Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al, No. 2:2015cv04479 - Document 136 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER & REASONS denying 97 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 5/23/2016. (mmm)
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Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al Doc. 136 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ALANA CAIN, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-4479 CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL. SECTION: R(2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Named plaintiffs Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste, Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to declare the m anner in which the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court judges collect post-judgm ent court costs from indigent debtors unconstitutional. According to plaintiffs, the judges m aintain a policy of jailing crim inal defendants who fail to pay their court costs solely because of their indigence. 1 The “judicial defendants” now ask the Court to dism iss plaintiffs’ claim s under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Defendants argue that the Crim inal District Court judges are not legally required to inquire into a state-court crim inal defendant’s reasons for 1 See generally R. Doc. 7 (Plaintiffs’ First Am ended Class Action Com plaint). 2 R. Doc. 97. Dockets.Justia.com nonpaym ent because the crim inal defendant m ust affirm atively raise his indigence to excuse his failure to pay. Defendants also argue that indigence does not excuse nonpayment when the state-court crim inal defendant agreed to pay court costs in his plea agreement with the State. Finally, defendants argue that nam ed plaintiffs willfully failed to pay their court costs and that therefore the judges lawfully issued arrest warrants for plaintiffs’ nonpaym ent, regardless of their indigence. Finding that defendants’ arguments fail under the law and plaintiffs’ alleged facts, the Court denies defendants’ m otion to dism iss. I. BACKGROU N D A. Factu al Alle gatio n s In this section 1983 civil rights lawsuit, plaintiffs allege that the Crim inal District Court judges, am ong others, m aintain an unconstitutional schem e of jailing indigent crim inal defendants and im posing excessive bail am ounts for nonpayment “offenses” in an effort to collect unpaid court courts. According to plaintiffs, the Crim inal District Court m aintains an internal “Collections Departm ent,” inform ally called the “fines and fees” department, that oversees the collection of court debts from form er crim inal defendants. The “typical” case allegedly proceeds as follows. When a person is charged with a crim e, the Crim inal District Court judges first determ ine whether the crim inal defendant is legally “indigent,” which m eans they qualify for appointm ent of counsel through the Orleans Public Defenders under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:175. According to plaintiffs, eight-five percent of the criminal defendants in Orleans Parish are legally indigent. 3 With assistance of counsel, the defendants either plead guilty to their crim inal charges or proceed to trial. If convicted, the crim inal defendants m ust appear before a judge for sentencing. At sentencing, in addition to im posing a term of im prisonm ent or probation, the judge m ay assess against the crim inal defendants various “court costs.” These costs m ay include restitution to any victim , a statutory fine, fees, or other costs im posed at the judge’s discretion. According to plaintiffs, the discretionary assessments “fund the District Attorney’s office, the Public Defender, and the Court[,]” which rely on these collections “to fund their operations and to pay employee salaries and extra benefits.”4 Plaintiffs allege that the Crim inal District Court judges im pose court costs without inquiring into the crim inal defendants’ ability to pay. 5 3 R. Doc. 7 at 5. 4 Id. at 22-23 ¶ 88. 5 Id. at 23 ¶ 91. If the crim inal defendants cannot im mediately pay in full, the judges allegedly direct them to the Collections Department, or “fines and fees.” There, a Collections Department em ployee allegedly im poses, at his discretion and without inquiring into a defendant’s ability to pay, a payment schedule—usually requiring a certain am ount per m onth. 6 Collections Department em ployees also allegedly warn the defendants that failure to pay the m onthly am ount, in full, will result in their arrests. Plaintiffs contend that Collections Departm ent em ployees refuse to accept anything less than full paym ent. 7 When crim inal defendants fail to pay, a Collections Department em ployee allegedly issues a pre-printed warrant for the defendant’s arrest by forging a judge’s nam e. 8 According to plaintiffs’ allegations, the Collections Department often issues these warrants “years after a purported nonpaym ent,” and the warrants are “routinely issued in error” or without regard to a debtor’s indigence. 