Donahue v. Smith, et al, No. 2:2015cv06036 - Document 168 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part 141 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to Rule 54(d) and § 1988, MOTION for Bill of Costs. With respect to costs, the motion is granted. With respect to attorney's fees, th e motion is denied. FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Local Rule 54.3, Brandon Donahue serve on Sarah Donahue's attorney and file with the clerk a motion to tax costs on the forms prescribed by the court, together with a certification that the items are correct and that the costs have been necessarily incurred. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 12/4/2017. (clc)
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Donahue v. Smith, et al Doc. 168 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A SARAH BARN ETT D ON AH U E, Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 15-6 0 3 6 RAN D Y SMITH , ET AL., D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E” ( 2 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is Defendant Brandon Michael Donahue’s m otion for attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). 1 The m otion is opposed. 2 For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the m otion in part and denies the m otion in part. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Sarah Donahue initially filed suit on Novem ber 18, 20 15, bringing federal and state law claim s against her ex-husband, Brandon Don ahue; Sheriff Rodney J . Strain, J r.; and Sergeants Michael Ripoll, J r., Alex Dantagnan, J r., and Steven Gaudet (collectively “Defendants”). 3 On Septem ber 12, 20 17, the Court granted judgm ent in favor of Defendants. 4 Defendant Ban don Donahue now seeks costs and attorneys’ fees, contending he is entitled to them as a “prevailing party,” and that Plaintiff’s claim s against him were “frivolous.” According to Plaintiff’s underlying com plaint, Brandon Donahue served as a reserve deputy with the St. Tam m any Parish Sheriff’s Office from 20 12 until 20 14. 5 In her 1 R. Doc. 141. R. Doc. 147. 3 R. Doc. 91. 4 R. Doc. 127. 5 R. Doc. 35 at 3, ¶ 11. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com com plaint, Plaintiff alleged Brandon Donahue “engaged in a pattern of violence against [her], which he justified and excused and was furthered by virtue of his position as a reserve deputy sheriff.”6 On Novem ber 18, 20 15, Plaintiff brought federal an d state law claim s against Defendants, 7 alleging Defendants conspired “to thwart the prosecution of Brandon Donahue, a fellow law enforcem ent officer, for dom estic violen ce.”8 In her secon d am ended com plaint, Plaintiff brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Brandon Donahue and the Deputies in their official and individual capacities for conspiracy to violate her rights under the First an d Fourteenth Am endm ents. 9 Plaintiff also brought a Monell claim against the Sheriff in his official capacity for failure to supervise and train. 10 On August 3, 20 17, this Court ruled on Defendants’ m otions to dism iss, granting the m otions in part. 11 The Court determ ined that all but one of the five alleged overt acts form ing the basis of Plaintiff’s claim s had prescribed, leaving only Plaintiff’s J une 24, 20 15 interaction with Gaudet, in which Plaintiff sought to press charges against Brandon Donahue for the alleged J uly 20 13 battery. 12 On Septem ber 11, 20 17, the Court granted judgm ent in favor of Dantagnan, Donahue, Ripoll, Sm ith, and Gaudet on Plaintiff’s rem aining claim s. 13 In granting judgm ent in favor of Defendants, the Court found Plaintiff had failed to present any evidence indicating Defendants agreed to protect Brandon Donahue from prosecution, thereby violating Plaintiff’s right to Equal Protection, nor had 6 Id. at ¶ 12. R. Doc. 91. 8 R. Doc. 35 at 12– 13. 9 R. Doc. 35 at 13. 10 Id. at 14. 11 R. Doc. 88 . 12 R. Doc. 35 at 12, ¶ 38 . 13 R. Doc. 126. 7 2 she put forth “proof that the cause of the differential treatm ent of which the plaintiff com plains was a totally illegitim ate anim us towards the plaintiff by the defendant.”14 On Septem ber 26, 20 17, Defendant Brandon Donahue filed the instant m otion for attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). 15 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure creates “a strong presum ption that the prevailing party will be awarded costs.”16 Rule 54(d) provides, in part, that “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Thus, to determ ine whether a party can recover its costs under Rule 54(d), the Court m ust determ ine whether that party is the “prevailing party” within the m eaning of the Rule. 17 After prevailing-party status has been determ in ed, the Court then m ust ask whether a federal statute, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, or a federal court order provides that costs, for one reason or another, should not be awarded to the prevailing party. 18 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, “the court, in its discretion, m ay allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs” in civil rights proceedings. 19 Congress enacted § 1988 , in large part, to ensure “effective access to the judicial process 14 Mata v. City of Kingsville, 275 F. App’x 412, 415 (5th Cir. 20 0 8 ) (quoting Hilton v. City of W heeling, 20 9 F.3d 10 0 5, 10 0 8 (7th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted)). 15 R. Doc. 141. 16 Schw arz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that when a district court declines to award costs to a prevailin g party, it should state its reasons for doin g so); Perry v. Port of Houston Authority , 31 F. App’x. 153 (5th Cir. 20 0 1) (rem anding the issue of costs to the district court for reconsideration for failing to award costs to the prevailing party and not stating its reasons for doin g so); Abate v. Kansas City Southern Ry . Co., No. 90 -1219, 1991 WL 195518 , at n . 