Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al, No. 2:2015cv04479 - Document 119 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion 54 to dismiss on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity.. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 5/3/16. (jjs)
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Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al Doc. 119 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ALANA CAIN, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-4479 CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL. SECTION: R(2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Named plaintiffs Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste, Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to declare the m anner in which the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court collects post-judgm ent court costs from indigent debtors unconstitutional. According to plaintiffs, the Crim inal District Court and other, related actors m aintain a policy of jailing crim inal defendants who fail to pay their court costs solely because of their indigence. 1 The “judicial defendants” now m ove the Court to dism iss plaintiffs’ claim s under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Defendants contend that plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can 1 See generally R. Doc. 7 (Plaintiffs’ First Am ended Class Action Com plaint). 2 The “judicial defendants” are the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, its thirteen judge, and the judicial adm inistrator, Robert Kazik. Dockets.Justia.com be granted because they are entitled to absolute and qualified im m unity. 3 For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D A. Factu al Alle gatio n s In this section 1983 civil rights lawsuit, plaintiffs allege, on behalf of them selves and those sim ilarly situated, that the City of New Orleans, the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, its judges and judicial adm inistrator, and Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusm an m aintain an unconstitutional schem e of jailing indigent crim inal defendants and im posing excessive bail am ounts for nonpayment “offenses” in an effort to collect unpaid court courts. According to plaintiffs, the Crim inal District Court m aintains an internal “Collections Departm ent,” inform ally called the “fines and fees” department, that oversees the collection of court debts from form er crim inal defendants. The “typical” case allegedly proceeds as follows. When a person is charged with a crim e, the Crim inal District Court judges first determ ine whether the crim inal defendant is legally “indigent,” 3 R. Doc. 54. m eaning they qualify for appointm ent of counsel through the Orleans Public Defenders under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:175. According to plaintiffs, eight-five percent of the criminal defendants in Orleans Parish are legally indigent. 4 With assistance of counsel, the defendants either plead guilty to their crim inal charges or proceed to trial. If convicted, the crim inal defendants m ust appear before a judge at the Crim inal District Court for sentencing. At sentencing, in addition to im posing a term of im prisonm ent or probation, the court m ay assess against the crim inal defendants various “court costs.” These costs m ay include restitution to any victim , a statutory fine, fees, or other costs im posed at the judge’s discretion. According to plaintiffs, the discretionary assessments “fund the District Attorney’s office, the Public Defender, and the Court[,]” which rely on these collections “to fund their operations and to pay employee salaries and extra benefits.”5 Plaintiffs allege that the Crim inal District Court judges im pose court costs without inquiring into the crim inal defendants’ ability to pay. 6 4 R. Doc. 7 at 5. 5 Id. at 22-23 ¶ 88. 6 Id. at 23 ¶ 91. If the crim inal defendants cannot im mediately pay in full, the Crim inal District Court judges direct them to the Collections Departm ent, or “fines and fees.” There, a Collections Departm ent em ployee allegedly im poses, at his discretion and without inquiring into a defendant’s ability to pay, a payment schedule—usually requiring a certain amount per month. 7 Collections Departm ent em ployees also allegedly warn the defendants that failure to pay the m onthly am ount, in full, will result in their arrests. Plaintiffs contend that Collections Departm ent em ployees refuse to accept anything less than full paym ent. 8 When crim inal defendants fail to pay, a Collections Department em ployee allegedly issues a pre-printed warrant for the defendant’s arrest by forging a judge’s nam e. 9 According to plaintiffs’ allegations, the Collections Department often issues these warrants “years after a purported nonpaym ent,” and the warrants are “routinely issued in error” or without regard to a debtor’s indigence. 10 7 Id. at 27-28 ¶10 3. 8 Id. at 28 ¶ 10 6. 9 Id. at 29 ¶ 10 9. 10 Id. at ¶ 110 . Plaintiffs also allege that each Collections Departm ent arrest warrant is “accom panied by a preset $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured money bond required for release.”11 According to plaintiffs, defendants’ unwavering adherence to this “autom atic $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond” requirement results from defendants’ financial interest in state-court arrestees’ paying for their release. 