Tractor and Equipment Co. v. Dual Trucking and Transport, LLC et al, No. 2:2015cv05413 - Document 64 (E.D. La. 2017)

Court Description: ORDER granting 48 Motion to Reopen Case; granting Motion to Enforce Judgment; granting Motion for Attorney Fees. IT IS ORDERED that there be a judgment in favor of plaintiff against Defendant Anthony Alford in the amount of $292,846.30 in pri ncipal, plus interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum from October 31, 2013, attorneys' fees in the amount of $30,508.50 and costs in the amount of $1,111.55. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there be a judgment in favor of plaintiff against Alford in the additional amount of $49,535.10 for attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiff in enforcing Alford's guarantee and the Montana judgment in Louisiana. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 8/22/2017. (cg)

Download PDF
Tractor and Equipment Co. v. Dual Trucking and Transport, LLC et al Doc. 64 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA TRACTOR AND EQUIPMENT CO. CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-5413 DUAL TRUCKING AND TRANSPORT, LLC, AND ANTHONY ALFORD SECTION: R ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is plaintiff’s m otion to reopen this m atter and for further relief. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of an open account agreement between Plaintiff Tractor and Equipm ent Co. and Defendant Dual Trucking and Transport, LLC (DTT). 2 In March 20 12, DTT applied for credit from plaintiff. 3 Defendant Anthony Alford, a 50 percent owner of DTT, signed a personal guarantee prom ising to repay Tractor and Equipm ent any m onies due 1 2 3 R. Doc. 48. R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 7. R. Doc. 46 at 1-2. Dockets.Justia.com because of the credit extended to DTT, including late payment charges, costs of collection, and a reasonable attorney’s fee for recovery of the debt. 4 Tractor and Equipm ent sued DTT and Anthony Alford in Montana state court, alleging that DTT had an unpaid account balance of $ 292,846.30 . 5 The Montana court dism issed the claim s against Alford for lack of personal jurisdiction in May 20 15. 6 On March 8, 20 16, the Montana court entered judgm ent against DTT in the am ount of $ 292,846.30 , plus interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum from October 31, 20 13, attorneys’ fees in the am ount of $ 30 ,50 8.50 , and costs in the am ount of $ 1,111.55. 7 On October 23, 20 15, Tractor and Equipm ent filed suit in this Court seeking a declaratory judgm ent against Alford and DTT. 8 On April 3, 20 17, the Court granted Tractor and Equipm ent’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent and declared that Alford’s personal guarantee is a valid and enforceable surety agreement. 9 On April 12, 20 17, Alford and DTT filed a notice of appeal of the Court’s declaratory judgment. 10 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Id. at 2, 5. R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 7. R. Doc. 5-4 at 10 . R. Doc. 16-8. R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 46; R. Doc. 47. R. Doc. 49. 2 Tractor and Equipm ent now m oves to reopen this matter and requests that the Court grant it further relief in the form of m onetary damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 11 II. D ISCU SSION A. Availability o f Fu rth e r Re lie f After entering a declaratory judgm ent, the Court may grant “[f]urther necessary or proper relief . . . after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determ ined by such judgm ent.” 28 U.S.C. § 220 2. The decision to grant further relief, including m onetary dam ages, is within the Court’s discretion. See N oatex Corp. v. King Const. of Houston, LLC, 732 F.3d 479, 487 (5th Cir. 20 13) (“Monetary dam ages are allowed under this provision and we review a district court’s decision to grant or deny such m onetary dam ages for abuse of discretion.”); see also United Teacher Assocs. Ins. Co. v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 558, 569-71 (5th Cir. 20 0 5). The Court’s declaratory judgm ent determ ined the legal rights of the parties in this m atter. The Montana court found that DTT owes plaintiff 11 R. Doc. 48. 3 dam ages, interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 12 After the Montana judgment was entered, the Court declared that Alford’s personal guarantee accom panying DTT’s credit application is a valid and enforceable surety agreement. 13 Alford is therefore liable for DTT’s debts to Tractor and Equipm ent. The Court retains jurisdiction to grant further relief even though an appeal is pending in this m atter. See United Teacher, 414 F.3d at 572-73. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, courts “have consistently held that neither the filing of an appeal nor a lengthy delay after the trial court’s initial ruling term inates the court’s authority to grant further relief pursuant to § 220 2.” Id. at 572; see also Horn & Hardart Co. v. N at’l Rail Passenger Corp., 843 F.2d 546, 548 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that the Declaratory J udgment Act’s provision for further relief is a statutory reservation to the general rule that an appeal divests district court of jurisdiction). Defendants concede that the Court retains the power to grant some further relief during the pendency of an appeal. 