Bickerstaff et al v. Bickerstaff et al, No. 2:2015cv03639 - Document 16 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 8 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Party Jule R. Herbert, Jr and Jule R. Herbert, Jr., P.C. dismissed. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/7/16. (jjs)
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Bickerstaff et al v. Bickerstaff et al Doc. 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LORETTA LOIS BICKERSTAFF APPEARING HEREIN THROUGH HER LEGALLY APPOINTED AGENT IN FACT AND MANDATARY, GERALD GREGORY BICKERSTAFF CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-3639 CAROLYN KRIDER BICKERSTAFF, ET AL. SECTION “R” (3) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Plaintiff Loretta Bickerstaff filed this state-law property dispute against her sisterin-law Carolyn Bickerstaff, attorney J ule Herbert, and J ule R. Herbert, J r., P.C. 1 Defendants J ule Herbert and J ule R. Herbert, J r., P.C. m ove the Court to dism iss plaintiff’s claim s against them for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). 2 Herbert, the individual, is an Alabam a resident. Herbert, the professional corporation, is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Alabam a. Because neither defendant has the requisite m inim um contacts with Louisiana, the Court grants the m otion to dism iss. I. BACKGROU N D This diversity action, for defendants’ alleged negligence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties, arises out of a property ownership dispute. Plaintiff Loretta Bickerstaff contends that she is the valid legal owner of a beach house in Gulf Shores, Alabam a. The 1 See generally R. Doc. 1. 2 R. Doc. 8 . Dockets.Justia.com facts, as alleged in plaintiff’s com plaint an d supplem ented by the parties’ briefs an d exhibits, are as follows. Plaintiff purchased the Alabam a beach house in J uly 1993. 3 In February 20 10 , plaintiff granted her brother, Richard Bickerstaff, power of attorney, giving him m anagem ent and control of her affairs. 4 A Novem ber 13, 20 10 “Assum ption Warranty Deed,” prepared by defendant J ule Herbert in Alabam a, but executed before Roxana Ross in J efferson Parish, Louisiana, appears to transfer ownership of the beach house from plaintiff to Richard Bickerstaff for ten dollars. 5 Herbert contends that Richard Bickerstaff’s son-in-law, Charles “Benny” Hausknecht, J r., asked him to prepare the Assum ption Warranty Deed. 6 According to Herbert, his office (defendant J ule R. Herbert, J r., P.C.) prepared the Assum ption Warranty Deed and forwarded it to Hausknecht in Louisiana. 7 Plaintiff and Richard Bickerstaff executed the contract before Roxann a Ross in Louisiana on Novem ber 13. Herbert’s office then recorded the contract in the public records of Baldwin County, Alabam a on Decem ber 7, 20 10 . 8 According to 3 R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 13. 4 Id. at ¶ 14. 5 R. Doc. 10 , Exhibit A-1. 6 R. Doc. 8 -2 at 1 ¶ 3. 7 Id. at 1-2 ¶ 4. 8 Id. at 2 ¶ 5. plaintiff, she did not knowingly transfer ownership of the beach house in Novem ber 20 10 or receive any m oney from the alleged transfer. 9 Following the 20 10 explosion of British Petroleum ’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico, Richard Bickerstaff allegedly filed a BP claim and attem pted to collect settlem ent proceeds for the loss of rental revenue and dim inished value of the beach house. According to plaintiff, on October 24, 20 13, Herbert assisted Richard Bickerstaff in pursuing his BP claim by writin g a letter to Richard, which stated, In writing this letter, I am confirm ing that m y office prepared an Assum ption Warranty Deed for the property referenced below. . . . Although the stated consideration was m inim al, the appraised value at the tim e of this transaction—and actual consideration for the transfer[—]was $ 413,10 0 .0 0 , and the transfer deed tax was duly reported and paid based on that am ount. 10 Hausknecht appears to have used this letter in his com m unications with a BP claim s reviewer. 11 According to plaintiff, the BP claim records also show two “HUD-1 Settlem ent Statem ents” that Herbert prepared. These settlem ent statem ents reflect the purported transfer of the beach house from plaintiff to Richard Bickerstaff in Novem ber 20 10 . 12 Plaintiff sued Richard Bickerstaff in Louisiana state court on May 16, 20 14, attacking the Novem ber 20 10 Assum ption Warranty Deed as invalid. One week later, on May 23, 20 14, Richard Bickerstaff and his wife, defendant Carolyn Bickerstaff, executed a “Second Mortgage” on the beach house. By the Second Mortgage, Richard Bickerstaff, as m ortgagor, purported to grant an interest in the beach house to Carolyn Bickerstaff, as 9 R. Doc. 10 , Exhibit A. 10 R. Doc. 10 , Exhibit A-3. 11 R. Doc. 10 , Exhibit A-8. 12 R. Doc. 10 , Exhibits A-4, A-5. m ortgagee, to secure prom pt paym ent of a $ 241,534 debt Richard allegedly owed to Carolyn. Herbert also prepared this Second Mortgage, and Richard and Carolyn executed the contract in Herbert’s office in Baldwin County, Alabam a on May 23, 20 14. 