12 Plaintiffs contend that the Crim inal District Court judges collect 1.8% of each bond, while the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office, the Orleans Public Defenders’ office, and the Orleans Parish Sheriff each collect 0 .4% of each bond. 13 Plaintiffs allege that when crim inal defendants are arrested for nonpaym ent, they are “routinely told” that to be released from prison, they m ust pay for the $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond, the entirety of their outstanding court debts, or som e other am ount “unilaterally determ ine[d]” by the Collections Department. 14 As a result, these indigent debtors allegedly “languish” in prison “indefinite[ly]” because they cannot afford to pay any of 11 Id. at ¶ 113. 12 Id. at 21-22 ¶88. 13 Id. at 22 ¶88. 14 Id. at 30 ¶114. the foregoing am ounts. 15 Although “arrestees are eventually brought to court,” plaintiffs allege that the Sheriff, the Crim inal District Court, and the judges “have no set policy or practice” regarding how long arrestees m ust wait for a hearing. According to plaintiffs, indigent debtors “routinely” spend a week or m ore in prison. 16 According to plaintiffs’ allegations, some arrestees, with help from fam ily and friends, pay for their release without ever having a hearing and thus have “no opportunity to contest the debt or the jailing.”17 When crim inal defendants are brought to court, the Crim inal District Court judges allegedly send them back to prison if they are unable to pay their debts or release them “on threat of future arrest and incarceration” if they do not prom ptly pay the Collections Departm ent. 18 At these brief “failure-to-pay hearings,” the judges allegedly do not consider the debtors’ abilities to pay. 19 15 Id. at ¶115. 16 Id. 17 Id. at ¶114. 18 Id. at ¶116. 19 Id. Plaintiffs contend that these practices are unconstitutional and have created “a local debtors’ prison” in Orleans Parish. 20 B. Partie s The nam ed plaintiffs in the First Am ended Complaint are six individuals who were defendants in the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court—Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste, Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell. 21 The Crim inal District Court appointed counsel from the Orleans Public Defenders to represent each of the named plaintiffs, except Reynaud Variste, during their crim inal proceedings. 22 Thus, the court m ust have determ ined that Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, Long, and Maxwell were legally indigent 20 See R. Doc. 7 at 3. 21 Id. at 7 ¶7. 22 R. Doc. 59-3 at 1 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 0 4/ 20 12) (“Court appointed Alex Liu, OPD.”), 5 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 0 2/ 20 13) (“Court appointed Seth Wayne, OPD.”), 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 0 2/ 20 14) (“Court appointed Lindsey Sam uel, OPD.”) 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 14/ 20 11) (“Court appointed J errod Thom pson-Hicks, OIPD.”); R. Doc.95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for 0 6/ 0 2/ 20 11) (“Court appointed Anna Fecker, OIDP). under Louisiana Revised Statutes §15:175. 23 Reynaud Variste appears to have retained private counsel. 24 With the assistance of counsel, all of the nam ed plaintiffs pleaded guilty to their respective crim inal charges, which include theft, 25 battery, 26 drug possession, 27 “sim ple crim inal dam age,”28 and disturbing the peace. 29 At plaintiffs’ sentencings, the presiding judges imposed term s of im prisonment, which were often suspended, as well as terms of active or inactive probation. In addition, the judges assessed against plaintiffs various court costs—whether restitution, fines, and/ or discretionary fees and costs. 30 23 See R. Doc. 7 at 5. 24 R. Doc. 59-3 at 14 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 9/ 25/ 20 12) (“Defendant m ust retain private counsel.”). 25 Id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea), 8 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea). 26 Id. at 12 (Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea). 27 Id. at 22 (Reynaud Variste Guilty Plea). 28 Id. at 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea). 29 R. Doc. 95-7 at 5 (Thaddeus Long Guilty Plea). 30 R. Doc. 59-3 at 2 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 5/ 30 / 20 13), 6 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 16/ 20 13), 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 21/ 20 14), 18 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 31/ 20 13), 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 3/ 0 6/ 20 12); R. Doc. 95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for 7/ 29/ 20 11). At som e point, all of the nam ed plaintiffs were arrested for failing to pay outstanding court costs on a warrant issued by the court’s Collections Department. Plaintiffs now sue the City of New Orleans for hiring the Crim inal District Court’s Collection Department workers and the police officers who execute the allegedly invalid arrest warrants. 