Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al, No. 2:2015cv04479 - Document 111 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 53 Motion to Dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties.. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/22/16. (jjs)
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Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al Doc. 111 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ALANA CAIN, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-4479 CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL. SECTION: R(2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Named plaintiffs Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste, Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to declare the m anner in which the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court collects post-judgm ent court costs from indigent debtors unconstitutional. According to plaintiffs, the Crim inal District Court and other, related actors m aintain a policy of jailing crim inal defendants who fail to pay their court costs solely because of their indigence. 1 The “judicial defendants” now m ove the Court to dism iss this case for plaintiffs’ alleged failure to join indispensable parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) and 19. 2 Because the Court finds that the parties 1 See generally R. Doc. 7 (Plaintiffs’ First Am ended Class Action Com plaint). 2 R. Doc. 53. The “judicial defendants” are the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, its thirteen judges, and the judicial adm inistrator, Robert Kazik. Originally, plaintiffs also sued the Crim inal District Court clerk, Arthur Morell, but he has been voluntarily dism issed. R. Doc. 65. Dockets.Justia.com defendants assert m ust be joined are not required, the Court denies the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D A. Factu al Alle gatio n s In this section 1983 civil rights lawsuit, plaintiffs allege, on behalf of them selves and those sim ilarly situated, that the City of New Orleans, the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, its judges and judicial adm inistrator, and Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusm an m aintain an unconstitutional schem e of jailing indigent crim inal defendants and im posing excessive bail am ounts for nonpayment “offenses” in an effort to collect unpaid court courts. According to plaintiffs, the Crim inal District Court m aintains an internal “Collections Departm ent,” inform ally called the “fines and fees” department, that oversees the collection of court debts from form er crim inal defendants. The “typical” case allegedly proceeds as follows. When a person is charged with a crim e, the Crim inal District Court judges first determ ine whether the crim inal defendant is legally “indigent,” m eaning they qualify for appointm ent of counsel through the Orleans Public Defenders under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:175. According to plaintiffs, eight-five percent of the criminal defendants in Orleans Parish are legally indigent. 3 With assistance of counsel, the defendants either plead guilty to their crim inal charges or proceed to trial. If convicted, the crim inal defendants m ust appear before a judge at the Crim inal District Court for sentencing. At sentencing, in addition to im posing a term of im prisonm ent or probation, the court m ay assess against the crim inal defendants various “court costs.” These costs m ay include restitution to any victim , a statutory fine, fees, or other costs im posed at the judge’s discretion. According to plaintiffs, the discretionary assessments “fund the District Attorney’s office, the Public Defender, and the Court[,]” which rely on these collections “to fund their operations and to pay employee salaries and extra benefits.”4 Plaintiffs allege that the Crim inal District Court judges im pose court costs without inquiring into the crim inal defendants’ ability to pay. 5 If the crim inal defendants cannot im mediately pay in full, the Crim inal District Court judges direct them to the Collections Departm ent, or “fines and fees.” There, a Collections Departm ent em ployee im poses, at his discretion and without inquiring into a defendant’s ability to pay, a payment 3 R. Doc. 7 at 5. 4 Id. at 22-23 ¶ 88. 5 Id. at 23 ¶ 91. schedule—usually requiring a certain am ount per m onth. 6 Collections Department em ployees also warn the defendants that failure to pay the m onthly am ount, in full, will result in their arrests. Collections Departm ent em ployees refuse to accept anything less than full paym ent. 7 When crim inal defendants fail to pay, a Collections Department em ployee allegedly issues a pre-printed warrant for the defendant’s arrest by forging a judge’s nam e. 8 According to plaintiffs, the Collections Departm ent often issues these warrants “years after a purported nonpayment,” and the warrants are “routinely issued in error” or without regard to a debtor’s indigence. 