Williams v. Cain et al, No. 2:2015cv03852 - Document 13 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER & REASONS ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 : The Court DENIES Williams's petition for habeas corpus and DENIES a certificate of appealability. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 7/29/2016.(mmm)
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Williams v. Cain et al Doc. 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LIONEL WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO: 15-3852 N. BURL CAIN, WARDEN SECTION: R ORD ER Before the Court is Lionel William s's petition for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court, having reviewed de novo the petition,1 the record, the applicable law, the Magistrate J udge's Report and Recom m endation ("R & R"),2 and the petitioner's objections thereto,3 hereby approves the R & R and adopts it as its opinion. As the Magistrate J udge correctly concludes, William s's petition is untim ely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") provides a one year statute of lim itations for state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That one year period runs from the latest of four triggering events, including, as relevant here, "the date on which the judgm ent of conviction becom es final" and "the 1 R. Doc. 1. 2 R. Doc. 10 . 3 R. Doc. 12. Dockets.Justia.com date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Suprem e Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Suprem e Court and m ade retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." Id. at § 2244(d)(1)(A), (C). William s contends that two Suprem e Court decisions, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (20 12), and Missouri v. Fry e, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (20 12), provide new rules of constitutional law that afford him relief. Thus, he argues that his lim itations period began to run on the date those decisions were issued, not the earlier date on which his conviction becam e final. The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that Lafler and Fry e did not announce new constitutional rules; they merely applied the Sixth Am endm ent right to counsel, as defined in Strickland v. W ashington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to a specific factual context. See Miller v. Thaler, 714 F.3d 897, 90 2 (5th Cir. 20 13); In re King, 697 F.3d 1189 (5th Cir. 20 12). Thus, the triggering event for new constitutional rights does not apply to Williams's petition. Under AEDPA, the period for William s to seek federal habeas relief began to run on the date that his conviction becam e final, Decem ber 23, 20 0 4, and expired one year later on Decem ber 23, 20 0 5. Because William s did not file his federal habeas petition until on or after August 26, 20 15, his petition is tim e-barred and m ust be dism issed. William s does not seriously dispute that his federal habeas petition is 2 untim ely. Instead, he argues in his objections that a Louisiana court incorrectly applied Louisiana law in finding a tim e bar to one of his previous state habeas petitions. According to William s, even if Lafler and Fry e did not create a new constitutional rule for purposes of AEDPA, they nonetheless turned on "a theretofore unknown interpretation of constitutional law," which warrants relief from Louisiana's two year statute of lim itations for habeas petitions. See La. Code Crim . Proc. art. 930 .8(A)(2) (providing an exception from the usual lim itations period for habeas petitions involving "a theretofore unknown interpretation of constitutional law" that has been m ade "retroactively applicable to [the petitioner's] case"). To the extent William s asks this Court to review the Louisiana court's application of article 930 .8(A)(2) to his state habeas petition, his request is beyond the scope of federal habeas corpus review. As the Suprem e Court has explained, "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexam ine state-court determ inations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is lim ited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 50 2 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 491 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (explaining that even if a Texas court m isapplied its own precedent, "this was a violation of state law [and] . . . . such a violation is not the concern 3 of a federal habeas court"). Moreover, even if the Court could review this issue, it would find no error in the Louisiana court's application of Louisiana law. See State v. Bradley , 155 So. 3d 565, 567 (La. App. 2 Cir. 20 13) (holding that Lafler and Fry e did not involve a "theretofore unknown interpretation of constitutional law" for purposes of article 930 .8(A)(2)). To the extent William s argues that the Louisiana court's disposition of his state habeas petition requires this Court to equitably toll AEDPA's statute of lim itations for federal habeas relief, his argum ent lacks m erit. AEDPA's lim itations period is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (20 10 ). But a petitioner is "entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that som e extraordinary circum stance stood in his way and prevented tim ely filing. Id. at 649 (internal quotation omitted). As the party seeking equitable relief, the burden is on the petitioner to "dem onstrate 'rare and exceptional circum stances' warranting application of the [tolling] doctrine." Alexander v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (quoting Felder v. Johnson, 20 4 F.3d 168, 170 – 71 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 )). Here, William s fails to carry his burden of proof. Although William s claim s that the state court erred in deem ing an earlier state habeas petition untim ely, he gives no evidence or argum ent for how this alleged error 4 prevented him from filing a tim ely petition in federal court. Moreover, that William s waited over ten years from the date on which his conviction becam e final to seek federal habeas relief only confirm s his lack of diligence in pursuing his rights. See Manning v. Epps, 688 F.3d 177, 184 (5th Cir. 20 12) (finding that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA's statute of lim itations when he did not diligently pursue federal habeas relief for m ore than 19 m onths after conviction becam e final). Accordingly, William s's objections to the Report and Recom m endation are without m erit. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings provides that "[t]he district court m ust issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." A court m ay only issue a certificate of appealability if the petitioner m akes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The "controlling standard" for a certificate of appealability requires the petitioner to show "that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that m atter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different m anner or that the issues presented [are] adequate to deserve encouragem ent to proceed further." Miller– El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (20 0 3) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (20 0 0 )). The Court finds that William s's petition, in conjunction with his objections to the Magistrate J udge's R & R, does not 5 satisfy this standard. Thus, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES William s's petition for habeas corpus and DENIES a certificate of appealability. New Orleans, Louisiana, this 29th day of J uly, 20 16. ________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 6
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