31 Plaintiffs also sue Sheriff Marlin Gusm an, in his official capacity, for “unconstitutionally detain[ing] im poverished people indefinitely because of their inability to . . . pay[] for their release.”32 In addition, plaintiffs sue the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court for its role in m anaging and funding the Collections Department, and the court’s J udicial Adm inistrator, Robert Kazik, in his individual and official capacities, because he is allegedly responsible for operating the Collections Departm ent. 33 Finally, plaintiffs nam e as defendants every judge at the Crim inal District Court—thirteen in all— because they allegedly supervise the Collections Departm ent em ployees and have failed to provide the parish’s criminal defendants with constitutionally- 31 R. Doc. 7 at 7 ¶8. 32 Id. at 8 ¶12. 33 Id. at 7-8 ¶¶9-10 . required process before im prisoning people for failure to pay court costs. Plaintiffs sue the judges only for declaratory relief. 34 C. Plain tiffs ’ Claim s fo r Re lie f Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Am endment rights, as well as violations of Louisiana tort law. Plaintiffs seek dam ages (including attorneys’ fees) and an injunction against all defendants, except the judges. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgm ent regarding the constitutionality of defendants’ practices. 35 The Court sum m arizes plaintiffs’ claims as follows: (1) Defendants’ policy of issuing and executing arrest warrants for nonpaym ent of court costs is unconstitutional under the Fourth Am endm ent and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; 34 35 Id. at 8 ¶13. Only Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, and Maxwell’s claim s for equitable relief rem ain. In an order addressing an earlier m otion to dism iss, the Court found that Reynaud Variste and Thaddeus Long lacked standing to pursue prospective equitable relief and dism issed those claims. R. Doc. 10 9 at 1921. (2) Defendants’ policy of requiring a $ 20 ,0 0 0 “fixed secured m oney bond” for each Collections Departm ent warrant (issued for nonpaym ent of court costs) is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (3) Defendants’ policy of indefinitely jailing indigent debtors for nonpaym ent of court costs without a judicial hearing is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (4) Defendants’ “schem e of m oney bonds” to fund certain judicial actors is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendm ent. To the extent defendants argue this schem e is in compliance with Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 13:1381.5 and 22:822, which govern the percentage of each surety bond that the judicial actors receive, those statutes are unconstitutional; (5) Defendants’ policy of jailing indigent debtors for nonpayment of court costs without any inquiry in to their ability to pay is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endment; (6) Defendants’ policy of jailing and threatening to im prison crim inal defendants for nonpaym ent of court debts is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent because it im poses unduly harsh and punitive restrictions on debtors whose creditor is the State, as com pared to debtors who owe m oney to private creditors; (7) Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful arrest under Louisiana law; and (8) Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful im prisonment under Louisiana law. D. Th e Ju d icial D e fe n d an ts ’ Mo tio n to D is m is s The Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, the thirteen judges, and the judicial adm inistrator now m ove to dism iss plaintiffs’ suit on grounds of absolute and qualified im m unity. According to defendants, the judges are absolutely im m une from suit for conduct which constitutes a “judicial act.”36 Defendants concede, however, that absolute judicial im m unity does not apply to plaintiffs’ claim s for declaratory relief, but argue that the Court’s awarding declaratory relief in this case upsets “federalism , fairness, and 36 R. Doc. 54-1 at 1. efficiency concerns.”37 Further, defendants argue that the J udicial Adm inistrator, Robert Kazik, is shielded by absolute or qualified im m unity for his alleged conduct because he m erely “assist[ed] judges in carrying out judicial functions.”38 In the present motion to dism iss, defendants do not raise any arguments pertaining to the am enability to suit of the Crim inal District Court itself. In opposition to the m otion to dism iss, plaintiffs note that they sue the judges for only declaratory relief, and thus absolute im m unity does not bar these claim s. Regarding the J udicial Adm inistrator, plaintiffs argue that Kazik is not entitled to absolute im m unity because he was not acting pursuant to a valid judicial order. Further, plaintiffs argue that Kazik’s conduct was objectively unreasonable, precluding his entitlem ent to qualified im m unity. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft 37 Id. 38 Id. v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Lorm and v. US Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 20 0 9); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 , 196 (5th Cir. 1996). III. D ISCU SSION A. Plain tiffs ’ Claim s Again s t th e Crim in al D is trict Co u rt Ju d ge s Defendants adm it that their arguments about judicial im munity do not apply to claim s for declaratory relief. 