14 But defendants argue that plaintiff’s request for interest and attorneys’ fees is outside the scope of the Court’s declaratory judgm ent and would im perm issibly expand the 12 13 14 R. Doc. 16-8. R. Doc. 47. R. Doc. 58 at 2. 4 judgm ent currently on appeal. 15 See Public Citizen v. Carlin, 2 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20 (D.D.C. 1998) (“The filing of a notice of appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction to alter, am end, or expand a declaratory judgm ent. The Court retains authority, however, to order ‘further necessary or proper relief’ to enforce its declaratory judgment.”) (internal citation om itted). The relief requested here does not require an expansion of the declaratory judgment. The Court’s order 16 granting declaratory judgment included the text of the personal guarantee, which reads as follows: PERSON AL GU ARAN TEE The undersigned, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , in consideration of your giving credit to the aforesaid applicant, jointly and severally guarantee(s) and agree(s) to pay to TRACTOR & EQUIPMENT CO., N C MACHINERY CO., MACHINERY POWER & EQUIPMENT CO., N C POWER SYSTEMS CO. OR ANY OF THEIR RELATED OR AFFILIATED COMPANIES all m onies which shall become due you from Dual Trucking and Transport LLC by reason of any credit you extended as credit you extend as [sic] herein requested, including late paym ent charges and all costs of collection and reasonable attorney’s fee for recovery of the debt if it is due whether it is incurred by the debtor or guarantor or both. 15 Id. at 2-3. Defendants also contend that the Court has already rejected plaintiff’s request to amend its com plaint to seek m onetary relief. Id. at 1-2. The Magistrate J udge denied plaintiff’s m otion for leave to am end for lack of jurisdiction and as m oot in light of this m otion for further relief. R. Doc. 56. This was not a rejection of plaintiff’s request on the m erits. 16 R. Doc. 46 at 5. 5 This guarantee unam biguously obliges Alford to pay Tractor and Equipm ent the m oney owed by DTT as a result of the credit extended, including any “late payment charges and all costs of collection and reasonable attorney’s fee[s] for recovery of the debt.”17 Attorneys’ fees based on a contractual agreement to pay fees are a proper subject for collateral relief under § 220 2. See Bilm ar Drilling, Inc. v. IFG Leasing Co., 795 F.2d 1194, 120 0 , 120 2 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Mercantile Nat’l Bank v. Bradford Trust Co., 850 F.2d 215, 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that attorneys’ fees are recoverable under § 220 2 where perm itted by contract). The Montana court has already determ ined that DTT owes Tractor and Equipm ent dam ages, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. 18 The Court’s declaratory judgment in this m atter “conclusively established the validity” of Alford’s personal guarantee of DTT’s debts, including interest and fees, and “the denial of the m otion for further relief would effectively render this declaratory judgment m eaningless.” United Teacher, 414 F.3d at 574. Defendants’ attempts to distinguish United Teacher are unavailing. Defendants argue that further relief in United Teacher was appropriate only because the declaratory judgment at issue in that case required specific 17 18 Id. R. Doc. 16-8. 6 perform ance of contractual obligations. 19 Id. at 569. Defendants further contend that, because plaintiff’s suit for declaratory relief did not specifically seek interest, attorneys’ fees, or a declaration as to how m uch debt Alford guaranteed, the Court cannot award such relief now. 20 But the request for m onetary dam ages in United Teacher was sim ilarly raised for the first tim e in a m otion for further relief, and came in addition to a request for specific perform ance. Id. at 569, 572. As is the case here, m onetary dam ages “flowed from , and [were] consistent with, the declaratory judgment,” but were not part of the earlier judgm ent. Id. at 573. The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 220 2 is to enable courts to grant further relief, not m erely relief already required by the term s of the declaratory judgm ent. See, e.g., Edw ard B. Marks Music Corp. v. Charles K. Harris Music Publ’g Co., 255 F.2d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that further relief “need not have been dem anded, or even proved, in the original action for declaratory relief”). Defendants cannot “nullify [their] adversary’s right to § 220 2 relief m erely by lodging an appeal.” Horn & Hardart Co., 853 F.2d at 548. 19 20 R. Doc. 58 at 3. Id. 7 The Court therefore finds that plaintiff is entitled to recover from Alford the full am ount of dam ages, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees that the Montana court determ ined DTT owes plaintiff. B. Atto rn e ys ’ Fe e s Under the term s of Alford’s personal guarantee, plaintiff is also entitled to recover from Alford additional reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in enforcing the surety agreem ent and the Montana judgment. 21 See Mercantile Nat’l Bank, 850 F.2d at 216, 218. Plaintiff requests $ 49,535.10 in attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs related to the prosecution of its claim . 22 Defendants object to an award of attorneys’ fees and ask for an additional hearing and discovery on the am ount of fees. 23 The Court finds that no further hearing with regard to attorneys’ fees is necessary. As part of its m otion for further relief, plaintiff’s counsel subm itted a detailed description of the work perform ed and hours incurred in the representation of this m atter. 