9 Plaintiffs also allege that each Collections Departm ent arrest warrant is “accom panied by a preset $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured money bond required for release.”10 According to plaintiffs, defendants’ unwavering adherence to this “autom atic $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond” requirement results from defendants’ financial interest in state-court arrestees’ paying for their 6 Id. at 27-28 ¶10 3. 7 Id. at 28 ¶ 10 6. 8 Id. at 29 ¶ 10 9. 9 Id. at ¶ 110 . 10 Id. at ¶ 113. release. 11 Plaintiffs contend that the Crim inal District Court judges collect 1.8% of each bond, while the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office, the Orleans Public Defenders’ office, and the Orleans Parish Sheriff each collect 0 .4% of each bond. 12 When crim inal defendants are arrested for nonpaym ent, they are “routinely told” that to be released from prison, they m ust pay for the $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured money bond, the entirety of their outstanding court debts, or som e other am ount “unilaterally determ ine[d]” by the Collections Department. 13 As a result, these indigent debtors “languish” in prison “indefinite[ly]” because they cannot afford to pay any of the foregoing am ounts. 14 Although “arrestees are eventually brought to court,” the Sheriff, the Crim inal District Court, and the judges “have no set policy or practice” regarding how long arrestees m ust wait for a hearing. According to plaintiffs, indigent debtors “routinely” spend a week or m ore in prison. 15 Som e arrestees, with help from fam ily and friends, pay for their release without 11 Id. at 21-22 ¶88. 12 Id. at 22 ¶88. 13 Id. at 30 ¶114. 14 Id. at ¶115. 15 Id. ever having a hearing and thus have “no opportunity to contest the debt or the jailing.”16 When crim inal defendants are brought to court, the Crim inal District Court judges allegedly send them back to prison if they are unable to pay their debts or release them “on threat of future arrest and incarceration” if they do not promptly pay the Collections Department. 17 At these brief “failure-to-pay hearings,” the judges allegedly do not consider the debtors’ abilities to pay. 18 Plaintiffs contend that these practices are unconstitutional and have created “a local debtors’ prison” in Orleans Parish. 19 B. Partie s The nam ed plaintiffs in the First Am ended Complaint are six individuals who were defendants in the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court—Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste, 16 Id. at ¶114. 17 Id. at ¶116. 18 Id. 19 See R. Doc. 7 at 3. Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell. 20 The facts pertaining to the named plaintiffs, as alleged in their com plaint, are as follows. The Crim inal District Court appointed counsel from the Orleans Public Defenders to represent each of the named plaintiffs, except Reynaud Variste, during their crim inal proceedings. 21 Thus, the court m ust have determ ined that Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, Long, and Maxwell were legally indigent under Louisiana Revised Statutes §15:175. 22 Reynaud Variste appears to have retained private counsel. 23 With the assistance of counsel, all of the nam ed plaintiffs pleaded guilty to their respective crim inal charges, which include theft, 24 battery, 25 20 R. Doc. 7 at 7 ¶7. 21 R. Doc. 59-3 at 1 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 0 4/ 20 12) (“Court appointed Alex Liu, OPD.”), 5 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 0 2/ 20 13) (“Court appointed Seth Wayne, OPD.”), 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 0 2/ 20 14) (“Court appointed Lindsey Sam uel, OPD.”) 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 14/ 20 11) (“Court appointed J errod Thom pson-Hicks, OIPD.”); R. Doc.95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for 0 6/ 0 2/ 20 11) (“Court appointed Anna Fecker, OIDP). 22 See R. Doc. 7 at 5. 23 R. Doc. 59-3 at 14 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 9/ 25/ 20 12) (“Defendant m ust retain private counsel.”). 24 Id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea), 8 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea). 25 Id. at 12 (Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea). drug possession, 26 “sim ple crim inal dam age,”27 and disturbing the peace. 28 At plaintiffs’ sentencings, the presiding judges imposed term s of im prisonment, which were often suspended, as well as terms of active or inactive probation. In addition, the judges assessed against plaintiffs various court costs—whether restitution, fines, and/ or discretionary fees and costs. 29 At som e point, all of the nam ed plaintiffs were arrested for failing to pay outstanding court costs. For exam ple, plaintiffs allege that on one occasion, Alana Cain explained to a Collections Department supervisor that she could not satisfy the full am ount of her expected m onthly paym ent. The Collections Department supervisor warned Cain that if she could not afford her m onthly payment, he would issue a warrant for her arrest. 