39 See generally Hollow ay v. W alker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985) (“J udicial im m unity does not extend to suits for . . . declaratory relief under section 1983.”). Here, plaintiffs have sued the Crim inal District Court judges for only declaratory relief. Plaintiffs do not seek dam ages or injunctive relief against the judges. Conceding this point, defendants nonetheless argue that the Court should decline to decide 39 Id. plaintiffs’ claim s for declaratory relief in the interests of “federalism, fairness, [and] efficiency.”40 The Declaratory J udgm ent Act, 28 U.S.C. § 220 1, which plaintiffs invoke here, is “an enabling act, which confers discretion on the courts” to decide or dism iss a declaratory judgm ent suit, “rather than an absolute right on a litigant.” W ilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995) (citations om itted); accord Sherw in-W illiam s Co. v. Holm es Cty ., 343 F.3d 383, 387, 389 (5th Cir. 20 0 3) (citations om itted). In analyzing claim s under the Act, a court m ust determ ine “(1) whether the declaratory action is justiciable; (2) whether the court has the authority to grant declaratory relief; and (3) whether to exercise its discretion to decide or dism iss the action.” Sherw inW illiam s, 343 F.3d at 387. In an earlier order resolving another m otion to dism iss, the Court satisfied itself that the claim s for declaratory relief were justiciable as to four of the six named plaintiffs. 41 The Court also has the authority to grant declaratory relief. 42 Therefore, the only issue presented by defendants’ 40 R. Doc. 54-1 at 6. 41 R. Doc. 10 9 at 19-21. 42 Defendants do not argue that the Court lacks proper authority. The Court’s authority to grant declaratory relief depends on whether (1) the declaratory defendant previously filed a cause of action in state court against current m otion is whether the Court should, in its discretion, exercise that authority. In determ ining whether to exercise its authority to hear a declaratory judgm ent action, a court should consider the following factors: (1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the m atters in controversy may be fully litigated; (2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the defendant; (3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing the suit; (4) whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory plaintiff to gain precedent in tim e or to change forum s exist; (5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the parties and witnesses; (6) whether retaining the lawsuit would serve the purposes of judicial econom y; and (7) whether the federal court is being called on to construe a state judicial decree involving the sam e parties and entered by the court before whom the parallel state suit between the same parties is pending. the declaratory plaintiff, (2) the state suit and the pending federal suit involve the same legal issues, and (3) the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits the court from enjoining the state court proceedings. AXA Re Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Day , 162 F. App’x 316, 319-20 (5th Cir. 20 0 6) (citation om itted). These concerns are not present here. Id. at 388 (quoting St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590 -91 (5th Cir. 1994)). These considerations aim to address concerns of federalism (“the proper allocation of decision-m aking between state and federal courts”), fairness (“legitim ate and proper reasons for forum selection”), and judicial efficiency (“avoid[ing] duplicative or piecem eal litigation where possible”). Id. at 390 -91. Defendants argue that the foregoing considerations dictate dism issal. Defendants contend that there are ongoing state-court proceedings and that plaintiffs have “clear[ly] engaged in forum shopping” because their constitutional challenges “should have been raised in the ongoing state crim inal proceedings [because] the potential exists for conflicting rulings.”43 These contentions, however, are merely re-packaged versions of defendants’ earlier argum ents in favor of Younger abstention and joinder of certain parties, which the Court rejected in other orders. 44 Having considered the relevant factors, the Court will exercise its discretion to hear plaintiffs’ claim s for declaratory relief. 43 R. Doc. 54-1 at 6-7. 44 R. Doc. 10 9 at 25-31; R. Doc. 111 at 25. First, there is no pending state action between the sam e parties and involving the sam e legal issues. See id. at 396; cf. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co. v. Tractor Supply Co., 624 F. App’x 159, 166 (5th Cir. 20 15) (“[A] district court m ay decline to decide a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the sam e parties.”). As explained in the Court’s earlier order, there is no ongoing state court action at all. 45 Further, plaintiffs do not raise “novel questions of state law” that m ight warrant the Court’s declining to decide the declaratory judgm ent action. See Sherw in-W illiam s, 343 F.3d at 396. On the contrary, plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges caution against dism issal; “[t]he presence of federal issues m ust always be a m ajor consideration weighing against surrender of federal jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem ’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)). Moreover, defendants’ argum ent that plaintiffs have engaged in forum shopping is without m erit. “Merely filing a declaratory judgment action in a federal court with jurisdiction to hear it . . . is not in itself improper . . . or otherwise abusive ‘forum shopping.’” Id. at 391. Finally, this Court is sufficiently convenient for all