Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al, No. 2:2015cv04479 - Document 109 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 52 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/21/16. (jjs)
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Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al Doc. 109 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ALANA CAIN, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-4479 CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL. SECTION: R(2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Nam ed plaintiffs Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste, Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to declare the m anner in which the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court collects post-judgm ent court costs from indigent debtors unconstitutional. According to plaintiffs, the Crim inal District Court and other, related actors m aintain a policy of jailing crim inal defendants who fail to pay their court costs solely because of their indigence.1 The “judicial defendants” m ove the Court to dism iss this case for lack of subject m atter jurisdiction.2 Although defendants concede that this Court has subject m atter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ constitutional claim s arising 1 See generally R. Doc. 7 (Plaintiffs’ First Am ended Class Action Com plaint). 2 R. Doc. 52. The “judicial defendants” are the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, its thirteen judges, an d the judicial adm inistrator, Robert Kazik. Originally, plaintiffs also sued the Crim inal District Court clerk, Arthur Morell, but he has been voluntarily dism issed. R. Doc. 65. 1 Dockets.Justia.com under section 1983, they argue that the facts and circum stances presented here dem and the Court’s abstaining from jurisdiction.3 For the following reasons, the Court denies the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D A. Factu al Alle gatio n s In this section 198 3 civil rights lawsuit, plaintiffs allege, on behalf of them selves and those sim ilarly situated, that the City of New Orleans, the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, its judges and judicial adm inistrator, and Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusm an m aintain an unconstitutional schem e of jailing indigent crim inal defendants and im posing excessive bail am ounts for nonpaym ent “offenses” in an effort to collect unpaid court courts. According to plaintiffs, the Crim inal District Court m aintains an internal “Collections Departm ent,” inform ally called the “fines and fees” departm ent, that oversees the collection of court debts from form er crim inal defendants. The “typical” case allegedly proceeds as follows. When a person is charged with a crim e, the Crim inal District Court judges first determ ine whether the crim inal defendant is legally “indigent,” 3 R. Doc. 52-1 at 1. 2 m eaning they qualify for appointm ent of counsel through the Orleans Public Defenders under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:175. According to plaintiffs, eight-five percent of the crim inal defendants in Orleans Parish are legally indigent.4 With assistance of counsel, the defendants either plead guilty to their crim inal charges or proceed to trial. If convicted, the crim inal defendants m ust appear before a judge at the Crim inal District Court for sentencing. At sentencing, in addition to im posing a term of im prisonm ent or probation, the court m ay assess against the crim inal defendants various “court costs.” These costs m ay include restitution to any victim , a statutory fine, fees, or other costs im posed at the judge’s discretion. According to plaintiffs, the discretionary assessm ents “fund the District Attorney’s office, the Public Defender, and the Court[,]” which rely on these collections “to fund their operations and to pay em ployee salaries and extra benefits.”5 Plaintiffs allege that the Crim inal District Court judges im pose court costs without inquiring into the crim inal defendants’ ability to pay.6 4 R. Doc. 7 at 5. 5 Id. at 22-23 ¶ 88. 6 Id. at 23 ¶ 91. 3 If the crim inal defendants cannot im m ediately pay in full im m ediately, the Crim inal District Court judges direct them to the Collections Departm ent, or “fines and fees.” There, a Collections Departm ent em ployee im poses, at his discretion and without inquiring into a defendant’s ability to pay, a paym ent schedule—usually requiring a certain am ount per m onth.7 Collections Departm ent em ployees also warn the defendants that failure to pay the m onthly am ount, in full, will result in their arrests. Collections Departm ent em ployees refuse to accept anything less than full paym ent. 8 When crim inal defendants fail to pay, a Collections Departm ent em ployee allegedly issues a pre-printed warrant for the defendant’s arrest by forging a judge’s nam e.9 According to plaintiffs, the Collections Departm ent often issues these warrants “years after a purported nonpaym ent,” and the warrants are “routinely issued in error” or without regard to a debtor’s indigence.10 Plaintiffs also allege that each Collections Departm ent arrest warrant is “accom panied by a preset $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond required for 7 Id. at 27-28 ¶10 3. 8 Id. at 28 ¶ 10 6. 9 Id. at 29 ¶ 10 9. 10 Id. at ¶ 110 . 4 release.”11 According to plaintiffs, defendants’ unwavering adherence to this “autom atic $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond” requirem ent results from defendants’ financial interest in state-court arrestees’ paying for their release.12 Plaintiffs contend that the Crim inal District Court judges collect 1.8% of each bond, while the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office, the Orleans Public Defenders’ office, and the Orleans Parish Sheriff each collect 0 .4% of each bond.13 When crim inal defendants are arrested for nonpaym ent, they are “routinely told” that to be released from prison, they m ust pay for the $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond, the entirety of their outstanding court debts, or som e other am ount “unilaterally determ ine[d]” by the Collections Departm ent.14 As a result, these indigent debtors “languish” in prison “indefinite[ly]” because they cannot afford to pay any of the foregoing am ounts.15 Although “arrestees are eventually brought to court,” the Sheriff, the Crim inal District Court, and the judges “have no set policy or practice” 11 Id. at ¶ 113. 