30 In March 20 15, Cain was 26 Id. at 22 (Reynaud Variste Guilty Plea). 27 Id. at 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea). 28 R. Doc. 95-7 at 5 (Thaddeus Long Guilty Plea). 29 R. Doc. 59-3 at 2 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 5/ 30 / 20 13), 6 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 16/ 20 13), 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 21/ 20 14), 18 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 31/ 20 13), 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 3/ 0 6/ 20 12); R. Doc. 95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for 7/ 29/ 20 11). 30 R. Doc. 7 at 10 ¶ 18. arrested for failing to pay her court debts. 31 J ail staff told Cain that her bail was set at “a $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured bond pursuant to standard policy” and that “there was no way to find out when her court date would be.”32 When Cain eventually attended a hearing, the presiding judge told her that “if she ever m issed a payment again, she would have to spend 90 days in jail.”33 The judge did not inquire into Cain’s ability to m eet the m onthly payments im posed by the Collections Departm ent. According to plaintiffs, in J uly and August 20 15, Ashton Brown spent twenty-nine days in prison solely because of unpaid debts stem m ing from a 20 13 conviction. 34 When Brown finally received a hearing on the issue of his nonpaym ent, the presiding judge refused to release Brown, “unless he paid at least $ 10 0 .”35 Because Brown could not afford to pay, the judge set another hearing for several days later and warned Brown “that he would be kept in jail unless he got a fam ily mem ber to pay.”36 Eventually, Brown’s 31 Id. at ¶¶20 -22. 32 Id. at 10 -11 ¶¶22-23. 33 Id. at 11 ¶27. 34 Id. at 12-13 ¶¶ 33-38. 35 Id. at 13 ¶ 38. 36 Id. fam ily “scrape[d] together $ 10 0 ,” and Brown was released. 37 Collections Department em ployees have since threatened arrest and jail tim e if Brown does not continue m aking monthly paym ents. 38 Reynaud Variste was allegedly arrested for nonpayment in J anuary 20 15 when police “storm ed [Variste’s] hom e with assault rifles and m ilitary gear.”39 These officers told Variste “not to worry . . . because he simply owed some old court costs.”40 In prison, jail staff allegedly told Variste that they “had no idea when or whether [he] would be taken to court.”41 A bail bondsm an told Variste that “he would probably not be released . . . until he paid his entire court debts, which would be cheaper than paying the $ 20 ,0 0 0 m oney bond” im posed upon him . 42 Eventually, Variste’s girlfriend paid “the entire debt am ount.” Variste was released from prison without a hearing. 43 37 Id. at 14 ¶40 . 38 Id. 39 Id. at ¶41. 40 Id. at ¶42. 41 Id. at 15 ¶47. 42 Id. 43 Id. at ¶48. Reynajia Variste was arrested in May 20 15 for failing to pay her court costs. J ail staff allegedly told Variste that she could pay her outstanding court debts or post the “standard $ 20 ,0 0 0 m oney bond” to be released. 44 While Variste was still in jail, a Collections Department em ployee told a m ember of Variste’s fam ily that Variste had to pay “at least $ 40 0 before [the Collections Departm ent] would agree to let [Variste] out of jail.”45 The Collections Departm ent allegedly arrived at this am ount because it was “close to half of what [Variste] owed in total.”46 Variste spent at least seven days in prison and was never given a hearing before her fam ily gathered enough m oney “to buy her release.”47 According to the First Amended Com plaint, the Collections Departm ent continues to threaten Reynajia Variste with prison tim e if she cannot m ake her m onthly payments. 48 Plaintiffs contend that Thaddeus Long was wrongly arrested for failing to pay his court costs because Long paid his debts in full years before. According to the First Am ended Com plaint, Long was convicted in 20 11 and 44 Id. at 16 ¶55. 45 Id. at 17 ¶57. 46 Id. 47 Id. at ¶60 . 48 Id. at ¶ 64. finished paying his court costs in October 20 13. 49 In J une 20 15, a New Orleans police officer, conducting a traffic stop, discovered an outstanding warrant for Long’s supposed nonpayment. 50 The officer arrested Long, and Long spent six days in prison, unable to post “the standard $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond” before he was given a hearing. At the failure-to-pay hearing, Long explained that he had already paid his court debts in full, a “m istake . . . apparent from the court records,” and he was released imm ediately. 51 Vanessa Maxwell allegedly spent twelve days in prison after her arrest for nonpaym ent before being brought to court. 52 According to plaintiffs, the presiding judge did not evaluate Maxwell’s present ability to pay, but nonetheless m ade her release from prison contingent on Maxwell’s paying $ 191 “within a week.”53 Plaintiffs contend that Maxwell was never able to com e up with the money, and Maxwell is now “in im m inent danger of arrest . . . pursuant to m onetary conditions that she cannot [m eet].”54 49 Id. at 18 ¶67. 