ROBIN SON , ET AL., Plain tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 15-6 8 71 W AL-MART STORES, IN C., ET AL., D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E”( 2 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is a m otion to rem and filed by Plaintiffs Michelle Robin son and Ernest Robinson (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). 1 The m otion is opposed. 2 For the reasons that follow, the m otion to rem and is D EN IED . BACKGROU N D This case arises from an alleged slip-and-fall incident at the Wal-Mart Supercenter on U.S. Highway 90 in Boutte, Louisiana. 3 According to the state-court petition, on or about August 11, 20 15, Plaintiff Michelle Robinson slipped and fell while shopping inside the store and suffered “severe and disabling injuries.”4 As a result, on Novem ber 13, 20 15, Michelle Robinson and her husband, Ernest Robinson, filed a petition for dam ages in the 29th J udicial District Court for the Parish of St. Charles, State of Louisiana, against Defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC; ABC Insurance Com pany; and J ohn Antoon, the Wal-Mart m anager on duty at the tim e of the incident. 5 On Decem ber 16, 20 15, this case was rem oved to federal court on the basis of the Court’s diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. 6 The parties do not contest the am ount in 1 R. Doc. 9. R. Doc. 11. 3 See R. Doc. 1 at 2. 4 R. Doc. 1-1 at 2. 5 R. Doc. 1-1 at 1. 6 See generally R. Doc. 1. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com controversy or whether it exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of $ 75,0 0 0 , exclusive of interest and costs, in this case. 7 The parties disagree, however, on whether the com plete diversity-of-citizenship requirem ent is satisfied. It is not disputed that Plaintiffs Michelle Robinson and Ernest Robinson are citizen s of Louisiana for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, 8 nor is it disputed that Defendan t J ohn Antoon is also a Louisiana citizen. 9 Thus, com plete diversity is, on its face, not present between the Plaintiffs and Antoon. According to the Defendants, however, federal diversity jurisdiction is proper, despite the fact that Plaintiffs and Antoon share Louisiana citizenship, because the Plaintiffs im properly joined Antoon in this m atter “in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction and keep this m atter in state court.”10 Plaintiffs disagree and, as a result, filed the instant m otion to rem and, arguing they pleaded “specific allegations against J ohn Antoon, including negligence, negligent training, and negligent supervision,” which shows they have valid claim s against Antoon and he was not im properly join ed to defeat diversity jurisdiction. 11 Whether Antoon was im properly joined is the sole issue before the Court. LEGAL STAN D ARD It is the rem oving party’s burden to establish im proper joinder, and the burden is a “heavy” one. 12 The Fifth Circuit has recognized two ways for the rem oving party to establish im proper joinder: (1) “actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts;” or (2) an “inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in 7 It appears, from the face of Plaintiff’s state-court petition, that the am ount-in-con troversy requirem ent is satisfied. Plaintiffs allege Michelle Robinson , as a result of this incident, suffered “severe and disabling injuries” to her “bones, m uscles, tendons, ligam ents, an d soft tissue of her back, neck, hips, kn ees, and body as a whole.” R. Doc. 1-1 at 3. The petition also avers Michelle Robinson has suffered “perm an ent disability and a loss of enjoym ent of life and will continue to do so in the future.” R. Doc. 1-1 at 3. 8 R. Doc. 1 at 5; R. Doc. 1-1 at 1. 9 R. Doc. 1 at 4– 5; R. Doc. 1-1 at 1. 10 R. Doc. 1 at 3. 11 R. Doc. 9-1 at 1. 12 Lundquist v. J&J Exterm in ating, Inc., No. 0 7-CV-1994, 20 0 8 WL 1968339, at *2 (W.D. La. May 2, 20 0 8 ) (quotin g Sm allw ood v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 38 5 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 20 0 4) (en banc)). 