9 6 Id. at 27-28 ¶10 3. 7 Id. at 28 ¶ 10 6. 8 Id. at 29 ¶ 10 9. 9 Id. at ¶ 110 . Plaintiffs also allege that each Collections Departm ent arrest warrant is “accom panied by a preset $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured money bond required for release.”10 According to plaintiffs’ allegations, the am ount a debtor m ust pay to satisfy the $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond is often m ore than the entirety of the debtor’s outstanding court costs. 11 Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ adherence to this “autom atic $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond” results from defendants’ financial interest in state-court arrestees’ paying for their release. 12 Plaintiffs contend that the Crim inal District Court judges collect 1.8% of each bond, while the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office, the Orleans Public Defenders’ office, and the Orleans Parish Sheriff each collect 0 .4% of each bond. 13 Plaintiffs allege that when crim inal defendants are arrested for nonpaym ent, they are “routinely told” that to be released from prison, they m ust pay for the $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond, the entirety of their outstanding court debts, or som e other am ount “unilaterally determ ine[d]” 10 Id. at ¶ 113. 11 See id. at ¶ 47. 12 Id. at 21-22 ¶88. 13 Id. at 22 ¶88. by the Collections Department. 14 As a result, these indigent debtors allegedly “languish” in prison “indefinite[ly]” because they cannot afford to pay any of the foregoing am ounts. 15 Although “arrestees are eventually brought to court,” plaintiffs allege that defendants “have no set policy or practice” regarding how long arrestees m ust wait for a hearing. According to plaintiffs, indigent debtors “routinely” spend a week or m ore in prison. 16 Plaintiffs allege that some arrestees, with help from fam ily and friends, pay for their release without ever having a hearing and thus have “no opportunity to contest the debt or the jailing.”17 When crim inal defendants are brought to court, the judges allegedly send them back to prison if they are unable to pay their debts or release them “on threat of future arrest and incarceration” if they do not prom ptly pay the Collections Departm ent. 18 The judges allegedly hold these brief “failure-to- 14 Id. at 30 ¶114. 15 Id. at ¶115. 16 Id. 17 Id. at ¶114. 18 Id. at ¶116. pay hearings” without providing the debtors notice of the critical issues or considering the debtors’ abilities to pay. 19 Plaintiffs contend that these practices are unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Am endm ents. B. Partie s The nam ed plaintiffs in the First Am ended Complaint are six individuals who were defendants in the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court—Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste, Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell. 20 The Crim inal District Court appointed counsel from the Orleans Public Defenders to represent each of the named plaintiffs, except Reynaud Variste, during their crim inal proceedings. 21 Thus, the court m ust have determ ined that Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, Long, and Maxwell were legally indigent 19 Id. 20 Id. at 7 ¶7. 21 R. Doc. 59-3 at 1 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 0 4/ 20 12) (“Court appointed Alex Liu, OPD.”), 5 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 0 2/ 20 13) (“Court appointed Seth Wayne, OPD.”), 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 0 2/ 20 14) (“Court appointed Lindsey Sam uel, OPD.”) 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 14/ 20 11) (“Court appointed J errod Thom pson-Hicks, OIPD.”); R. Doc.95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for 0 6/ 0 2/ 20 11) (“Court appointed Anna Fecker, OIDP). under Louisiana Revised Statutes §15:175. 22 Reynaud Variste appears to have retained private counsel. 23 With the assistance of counsel, all of the nam ed plaintiffs pleaded guilty to their respective crim inal charges, which include theft, 24 battery, 25 drug possession, 26 “sim ple crim inal dam age,”27 and disturbing the peace. 28 At plaintiffs’ sentencings, the presiding judges imposed term s of im prisonment, which were often suspended, as well as terms of active or inactive probation. In addition, the judges assessed against plaintiffs various court costs—whether restitution, fines, and/ or discretionary fees and costs. 29 22 See R. Doc. 7 at 5. 23 R. Doc. 59-3 at 14 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 9/ 25/ 20 12) (“Defendant m ust retain private counsel.”). 24 Id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea), 8 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea). 25 Id. at 12 (Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea). 26 Id. at 22 (Reynaud Variste Guilty Plea). 27 Id. at 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea). 28 R. Doc. 95-7 at 5 (Thaddeus Long Guilty Plea). 