parties, who are Louisiana citizens, and judicial 45 R. Doc. 10 9 at 25-30 . economy is not wasted by the Court’s retaining the lawsuit. As addressed in a previous order, defendants’ concern about inconsistent rulings rests on the erroneous assertion that plaintiffs challenge the im position of court costs, rather than the m anner in which court costs are collected. Cf. id. (“Duplicative litigation m ay also raise federalism or com ity concerns because of the potential for inconsistent state and federal court judgm ents . . . .”). The rem aining considerations (the second, fourth, and seventh factors) do not apply. Cf. Ironshore Specialty Ins., 624 F. App’x at 167 (noting that certain factors “speak to fairness”—“whether the plaintiff is using the declaratory judgm ent process to gain access to a federal forum on im proper or unfair grounds”). Because federalism , fairness, and efficiency do not weigh in favor of dism issal, the Court denies defendants’ m otion to dism iss plaintiffs’ claim s for declaratory relief against the Crim inal District Court judges. B. Plain tiffs ’ Claim s again s t th e Crim in al D is trict Co u rt Ju d icial Ad m in is trato r Defendants argue that Robert Kazik, the Crim inal District Court J udicial Adm inistrator, is entitled to absolute im m unity because at all tim es he was assisting the judges in carrying out their judicial functions. Alternatively, defendants argue that Kazik is at least entitled to qualified im m unity for his actions, which were not objectively unreasonable. Because the Court finds that Kazik is protected by absolute quasi-judicial im m unity, the Court does not address defendants’ argum ents for qualified im m unity. “Despite the broad term s of § 1983,” the Supreme Court “has long recognized” that im m unity doctrines protect certain potential defendants from liability under the statute. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 150 2 (20 12). For example, judges are absolutely im m une from m onetary liability “for all judicial acts that are not perform ed in the clear absence of jurisdiction, however erroneous the act and however evil the m otive.” Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 995 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989) (citing Stum p v. Sparkm an, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)). This is so because of the “special nature” of a judge’s responsibilities. Id. (quoting Butz v. Econom ou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978)). Absolute im m unity “help[s] guarantee an independent, disinterested decision-m aking process” by “prevent[ing] harassment and intim idation that could otherwise result if disgruntled litigants—particularly crim inal defendants and inm ates . . . could vent their anger by suing . . . the person or persons who rendered an adverse decision.” Id. at 996-97 (citations om itted). To further this underlying policy, “other necessary participants in the judicial process are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im m unity.” Kirkendall v. Gram bling & Mounce, Inc., 4 F.3d 989, 1993 WL 360 732, at *3 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation om itted). This absolute quasi-judicial im m unity “protects officials that perform functions com parable to those of judges. . . .” Da Vinci Inv., Ltd. P’ship v. Parker, 622 F. App’x 367, 373 (5th Cir. 20 15) (quoting Beck v. Tex. Bd. of Dental Exam ’rs, 20 4 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 )). In determ ining whether an official is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im m unity, courts must take a “functional approach”—looking to “the nature of the function perform ed, not the identity or title of the actor who perform ed it.” Buckley v. Fitzsim m ons, 50 9 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). Consistent with this “functional approach,” courts often hold that other judicial em ployees, such as clerks of court, law clerks, and others, enjoy absolute quasi-judicial im m unity when “perform ing a discretionary act or . . . a m inisterial function at the direction of the judge.”46 W illiam s v. W ood, 46 Absolute quasi-judicial im m unity, in another sense of that term , also applies to actors outside of the traditional state judicial system , who perform quasi-judicial functions. See O’N eal v. Miss. Bd. of N ursing, 113 F.3d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “certain quasi-judicial agency officials” are entitled to absolute im m unity). For exam ple, adm inistrative law judges, disciplinary com m ittee m em bers, parole boards, and others have all been entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im m unity. See Johnson, 870 F.2d at 995 (collecting cases). “To determ ine whether nonjudicial actors perform quasijudicial functions, and thus are entitled to absolute imm unity” the court considers, am ong other things, “(1) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intim idation; (2) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a m eans of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (3) insulation from political influence; (4) the im portance of precedent; (5) the adversary nature of the process; and (6) the correctability of error on appeal.” Da Vinci Inv., Ltd., 622 F. App’x at 612 F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1980 ) (quoting W aits v. McGow an, 516 F.2d 20 13, 20 6 (3d Cir. 1975)); see generally Evans