2 state court.”13 There is no allegation of actual fraud in this case. “The test for im proper joinder where there is no allegation of actual fraud is whether the defendant has dem onstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant.”14 “In determ ining the validity of an allegation of im proper joinder, the district court m ust construe factual allegations, resolve contested factual issues, and resolve am biguities in the controlling state law in the plaintiff’s favor.”15 In Sm allw ood v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., the Fifth Circuit articulated two avenues for determ ining whether a plaintiff has a reasonable basis for recovery under state law. 16 First, “[t]he court m ay conduct a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, looking initially at the allegations of the com plaint to determ ine whether the com plaint states a claim under state law against the in-state defendant.”17 “Ordinarily, if a plaintiff can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, there is no im proper joinder.”18 Second, if the plaintiff has stated a claim and, as a result, survives a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, but “m isstated or om itted discrete facts that would determ ine the propriety of joinder,” the court m ay “pierce the pleadings and conduct a sum m ary inquiry.”19 “[A]lthough the type of inquiry into the evidence is sim ilar to the sum m ary judgm ent inquiry, the district court is not to apply a sum m ary judgm ent standard but rather a standard closer to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.”20 “The district court m ust also 13 Sm allw ood v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 20 0 4) (en ban c) (citing Travis v. Irby , 326 F.3d 644, 646– 47 (5th Cir. 20 0 3)). 14 Rodrigue v. Continental Ins. Co., No. 14-1797, 20 14 WL 4999465, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 20 14) (citing Sm allw ood, 385 F.3d a 573). 15 Rodrigue, 20 14 WL 4999465, at *2 (citing Burden v. Gen. Dy nam ics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995)). 16 Sm allw ood v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568 , 573 (5th Cir. 20 0 4) (en ban c). See also Rodrigue, 20 14 WL 4999465, at *2. 17 Sm allw ood, 385 F.3d at 573. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 McKee v. Kansas City S. Ry . Co., 358 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 20 0 4). 3 take into account ‘the status of discovery’ and consider what opportunity the plaintiff has had to develop its claim s against the non-diverse defendant.”21 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS Antoon was on duty as the m anager of the Wal-Mart store at the tim e of the alleged slip an d fall. Under Louisiana law, a store m anager or em ployee cannot be held liable for an injury to a third party unless the m anager or em ployee breached an indepen dent, personal duty to the third party, which caused the third party’s in jury. 22 In Canter v. Koehring, the Louisiana Suprem e Court identified four distinct criteria which m ust be satisfied before an em ployee can be found liable to a third party for his or her injury: (1) The principal or em ployer owes a duty of care to the third person . . . , breach of which has caused the dam age for which recovery is sought; (2) The duty is delegated by the principal or em ployer to the defendant; (3) The defendant . . . has breached this duty through personal (as contrasted with technical or vicarious) fault. The breach occurs when the defendant has failed to discharge the obligation with the degree of care required by ordinary prudence under the sam e or sim ilar circum stances . . . ; and (4) [P]ersonal liability cannot be im posed upon the officer, agent, or em ployee sim ply because of his general adm inistrative responsibility for perform ance of som e function of em ploym ent. He m ust have a personal duty towards the injured plaintiff, breach of which specifically caused the plaintiff’s dam ages. 23 Plaintiffs argue Antoon is at least partially liable for the injuries Michelle Robinson sustained in the slip-and-fall incident, attributing three acts of negligence to Antoon: (1) 21 Id. 22 Canter v. Koehring Co., 28 3 So. 2d 716, 720 – 21 (La. 1973), superseded by statute on other grounds, LA. R EV. STAT. § 23:10 32. See also Garrett v . AEP River Operations, LLC, No. 15-5562, 20 16 WL 9450 56, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 20 16); Rushing v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 15-269, 20 15 WL 15650 64, at *2– 3 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 20 15); Hay nes v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 13-649-J J B-RLB, 20 14 WL 27690 80 , at *3 (M.D. La. May 30 , 20 14); Gerald v. Hospitality Properties Trust, No. 0 9-2989, 20 0 9 WL 150 7570 , at *3 (E.D. La. May 27, 20 0 9). 23 Canter, 283 So. 3d at 721. See also Anderson v. Ga. Gulf Lake Charles, LLC, 342 F. App’x 911, 916 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (quotin g In re 1994 Exxon Chem . Fire, 558 F.3d 378 , 386 (5th Cir. 20 0 9)) (“Canter’s four-part test is used to determ ine whether an em ployee is individually liable to third persons, even if they are not co-em ployees.”). 