12 Id. at 21-22 ¶88. 13 Id. at 22 ¶88. 14 Id. at 30 ¶114. 15 Id. at ¶115. 5 regarding how long arrestees m ust wait for a hearing. According to plaintiffs, indigent debtors “routinely” spend a week or m ore in prison.16 Som e arrestees, with help from fam ily and friends, pay for their release without ever having a hearing and thus have “no opportunity to contest the debt or the jailing.”17 When crim inal defendants are brought to court, the Crim inal District Court judges allegedly send them back to prison if they are unable to pay their debts or release them “on threat of future arrest and incarceration” if they do not prom ptly pay the Collections Departm ent.18 At these brief “failure-to-pay hearings,” the judges do not consider the debtors’ abilities to pay. 19 Plaintiffs contend that these practices are unconstitutional and have created “a local debtors’ prison” in Orleans Parish.20 16 Id. 17 Id. at ¶114. 18 Id. at ¶116. 19 Id. 20 See R. Doc. 7 at 3. 6 B. Partie s The nam ed plaintiffs in the First Am ended Com plaint are six individuals who were defendants in the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court—Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste, Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell.21 The facts pertaining to the nam ed plaintiffs, as alleged in their com plaint, are as follows. The Crim inal District Court appointed counsel from the Orleans Public Defenders to represent each of the nam ed plaintiffs, except Reynaud Variste, during their crim inal proceedings.22 Thus, the court m ust have determ ined Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, Long, and Maxwell to be legally indigent 21 R. Doc. 7 at 7 ¶7. 22 R. Doc. 59-3 at 1 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 0 4/ 20 12) (“Court appointed Alex Liu, OPD.”), 5 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 0 2/ 20 13) (“Court appointed Seth Wayne, OPD.”), 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 0 2/ 20 14) (“Court appointed Lindsey Sam uel, OPD.”) 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 14/ 20 11) (“Court appointed J errod Thom pson-Hicks, OIPD.”); R. Doc.95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for 0 6/ 0 2/ 20 11) (“Court appointed Anna Fecker, OIDP). On Decem ber 3, 20 15, the Court took judicial notice of the facts contained in the Crim inal District Court docket sheets, signed guilty pleas, sentencing hearing transcripts of certain nam ed plaintiffs. R. Doc. 74. Since then, defendants m oved the Court to take judicial notice of the facts contained in additional records, including court docket sheets, signed guilty pleas, and sentencing hearing transcripts for other nam ed plaintiffs. R. Doc. 95. To the extent the Court relies on these docum ents throughout this order, defendants’ second m otion to take judicial notice is granted in part. 7 under Louisiana Revised Statutes §15:175. 23 Reynaud Variste appears to have retained private counsel.24 With the assistance of counsel, all of the nam ed plaintiffs pleaded guilty to their respective crim inal charges, which include theft,25 battery,26 drug possession,27 “sim ple crim inal dam age,”28 and disturbing the peace.29 At plaintiffs’ sentencings, the presiding judges im posed term s of im prisonm ent, which were often suspended, as well as term s of active or inactive probation. In addition, the judges assessed against plaintiffs various court costs—whether restitution, fines, and/ or discretionary fees and costs.30 23 See R. Doc. 7 at 5. 24 R. Doc. 59-3 at 14 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 9/ 25/ 20 12) (“Defendant m ust retain private counsel.”). 25 Id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea), 8 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea). 26 Id. at 12 (Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea). 27 Id. at 22 (Reynaud Variste Guilty Plea). 28 Id. at 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea). 29 R. Doc. 95-7 at 5 (Thaddeus Long Guilty Plea). 30 R. Doc. 59-3 at 2 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 5/ 30 / 20 13), 6 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 12/ 16/ 20 13), 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 21/ 20 14), 18 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 10 / 31/ 20 13), 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 3/ 0 6/ 20 12); R. Doc. 95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for 7/ 29/ 20 11). 8 At som e point, all of the nam ed plaintiffs were arrested for failing to pay outstanding court costs. For exam ple, plaintiffs allege that on one occasion, Alana Cain explained to a Collections Departm ent supervisor that she could not satisfy the full am ount of her expected m onthly paym ent. The Collections Departm ent supervisor warned Cain that if she could not afford her m onthly paym ent, he would issue a warrant for her arrest.31 In March 20 15, Cain was arrested for failing to pay her court debts. 32 J ail staff told Cain that her bail was set at “a $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured bond pursuant to standard policy” and that “there was no way to find out when her court date would be.”33 When Cain eventually attended a hearing, the presiding judge told her that “if she ever m issed a paym ent again, she would have to spend 90 days in jail.”34 The judge did not inquire into Cain’s ability to m eet the m onthly paym ents im posed by the Collections Departm ent. According to plaintiffs, in J uly and August 20 15, Ashton Brown spent twenty-nine days in prison solely because of unpaid debts stem m ing from a 31 R. Doc. 7 at 10 ¶ 18 . 32 Id. at ¶¶20 -22. 33 Id. at 10 -11 ¶¶22-23. 34 Id. at 11 ¶27. 