v. Suter, 260 F. App’x 726, 727 (5th Cir. 20 0 7) (“Clerks have absolute quasi-judicial im m unity . . . when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” (citing Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987)); Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 20 4, 214 (2d Cir. 20 0 9) (granting absolute im m unity to fam ily court staff attorneys); Olivia v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[F]or purposes of absolute judicial im m unity, judges and their law clerks are as one.”). In other words, judicial em ployees are absolutely im m une when they act, whether “in bath faith or with m alice” pursuant to a court order or a judge’s instructions because the em ployee is “act[ing] as the arm of the judge and com es within his absolute im m unity.” W illiam s, 612 F.2d at 985; accord Johnson, 870 F.2d at 998 (describing parole board m embers as “serving essentially as the arm of the sentencing judge”); Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 F. App’x 60 1, 60 5 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (granting absolute im m unity to “em ployees of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit 373 (denying im munity to city councilm em ber). Because the defendant at issue here is a judicial em ployee serving at the pleasure of the Crim inal District Court judges, the Court does not apply these factors in determ ining whether he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im m unity. Court of Appeal who acted pursuant to the procedures allegedly im plem ented by the judges”). A judicial directive that cloaks court em ployees with absolute im m unity m ay be form al and official, such as a court order, or m ore inform al, such as verbal com m unication from a judge. For exam ple, in Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, a civil rights plaintiff sued several state-court appellate judges and other em ployees of the Louisiana appeals court for allegedly instituting a policy to “circum vent Louisiana’s constitutional requirem ent of three judge panels” on pro se post-conviction writs. 357 F. App’x 60 1, 60 3 (5th Cir. 10 0 9). The judges allegedly directed a staff m ember to rule on the prisoners’ writ applications without review by the constitutionally-required panel. 47 Id. In affirm ing the district court’s dism issal of the 1983 suit, the Fifth Circuit held that the court’s employees who allegedly helped carry out the court’s unconstitutional policy were protected by judicial im m unity, even 47 In the underlying facts cited by the district court, a deceased m ember of the court’s staff detailed in a suicide note that “for . . . the past 10 years, not one crim inal writ application filed by an inm ate pro se has been reviewed by a J udge on the Court.” Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, No. 0 9-2766, 20 0 9 WL 110 7713, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 20 0 9). The staff m ember continued, “I prepared the ruling on each of those writ applications, and they were signed by a J udge without so m uch as a glance at the application. In fact, two of the judges on the writ panel never even knew the pro se application was filed, m ust less aware of the application’s contents.” Id. though there was no official court order or decree directing the employees to engage in the prohibited conduct. Id. at 60 5. The court explained that because these employees “acted pursuant to the procedures allegedly im plem ented by the judges [and] were only acting at the express direction of the judges, to assist them in carrying out their judicial functions, these defendants [were] likewise entitled to absolute judicial im m unity with respect to [the plaintiff’s] claim for m onetary dam ages.” Id. Here, the crux of plaintiffs’ claims against the Crim inal District Court J udicial Adm inistrator Robert Kazik is his supposed involvem ent in the constitutional violations com m itted by the Crim inal District Court’s Collections Departm ent. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Kazik trained Collections Departm ent em ployees to issue arrest warrants, accompanied by a $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond for court debtors’ nonpayment of court costs. Kazik allegedly trained the Collections Department em ployees to sign the judges’ nam es to pre-printed warrants without ever consulting a judge or a m ember of the judge’s staff. Although plaintiffs seem ingly argue in opposition to dism issal that Kazik furtively undertook this allegedly unconstitutional conduct on his own, the allegations in the First Am ended Com plaint reveal the opposite. Indeed, plaintiffs allege that the judges “supervise and are responsible for the J udicial Adm inistrator,”48 and a Crim inal District Court transcript incorporated by reference to the complaint details the judges’ knowledge and approval of Kazik’s conduct. 49 According to this transcript, the judges have, for years, delegated authority to the Collections Departm ent em ployees to issue arrest warrants for court debtors’ nonpaym ent without the judges’ direct oversight. 50 The judges have allegedly given Kazik and the Collections Departm ent “standing authority” not only to issue warrants for nonpayment, but also to recall arrest warrants or release incarcerated debtors when they pay back-owed debts. 