29 R. Doc. 59-3 at 2 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 5/ 30 / 20 13), 6 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 16/ 20 13), 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 21/ 20 14), 18 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 31/ 20 13), 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 3/ 0 6/ 20 12); R. Doc. 95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for 7/ 29/ 20 11). At som e point, all of the nam ed plaintiffs were arrested for failing to pay outstanding court costs on a warrant issued by the court’s Collections Department. Plaintiffs now sue, am ong others, every judge at the Criminal District Court—thirteen in all—because they allegedly supervise the Collections Department employees and have failed to provide the parish’s crim inal defendants with constitutionally-required process before im prisoning them failure to pay court costs. Plaintiffs sue the judges only for declaratory relief. 30 C. Plain tiffs ’ Claim s fo r Re lie f Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Am endment rights, as well as violations of Louisiana tort law. 31 30 31 Id. at 8 ¶13. Only Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, and Maxwell’s claim s for equitable relief rem ain. In an order addressing an earlier m otion to dism iss, the Court found that Reynaud Variste and Thaddeus Long lacked standing to pursue prospective equitable relief and dism issed those claims. R. Doc. 10 9 at 1921. The Court sum m arizes plaintiffs’ claims as follows: (1) Defendants’ policy of issuing and executing arrest warrants for nonpaym ent of court costs is unconstitutional under the Fourth Am endm ent and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (2) Defendants’ policy of requiring a $ 20 ,0 0 0 “fixed secured m oney bond” for each Collections Departm ent warrant (issued for nonpaym ent of court costs) is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (3) Defendants’ policy of indefinitely jailing indigent debtors for nonpaym ent of court costs without a judicial hearing is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (4) Defendants’ “schem e of m oney bonds” to fund certain judicial actors is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendm ent. To the extent defendants argue this schem e is in compliance with Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 13:1381.5 and 22:822, which govern the percentage of each surety bond that the judicial actors receive, those statutes are unconstitutional; (5) Defendants’ policy of jailing indigent debtors for nonpayment of court costs without any inquiry into their ability to pay is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endment; (6) Defendants’ policy of jailing and threatening to im prison crim inal defendants for nonpaym ent of court debts is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent because it im poses unduly harsh and punitive restrictions on debtors whose creditor is the State, as com pared to debtors who owe m oney to private creditors; (7) Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful arrest under Louisiana law; and (8) Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful im prisonment under Louisiana law. In m oving for dism issal, defendants lim it their argum ents to plaintiffs’ claim s that defendants unconstitutionally issue and execute arrest warrants for nonpaym ent and unconstitutionally im prison court debtors without m eaningfully inquiring into their ability to pay. 32 Accordingly, the Court lim its its analysis to those claim s. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Lorm and v. US Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 20 0 9); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 , 196 (5th Cir. 1996). A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal 32 See R. Doc. 97 at 1(“[Defendants] m ove this court for an order dism issing this action, particularly claim s (a) & (d) in plaintiffs’ Request for Relief.”). Although defendants appear to ask the Court to dism iss plaintiffs’ com plaint as a whole, defendants’ argum ents are plainly lim ited to the claim s stated above. conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elem ents of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiff's claim . Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, the claim m ust be dism issed. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. III. D ISCU SSION In their First Am ended Com plaint, plaintiffs cite, in passing, Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), as support for their constitutional challenges to defendants’ conduct. Because defendants’ m otion to dism iss focuses on whether certain aspects of Bearden apply to this case, the Court begins its analysis with a brief discussion of two Suprem e Court cases. In Tate v. Short, the United States Supreme Court addressed a constitutional challenge to a state’s m ethod of collecting fines from an indigent crim inal defendant. 