4 “negligently training the em ployees to properly warn of hazardous conditions”; (2) “negligent supervision of the em ployees for which he m aintain ed supervision an d control”; and (3) “failing to provide safe passageways, aisles, and conditions which do not pose an unreasonable and foreseeable risk and hazard of injury to plaintiff.”24 These are the only allegations against Antoon in the Plaintiffs’ state-court petition. Nowhere therein do Plaintiffs allege that Antoon owed a personal, independent duty, delegated by WalMart, to store patrons, nor do the Plaintiffs allege that Antoon breached such a duty through personal, rather than technical or adm inistrative, fault. Allegations such as those in Plaintiffs’ state-court petition are not sufficient under Canter to im pose personal liability on Antoon. Several federal district courts in Louisiana have found sim ilar allegations to be insufficient to trigger personal liability on the part of a store m anager or em ployee, concluding that the m anager or em ployee was im properly join ed to defeat com plete diversity. 25 For exam ple, in Rushing v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc., a store patron sued WalMart and the store m anager for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when two cases of drinks fell from a shelf onto her head while shopping at a Wal-Mart store in Ham m on d, Louisiana. 26 The action was filed in state court and rem oved to federal court, despite the apparent lack of com plete diversity, on im proper join der grounds. 27 In considering the 24 R. Doc. 1-1 at 2. See, e.g., Rushing v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 15-269, 20 15 WL 15650 64 (E.D. La. Apr. 8 , 20 15); Sanchez v. Shintech Louisiana, LLC, No. 12-370 -BAJ -SCR, 20 13 WL 1296684 (M.D. La. Feb. 19, 20 13); Gautreau v. Low e’s Hom e Ctr., Inc., No. 12-630 , 20 12 WL 716528 0 (M.D. La. Dec. 19, 20 12); Black v. Low e’s Hom e Ctr., Inc., No. 10 -478-C-M2, 20 10 WL 4790 90 6 (M.D. La. Oct. 22, 20 10 ); Arrighi v. Celebration Station Prop., Inc., No. 10 -10 5-BAJ -SCR, 20 10 WL 43860 66 (M.D. La. Sept. 14, 20 10 ); Driver v. W al-Mart Louisiana, LLC, No. 0 9-786, 20 0 9 WL 2913938 (W.D. La. Sept. 9, 20 0 9); Carter v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A. 0 4-0 0 72, 20 0 5 WL 18310 92 (W.D. La. J uly 28, 20 0 5); Brady v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc., 90 7 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. La. 1995); Maxw ell v. Monsanto Co., No. Civ.A. 91-0 15, 1991 WL 42571 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 1991). 26 Rushing, 20 15 WL 15650 64. 27 Id. at *1. 25 5 plaintiff’s m otion to rem and, the court looked, specifically, to the plaintiff’s allegations against the Wal-Mart store m anager. 28 The allegations were that the store m anager was liable, inter alia, for: “Failing to m aintain proper supervision of its em ployees; Failing to properly stock the shelves of the subject prem ises; Failing to m aintain a safe and proper look-out; Failing to see they they [sic] should have seen; Failing to exercise vigilan ce; Failing to provide proper training and instructions to their em ployees; Stocking shelves in a dangerous condition; Stocking shelves at heights unreasonable for patrons; Placing heavy item s [sic] high shelves; Stocking item s in a dangerous condition; m an ner and configuration; Placing too m any item s on a shelf; Failure to reasonably inspect shelving to rem ove unreasonably dangerous conditions . . . .”29 Relying on a wealth of case law from federal district courts in Louisiana, the Rushing court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations against the store m anager were insufficient to trigger personal liability, as the plaintiff did not allege that Wal-Mart delegated any duty to the m anager or that the m anager breached such a duty through personal fault. 30 The court noted there were “neither allegations nor evidence that WalMart delegated an y duty to [the store m anager] or that [the store m anager] breached a personal duty to plaintiff.”31 Instead, according to the court, the plaintiff m erely alleged, generically, that the store m anager “failed to supervise and provide proper training and instructions to Wal-Mart’s em ployees,” which does not am ount to the breach of a personal duty to ensure the plaintiff’s safety. 32 Quoting Carter v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc., a decision of the Western District of Louisiana, the Rushing court explained “[t]his is a classic case 28 Id. at *3. Id. 30 Id. at *3– 4. 31 Id. at *4. 