51 All of the judges are “aware of the [Collections Department’s] practice,” and unless a judge instructs the Collections Departm ent otherwise, Kazik and other court em ployees continue operating pursuant to this policy. It is undisputed that issuing arrest warrants and setting bail are judicial functions, typically performed by a judge in his or her judicial capacity. See generally Ballard v. W all, 413 F.3d 510 , 516 (5th Cir. 20 0 5) (“Ordering the police officers to arrest and im prison [the plaintiff] and 48 R. Doc. 7 at 8 ¶13. 49 R. Doc. 7-1. 50 Id. at 23. 51 Id. at 24-25. requiring . . . paym ent of a m oney judgm ent are clearly acts norm ally perform ed by a judge.”); Herring v. May field, 51 F.3d 10 43, 1995 WL 1530 26, at *1 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[S]etting the am ount of the bond . . . is within the scope of [the judge’s] jurisdiction, thus affording her absolute judicial im m unity.”); W atson v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 611 F.2d 120 , 123 (5th Cir. 1980 ) (“[T]he issuance of an arrest warrant is a com m on judicial function.”). It is also undisputed that these acts were carried out within the Crim inal District Court, although not necessarily in a form al courtroom proceeding or a judge’s cham bers. Further, these arrest warrants for nonpaym ent concerned former crim inal defendants in that court. Thus, had the arrest warrants been issued by the judges them selves, they would undoubtedly be entitled to absolute judicial im m unity. 52 See Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515 (considering whether the act com plained of is a “normal judicial function,” whether the act occurred in the courtroom or “appropriate adjunct spaces,” 52 Although judicial officers are not entitled to absolute im m unity for acts perform ed in “the clear absence of jurisdiction,” plaintiffs do not argue, and the Court does not find, that the conduct at issue falls within this exception. The “absence of jurisdiction” refers to the court’s lacking subject m atter jurisdiction to hear the case or personal jurisdiction over a litigant. See generally Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1389 (noting that “a clear absence of all jurisdiction” refers only to a “clear lack” of subject m atter or personal jurisdiction). Nothing in the record indicates the Crim inal District Court judges lacked subject m atter or personal jurisdiction over the state-court crim inal defendants. whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court, and whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in determ ining whether the judge acted within her judicial capacity for purposes of absolute judicial im m unity). The issue in this case is whether the Crim inal District Court’s J udicial Adm inistrator, who had “standing authority” from the judges to m onitor court debtors’ paym ent of court costs and to issue arrest warrants when debtors failed to pay, is equally entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im m unity for acting at the judges’ instruction. Plaintiffs argue that Kazik cannot be im m une because there are no allegations that, in issuing arrest warrants for nonpaym ent, Kazik was “com plying with a valid judicial order.”53 But as noted, formal court decrees are not necessary to im m unize court em ployees who act according to a judge’s instructions. See Severin, 357 F. App’x at 60 3. Because, by plaintiffs’ own allegations, Kazik acted according to “procedures allegedly implemented by the judges [and] at the express direction of the judges, to assist them in carrying out their judicial functions,” Kazik is also protected by absolute quasi-judicial im m unity. Id.; see also Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1988) (imm unizing “deputy circuit 53 R. Doc. 70 at 19. clerk [who] issued the arrest warrant at the direction of the assistant circuit judge”). Absolute quasi-judicial im m unity shields Kazik from suit under both federal and state law. See generally Sharp v. Palm isano, No. 13-5429, 20 13 WL 5969661, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 20 13) (“Louisiana jurisprudence on judicial im m unity m irrors the federal doctrine.” (quoting Moore v. Tay lor, 541 So.2d 378, 381 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1989))). As noted, absolute judicial im m unity—and therefore absolute quasi-judicial im m unity—does not apply to claim s for declaratory relief. See generally Hollow ay v . W alker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, the Court dism isses plaintiffs’ claim s against Kazik, in his individual capacity, for m onetary and injunctive relief under federal and state law. 54 54 Absolute imm unity does not apply to claim s against a defendant in his official capacity. See Turner v. Houm a Mun. Fire & P0 lice Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (collecting cases). However, if the suit against the m unicipal entity “fails for a jurisdictional, procedural, or pleading defect,” any official capacity claim against an individual also fails. Id. The Court has not yet addressed the parties’ argum ents regarding plaintiffs’ claim s against Criminal District Court. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants’ m otion to dism iss on grounds of absolute and qualified im m unity. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _3rd _ _ _ day of May, 20 16. __ ___________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE
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