40 1 U.S. 395 (1971). The crim inal defendant in Tate had accumulated fines for traffic offenses, offenses punishable only by fine. Id. at 396-97. Because the defendant was indigent when the state court im posed the fines, the court sentenced him to a term of im prisonment—each day counted as five dollars toward the defendant’s outstanding fines. Id. The Suprem e Court invalidated this practice under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endment, explaining that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the State from im posing a fine as a sentence and then autom atically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.” Id. at 398 (citation om itted). Over a decade later, in Bearden v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held— in the context of a probation revocation proceeding—that courts cannot revoke an indigent defendant’s probation (and thereby sentence him to a term of im prisonm ent) for his failure to pay a court-im posed fine or restitution “absent evidence that the defendant was somehow responsible for the failure or that alternative forms of punishm ent were inadequate. See 461 U.S. 660 , 665 (1983). Specifically, the Court held: [A] sentencing court m ust inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to m ake sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court m ay revoke probation and sentence the defendant to im prisonment . . . If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court m ust consider alternate m easures of punishm ent other than im prisonm ent. Only if alternate measures are not adequate to m eet the State’s interests in punishm ent and deterrence m ay the court im prison a probationer who has m ade sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom sim ply because, through no fault of his, he cannot pay the fine. Id. at 672-73. The judicial defendants ask the Court to dism iss plaintiffs’ claim s against them for three reasons. First, defendants argue that, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions that a court m ust inquire into a debtor’s reasons for failing to pay, Fifth Circuit law im poses an affirm ative duty on the debtors to assert indigence to avoid arrest for nonpayment. 33 Second, defendants argue that Bearden does not apply to court costs im posed pursuant to a crim inal defendant’s plea agreem ent with the State. 34 Third, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ conduct “reveals a willful disregard to pay” and that therefore plaintiffs were legally arrested regardless of their financial status. 35 According to defendants, plaintiffs cannot state a claim because they did not appear before the court and assert their indigence. Defendants do not explain in what form and/ or at what proceeding plaintiffs were expected to do so. 36 No court has held that indigent debtors are required to initiate 33 R. Doc. 97-1 at 8-12. 34 Id. at 14-15. 35 Id. at 13. 36 To the extent defendants argue that plaintiffs should have raised their indigence at sentencing, when the Crim inal District Court judges imposed proceedings to request a m odification of their financial obligations or otherwise risk imprisonment for nonpayment. The two Fifth Circuit cases defendants cite do not stand for this proposition. In both cases—Garcia v. City of Abilene and Sorrells v. W arner—the state-court crim inal defendants indicated an ability and willingness to pay their court costs. See 21 F.3d 110 9, *3 n.8. (5th Cir. 1994); 890 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1989). The crim inal defendants also failed (or repeatedly failed) to appear, in person, at previously scheduled court hearings and thus squandered any occasion they had to inform the courts otherwise. 21 F.3d at *1; 890 F.2d at 774. In both cases, the Fifth Circuit noted in passing that the criminal defendants’ arguments under Tate and Bearden failed because, in those cases, the indigent defendants had appeared before the court and “asserted” their indigence. 21 F.3d at *3; 890 F.2d at 776. Neither case holds that a state court’s obligation to ascertain the reason for nonpaym ent depends on the debtor’s initiating proceedings to raise his indigence to the court. On the contrary, the Fifth Circuit recently reiterated that Bearden “require[s] a court to inquire into the reasons for the [crim inal defendant’s] failure to pay court costs, this argum ent is plainly inconsistent with Bearden. In Bearden, the lower court revoked the crim inal defendant’s probation when he became unable to pay the court-im posed fine and restitution after sentencing. See 461 U.S. at 663. before revoking probation.” United States v. Scales, _ _ F. App’x _ _ , 20 16 WL 10 72133, at *7 (5th Cir. 20 16) (citing Bearden; 461 U.S. at 672; United States v. Pay an, 992 F.2d 1387, 1396 (5th Cir. 1993)). To the extent that defendants argue that the Crim inal District Court afforded plaintiffs an opportunity to inform the court of their indigence before being arrested and im prisoned for nonpaym ent, this is unsupported by cognizable evidence and is contradicted by the allegations