3 (E.D. La. 1991). 17 See, e.g., Schw arz, 767 F.2d at 130 . 18 See F ED . R. CIV. P. 54(d) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs— other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”). 19 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 832– 33 (20 11). 3 for persons with civil rights grievances.”20 This fee provision was intended to “m ake it easier for a plaintiff of lim ited m ean s to bring a m eritorious suit.”21 However, by allowing attorney’s fees to prevailing defen dants, Congress also intended the provision “to deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation,” “to discourage frivolous suits,” and “to dim in ish the likelihood of unjustified suits being brought.”22 As a result of these com peting policy considerations, “the standard for awarding attorney’s fees differs if a defendant rather than a plaintiff prevails.”23 Typically, a prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action is entitled to recover his reasonable attorney’s fees, unless there is a showing of special circum stances which would m ake such an award unjust. 24 However, when the “prevailing party” is the defendant, the district court can award attorney’s fees “only ‘upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’”25 A. Co s ts For the Court to award Brandon Donahue reasonable costs, (1) he m ust be a prevailing party, and (2) no federal statute, the Federal Rules, or court order otherwise provides that costs should not be awarded. 26 a. W ho is the prevailing party ? “The ‘prevailing party’ determ ination is a clear, m echanical one; when a judgm ent 20 Hensley v . Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). Garm ent Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420 (1978). 22 Id. 23 W hite v. Southpark Indep. Sch. Dist., 693 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 198 2). 24 See Dean v . Riser, 240 F.3d 50 5, 50 8 (5th Cir. 20 0 1). 25 Id. (quotin g Christiansburg Garm ent Co., 434 U.S. at 421 (“[A] district court m ay in its discretion award attorneys[‘] fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, un reasonable, or without foundation , even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”)). 26 See F ED . R. CIV. P. 54(d). 21 Christiansburg 4 is entered in favor of a party, it is the prevailing party.”27 In this case, judgm ent was entered in favor of Defendants, including Brandon Donahue. 28 Thus, Brandon Don ahue is a prevailing party. b. Does a federal statute, federal rule, or court order “provide otherw ise”? Although Rule 54(d) does not require that costs be awarded to the prevailing party, it states that costs should be awarded unless a federal statute, a federal rule, or a court order provides otherwise. In this case, no rule prevents the award of costs. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s m otion with respect to costs. B. Atto rn e y’s Fe e s A successful civil rights defendant m ay also recover attorney’s fees again st the plaintiff, but only if the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”29 A suit is frivolous if it is “so lacking in arguable m erit as to be groundless or without foundation.”30 While this standard does not require a showing of bad faith on the part of plaintiff, district courts should avoid “post hoc reasoning by concluding that because a plaintiff did not ultim ately prevail, his action m ust have been unreason able or without foundation.”31 The factors im portant to frivolity determ inations are whether (1) plaintiff established a prim a facie case, (2) the defendant offered to settle, and (3) the district court dism issed the case or held a full-blown trial. 32 27 Allianz Versicherungs, AG v. Profreight Brokers, Inc., 99 F. App’x 10 , 13 (5th Cir. 20 0 4) (citing Baker v. Bow en , 839 F.2d 10 75, 10 81, (5th Cir. 1988 ); see also 10 J am es Wm . Moore et al., M OORE ’S F EDERAL P RACTICE ¶ 54.10 1[3] (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]he prevailin g party is the party in whose favor judgm ent was entered, even if that judgm ent does not fully vindicate the litigant’s position in the case.”)). 28 R. Docs. 88 , 126. 29 See Dean , 240 F.3d at 50 8 (“[A]ttorney’s fees for prevailing defendants are presum ptively unavailable unless a showing is m ade that the underlyin g civil rights suit was vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise without m erit.”); W hite, 693 F.2d at 1169-70 . 30 Plem er v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1140 -41 (5th Cir. 1983). 31 Christianburg Garm ent Co., 434 U.S. at 421. 32 See United States v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d 60 4, 60 9 (5th Cir. 1991). 5 In this case, although the Court dism issed som e of Plaintiffs’ claim s on Defendants’ respective m otions to dism iss based on prescription, two of her claim s survived the m otion to dism iss stage. Thus, Plaintiff m ade out a prim e facie case. Although the parties did not settle, and the Court ultim ately granted sum m ary judgm ent in favor of Defendants, the Court cannot say Plaintiff’s grievances were baseless, nor can the Court say Plaintiff’s lawsuit was frivolous. Accordingly; CON CLU SION IT IS ORD ERED that Defendant Brandon Michael Donahue’s m otion for attorneys’ fees and costs 33 is GRAN TED in part and D EN IED in part. With respect to costs, the m otion is granted. With respect to attorney’s fees, the m otion is denied. IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that pursuant to Local Rule 54.3, Brandon Donahue serve on Sarah Donahue’s attorney and file with the clerk a m otion to tax costs on the form s prescribed by the court, together with a certification that the item s are correct an d that the costs have been necessarily incurred. N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 4 th d ay o f D e ce m be r, 2 0 17. _______________________ ________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 33 R. Doc. 141. 6
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