32 Id. 29 6 of attem pting to place liability on an em ployee sim ply because of his general adm in istrative responsibility for perform ance of som e function of em ploym ent.”33 The Rushing court found the plaintiff could not, as a m atter of law, recover against the store m anager under Louisiana law, concluding that the store m anager had been im properly joined. The Rushing decision is analogous to the instant case, and the Court finds its reasoning to be instructive. In this case, as in Rushing, the Plaintiffs have not alleged that Antoon owed them a personal, indepen dent duty, the breach of which caused Michelle Robinson to slip and fall and suffer the injuries which she alleges. Nor have Plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart delegated to Antoon the duties which it owed to third-party patrons as a m erchant under Louisiana law. 34 Having conducted a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry, looking to the allegations of the state-court petition to determ ine whether the Plaintiffs stated a viable claim against Antoon under Louisiana law, the Court finds the Plaintiffs have not stated such a claim and cannot recover from Antoon under Louisiana law. Antoon was im properly join ed to defeat com plete federal diversity jurisdiction, and he m ust be dism issed from this action as a defendant. 35 As between the Plaintiffs and the rem aining 33 Id. (quoting Carter v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A. 0 4-0 0 72, 20 0 5 WL 18310 92, at *3 (W.D. La. J uly 28 , 20 0 5)) (internal quotation m arks om itted). 34 “Wal-Mart, as a m erchant, owes its custom ers a duty ‘to exercise reasonable care to keep [its] aisle, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condiotion.’” Id. at *3 (citin g LA. R EV. STAT. § 9:280 0 .6). 35 “A findin g of im proper join der is tantam ount to dism issal of the defendant who was im properly joined.” Butler v . La. State. Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., No. 12-CV-1838 , 20 12 WL 778440 2, at *4 (W.D. La. Nov. 19, 20 12) (citing Carriere v . Sears, Roebuck & Co., 8 93 F.2d 98, 10 2 (5th Cir. 1990 )). See also Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v . Travelers Property Cas. Co. of Am erica, No. 712-0 0 133, 20 13 WL 5969920 , at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 20 13) (dism issing n on-diverse defendant upon findin g of im proper joinder); Hardy v. Ducote, 246 F. Supp. 2d 50 9, 515– 16 (W.D. La. 20 0 3) (dism issin g non-diverse defendants upon findin g that they had been im properly joined); M ahon v. Aegon Direct Mktg. Servs., Inc., No. 0 4-975, 20 0 5 WL 1249486, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 20 0 5) (dism issal of non-diverse defendant required once court finds im proper joinder). 7 Defendants, com plete diversity is present, and federal diversity jurisdiction is proper before this Court. 36 CON CLU SION IT IS ORD ERED that the Plaintiffs’ m otion to rem and is D EN IED . IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that Defendant J ohn Antoon is D ISMISSED from this action as a defendant. N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 19 th d ay o f Ap ril, 2 0 16 . _____________ ________ _________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 36 Plaintiffs are both citizens of Louisiana. R. Doc. 1 at 1. Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., is a foreign corporation incorporated in the State of Delaware with its principal place of business in Arkansas. R. Doc. 1 at 4. Defendant Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC, is constituted by a sole m em ber, Wal-Mart Stores East, LP. R. Doc. 1 at 4. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, in turn, is com prised of a general partn er, WSE Managem ent, LLC, and a lim ited partner, WSE Investm ent, LLC. R. Doc. 1 at 4. The sole m em ber of both WSE Managem ent, LLC, and WSE Investm ent, LLC, is Wal-Mart Stores East, LLC, which is com prised of a sole m em ber—WalMart Stores, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its prin cipal place of busin ess in Arkansas. R. Doc. 1 at 4. Defendant ABC Insurance Co. is an unidentified, unserved party, which m ust be ignored for purposes of assessing the presence of com plete diversity. See, e.g., Harvey v. Shelter Ins. Co., No. 13-392, 20 13 WL 1768658 (E.D. La. Apr. 24, 20 13); W estley v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 0 6-8 28 8, 20 0 7 WL 442221 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 20 0 7). As such, the Plaintiffs are com pletely diverse from the rem ain ing defendants, and diversity jurisdiction is proper. 8
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