9 20 13 conviction.35 When Brown finally received a hearing on the issue of his nonpaym ent, the presiding judge refused to release Brown, “unless he paid at least $ 10 0 .”36 Because Brown could not afford to pay, the judge set another hearing for several days later and warned Brown “that he would be kept in jail unless he got a fam ily m em ber to pay.”37 Eventually, Brown’s fam ily “scrape[d] together $ 10 0 ,” and Brown was released.38 Collections Departm ent em ployees have since threatened arrest and jail tim e if Brown does not continue m aking m onthly paym ents.39 Reynaud Variste was allegedly arrested for nonpaym ent in J anuary 20 15 when police “storm ed [Variste’s] hom e with assault rifles and m ilitary gear.”40 These officers told Variste “not to worry . . . because he sim ply owed som e old court costs.”41 In prison, jail staff allegedly told Variste that they 35 Id. at 12-13 ¶¶ 33-38. 36 Id. at 13 ¶ 38. 37 Id. 38 Id. at 14 ¶40 . 39 Id. 40 Id. at ¶41. 41 Id. at ¶42. 10 “had no idea when or whether [he] would be taken to court.”42 A bail bondsm an told Variste that “he would probably not be released . . . until he paid his entire court debts, which would be cheaper than paying the $ 20 ,0 0 0 m oney bond” im posed upon him .43 Eventually, Variste’s girlfriend paid “the entire debt am ount.” Variste was released from prison without a hearing.44 Reynajia Variste was arrested in May 20 15 for failing to pay her court costs. J ail staff allegedly told Variste that she could pay her outstanding court debts or post the “standard $ 20 ,0 0 0 m oney bond” to be released.45 While Variste was still in jail, a Collections Departm ent em ployee told a m em ber of Variste’s fam ily that Variste had to pay “at least $ 40 0 before [the Collections Departm ent] would agree to let [Variste] out of jail.”46 The Collections Departm ent allegedly arrived at this am ount because it was “close to half of what [Variste] owed in total.”47 Variste spent at least seven days in prison and was never given a hearing before her fam ily gathered 42 Id. at 15 ¶47. 43 Id. 44 Id. at ¶48. 45 Id. at 16 ¶55. 46 Id. at 17 ¶57. 47 Id. 11 enough m oney “to buy her release.”48 According to the First Am ended Com plaint, the Collections Departm ent continues to threaten Reynajia Variste with prison tim e if she cannot m ake her m onthly paym ents.49 Plaintiffs contend that Thaddeus Long was wrongly arrested for failing to pay his court costs because Long paid his debts in full years before. According to the First Am ended Com plaint, Long was convicted in 20 11 and finished paying his court costs in October 20 13.50 In J une 20 15, a New Orleans police officer, conducting a traffic stop, discovered an outstanding warrant for Long’s supposed nonpaym ent. 51 The officer arrested Long, and Long spent six days in prison, unable to post “the standard $ 20 ,0 0 0 secured m oney bond” before he was given a hearing. At the failure-to-pay hearing, Long explained that he had already paid his court debts in full, a “m istake . . . apparent from the court records,” and he was released im m ediately.52 48 Id. at ¶60 . 49 Id. at ¶ 64. 50 Id. at 18 ¶67. 51 Id. 52 Id. at ¶69. 12 Vanessa Maxwell allegedly spent twelve days in prison after her arrest for nonpaym ent before being brought to court.53 According to plaintiffs, the presiding judge did not evaluate Maxwell’s present ability to pay, but nonetheless m ade her release from prison contingent on Maxwell’s paying $ 191 “within a week.”54 Plaintiffs contend that Maxwell was never able to com e up with the m oney, and Maxwell is now “in im m inent danger of arrest . . . pursuant to m onetary conditions that she cannot [m eet].”55 Plaintiffs now sue the City of New Orleans for hiring the Crim inal District Court’s Collection Departm ent workers, as well as the police officers who execute the allegedly invalid arrest warrants.56 Plaintiffs also sue Sheriff Marlin Gusm an, in his official capacity, for “unconstitutionally detain[ing] im poverished people indefinitely because of their inability to . . . pay[] for their release.”57 In addition, plaintiffs sue the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court for its role in m anaging and funding the Collections Departm ent, and the court’s J udicial Adm inistrator, Robert Kazik, in his 53 Id. at 20 ¶83. 54 Id. 55 Id. at ¶84. 56 Id. at 7 ¶8. 57 Id. at 8 ¶12. 13 individual and official capacities, because he is allegedly responsible for operating the Collections Departm ent.58 Finally, plaintiffs nam e as defendants every judge at the Crim inal District Court—thirteen in all— because they allegedly supervise the Collections Departm ent em ployees and have failed to provide the parish’s crim inal defendants with constitutionallyrequired process before im prisoning people for failure to pay court costs. Plaintiffs sue the judges only for declaratory relief.59 C. Plain tiffs ’ Claim s fo r Re lie f Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Am endm ent rights, as well as violations of Louisiana tort law. Plaintiffs seek dam ages (including attorneys’ fees) and an injunction against all defendants, except the judges. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgm ent regarding the constitutionality of defendants’ practices. The Court sum m arizes plaintiffs’ allegations, as articulated in the First Am ended Com plaint, as follows: 58 Id. at 7-8 ¶¶9-10 . 59 Id. at 8 ¶13. 14 (1) Defendants’ policy of issuing and executing arrest warrants for nonpaym ent of court costs is unconstitutional under the Fourth Am endm ent and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (2) Defendants’ policy of requiring a $ 20 ,0 0 0 “fixed secured m oney bond” for each Collections Departm ent warrant (issued for nonpaym ent of court costs) is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (3) Defendants’ policy of indefinitely jailing indigent debtors for nonpaym ent of court costs without a judicial hearing is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (4) Defendants’ “schem e of m oney bonds” to fund certain judicial actors is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent. To the extent defendants argue this schem e is in com pliance with Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 13:1381.5 and 22:822, which govern the percentage of each surety bond that the judicial actors