50 Id. 51 Id. at ¶69. 52 Id. at 20 ¶83. 53 Id. 54 Id. at ¶84. Plaintiffs now sue the City of New Orleans for hiring the Crim inal District Court’s Collection Department workers, as well as the police officers who execute the allegedly invalid arrest warrants. 55 Plaintiffs also sue Sheriff Marlin Gusm an, in his official capacity, for “unconstitutionally detain[ing] im poverished people indefinitely because of their inability to . . . pay[] for their release.”56 In addition, plaintiffs sue the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court for its role in m anaging and funding the Collections Department, and the court’s J udicial Adm inistrator, Robert Kazik, in his individual and official capacities, because he is allegedly responsible for operating the Collections Departm ent. 57 Finally, plaintiffs nam e as defendants every judge at the Crim inal District Court—thirteen in all— because they allegedly supervise the Collections Departm ent em ployees and have failed to provide the parish’s criminal defendants with constitutionallyrequired process before im prisoning people for failure to pay court costs. Plaintiffs sue the judges only for declaratory relief. 58 55 Id. at 7 ¶8. 56 Id. at 8 ¶12. 57 Id. at 7-8 ¶¶9-10 . 58 Id. at 8 ¶13. C. Plain tiffs ’ Claim s fo r Re lie f Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Am endment rights, as well as violations of Louisiana tort law. Plaintiffs seek dam ages (including attorneys’ fees) and an injunction against all defendants, except the judges. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgm ent regarding the constitutionality of defendants’ practices. 59 The Court sum m arizes plaintiffs’ claims as follows: (1) Defendants’ policy of issuing and executing arrest warrants for nonpaym ent of court costs is unconstitutional under the Fourth Am endm ent and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (2) Defendants’ policy of requiring a $ 20 ,0 0 0 “fixed secured m oney bond” for each Collections Departm ent warrant (issued for nonpaym ent of court costs) is unconstitutional under the Due 59 Only Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, and Maxwell’s claim s for equitable relief rem ain. In an order addressing an earlier m otion to dism iss, the Court found that Reynaud Variste and Thaddeus Long lacked standing to pursue prospective equitable relief and dism issed those claims. R. Doc. 10 9 at 1921. Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (3) Defendants’ policy of indefinitely jailing indigent debtors for nonpaym ent of court costs without a judicial hearing is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (4) Defendants’ “schem e of m oney bonds” to fund certain judicial actors is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendm ent. To the extent defendants argue this schem e is in compliance with Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 13:1381.5 and 22:822, which govern the percentage of each surety bond that the judicial actors receive, those statutes are unconstitutional; (5) Defendants’ policy of jailing indigent debtors for nonpayment of court costs without any inquiry into their ability to pay is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endment; (6) Defendants’ policy of jailing and threatening to im prison crim inal defendants for nonpaym ent of court debts is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent because it im poses unduly harsh and punitive restrictions on debtors whose creditor is the State, as com pared to debtors who owe m oney to private creditors; (7) Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful arrest under Louisiana law; and (8) Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful im prisonment under Louisiana law. Im portantly, plaintiffs do not ask the Court to declare that defendants’ practice of im posing court costs, discretionary or not, is unconstitutional. D. Th e Ju d icial D e fe n d an ts ’ Mo tio n to D is m is s The Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, the thirteen judges, and the judicial adm inistrator now m ove to dism iss plaintiffs’ suit for plaintiffs’ alleged failure to join required parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) and 19. Defendants argue that the “Indigent Transcript Fund,” the Orleans Public Defenders office, the Orleans Parish District Attorney, the “[Louisiana Com mission on Law Enforcement] Training and Assistance Fund,” the “Crime Victim s Reparation Fund,” the Louisiana Supreme Court, “Crim e Stoppers,” the “Coroner’s Operational Fund,” and the “Drug Abuse Education and Treatm ent Fund” are all required parties because Louisiana law em powers Crim inal District Court judges to impose varying am ounts of “courts cost” on crim inal defendants to fund the operations of these entities. According to defendants, any ruling by this Court regarding the constitutionality of defendants’ “assessing and collecting these costs will have direct . . . and potentially catastrophic im pacts” on these absent parties. 