13 According to Herbert, he drafted this contract again at the insistence of Benny Hausknecht. 14 Herbert recorded the Second Mortgage in the Baldwin County public records on J une 6, 20 14. 15 According to plaintiff, this Second Mortgage is a sham and “part of [a] schem e to deprive [plaintiff] of the beach house.”16 On August 19, 20 15, plaintiff, through her current legally appointed agent-in-fact and m an datary Gerald Gregory Bickerstaff, filed this lawsuit, alleging defendants Carolyn Bickerstaff, J ule Herbert, and J ule Herbert’s professional corporation are liable to her for “negligence, fraud, collusion, breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of contract.”17 Plaintiff, considering herself to be Herbert’s client, contends that Herbert “com pletely disregarded” their attorney-client relationship and breached the “fiduciary, legal, and ethical duties” he owed to plaintiff by repeatedly engaging in conflicted transactions regarding her beach house property. 18 Plaintiff asks the Court to rescind the Second 13 R. Doc. 10 , Exhibit A-6. 14 R. Doc. 8 -2 at 2 ¶ 6-7. 15 Id. at ¶ 8 . 16 R. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 21. 17 Id. at 3. 18 See id. at 3-6. Mortgage, order defendants to can cel the Second Mortgage from the Baldwin County public records, and award plaintiff dam ages, including pain and suffering. 19 Defendants Herbert and Herbert’s professional corporation, both citizens of Alabam a, 20 now m ove the Court to dism iss plaintiff’s claim s against them for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). 21 Herbert subm its an affidavit, in which he declares, am ong other things: • • Herbert is not licensed to practice law in Louisiana; Herbert does not solicit business in Louisiana and did not solicit Benn y Hausknecht’s referral of work for the contracts at issue here; • The services provided by Herbert’s office for the contracts at issue were perform ed and carried out in Alabam a; and • Herbert has no knowledge that the Second Mortgage executed in favor of Carolyn Bickerstaff is a sham or that Richard Bickerstaff is not the legal owner of the beach house by virtue of the Novem ber 20 10 Assum ption Warranty Deed. 22 In opposition to the m otion to dism iss, plaintiff subm its her own affidavit. Plaintiff declares, am ong other things: • Plaintiff did not knowingly transfer ownership of her beach house in Novem ber 20 10 and did not learn about the purported transfer until “several years” later; 19 R. Doc. 1 at 4, 10 . 20 See id. at 2. 21 See R. Doc. 8 . 22 R. Doc. 8 -2 at 2-3. • Plaintiff “thought defendant J ule R. Herbert should have contacted [her]” about the legal services he rendered to others in connection with the beach house; • “The Herbert defen dants knew or should have known that the Second Mortgage executed in favor of Carolyn Bickerstaff was a sham ”; and • “The Herbert defendants knew or should have known that Richard Bickerstaff was not the legal owner of the property transferred in the Assum ption Warranty Deed in 20 10 and that [plaintiff has] been the legal owner of the beach house since . . . 1993.” II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Personal jurisdiction is essential to the jurisdiction of a district court—without it, the court is “powerless to proceed to . . . adjudication.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (quoting Em p'rs Reinsurance Corp. v. Bry ant, 299 U.S. 374, 38 2 (1937)). When a nonresident defen dant m oves to dism iss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden to show that personal jurisdiction exists. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). When the court rules on a m otion to dism iss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, as in this case, the plaintiff need only m ake a prim a facie case that jurisdiction exists; “[p]roof by a preponderance of the eviden ce is not required.” Johnston v. Multidata Sy s. Int'l Corp., 523 F.3d 60 2, 60 9 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). The allegations of the com plaint, except as controverted by opposing affidavits, are taken as true, and all conflicts in the facts are resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id.; Revell, 317 F.3d at 469. In m aking its determ in ation, the court m ay consider “affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testim ony, or any com bination of the recognized m ethods of discovery.” Revell, 317 F.3d at 469 (quoting Stuart v. Spadem an, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985)). A court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant if (1) the forum state's long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and (2) the forum state's exercise of jurisdiction com plies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent. Id. Because Louisiana's long-arm statute, La. Rev. Stat. § 13:320 1, et seq., extends jurisdiction to the full lim its of due process, the Court's inquiry collapses into a single question: whether the exercise of its jurisdiction in this case satisfies federal due process requirem ents. Dickson Mar. Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing La. Rev. Stat. § 13:320 1(B)); Alonso v. Line, 846 So. 2d 745, 750 (La. 20 0 3). The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies due process when (1) the defendant “has purposefully availed him self of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing 'm inim um contacts' with the forum state;” and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant “does not offend traditional notions of fair play an d substantial justice.” Revell, 317 F.3d at 470 (quoting Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)). There are two ways to establish m inim um contacts: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. See id. General jurisdiction is not at issue here. 23 Specific jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant “has purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Panda Brandy w ine Corp. v. Potom ac Elec. Pow er Co., 253 F.3d 8 65, 8 68 (5th Cir. 20 0 1) (quoting Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco A.B., 20 5 F.3d 20 8, 215 (5th 23 R. Doc. 10 at 3 (arguing only specific jurisdiction). Cir. 20 0 0 )); see also Helicopteros N acionales de Colom bia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 40 8, 414 n.8 (1984). Minim um contacts m ay be established by actions, or even a single act, by the nonresident defendant whereby it “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzew icz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). “The non-resident's ‘purposeful availm ent’ m ust be such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state.” Ruston Gas Turbines Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting W orld– W ide Volksw agen Corp. v. W oodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (198 0 )). Im portantly, “[t]he unilateral activity of [a plaintiff] who claim [s] som e relationship with a nonresident defen dant cannot satisfy the requirem ent of contact with the forum State.” Pervasive Softw are Inc. v. Lexw are Gm bH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 20 12) (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). The Fifth Circuit has synthesized the test for specific jurisdiction into a three-step inquiry: (1) whether the defendant has m inim um contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant's forum -related contacts; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 200 6) (quoting N uovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/ V, 310 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 20 0 2)). “If the plaintiff successfully satisfies the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant to defeat jurisdiction by showin g that its exercise would be unfair or unreasonable.” Id. III. D ISCU SSION Having reviewed plain tiff’s com plaint, the parties’ briefs, and the affidavits and exhibits subm itted with those briefs, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants J ule R. Herbert and his professional corporation. The extent of Herbert’s contacts with the state of Louisiana are as follows. 24 In 20 10 , Benny Hausknecht, a Louisiana resident, 25 contacted Herbert, in Alabam a, about preparing an assum ption warranty deed regarding the beach house, which is located in Alabam a. 26 Hausknecht contacted Herbert on behalf of Hausknecht’s father-in-law, Richard Bickerstaff, another Louisiana resident. 27 Herbert prepared the Assum ption Warranty deed in Alabam a an d m ailed it to Hausknecht in Louisiana. 28 After the Assum ption Warranty Deed was executed before a notary in Louisiana, som eon e (presum ably Hausknecht or Richard Bickerstaff) sent the executed deed back to Herbert 24 Plaintiff does not contend that anyone em ployed by J ule R. Hebert, J r., P.C. other than Herbert acted as the corporation’s agent in its contacts with Louisiana. Thus, the Court’s analysis of Herbert’s contacts addresses whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over him and his professional corporation. 25 Though plaintiff fails to explicitly state that Hausknecht is a Louisiana resident, plaintiff notes that “Hausknecht lives n ext door to defendant Carolyn Bickerstaff,” R. Doc. 10 at 7, and according to plaintiff’s com plaint, Carolyn Bickerstaff is dom iciled in the J efferson Parish, Louisiana. R. Doc. 1 at 2. ¶ 2. 26 R. Doc. 8 -2 at 1 ¶ 3. 27 R. Doc. 10 -2 at 3 (listing Richard Bickerstaff’s address). 28 R. Doc. 8 -2 at 1 ¶ 4. in Alabam a. At som e point, Herbert prepared “HUD-1 Settlem ent Statem ents” regarding the property transfer. 29 Three years later, on October 24, 20 13, Herbert m ailed a letter from his office in Alabam a to Richard Bickerstaff in Louisiana. 30 The letter states that Herbert prepared the Novem ber 20 10 Assum ption Warranty Deed and that the “actual consideration for the transfer [of ownership] was $ 413,10 0 .0 0 .”31 Hausknecht then attached Herbert’s letter to Richard Bickerstaff to a letter Hausknecht wrote a claim s reviewer for the BP settlem ent. 32 In May 20 14, Hausknecht again contacted Herbert on behalf of Richard Bickerstaff. 