receive, those statutes are unconstitutional; 15 (5) Defendants’ policy of jailing indigent debtors for nonpaym ent of court costs without any inquiry into their ability to pay is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent; (6) Defendants’ policy of jailing and threatening to im prison crim inal defendants for nonpaym ent of court debts is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent because it im poses unduly harsh and punitive restrictions on debtors whose creditor is the State, as com pared to debtors who owe m oney to private creditors; (7) Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful arrest under Louisian a law; and (8) Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful im prisonm ent under Louisiana law. D. Th e Ju d icial D e fe n d an ts ’ Mo tio n to D is m is s The Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, the thirteen judges, and the judicial adm inistrator now m ove to dism iss plaintiffs’ suit for lack of subject m atter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Defendants adm it that plaintiffs invoke the Court’s subject m atter jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because plaintiffs’ constitutional claim s 16 arise under section 1983.60 Nonetheless, defendants argue that “im portant considerations of com ity and federalism ” dem and that the Court decline jurisdiction in this case.61 Defendants urge the Court to abstain under the doctrines announced in Younger v. Harris, 40 1 U.S. 37 (1971) (“Younger abstention”); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (“Burford abstention”); and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldm an, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (collectively, the “RookerFeldm an doctrine”). The Court first addresses whether certain plaintiffs have standing and then addresses each of defendants’ argum ents in turn. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Motions subm itted under Rule 12(b)(1) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the court's subject m atter jurisdiction on the allegations of the com plaint. Lopez v. City of Dallas, Tex., 20 0 6 WL 1450 520 , *2 (N.D. Tex. 20 0 6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) m otion to 60 Defendants do not address the Court’s supplem ental jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ state-law claim s, which are “so related” to the constitutional claim s as to “form part of th e sam e case or controversy.” See 28 U.S. § 1367. Defendants’ argum ents for dism issal are directed only to plaintiffs’ constitutional claim s. See R. Doc. 52-1. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis is lim ited to plaintiffs’ claim s arising under section 1983. 61 Id. at 1-2. 17 dism iss, the court m ay rely on (1) the com plaint alone, presum ing the allegations to be true, (2) the com plaint supplem ented by undisputed facts, or (3) the com plaint supplem ented by undisputed facts and by the court's resolution of disputed facts. See Montez v. Dep’t of N avy , 392 F.3d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 20 0 4). The plaintiff bears the burden of dem onstrating that subject m atter jurisdiction exists. See Paterson v. W einberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981). When exam ining a factual challenge to subject m atter jurisdiction that does not im plicate the m erits of plaintiff's cause of action, the district court has substantial authority “to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 10 4 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Clark v. Tarrant County , 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the court m ay consider m atters outside the pleadings, such as testim ony and affidavits. See Garcia, 10 4 F.3d at 1261. A court's dismissal of a case for lack of subject m atter jurisdiction is not a decision on the m erits, and the dism issal does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in another forum . See Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 60 6, 60 8 (5th Cir. 1977). III. D ISCU SSION A. Re yn au d Varis te ’s an d Th ad d e u s Lo n g’s Stan d in g to Pu rs u e Equ itable Re lie f 18 Defendants do not raise the issue of plaintiffs’ Article III standing. When necessary, however, a federal court m ust address the issue of standing on its own. Ford v. N YLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 30 1 F.3d 329, 331-32 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (citations om itted). Article III of the Constitution requires plaintiffs in federal court to allege an actual “case or controversy.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974); see generally U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases [and] to controversies . . . .”). The case-or-controversy requirem ent m eans that plaintiffs “m ust allege som e threatened or actual injury resulting from the [defendants’] putatively illegal action before a federal court m ay assum e jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)). “Abstract injury is not enough. . . . The injury or threat of injury m ust be both real and im m ediate.” Id. at 494 (quoting Golden v. Zw ickler, 394 U.S. 10 3, 10 9-110 (1969)). For plaintiffs seeking equitable relief, “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy . . . if unaccom panied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Id. at 495-96; see also City of Los Angeles v. Ly ons, 461 U.S. 95, 10 5 (1983) (finding allegation that defendants “routinely” engage in unconstitutional conduct “falls far short of the allegations . . . necessary to establish a case or controversy” for plaintiff seeking injunctive relief). 19 Here, by plaintiffs’ own allegations, and the Crim inal District Court records of which this Court has taken judicial notice, neither Reynaud Variste nor Thaddeus Long owe any outstanding court costs for which they m ay be im prisoned according to defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional policy.62 Nor are they currently incarcerated for past-due debts. Because Variste and Long have no outstanding debts and are not currently incarcerated, they are not suffering any “real or im m ediate” injury or threat of the alleged injury—the unconstitutional arrest and im prisonm ent as a result of their indigence. Cf. Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., No. 12-CV-0 2819RDP, 20 13 WL 5428360 , at *(N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 20 13) (“Plaintiffs are experiencing continuing, present adverse effects [because] all of the Plaintiffs are still on probation and still owe various fines and fees.”). Any “prospect of future injury” assum es that Variste and Long will again be charged with violations of Louisiana crim inal law, will again be assessed with courts costs that they cannot pay, and will again be arrested and im prisoned for nonpaym ent. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496. But the Court 62 See R. Doc. 7 at 15 (noting that after his arrest in 20 15, Reynaud Variste “eventually used his paycheck to pay the entire debt am ount”), 18 (alleging that Thaddeus Long was wrongfully arrested for failing to pay because he “paid his debts in full in October 20 13”); R. Doc. 59-3 at 20 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet) (“The defendant has paid all fines and fees as ordered by the court.”); R. Doc. 95-7 at 1-2 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet) (sam e). 20 m ust assum e that plaintiffs “will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct.” Id. at 497. Thus, any threat of injury is m ere “speculation and conjecture”—too abstract to satisfy Article III’s requirem ent of a “case or controversy.” See id. Because Reynaud Variste and Thaddeus Long lack standing to pursue their claim s for equitable relief, the Court dism isses their claim s for declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants. See generally Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herm an, 959 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[P]laintiffs m ay lack standing to seek prospective relief even though they have standing to sue for dam ages.”). In addressing defendants’ argum ents for dism issal in the rem ainder of this order, the Court will refer only to plaintiffs Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, and Maxwell where necessary. B. H e ck v . H u m p h r e y D o e s N o t Bar Plain tiffs ’ Se ctio n 19 8 3 Claim s fo r D am age s The Court begins with an analysis of Heck v. Hum phrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck is not a traditional abstention case like the other doctrines defendants contend require dism issal. Nonetheless, because defendants briefly argue it, the Court will address it. 21 In Heck, the United States Suprem e Court held that a crim inal defendant m ay not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence in a suit for dam ages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless that conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state court, or called into question by a federal court’s issuing a writ of habeas corpus. 512 U.S. at 486-87. A crim inal defendant challenges the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence in a section 1983 case when “establishing the basis for the dam ages claim necessarily dem onstrates the invalidity of the conviction.” Id. at 482-83. In other words, Heck bars suit when the factual findings necessary to prevail on the 1983 claim directly contradict or underm ine the factual findings underlying the plaintiff’s crim inal conviction. For exam ple, Heck often applies in 1983 claim s for offenses such as false im prisonm ent, use of excessive force, or m alicious prosecution against the plaintiff’s arresting officers or others. See, e.g., DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 20 0 7) (applying Heck to claim s for false arrest, false im prisonm ent, m alicious prosecution, illegal search and seizure, and use of excessive force); LaMartina-How ell v. St. Tam m any Par. Sch. Bd., No. 0 7-1168, 20 0 9 WL 3837323, at *6 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 20 0 9) (applying Heck to plaintiff’s claim of 22 false arrest because it would underm ine plaintiff’s state-court conviction for resisting arrest). Here, the nam ed plaintiffs have all pleaded guilty to various crim inal offenses under Louisiana law. Alana Cain was convicted of theft of $ 150 0 or m ore for stealing a ring.63 Ashton Brown was convicted of m isdem eanor theft of under $ 50 0 .64 Reynajia Variste and Vanessa Maxwell were both convicted of second-degree battery.65 Maxwell was also convicted of “sim ple crim inal dam age under $ 50 0 .”66 In this section 1983 action, plaintiffs allege that the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court, its judges, and other actors m aintain an unconstitutional policy of issuing post-judgm ent arrest warrants and indefinitely jailing crim inal defendants for their failure to pay outstanding court costs. Plaintiffs contend, am ong other things, that this violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent because defendants routinely deny the state-court crim inal defendants judicial 63 R. Doc. 59-3 at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea); R. Doc. 59-4 at 3 (Transcript of Alana Cain’s Guilty Plea). 64 R. Doc. 59-3 at 5 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea); R. Doc. 95-4 at 11-12 (Transcript of Ashton Brown’s Guilty Plea). 65 R. Doc. 59-3 at 12 (Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea), 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea). 66 Id. at 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea). 23 hearings or any other opportunity to explain their inability to pay, which is allegedly due only to their indigence. Beyond bare or conclusory statem ents such as “plaintiffs cannot state a claim under the Heck doctrine,”67 and “the [Heck] rule applies here,”68 defendants have not articulated any argum ent for applying Heck to plaintiffs’ constitutional claim s. Defendants cannot seriously argue that the facts necessary to support plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim s (i.e., the Crim inal District Court judges’ failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the crim inal defendants’ good-faith ability to pay) contradict or underm ine the factual bases for plaintiffs’ state-court guilty pleas for theft, battery, and “sim ple crim inal dam age.” Therefore, Heck does not apply. See Pow ers v. Ham ilton Cty . Pub. Def. Com m ’n, 50 1 F.3d 592, 60 4 (11th Cir. 20 0 7) (“To prevail in his § 1983 suit, [plaintiff] m ust show that he was not afforded an indigency hearing to which he had a constitutional right before being com m itted to jail. If he succeeds, the resulting judgm ent in his favor would in no way im pugn his conviction for reckless driving.”). B. Y o u n g e r Abs te n tio n D o e s N o t Ap p ly 67 R. Doc. 52-1 at 13. 