Montgomery-Smith v. Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, et al., No. 2:2015cv06369 - Document 142 (E.D. La. 2017)

Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 119 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 11/27/2017. (clc)

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Montgomery-Smith v. Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, et al. Doc. 142 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A D EN EEN L. MON TGOMERY-SMITH , Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 15 -6 3 6 9 LOU ISIAN A D EPARTMEN T OF H EALTH AN D H OS PITALS, ET AL., D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E”( 3 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is a Motion for J udgm ent Notwithstanding the Verdict filed by Plaintiff, Deneen Montgom ery-Sm ith. 1 The m otion is opposed. 2 The m otion is before the Court on the briefs, without oral argum ent. Having considered the m em oranda of counsel, the record, and the applicable law, the Court D EN IES the m otion. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Deneen Montgom ery-Sm ith is an African-Am erican fem ale who is m ore than 40 years old, has m ore than 25 years of experience with the State of Louisiana, and has m ore than 12 years of experience with the Louisiana Departm ent of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”). In her underlying com pliant, Plaintiff alleged she worked at the DHH-Office of the Bureau of Protective Services and was prom oted to the position of APS Supervisor on March 30 , 20 0 4, where she worked until J uly 30 , 20 0 7. On this date, Plaintiff alleged she was transferred without her agreem ent to the DHH-Office of Public Health after she filed an EEOC charge and a lawsuit for discrim ination, retaliation, harassm ent, failure to prom ote, and den ial of m erit in creases. The lawsuit was filed on April 13, 20 0 7 in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Plaintiff filed a second 1 R. 2 Doc. 119. R. Doc. 125. 1 Dockets.Justia.com lawsuit on October 24, 20 0 8 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. According to Plaintiff, when she was rem oved to Vital Records, she was subjected to a hostile work environm ent through isolation and hum iliation for a host of reasons. 3 In her com plaint, Plaintiff contended that, although the lawsuits she filed in 20 0 7 an d 20 0 8 were settled in 20 11, she continued to be subjected to retaliation, isolation, an d a hostile work environm ent at DHH. On Novem ber 30 , 20 15, Plaintiff filed a com plaint against Defendants, the State of Louisiana, through DHH, and against Devin George, Nadine Sm ith, and Darlene WarrenSm ith in their individual and official capacities. 4 On May 15, 20 16, Defendants filed a m otion to dism iss Plaintiff’s claim s, which the Court granted in part and denied in part, leaving only: (1) Plaintiff’s Title VII Retaliation claim s against DHH based on acts occurring between May 30 , 20 14 and March 26, 20 15; an d (2) Plaintiff’s Title VII Hostile Work Environm ent claim against DHH based on acts occurring prior to March 26, 20 15. The case then proceeded to trial. During the five-day trial, the jury heard testim ony from several witnesses, including Plaintiff. On J uly 28, 20 17, the jury entered a unanim ous verdict in favor of Defendants, finding Plaintiff was not subjected to retaliation, discrim ination, or a hostile work environm ent. 5 On August 17, 20 17, Plaintiff filed the instant m otion for judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict. 6 3 R. Doc. 23 at 5-8 . R. Doc. 1. For the tim e periods covered, Darlene Warren-Sm ith was no longer a state em ployee and instead, was an independen t consultant to DHH. See R. Doc. 23. 5 See R. Docs. 10 2– 10 7, 111. 6 R. Doc. 119. 4 2 D ISCU SSION The standard for granting judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict is a stringent one. As the Fifth Circuit has held, On m otions for . . . judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict the Court should consider all of the evidence—not just that evidence which supports the non m over’s case—but in the light and with all reasonable inferences m ost favorable to the party opposed to the m otion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelm ingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable [people] could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the m otions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial eviden ce opposed to the m otions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-m in ded [people] in the exercise of im partial judgm ent m ight reach different conclusions, the m otions should be denied. . . . A m ere scintilla of eviden ce is insufficient to present a question for the jury. The m otion . . . for judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict should not be decided by which side has the better of the case, nor should they be granted only when there is com plete absence of probative facts to support a jury verdict. There m ust be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question. However, it is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of the facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determ ine the credibility of witnesses. 