24 Defendants had notice and an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of the fees claim ed, and failed to 21 22 23 24 R. Doc. 46 at 5; R. Doc. 1-5. R. Doc. 48-1 at 8, R. Doc. 48 -2 at 2. R. Doc. 58 at 3-4. R. Doc. 48-2. 8 do so. Defendants are not entitled to another opportunity to challenge plaintiff’s fee request. 25 Because the Court is sitting in diversity and plaintiff’s right to attorneys’ fees arises out of a surety agreement declared valid under Louisiana law, “[s]tate law controls both the award of and the reasonableness of” attorneys’ fees. See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 30 2 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). Under Louisiana law, courts m ay inquire into the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees and should consider: “(1) the ultim ate result obtained; (2) the responsibility incurred; (3) the importance of the litigation, (4) am ount of m oney involved; (5) extent and character of the work perform ed; (6) legal knowledge, attainm ent, and skill of the attorneys; (7) num ber of appearances m ade; (8) intricacies of the facts involved; (9) diligence and skill of counsel; and (10 ) the court’s own knowledge.” State v. W illiam son, 597 So. 2d 439, 441-42 (La. 1992). These factors are derived from Rule 1.5(a) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 442 n.9. Am ong the factors listed in Rule 1.5(a) 25 Defendants appear to suggest that an additional hearing is required because the statute provides that further relief m ay be granted “after reasonable notice and hearing.” 28 U.S.C. § 220 2. This motion was properly subm itted on the briefs, without an oral hearing, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 and Local Rule 7.2. Defendants did not request oral argument under Local Rule 78.1. The Court is therefore not required to provide defendants with an additional hearing. 9 is “[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for sim ilar legal services.” Id. The Court need not expressly consider all the factors, however, and may m ultiply the num ber of hours worked by an hourly rate the Court deems reasonable. See Fourchon Docks, Inc. v. Milchem Inc., 849 F.2d 1561, 1568 (5th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff subm its the affidavit of its lead counsel, Christopher Riviere, as well as an item ized billing statem ent, as evidence of the attorneys’ fees and costs it has incurred. 26 Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $ 225 per hour for attorneys and $ 95 per hour for paralegals. 27 Riviere attests that he has over 35 years of relevant legal experience, and his associates William Abel and Todd Magee have 5 years and 3.5 years of experience, respectively. 28 The Court finds that the requested hourly rates are reasonable, and well within the range that this Court has approved in sim ilar cases. See, e.g., DirectTV, LLC v. Ertem , No. 13-487, 20 15 WL 459398, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 20 15) (approving hourly rates of $ 350 / hour for partners, $ 250 / hour for associates, and $ 95/ hour for legal assistants); Offshore Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Palm Energy Offshore, LLC, No. 10 -4151, 20 14 WL 50 39670 , at *8-9 (E.D. 26 27 28 R. Doc. 48-2. Id. at 2. Id. at 2-3. 10 La. Sep. 25, 20 14) (finding reasonable hourly rates ranging from $ 225/ hour to $ 325/ hour for attorneys and $ 10 0 / hour for paralegals). The Court has reviewed line by line the billing statement subm itted on behalf of plaintiff’s counsel and finds the hours expended to be reasonable. 29 The billing statem ent and the record reflect that plaintiff’s counsel prepared the initial com plaint, drafted various m otions and supporting docum entation in both federal and state courts, successfully defended against a m otion to dism iss, and prevailed in this Court on cross m otions for sum m ary judgment. 30 The Court therefore finds that plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs in the am ount of $ 49,535.10 as a result of its legal efforts in Louisiana to collect on the debt owed by defendants. III. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to reopen this case and for further relief is GRANTED. 29 Several entries in the item ized bill are blacked out and it is not possible to ascertain what work was perform ed. The Court has subtracted the am ounts associated with the blacked-out entries from the total fees. After rem oving these entries, the Court finds that the item ized bill still includes at least $ 49,535.10 in valid fees and costs. See R. Doc. 48-2. 30 See R. Doc. 14; R. Doc. 46; R. Doc. 48-2. 11 IT IS ORDERED that there be a judgment in favor of plaintiff against Defendant Anthony Alford in the am ount of $ 292,846.30 in principal, plus interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum from October 31, 20 13, attorneys’ fees in the am ount of $ 30 ,50 8.50 and costs in the am ount of $ 1,111.55. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there be a judgm ent in favor of plaintiff against Alford in the additional am ount of $ 49,535.10 for attorneys’ fees incurred by plaintiff in enforcing Alford’s guarantee and the Montana judgm ent in Louisiana. 22nd New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of August, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 12

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.