68 Id. at 14. 24 As to the abstention doctrines, defendants first argue that Younger abstention applies. Following the rule of Younger v. Harris, federal courts m ay not enjoin pending state court proceedings. 40 1 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) (“[N]ational policy forbid[s] federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circum stances.”); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 50 4 U.S. 689, 70 5 (1992) (“Younger itself held that, absent unusual circum stances, a federal court could not interfere with a pending state crim inal prosecution.”). Younger abstention is warranted when (1) “the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding,” (2) the state proceeding “im plicates im portant state interests,” and (3) the plaintiff has “an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding[] to raise constitutional challenges.” Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 20 12); accord Middlesex Cty . Ethics Com m . v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Plaintiffs contend that there are no “ongoing state judicial proceedings” because each plaintiff has been convicted and sentenced. According to plaintiffs, the Crim inal District Court issued final judgm ents in their crim inal cases “years ago.”69 69 Defendants argue that plaintiffs are R. Doc. 70 at 4. 25 subject to ongoing crim inal proceedings because each of them was sentenced to pay a certain am ount of court courts, and “none have paid in full.”70 According to defendants, plaintiffs’ crim inal cases will “rem ain open until all assessed costs are paid.”71 Pending crim inal prosecutions are classic “ongoing state judicial proceedings.” See, e.g., Health N et, Inc. v. W ooley , 534 F.3d 487, 494 (5th Cir. 20 0 8) (“Younger abstention originally applied only to crim inal prosecutions . . . .”). Once a crim inal defendant’s conviction and sentence have becom e final, however, his crim inal prosecution is no longer “ongoing” even though the defendant m ay still be serving the rem ainder of his sentence. See generally N ew Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of N ew Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 , 369 (198 9) (“[T]he proceeding is not com plete until judicial review is concluded. . . . For Younger purposes, the State’s trial-and-appeals process is treated as a unitary system . . . .”); Pow ers v. Ham ilton Cty . Pub. Def. Com m ’n, 50 1 F.3d 592, 60 5-0 6 (11th Cir. 20 0 7) (finding Younger inapplicable after state-court revoked plaintiff’s probation m onths before he filed suit because the “proceedings in state court have long since 70 R. Doc. 52-1 at 3, 5. 71 R. Doc. 78 at 2. 26 concluded”); Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty . Bd. of Cty . Com m ’rs, 40 5 F.3d 1298, 1316 n.9 (11th Cir. 20 0 5) (finding Younger abstention “clearly erroneous” when plaintiff “has already been tried and convicted . . . and none of the parties suggests that any charges rem ain pending against him ”); Trom bley v. Cty . of Cascade, Mont., 879 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no ongoing proceeding when plaintiff “has pleaded guilty and is currently out on parole”); Alm odovar v. Reiner, 832 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 198 7) (“Probation is not a pending crim inal action for Younger purposes.”); Moncier v. Jones, No. 3:11-CV-30 1, 20 12 WL 262984, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. J an. 30 , 20 12) (explaining that a proceeding is “pending” from “the tim e of filing . . . until a litigant has exhausted his state appellant rem edies”); Baltzer v. Birkett, No. 0 2 C 4718, 20 0 3 WL 366577, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 20 0 3) (finding no ongoing proceeding when plaintiff was serving his prison sentence, but the tim e for appeal had expired). Here, each of the nam ed plaintiffs has pleaded guilty and been sentenced by the Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court—the m ost recent in 20 14, nearly a year before plaintiffs filed this suit.72 With the exception of Vanessa Maxwell, who appears to have served eighteen m onths, all of the 72 See R. Doc. 59-3 at 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet). 27 nam ed plaintiffs were sentenced to “suspended” or “deferred” term s of im prisonm ent and sentenced to active or inactive probation. The Crim inal District Court also im posed court costs as part of plaintiffs’ crim inal sentences.73 For som e, the court ordered paym ent of these court costs as a condition of their probation.74 After sentencing, the Crim inal District Court “referred” plaintiffs to “fines and fees”—the court’s internal collections departm ent—and m arked plaintiffs’ court records as “case closed.”75 It is undisputed that these convictions and sentences are now final because none of the plaintiffs directly appealed. Moreover, there are no new pending prosecutions against any nam ed plaintiff. None of the plaintiffs is currently incarcerated while awaiting trial or other crim inal proceeding, and none currently has a warrant outstanding for his or her arrest or charges filed against him or her for nonpaym ent of court costs or any substantive crim inal offense.76 See Abusaid, 40 5 F.3d at 1316 n.9 (finding Younger abstention 73 Id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea), 8 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea), 12 (Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea), 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea). 74 See id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea). 