33 Hausknecht asked Herbert to draft a second m ortgage on the beach house in Alabam a in favor of Richard’s wife, Carolyn Bickerstaff. 34 Herbert prepared the contract, and Richard and Carolyn Bickerstaff executed the Second Mortgage in Herbert’s office in Baldwin County, Alabam a. 35 Under sim ilar circum stances, courts have found that the nonresident defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state to give rise to person al jurisdiction. For exam ple, in Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey , the Fifth Circuit found that the defendant, 29 R. Doc. 10 , Exhibits A-4, A-5. 30 R. Doc. 10 , Exhibit A-3. 31 Id. 32 R. Doc. 10 , Exhibit A-8. 33 R. Doc. 8 -2 at 2 ¶ 6. 34 Id. 35 Id. at ¶ 7; R. Doc. 10 , Exhibit A-6, at 4. an Oklahom a resident, had (1) contracted with a Texas resident, (2) m ailed the parties’ final contract to Texas, (3) m ailed three contractual paym ents to Texas, and (4) “engaged in extensive telephonic and written com m unications” with the Texas plaintiff. 80 1 F.2d 773, 777-78 (5th Cir. 1986). In holding that these contacts were insufficient to vest the Texas district court with personal jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit explained: [M]erely contracting with a resident of the forum state is insufficient to subject the nonresident to the forum ’s jurisdiction. . . . Our conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that perform ance of the contract was centered in Oklahom a rather than Texas. Given that the m aterial perform ance occurred in Oklahom a, the fact that [the defendant] m ailed paym ents to Texas does not weigh heavily in our determ ination. Finally, the exchange of com m unications between Texas and Oklahom a in the course of developing and carrying out the contract was in itself also insufficient to constitute purposeful availm ent of the benefits and protections of Texas law. These com m unications to Texas rested on nothing but “the m ere fortuity that [the plaintiff] happens to be a resident of the forum .” Id. at 778 (citations om itted). The Fifth Circuit recently relied on its holding in Holt Oil in finding that a Texas partnership and lim ited liability com pany did not have sufficient contacts with Louisian a to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Bram m er En g’g, Inc. v. E. W right Mountain Ltd. P’ship, 30 7 F. App’x 8 45 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). In Bram m er En gineering, the Fifth Circuit reiterated that “the fact that defendants m ay have been parties to contracts with Louisiana residen ts, including [the plaintiff], does not give rise to jurisdiction.” Id. at 847-48 . The court also held that the defendants’ com m unications with Louisiana residents and requests for inform ation to be sent to the defen dants were “at m ost, m erely incidental to perform ance of the Texas-centered contract and resulted only from the coinciden ce that [plain tiff] is a Louisiana resident. Such incidental requests . . . do not eviden ce defendants’ purposeful availm ent of the benefits and protections of Louisiana law.” Id. at 848. In Advance Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Cucullu, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over a Texas attorney who represented a Louisiana resident an d allegedly com m itted m alpractice. 614 So. 2d 8 78 , 8 79 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993). The court explain ed that the attorney was hired by a Louisian a resident while the attorney lived and practiced in Texas, the attorney did not advertise in Louisiana or solicit work there, and the attorney perform ed all of the work associated with the Louisiana resident in Texas. Id. at 8 80 . These contacts were insufficient to allow the state trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction. The m aterial facts of this case are in distinguishable from those in Holt Oil, Bram m er Engineering, and Advance Petroleum . Plaintiff does not dispute that Herbert lives and works in Alabam a. Plaintiff also does not dispute that Herbert is not licensed to practice in Louisiana. Herbert does not solicit business in Louisiana. Here, Herbert was solicited by a Louisiana resident, Hausknecht, to perform legal work in Alabam a regarding property located in Alabam a. Though plaintiff alleges that Herbert directed com m unications to Louisiana on two occasions (m ailing the warranty deed to Hausknecht in Novem ber 20 10 and m ailing the letter about his work on the warranty deed to Richard Bickerstaff in October 20 13), this is insufficient to constitute purposeful availm ent of Louisiana law. See Holt Oil, 8 0 1 F.2d at 778; Bram m er Eng’g, 30 7 F. App’x at 848 . If the m ere exchange of com m unication sufficed, a court could exercise jurisdiction “based only on the fortuity that one of the parties happens to reside in the forum state.” Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom , 481 F.3d 30 9, 312 (5th Cir. 20 0 7). But as noted, “fortuitous[] or attenuated contacts are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction.” Id. Plaintiff’s argum ents to the contrary are un intelligible or otherwise m eritless. Plaintiff appears to argue that, notwithstanding well-established rules of professional conduct, m erely because Herbert drafted the Assum ption Warranty Deed and the Secon d Mortgage of the beach house, every person involved in those contracts was or is Herbert’s client. In other words, plaintiff contends that plaintiff is Herbert’s client—even though plaintiff did not know who Herbert was until “several years” later—because she owned the beach house before the purported transfer to Richard Bickerstaff; 36 that Richard Bickerstaff is Herbert’s client because “it was on [Richard’s] behalf that the Warranty Deed was drafted”; 37 that “defendant Carolyn Bickerstaff is Herbert’s client [because] she was the ‘m ortgagee’ on the beach house” in the Second Mortgage; an d finally, that Benny Hausknecht is Herbert’s client because he originally asked Herbert to prepare the beach house contracts. 38 Thus, according to plaintiff, Herbert has four clients in Louisiana. Even if this is true, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Herbert. In analyzing jurisdiction, the Court m ust focus on “the defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” W alden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (20 14). When the only basis for personal jurisdiction is a defendant’s “relationship with a plaintiff or third party,” personal jurisdiction does not exist. Id. at 1123. 36 R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 11 (“Loretta . . . was owed fiduciary, legal, and ethical duties by the Herbert defen dants, as the Herbert defen dants took multiple actions concerning property she owned . . . .”); R. Doc. 10 , Exhibit A at 2 ¶¶ 3, 8 (“After discovering what legal services were rendered by the Herbert defendants concerning m y beach house to others . . . I thought J ule R. Herbert should have contacted m e about said legal services.”). 37 Id. at 6. 38 Id. at 7. Plaintiff also em phasizes Herbert’s “role” in Richard Bickerstaff’s filing allegedly fraudulent BP claim s. Plaintiff’s argum ents here go m ore toward the m erits of her claim s than whether this Court m ay exercise jurisdiction over Herbert. These argum ents are therefore not helpful to the Court’s analysis. For exam ple, plaintiff notes that Herbert prepared HUD-1 Settlem ent Statem ents, but does not contend that he prepared these docum ents anywhere other than in Alabam a. Plaintiff also highlights purported discrepan cies between two settlem ent statements, contending that this reveals Herbert’s “efforts to violate established real estate laws.”39 Regardless, these alleged discrepancies do not confer personal jurisdiction over Herbert in Louisiana. Finally, plaintiff appears to argue that the m ethod by which Herbert, along with Richard and Carolyn Bickerstaff, executed the Second Mortgage on the beach house supports this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Mischaracterizing Herbert’s argum ents for dism issal, plaintiff argues, “Herbert relies upon the fact that the Warranty Deed was executed in Louisiana to attem pt to escape the Court’s jurisdictional reach; does the opposite apply if another Herbert docum en t, the Second Mortgage, was executed in Alabam a?”40 As repeatedly noted, the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction depends on Herbert’s contacts with Louisiana. That Herbert oversaw the execution of the Second Mortgage in Alabam a, rather than Louisiana, supports Herbert’s argum ent that his work was lim ited to his hom e state and that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. 41 39 Id. at 9. 40 Id. at 11. 41 Even though plaintiff does not argue it, the Court has considered Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and concludes that it does not warrant finding personal jurisdiction over Herbert. Again, there is no evidence that Herbert’s actions were targeted at Louisiana, rather than Alabam a. “The ‘effects’ test in Calder does not supplant the need Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has not m ade a prim a facie case that jurisdiction exists. Because plaintiff has not shown that Herbert has the requisite m inim um contacts with Louisiana, the Court need not consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ m otion to dism iss. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJ UDICE plaintiff’s claim s against J ule R. Herbert, an d J ule R. Herbert, J r., P.C. for lack of personal jurisdiction. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _7th day of April, 20 16. __ ___________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE to dem onstrate m inim um contacts that constitute purposeful availm ent[,]” see Mullins v. TestAm erica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 40 0 (5th Cir. 20 0 9), and “the focal point . . . of the harm suffered” by plaintiff is Alabam a, because the property of which she was allegedly fraudulently deprived is located there. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
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