7 Thus, if there is substantial eviden ce to support the verdict, the challenge to it m ust be denied. 8 “Substantial eviden ce” m eans evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable an d fair-m inded persons in the exercise of im partial judgm ent m ight reach different conclusions; a m ere scintilla of evidence is in sufficient. 9 A party m ay m ove for a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict only if the party first m oved for judgm ent as a m atter of law at the close of all evidence, before the verdict was rendered. 10 In this case, although Defendants m ade a Rule 50 m otion for judgm ent as a 7 Boy le v . Pool Offshore Co., 893 F.2d 713, 715– 16 (5th Cir. 1990 ) (citin g Boeing v. Shipm an, 411 F.2d 365, 374– 75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc)). 8 Shipm an, 411 F.2d at 374, overruled on other grounds by Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 10 7 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997). 9 Id.; see also Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367, 1371 (5th Cir. 198 2). 10 Douglas v. Dy nm cderm ott Petroleum Operations Co., No. 95-1967, 1996 WL 560 0 18, at *1 (E.D. La. 1996). 3 m atter of law at the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief on J uly 27, 20 17, Plaintiff did not m ake a sim ilar m otion before the jury’s verdict was rendered. 11 Courts have noted two exceptions to this prohibition in certain circum stances: (1) “where the original m otion for judgm ent as a m atter of law was made at the end of the plaintiff’s case but not renewed at the close of all the evidence”; and (2) “where the m oving party objected to the court’s jury instructions on the grounds that there was no evidence to support a claim but failed to m ove for a directed verdict on that claim .” 12 Because “a party who fails to m ove for judgm ent as a m atter of law at the close of all evidence is foreclosed from [bringing] a post-verdict m otion for judgm ent as a m atter of law,” 13 and neither exception to this rule is applicable in this case, “the Court is foreclosed from considering the presen t m otion for judgm ent.” 14 Even if Plaintiff had not waived her right to bring a Rule 50 (b) m otion for judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict, her argum ent in favor of the m otion is not com pelling. The m oving party in a post-verdict m otion as a m atter of law bears a very heavy burden. 15 “If reasonable persons could differ in their interpretation of the eviden ce, then the m otion should be den ied.” 16 In this case, the jury heard testim ony from several witnesses over a five-day period. Although Plaintiff testified she was excluded from m eetings and faced social isolation at work, 17 several other witnesses testified that Plaintiff was included during m eetings an d if she was not included, it was because she was not a m em ber of the 11 The Court notes that after the jury rendered its verdict in favor of Defendants, Plaintiff’s counsel stated: “Your Honor, . . . Plaintiff[] would like to file for a m otion notwithstandin g the verdict.” This statem ent was m ade too late. See id. 12 Id. (citing Hinojosa v. Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223, 1228 (5th Cir. 198 8)). 13 Id. 14 Sanford v. Kostm ay er Con str. Co., 891 F. Supp. 120 1, 120 4 (E.D. La. 1995)); see also Flow ers v. S. Reg’l Phy s. Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 20 0 1). 15 Thom as v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim inal Justice, 220 F.3d 38 9, 392 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). 16 Id. 17 R. Doc. 125-1. 4 com m ittee that was m eeting. 18 Other witnesses testified they did not perceive Plaintiff as being isolated. 19 Additionally, although Plaintiff testified she was passed over for prom otions for retaliatory reasons, other witnesses testified to the contrary. For exam ple, Devin George, Plaintiff’s supervisor, provided the jury with nonretaliatory reasons as to why he promoted other applicants over Plaintiff. 20 In sum, during the course of the trial, Defendants presented substantial evidence refuting Plaintiff’s Title VII Retaliation and Hostile Work Environment claim s against DHH. Thus, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict in favor Defendants, and Plaintiff is not entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law. Accordingly; CON CLU SION IT IS ORD ERED that Plaintiff Deneen Montgom ery-Sm ith’s Motion for J udgm ent Notwithstanding the Verdict 21 be and hereby is D EN IED . N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 2 7th d ay o f N o ve m be r, 2 0 17. ________________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 18 R. Docs. 125-3, 125-4. R. Doc. 125-4. 20 R. Doc. 125-2. 21 R. Doc. 119. 19 5

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