Raymond v. Hudson Group, et al, No. 2:2015cv05587 - Document 17 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting MOTION 10 to dismiss Count 3 of Plaintiff's complaint.. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 5/13/16. (jjs)
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Raymond v. Hudson Group, et al Doc. 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LINNIE RAYMOND CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-5587 HUDSON GROUP and GINA TREVINO SECTION: R(4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants New Orleans Air Ventures II and Gina Trevino m ove the Court to dism iss Count 3 of plaintiff Linnie Raym ond’s com plaint, 1 which alleges that they are liable for intentional infliction of em otional distress in connection with Raym ond’s term ination of em ployment. 2 Defendants argue that Raym ond fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Raym ond’s allegations that she was “warned” for untim ely com pleting an assignm ent, “written up” for failing to com plete an assignment, and ultim ately term inated because of “poor job perform ance” are not so extreme and outrageous as to state a plausible claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress. Defendants’ conduct, as alleged in Raym ond’s com plaint, did not rise to such an extraordinary level of atrocity 1 R. Doc. 10 . 2 R. Doc. 1 at 8-9. Dockets.Justia.com or indecency, as required by Louisiana law. Therefore, the Court grants defendants’ m otion to dism iss. I. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Linnie Raym ond filed this action following term ination of her em ploym ent from the Louis Arm strong International Airport in Kenner, Louisiana. 3 Raym ond alleges that defendant New Orleans Air Ventures II was her employer and that defendant Gino Trevino was the general m anager of Air Ventures’s Kenner location and the person who ultim ately fired her. 4 According to Raym ond’s allegations, she worked at the airport since 20 0 5. 5 Raym ond alleges that, before Trevino’s served as general m anager, Raym ond and the other Air Ventures em ployees were allowed “true” lunch breaks, in that they were not required to perform job responsibilities during their breaks. 6 When Trevino became m anager, she required the em ployees 3 Id. at 1. 4 Id. at 1-2. Originally, Raym ond nam ed “Hudson Group” as her em ployer and a defendant in this action. On J anuary 29, 20 16, the Court allowed Raym ond to substitute Air Ventures for Hudson Group based on Raym ond’s representations that Air Ventures was her proper legal em ployer. R. Docs. 8-9. 5 R. Doc. 1 at 2. 6 Id. to “rem ain in the area” during their lunch breaks in the event they were needed to assist a custom er, relieve a fellow em ployee, or other reasons. 7 Trevino also allegedly increased the em ployees’ usual eight-and-one-halfhour shifts, with unpaid half-hour lunches, to ten-hour shifts, with two hours of “break time.”8 But em ployees were expected to be “on call” or “on standby” during the two-hour break. 9 Following this shift change, Raym ond began to complain about Trevino’s m anagem ent. Raym ond alleges that before she com plained, Trevino gave her a thank-you card, which com m ented on Raym ond’s “hard work and dedication.”10 Raym ond alleges that after com plaining to Air Ventures’s Regional Vice President about Trevino’s “scheduling irregularities” and “unfair scheduling,” Trevino met with Raym ond to discuss her job perform ance. 11 At this m eeting, Trevino “m ade vague references” to Raym ond’s “priorities” not being “in order.” 7 Id. at 2-3. 8 Id. at 3. 9 Id. 10 Id. at 4. 11 Id. Som etime thereafter, Raym ond again com plained to the Reginal Vice President—this time, that Trevino was “harass[ing] and retaliat[ing] against [Raym ond] for com plaining about scheduling.”12 Raym ond also re-urged her com plaints about the “scheduling irregularities” directly to Trevino during work m eetings. 13 Raym ond then received “an em ployee warning notice” for failing to tim ely com plete an assignment from the assistant general m anager (Trevino’s assistant). Raym ond contends she was never given a tim e frame in which to com plete the assignment. 14 The next day, Raym ond em ailed the Regional Vice President and Hum an Resource department to ask that the warning notice be withdrawn. 15 Approxim ately two weeks later, Trevino “wr[o]te-up” Raym ond for failing to “com plet[e] an electronic count.”16 Raym ond contends that because she tim ely completed the electronic count, she refused to sign the “write-up.”17 Trevino then “handed [Raym ond] term ination papers” and told Raym ond “she was no 12 Id. at 4. 13 Id. at 5. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. at 6. 17 Id. longer needed.”18 The term ination papers, which were “already filled in,” noted “poor job perform ance” as the reason for Raymond’s term ination. 19 Approxim ately one week later, a m ember of Air Ventures’s Hum an Resource department contacted Raym ond and told her that her term ination was “a corporation decision” and “not [Trevino’s] fault.”20 Raym ond now sues Air Ventures and Trevino, alleging four causes of action. In Count 1, Raym ond claims she is entitled to overtim e pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In Count 2, Raym ond claim s that she was unlawfully retaliated against under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In Count 3, Raym ond claim s that Air Ventures and Trevino intentionally subjected her to severe em otional distress. In Count 4, Raym ond claim s that Air Ventures is vicariously liable for Trevino’s unlawful conduct. 21 Air Ventures and Trevino m ove the Court to dism iss Raym ond’s claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress. 22 Defendants argue that accepting all of Raym ond’s allegations as true, none of defendants’ conduct 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Id. at 7-9. 22 R. Doc. 10 . is so extreme or outrageous to state a claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress under Louisiana law. 23 Raym ond argues that defendants’ conduct was outrageous because they “falsely accused [her] of poor job perform ance” and “us[ed] these false allegations as grounds for term inating her.”24 II. D ISCU SSION To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Lorm and v. US Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 20 0 9); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 , 196 (5th Cir. 1996). 23 Id. at 1. 24 R. Doc. 11-1 at 4-5. A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elem ents of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiff's claim . Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, the claim m ust be dism issed. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. To state a plausible claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress under Louisiana law, a plaintiff m ust allege: (1) that the conduct of the defendant was extrem e and outrageous; (2) that the em otional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and (3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe em otional distress or knew that severe em otional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct. N icholas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 10 17, 10 22 (La. 20 0 0 ) (quoting W hite v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 120 5, 120 9 (La. 1991)). For the defendant’s conduct to be “extreme and outrageous,” it m ust “go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and . . . be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized com m unity.” King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP, 743 So. 2d 181, 18586 (La. 1999) (quoting W hite, 585 So. 2d at 120 9). “[M]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” will not suffice. Id. at 186. Here, Raym ond alleges that she was privately chastised by Trevino twice and that she received “an em ployee warning notice” from Trevino’s assistant once. 25 According to Raym ond’s allegations, in her first m eeting with Trevino, Trevino only “m ade vague references” to Raym ond’s work priorities. 26 During their second meeting, Trevino attem pted to give Raym ond a “write-up” but later term inated Raym ond, telling her that she “was no longer needed.” Trevino’s “vague references” and other statem ents regarding Raym ond’s job performance are far from the “extrem e and outrageous” conduct necessary to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress. See id. Contrary to Raym ond’s arguments in opposition, based on the allegations of her complaint, these interactions with Trevino were apparently lim ited to Raym ond’s purported job perform ance, and Trevino’s conduct was in no way egregious. These allegations are therefore 25 R. Doc. 1 at 4-6. 26 Id. at 4. insufficient to state a claim for relief. See Bertaut v. Folger Coffee Co., No. 0 6-2437, 20 0 6 WL 2513175, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 20 0 6) (“[C]onduct in the workplace . . . will rarely be so severe that it will rise to the level of outrageous . . . .” (collecting cases)). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’ m otion to dism iss Count 3 of Raym ond’s com plaint. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _13th _ _ day of May, 20 16. ___ ___________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE
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