60 Defendants also argue that a ruling in plaintiffs’ favor by this Court m ay conflict with an existing state writ of m andam us that requires defendants to assess the Indigent Defender Fund fee m andated by Louisiana Revised Statute §15:68. 61 See Louisiana Public Defender Board v. Parker, No. 597627 (19th J udicial District Court, Parish of J efferson, Mar. 4, 20 11). In opposition to the m otion to dism iss, plaintiffs argue that defendants m isunderstand the relief plaintiffs seek. To start, plaintiffs reiterate that they do not challenge the validity of the court costs im posed upon them by defendants. Plaintiffs do not seek to elim inate the Crim inal District Court judges’ ability to im pose court costs, as perm itted by Louisiana law. Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges lie with defendants’ means of collecting validly-im posed court costs—specifically, with defendants’ alleged jailing of indigent debtors without a m eaningful inquiry into the debtors’ ability to 60 R. Doc. 53-1 at 2. 61 Id. pay. Plaintiffs therefore contend that the entities defendants argue m ust be joined are unnecessary and not required to resolve this litigation. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) perm its a party to bring a m otion to dism iss a com plaint for failure to join a required party under Rule 19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). Proper joinder under Rule 19 is a two-step process. First, the court m ust decide if the absent party is required to fairly and com pletely resolve the dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Sch. Bd. of Avoy elles Par. V. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 647 F.3d 570 , 578 (5th Cir. 20 11); Dore Energy Corp. v. Prospective Inv. & Trading Co. Ltd., 570 F.3d 219, 230 -31 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). Second, if the absent party is required, but joinder is not feasible, the court m ust decide whether the absent party is “indispensable” to the action under Rule 19(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); Sch. Bd. of Avoy elles Par., 647 F.3d at 578. Under Rule 19(a)(1), a party is “required” if: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord com plete relief am ong existing parties; or (b) that person claim s an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical m atter im pair or im pede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, m ultiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). If a required party cannot be joined in the action because its joinder would defeat the court's diversity jurisdiction, the court m ust determ ine “whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed am ong the existing parties or should be dism issed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). In m aking this determ ination, the court m ay consider: (1) the extent to which a judgm ent rendered in the person’s absence m ight prejudice that person or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions in the judgm ent; (B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures; (3) whether a judgm ent rendered in the person’s absence would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate rem edy if the action were dism issed for nonjoinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). State law is relevant “in determ ining what interest the outsider actually has, but the ultim ate question whether, given those state-defined interests, a federal court m ay proceed without the outsider is a federal m atter.” Morrison v. N ew Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 415 F.2d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 1969) (citing Provident Tradesm ens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 10 2, 125 n. 22, 88 S.Ct. 733, 746 n. 22 (1968)). III. D ISCU SSION The Court begins by clarifying the relief plaintiffs seek in their First Am ended Com plaint. Although defendants characterize plaintiffs’ com plaint as a broad attack on the “constitutional perm issibility of assessing and collecting” court costs im posed on state-court crim inal defendants, 62 this characterization is incorrect for two reasons. First, plaintiffs do not com plain about defendants’ im posing or assessing court costs as valid terms of the sentences of state-court crim inal defendants. Indeed, as defendants note, the Louisiana Suprem e Court has recently held that state trial courts m aintain discretion to im pose a “broad category of costs” under Louisiana law. See generally State v. Griffin, 180 So. 3d 1262, 1268 (La. 20 15). Moreover, the im position of som e costs, such as the “special costs to the district indigent defender fund,” are not discretionary; a Louisiana trial court has no choice but to im pose these costs on a crim inal defendant who has been