in plaintiffs’ com plaint, which the Court m ust accept as true. 37 According to the First Am ended 37 Com plaint, plaintiffs were arrested and im prisoned on Defendants have asked the Court to take judicial notice of records from the Crim inal District Court files. R. Doc. 95. These records are a jumble of 248 pages, including computer “screen shots,” unsigned arrest warrants, unsigned and adm ittedly m isdated letters from the court, and what appear to be place-holder docum ents for the court’s internal files. See, e.g., R. Doc. 95-3 at 36, 40 -41, 47; R. Doc. 95-6 at 17; see also R. Doc. 95 at 1 n.2 (“The attached paym ent notices contained the date they were printed and reflect the print date.”); R. Doc. 97-1 at 7 (“Please note that the date listed on the Notice is part of the com puter program that autom atically prints the date of printing[.]”). None of the documents is authenticated by affidavit or otherwise. Because of the m anner in which these records were subm itted, the Court is unable to discern for itself either their authenticity or relevance to the issues raised by defendants’ m otion. The Court therefore cannot take judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 20 1(b) (“The court m ay judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determ ined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”). Regardless, defendants’ argum ents are sim ply contested factual disputes—insufficient to dem onstrate that plaintiffs’ allegations fail as a m atter of law. im properly-issued warrants, not supported by probable cause, solely for their failure to pay court costs due to indigence. Plaintiffs allege that the Crim inal District Court judges failed to inquire into plaintiffs’ reasons for nonpaym ent before issuing the illegal warrants. In addition, plaintiffs allege that the Crim inal District Court im posed a pre-set $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond on each plaintiff, the payment of which cost m ore than plaintiffs’ outstanding court debts. Plaintiffs also allege that they “languished” in prison with no set hearing date and that when they were eventually brought to court—if they were ever brought to court before their release from prison— the court failed to m eaningfully inquire into their ability to pay court costs before re-imposing strict payment deadlines and sending some plaintiffs back to prison because they could not afford their debts. Plaintiffs further allege that they repeatedly told the Collections Departm ent em ployees—who had “standing authority”38 over collecting court costs—that they were unable to pay due to indigence. 38 R. Doc. 7-1 at 23. For exam ple, named plaintiff Alana Cain asserts that she advised a Collections Departm ent supervisor that she did not have enough m oney to pay her usual m onthly paym ent. 39 Although Cain allegedly offered to pay a lower am ount, the Collections Departm ent “refuse[d] to accept any payment sm aller than $ 50 ,” and the court issued a warrant for her arrest. 40 Plaintiffs also allege that som e debtors argued their indigence, to no avail, directly to the Crim inal District Court judges. According to the First Am ended Com plaint, after plaintiff Ashton Brown was arrested for nonpayment, he told a Crim inal District Court judge that he could not afford his court debts unless he was released from prison to secure em ployment, but “[t]he judge told [Brown] that he could not release [Brown] unless [Brown] paid at least $ 10 0 .”41 The judge sent Brown back to jail and told Brown that he would be kept there unless a fam ily m ember paid his outstanding debt. 42 Accepting the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, as this Court m ust on a 12(b)(6) m otion, plaintiffs have plausibly stated a claim for relief. 39 R. Doc. 7 at 10 . 40 Id. 41 Id. at 13. 42 Id. at 13-14. Defendants also argue that the Crim inal District Court judges are not legally required to inquire into state-court crim inal defendants’ failure to pay outstanding court costs when the defendants “voluntarily agree[] to pay restitution as part of the[ir] plea agreem ent[s].”43 The only cases on which defendants rely for this proposition are non-binding and factually dissim ilar. In United States v. Mitchell, for exam ple, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces interpreted Bearden alongside the Arm ed Forces’ Manual for Courts Martial in a case involving a crim inal plea agreem ent. 51 M.J . 