75 See, e.g., id. at 2 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet), 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet). 76 See R. Doc. 61 at 2 (“[T]here are no outstanding capias warrants for nonpaym ent or late paym ent of outstanding Orleans Parish Crim inal District Court debts[.]”). 28 “clearly erroneous” when “none of the parties suggests that any charges rem ain pending against [the plaintiff]”); Moncier, 20 12 WL 262984, at *5 (explaining that a proceeding is “pending” from “the tim e of filing . . . until a litigant has exhausted his state appellant rem edies”) The issue here is whether plaintiffs, m erely because their court costs rem ain unpaid, are subject to ongoing state judicial proceedings. Defendants’ only argum ent is that plaintiffs’ original crim inal prosecutions rem ain open because their sentences are not “com plete” or “satisfied” until plaintiffs pay the full am ount of outstanding court costs. But an incom plete sentence, such as an undischarged term of im prisonm ent, probation, or parole, does not constitute an “ongoing state judicial proceeding” for purposes of Younger abstention. See, e.g., Trom bley , 879 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1989) (no ongoing proceeding when plaintiff “is currently out on parole”); Alm odovar, 832 F.2d at 1141 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Probation is not a pending crim inal action for Younger purposes.”); Baltzer, 20 0 3 WL 366577, at *3 (finding no ongoing proceeding when plaintiff was serving his prison sentence, but the tim e for appeal had expired). Because the m ere existence of plaintiffs’ undischarged debts does not constitute an “ongoing state judicial proceeding,” Younger abstention does not apply. See generally Steffel v. Thom pson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (“When no state crim inal 29 proceeding is pending at the tim e the federal com plaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state crim inal justice system ; nor can federal intervention, in that circum stance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles.”). Defendants’ argum ent that Bice v. Louisiana Public Defender Board controls the outcom e here is m isplaced. In Bice, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirm ed a district court’s decision to abstain from interfering with the plaintiff’s pending prosecution in New Orleans Municipal Court. 677 F.3d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 20 12). The plaintiff in Bice argued that a Louisiana law requiring convicted crim inal defendants to pay into the state’s Indigent Defender Fund was unconstitutional under Sixth and Fourteenth Am endm ents because the plaintiff’s appointed counsel was biased against him . Id. at 715-16. Applying Younger, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff was subject to an ongoing crim inal prosecution in m unicipal court and that his civil rights challenge would have required “postpon[ing] Bice’s prosecution until adequate funding is located” or “withdraw[ing] Bice’s public defender [and] requiring the m unicipal court judge to locate new counsel.” Id. at 718-19. 30 Sim ilar circum stances are not present in this case. As noted, each of the plaintiffs was convicted and sentenced long ago, and those convictions are now final. None of the plaintiffs is currently subject to crim inal charges in state-court. Therefore, there are no ongoing state judicial proceedings and abstention under Younger is not warranted here. C. Bu r fo r d Abs te n tio n D o e s N o t Ap p ly Be cau s e Plain tiffs ’ Co n s titu tio n al Claim s D o N o t In vo lve a State Ad m in is trative Pro ce d u re s Defendants also argue that Burford abstention is warranted here because a ruling that jailing crim inal defendants for failing to pay court costs is unconstitutional would “negat[e] Louisiana law” in Orleans Parish, which m aintains a “com prehensive schem e for am ending, reconsidering, and reviewing crim inal sentences.”77 Plaintiffs counter that Burford abstention is inappropriate for two reasons. First, plaintiffs argue that they have not challenged the validity of their crim inal sentences and therefore do not want their sentences am ended, reconsidered, or reviewed. Second, plaintiffs em phasize that regardless of what Louisiana law m ay allow, “all Louisiana 77 R. Doc. 52-1 at 8-9. 31 parishes, all m unicipal entities, and all state actors” m ust abide by the Constitution of the United States.78 In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., the Suprem e Court affirm ed a district court’s decision to abstain in a case involving “questions of the regulation of the [Texas oil and gas] industry by the State adm inistrative agency.” 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943). In support of its holding, the Court em phasized that “the federal governm ent . . . chose[] to leave the principal regulatory responsibility with the states.” Id. at 319. After Burford, “[w]here tim ely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court sitting in equity m ust decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state adm inistrative agencies.” N ew Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 , 361 (1989) (em phasis added). As a general rule, “Burford abstention requires the existence of a state adm inistrative proceeding to which the federal court could defer.” Lipscom b v. Colum bus. Municipal Separate School District, 145 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1998) (em phasis added) (citing St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy , 682 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 20 12) (“Burford abstention is concerned with protecting com plex state adm inistrative processes from 78 R. Doc. 70 at 9-10 . 