convicted. See generally La. Rev. Stat. § 15:168 (“Every court of original 62 R. Doc. 53-1 at 2. crim inal jurisdiction . . . shall rem it the following special costs . . .” (em phasis added)). Second, plaintiffs do not com plain about defendants’ generally collecting court costs, assum ing those collection efforts are carried out in a m anner consistent with constitutional principles. A review of the First Am ended Com plaint reveals that plaintiffs challenge only the m anner in which defendants allegedly collect outstanding court costs from indigent crim inal defendants who have failed to pay. Specifically, plaintiffs take issue with the following alleged policies: defendants’ failing to inquire into a crim inal defendant’s reasons for failing to pay court costs before issuing and executing arrest warrants for nonpaym ent by indigent debtors (Counts One, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight); defendants’ requiring a $ 20 ,0 0 0 “secured m oney bond,” allegedly m otivated by their financial interests, to release indigent debtors from prison (Counts Two and Four); and defendants’ detaining indigent debtors without a prom pt judicial appearance after their arrests (Count Three). Having properly fram ed plaintiffs’ allegations, the Court finds that none of the absent parties defendants argue must be joined is a required party under Rule 19. Despite the absence of the third party entities that defendants propose m ust be joined, the Court can accord com plete relief am ong the existing litigants. In m aking this determ ination, the Court looks to the relief prayed for by the claim ant. See In re Chinese Manufactured Dry w all Prods. Liab. Litig., 273 F.R.D. 380 , 385-86 (E.D. La. 20 11); Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. v. 4C’s Land Corp., No. 10 -70 2, 20 10 WL 3430 516, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 20 , 20 10 ). The Court “does not consider the effect that a judgm ent m ay have on absent parties when evaluating ‘com plete relief.’” VFS US LLC v. Vaczilla Trucking, LLC, No. 15-2226, 20 15 WL 7281619, at *14 (E.D. La. Nov. 16, 20 15) (citing United States v. Rutherford Oil Corp., No. G-0 8-0 231, 20 0 9 WL 1351794, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 20 0 9)). As noted, plaintiffs request the Court to declare unconstitutional defendants’ policies of incarcerating indigent debtors for nonpaym ent, autom atically requiring from them a “$ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond,” and detaining them without a prom pt judicial appearance. In seeking this relief, plaintiffs have sued the state actors who are allegedly responsible for the specific conduct at issue. There are no allegations (from either plaintiffs or defendants) that the Orleans Parish Coroner or whoever adm inisters Louisiana’s Drug Abuse Education and Treatm ent Fund, for exam ple, participates in the decisions to arrest indigent debtors for nonpaym ent. The same is true for defendants’ allegedly requiring a “$ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond” and detaining arrestees without a prom pt judicial appearance—these third party entities are not involved. Because none of the third parties participates in the conduct com plained of, their presence in this litigation is unnecessary for the Court to “accord com plete relief” if plaintiffs ultim ately prevail on their claim s. See Haas v. Jefferson N at’l Bank of Miam i Beach, 442 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding absent person to be a required party under Rule 19(a) because “his presence is critical to the disposition of the im portant issues in the litigation”). The Court next addresses whether any of these third parties “claim [] an interest relating to the subject of the action.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). The “interest relating to the subject of the action” m ust be a legally protected one. E.g., United States v. San Juan Bay Marina, 239 F.3d 40 0 , 40 6 (1st Cir. 20 0 1) (“A party is necessary under Rule 19(a) only if they claim a ‘legally protected interest’ relating to the subject m atter of the action.”); see also Escam illa v. M2 Tech., Inc., 536 F. App’x 417, 421 (5th Cir. 20 13) (noting that the licensor of a tradem ark is usually a required party because “the licensor has a legally protected interest in the subject m atter of the action”). “Rule 19 does not contem plate joinder of any party who m ight possibly be affected by a judgm ent in any way.” Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 843 F.2d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 1998). Several district courts in the Fifth Circuit hold that an absent party’s failure to “seek joinder on its own is indicative of its lack of interest in the subject m atter of the suit.” W oodard v. W oodard Villa, Inc., No. 15-1777, 20 16 WL 1298995, at *4 (W.D. La. Mar. 31, 20 16) (collecting cases); see also Colbert v. First N BC Bank, No. 13-30 43, 20 14 WL 1329834, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 20 14) (“[T]o be a required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B) because of an interest in the subject m atter of the action, the party must assert its own interest.”). Here, none of the absent parties has moved to intervene or otherwise attem pted to participate in this litigation. Defendants m erely argue on behalf of the absent parties that any potential ruling on the m erits in this case will have “potentially catastrophic im pacts on the crim inal justice operations of entities not before the Court.”63 Defendants’ dire prediction, lacking any concrete support, is insufficient to show that these absent parties are necessary to resolve plaintiffs’ claims. Regardless, defendants’ only argument that the absent parties are interested in the subject m atter of this litigation rests on the erroneous assertion that plaintiffs challenge defendants’ im position of court costs. 64 Any potential ruling regarding the m anner in which defendants collect court 63 64 R. Doc. 53-1 at 2. Defendants do not argue—and the Court cannot discern any legitim ate reason why—the absent parties have any interest in the subject m atter of plaintiffs’ other allegations, i.e., determining the appropriate am ount of bail for nonpaym ent offenses or how long arrestees wait for a judicial hearing. costs will not, “as a practical m atter[,] im pair or im pede” the absent parties’ entitlem ent to receive court costs under Louisiana law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(b)(i). Any argument that defendants will collect less m oney overall, and thus financially im pact the absent parties, unless they continue current— allegedly unconstitutional—practices is theoretical at best. “[T]he mere theoretical possibility of prejudice does not require joinder.” Colbert, 20 14 WL 1329834, at *4 (quoting Cortez v. County of L.A., 96 F.R.D. 427, 430 (C.D. Cal. 1983)). Further, this proceeding is unlikely to subject defendants to “m ultiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations,” as they contend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(b)(ii). Defendants argue that the Crim inal District Court judges are currently subject to state-court writ of m andam us requiring them to assess a “special cost[]” benefitting the Orleans Parish indigent defender fund in every case in which a state-court crim inal defendant is convicted. See Louisiana Public Defender Board v. Parker, No. 597627 (19th J udicial District Court, Parish of J efferson, Mar. 4, 20 11). Again, because plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the costs, any relief, if ultim ately granted, will not invalidate the im position of court costs. Cf. Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 843 F.2d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 1988) (“It is the threat of inconsistent obligations, not the possibility of multiple litigation or a subjective preference for state court, that determ ines Rule 19 considerations.”); EEOC v. Brow n & Root, Inc., 688 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir.1982) (finding insufficient under Rule 19(a) a party's claim “that it will som ehow be left facing inconsistent obligations,” which was “groundless”); U.S. ex rel. Branch Consultants, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 266, 272 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 20 10 ). (“[T]he key is whether the possibility of being subject to m ultiple obligations is real; an unsubstantiated or speculative risk will not satisfy the Rule 19(a) criteria.”). 65 Because joinder of the absent parties is not required under Rule 19(a), further analysis under Rule 19(b) is unnecessary. 65 The only case defendants cite in support of their arguments that the proposed third parties m ust be joined is Schutten v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1970 ). Schutten involved an ownership dispute over im m ovable property and its attendant m ineral rights. The plaintiffs sought to evict the defendant, Shell Oil Com pany. Id. at 870 . Shell was the lessee of a m ineral contract with the Orleans Parish Levee Board, who also claim ed ownership of the property at issue. Id. at 870 -71. The Fifth Circuit held that the Levee Board was a required party because any resolution in favor of the plaintiffs against Shell affected the Levee Board “would m ost assuredly create a cloud on the Levee Board’s title and greatly dim inish the value of the property.” Id. at 874. For the reasons already explained, the facts of Schutten, a property dispute am ong multiple parties—each of which asserted a direct, tangible ownership interest in the property—do not bolster defendants’ arguments here. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ m otion to dism iss for failure to join indispensable parties. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _22nd _ _ day of April, 20 16. ___ ___________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE
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