490 , 493-94 (C.A.A.F. 1999). The crim inal defendant “negotiated a pretrial agreement in which he offered . . . to m ake full restitution for the bad checks.” Id. at 491 (em phasis added). The defendant’s plea agreement reflected that he “underst[ood] and agree[d] that restitution [wa]s a specific condition” the defendant offered in exchange for the plea agreem ent. Id. Further, the defendant represented in the course of negotiating the agreement and in the court-m artial proceeding that he had the necessary financial resources to m ake full restitution. Id. When the defendant failed to satisfy his restitution obligations, his hearing officer concluded that the defendant failed to m ake “a sufficient bona fide effort to acquire funds in light of the resources 43 R. Doc. 97-1 at 14. alternatives he represented to the Governm ent in his pretrial agreement” and that the defendant “was less than straightforward . . . in representing the status of his finances.” Id. In affirm ing the hearing officer’s revocation of the defendant’s suspended sentence, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held “that the Due Process Clause does not protect an accused who offers to m ake full restitution, knowing full well that he cannot; nor does it protect an accused who fails to take tim ely and reasonable steps to safeguard his assets so that he can m ake restitution as prom ised.” Id. at 494. Relying on Mitchell and another m ilitary court opinion, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has also held that a crim inal defendant “who had control over the plea agreement and its contents” and “knew his financial situation before he entered into the plea agreem ent” fails to satisfy Bearden’s requirement of good faith when he subsequently neglects his restitution obligations. State v. N ordahl, 680 N.W.2d 247, 252-53. There are a num ber of reasons why Mitchell and N ordahl are factually inapposite. First, defendants em phasize in support of their other arguments that “inability to pay is not necessarily a perm anent state.”44 By the sam e logic, a person’s ability to pay is equally im perm anent. Neither Mitchell nor 44 Id. at 12. N ordahl stand for the proposition that a crim inal defendant, who experiences a change in circum stances after pleading guilty, has per se willfully failed to pay when he cannot later m eet his financial obligations. In addition, Mitchell and N ordahl do not address m andatory financial obligations, which—by definition—a crim inal defendant cannot voluntarily offer to pay. As defendants have argued to this Court in support of other m otions to dism iss, some of the costs the judges im pose are m andatory, 45 which m eans that the state-court defendants have no ability to bargain over these assessments in their plea negotiations. Finally, certain Crim inal District Court records show that plaintiffs either did not agree to any am ount of court costs or agreed to an am ount less than what the court ultim ately im posed. 46 Accepting plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations as true, 45 See generally R. Doc. 53-1 (Defendants’ Motion to Dism iss for Failure to J oin Required Parties); R. Doc. 111 at 20 (order denying defendants’ joinder m otion). 46 Alana Cain seem ingly agreed to pay total of $ 90 1.50 in her plea agreement. R. Doc. 59-3 at 4. Although the presiding judge assessed Cain with these costs at her sentencing on May 30 , 20 13, the court also ordered Cain to pay $ 1,80 0 in restitution, an obligation not listed in her plea agreement, over a m onth later, on J uly 8, 20 13. Id. at 2 (entries for 0 5/ 30 / 20 13 and 0 7/ 0 8/ 20 13). Sim ilarly, Ashton Brown agreed to pay $ 50 0 in court costs, but Brown’s docket sheet and Collections Departm ent records reflect that the court holds Brown responsible for a total debt to $ 542.50 . Id. at 8; Id. at 5 (entry for 12/ 16/ 20 13); R. Doc. 95-4 at 37 (Orleans Parish Collections Departm ent Paym ent Receipt). According to Vanessa Maxwell’s plea agreement, she did not agree to pay any am ount of court costs, but her supported by the lim ited Crim inal District Court records of which this Court has taken judicial notice, plaintiffs plausibly state a claim for relief. Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ conduct “reveals a willful disregard to pay” their outstanding court costs. 47 Defendants note that in Bearden, the Suprem e Court did not preclude a court’s im prisoning a defendant who “willfully refuse[s] to pay the fine or restitution when he has the m eans to pay.” 461 U.S. 660 , 668 (1983). In support of dism issal on this basis, defendants first argue, again without citation to supporting evidence, that all of the nam ed plaintiffs received notice of their defaults from the court and ignored that notice. In addition, defendants argue that if “plaintiffs were unable to pay . . . they need to come to court and say so.”48 For the reasons the Court has explained throughout this order, these conclusory argum ents are factually contested or otherwise legally insufficient to warrant dism issal. docket sheet reflects that the court nonetheless im posed $ 191.50 . R. Doc. 59-3 at 28; Id. at 23 (entry for 0 3/ 0 6/ 20 12). 47 R. Doc. 97-1 at 13. 48 Id. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ m otion to dism iss under Rule 12(b)(6) for plaintiffs’ purported failure to plead their indigence in state court. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _23rd _ _ day of May, 20 16. ___ ___________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE
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