32 undue federal inference . . . .” (em phasis added)); W ebb v. B.C. Rogers Poultry , Inc., 174 F.3d 697, 70 0 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The Burford doctrine allows a federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in deference to com plex state adm inistrative procedures.” (em phasis added)). Although courts have applied Burford to areas other than state adm inistrative proceedings, these occasions are rare and arise only when the case presents state-law issues of wholly local concern. See Estate of Merkel v. Pollard, 354 F. App’x 88 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (applying Burford abstention because adjudication required resolving Texas divorce law); Claudill v. Eubanks Farm s, Inc., 30 1 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 20 0 2) (applying Burford abstention to diversity action for dissolution of a Kentucky corporation); see generally Aransas Project v. Shaw , 775 F.3d 641, 650 (5th Cir. 20 14) (“Of prim ary concern in Burford was the involvem ent of the federal courts in deciding issues of essentially state law and policy.”). Here, plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim s neither im plicate the procedures of a state adm inistrative agency nor raise state-law issues of only local concern. On the contrary, plaintiffs allege that defendants have deprived them of their constitutional rights—claim s that plainly arise under federal law and that “are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts.” McN eese v. Bd. of Ed. For Cm ty . Unit Sch. Dist. 187, Cahokia, Ill., 373 U.S. 668, 674 33 (1963) (refusing to apply Burford abstention). Defendants’ argum ent that they have validly adhered to Louisiana law m isses the point. In evaluating a constitutional claim , “it is im m aterial whether [defendants’] conduct is legal or illegal as a m atter of state law.” Id. Burford abstention does not apply. D. R o o k e r -Fe ld m a n D o e s N o t Ap p ly Be cau s e Plain tiffs ’ Co n s titu tio n al Claim s D o N o t Re qu ire Re je ctin g Th e ir State -Co u rt Co n victio n s Finally, defendants argue that the Court should abstain from adjudicating plaintiffs’ claim s under the Rooker-Feldm an doctrine. RookerFeldm an bars federal district courts from “m odify[ing] or revers[ing] state court judgm ents.” Truong v. Bank of Am ., N .A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 20 13) (citations om itted); see also N oel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 20 0 3) (holding Rooker-Feldm an applies when a federal plaintiff challenges a state-court judgm ent as “legal[ly] wrong” or otherwise “erroneous”). Rooker-Feldm an is an especially narrow doctrine, “confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers com plaining of injuries caused by state-court judgm ents . . . and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgm ents.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 , 284 (20 0 5). In determ ining whether Rooker-Feldm an applies, a court m ust carefully evaluate what it is asked to review and reject. Truong, 717 F.3d at 34 382 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284). The court lacks jurisdiction only when the plaintiff “seeks relief that directly attacks the validity of an existing state court judgm ent,” W eaver v. Tex. Capital Bank, N .A., 660 F.3d 90 0 , 90 4 (5th Cir. 20 11) (em phasis added), or the plaintiff’s federal claim s “are so inextricably intertwined with a state judgm ent that the federal court is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy , 682 F.3d 381, 390 -91 (5th Cir. 20 12) (citing D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldm an, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). Rooker-Feldm an does not prohibit a federal plaintiff from “present[ing] som e independent claim , albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. Defendants’ argum ents in support of abstention under RookerFeldm an rest on a m isunderstanding of the relief plaintiffs seek through their section 1983 claim s. Defendants em phasize that all of the nam ed plaintiffs pleaded guilty to their respective crim inal charges and that none of their convictions or sentences has been reversed or expunged. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ efforts to “reconsider[], am end[], . . . or appeal” their sentences m ust be done in state court.79 But plaintiffs’ allegations, as well as 79 R. Doc. 52-1 at 10 . 35 their argum ents in opposition to dism issal, m ake clear that plaintiffs do not contest the validity of their state-court convictions or sentences. Indeed, plaintiffs plainly adm it that none of them “is challenging his or her crim inal conviction or sentence.”80 Nor do they argue “that their convictions should be overturned or that the m onetary portion of the judgm ent against them is invalid.”81 Instead, plaintiffs challenge the m eans by which defendants’ attem pt to enforce the state court judgm ent, an issue separate and distinct from the validity of the judgm ent itself. See Mosley v. Bow ie Cty . Tex., 275 F. App’x 327, 329 (5th Cir. 20 0 8) (distinguishing between challenging a judgm ent and challenging defendants’ “efforts to enforce” the judgm ent); Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., No. 12-CV-0 2819-RDP, 20 13 WL 5428360 , at *8 -9 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 20 13) (finding plaintiffs’ challenge to arrests for nonpaym ent attacks only “the post-judgm ent probationary program [,]” rather than the “m erits” or “bases” of the state court decisions). Because a claim that defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in defendants’ enforcem ent of the state court judgm ents “do[es] not ask the district court to 80 R. Doc. 70 at 2. 81 Id. 36 review, m odify, or nullify, a final order of a state court, [this claim is] not barred under the Rooker-Feldm an doctrine. Mosley , 275 F. App’x at 329 (quoting W eekly v. Morrow , 20 4 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 )). In sum , none of the foregoing abstention doctrines applies to plaintiffs’ section 1983 civil rights claim s. Because the Court has subject m atter jurisdiction over these claim s and supplem ental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claim s, the Court denies defendants’ m otion to dism iss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ m otion to dism iss for lack of jurisdiction. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ 21st _ _ _ day of April, 20 16. ___ ___________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 37
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