Pruco Life Insurance Company v. Breen et al, No. 2:2015cv03250 - Document 166 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 138 Motion to Vacate ; denying 149 Motion to Strike ; denying 149 Motion for Attorney Fees; denying 151 Motion for Sanctions; denying 157 Motion for Sanctions; denying 157 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 9/20/2018. (Reference: All cases)(cg)
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Pruco Life Insurance Company v. Breen et al Doc. 166 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-3250 c/ w NO. 15-6946 KACIE BREEN AND THE ESTATE OF WAYNE EDMOND BREEN SECTION “R” (3) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court are intervenor defendant Sean Michael Breen’s m otion for relief from judgm ent, 1 his m otion to strike portions of defendant Kacie Breen’s response in opposition to the m otion for relief from judgment, 2 defendant Kacie Breen’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions, 3 and Sean Michael Breen’s m otion for Rule 11 sanctions. 4 For the following reasons, the Court denies all of the m otions. 1 2 3 4 R. Doc. 138. R. Doc. 149. R. Doc. 151. R. Doc. 157. Dockets.Justia.com I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of the death of Dr. Wayne Breen. On March 1, 20 15, Dr. Breen was shot and killed by his wife, defendant Kacie Breen. 5 Dr. Breen had two life insurance policies, one with Pruco Life Insurance Com pany (Pruco) and the other with Lincoln National Life Insurance Com pany (Lincoln). 6 Both policies name Kacie Breen as the sole beneficiary. 7 Dr. Breen and Kacie Breen had one child together, Aiden Breen, who is not a party to this suit. 8 Dr. Breen also had six adult children—five from a previous m arriage and one from an extra-m arital relationship. 9 After Dr. Breen’s death, Pruco and Lincoln filed these consolidated interpleader actions in federal court. 10 Kacie Breen, the adult Breen children, and Alyce Landry, the adm inistratrix of Dr. Breen’s estate, are nam ed claim ants. Landry and the adult Breen children sought to defeat Kacie Breen’s status as beneficiary by invoking the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:90 1(D), also known as Louisiana’s “slayer rule.”11 This rule bars a beneficiary from receiving life insurance proceeds if she is either “[h]eld by 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 R. Doc. 10 9 at 2. Id. Id. Id. at 3. Id. R. Doc. 1; Case No. 15-6946, R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 10 9 at 20 . 2 a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction to be crim inally responsible for the death, disablement, or injury of the individual insured,” or “[j]udicially determ ined to have participated in the intentional, unjustified killing of the individual insured.” La. R.S. § 22:90 1(D). Kacie Breen m aintained that she killed her husband in self-defense. 12 J udge Kurt Engelhardt held a two-day bench trial on this m atter in March 20 17. On J une 9, 20 17, the court held that the adult Breen children and Landry had not m et their burden of proving that the killing was unjustified. 13 Kacie Breen was thus entitled to the proceeds of the policies as a qualified beneficiary. 14 One of the adult Breen children, Sean Breen, appealed the judgm ent to the Fifth Circuit, which affirm ed J udge Engelhardt’s decision on August 16, 20 18. 15 While the appeal was pending, Sean Breen filed this m otion for relief from judgm ent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b). 16 In addition to his m otion for relief from judgm ent, Sean Breen m oves to strike portions of Kacie Breen’s response in opposition to the m otion as 12 Id. at 17. Id. at 37-38. 14 Id. 15 R. Doc. 117; Pruco Life Insurance Co. v. Breen, No. 17-30 591, 20 18 WL 3933757 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 20 18). 16 R. Doc. 138. 3 13 im m aterial, impertinent, and scandalous under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). 17 Sean Breen and Kacie Breen also filed m otions for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 18 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD A district court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b). Ly les v. Medtronic Sofam or Danek, USA, Inc., 871 F.3d 30 5, 315 (5th Cir. 20 17). Rule 60 (b) perm its a court to grant relief from a final judgm ent or order only upon a showing of one of the following: (1) m istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in tim e to m ove for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), m isrepresentation, or m isconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgm ent has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgm ent that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. 17 18 R. Doc. 149. R. Doc. 151; R. Doc. 157. 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b). Relief under Rule 60 (b) is considered an extraordinary remedy, but courts m ay construe the Rule in order to do substantial justice. Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 10 0 0 , 10 0 7 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts m ust balance “the sanctity of final judgm ents and the incessant com mand of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Id. (quotation m arks om itted). A district court has the authority to relieve a party from final judgm ent under Rule 60 (b), even if the trial court’s earlier judgment was affirm ed on appeal. Standard Oil Co. of California v. U.S., 429 U.S. 17, 19 (1976). III. D ISCU SSION A. Th e Co u rt d e n ie s th e Ru le 6 0 ( b) Mo tio n fo r Re lie f fro m Ju d gm e n t Sean Breen m akes several argum ents under Rule 60 (b). He first alleges that the trial judgm ent is void under Rule 60 (b)(4) because Aiden, the child of Dr. Breen and Kacie Breen, was not properly represented, violating his due process rights. 19 He also requests that the judgm ent be set aside under Rule 60 (b)(3) on the basis of fraud, m isrepresentation, and m isconduct by both Kacie Breen and by her attorney Richard Ducote. 20 He 19 20 R. Doc. 138-2 at 43-44. Id. at 49. 5 next argues that the judgment should be set aside under Rule 60 (b)(6) because Mr. Ducote’s m isconduct constitutes fraud on the court. 21 Finally, Sean Breen argues that the trial court m ade a m istake of law under Rule 60 (b)(1) in failing to assess whether Kacie Breen’s use of deadly force was necessary as required by La. Rev. Stat. § 14:20 (A). 22 The Court addresses each of these argum ents in turn. 1. Th e Ju d g m e n t Is N o t Vo id U n d e r R u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 4 ) A judgm ent is void under Rule 60 (b)(4) in two circum stances: (1) when the deciding court “lacked jurisdiction of the subject m atter, or of the parties” or (2) when the court “acted in a m anner inconsistent with due process of law.” Carter, 136 F.3d at 10 0 6 (quoting N ew York Life Ins. Co. v. Brow n, 84 F. 3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996)). Sean Breen does not contest the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject m atter or the parties to the case. 23 Due process in civil cases generally requires “proper notice and service of process and a court of com petent jurisdiction; procedural irregularities during the course of a civil case, even serious ones, will not subject the judgm ent to collateral attack.” N ew York Life, 84 F. 3d at 143. But the opportunity to be heard is also a fundam ental requirement of due process. See id. 21 22 23 Id. at 55. Id. at 68. Id. at 44. 6 Sean Breen argues that the judgm ent is void because the trial court acted in a m anner inconsistent with the due process rights of Kacie’s and Dr. Breen’s child, Aiden. 24 He contends that the m inor’s due process rights were violated because he was not given notice of the interpleader action, had no legal representative protecting his interests, and had no opportunity to be heard in the interpleader action. 25 As a non-party to the case, Aiden Breen would ordinarily have no rights to notice, legal representation, or to be heard, because he is not bound by the judgment. See 18A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449 (3d ed. 20 18) (“The basic prem ise of preclusion is that parties to a prior action are bound and nonparties are not bound.”). But Sean Breen contends that the child did have these rights along with the right to be a party to the case, because he was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. 26 Generally, parties should be joined under Rule 19 if they are required to fairly and completely resolve the dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Under Rule 19(a)(1), a party is “required” if: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord com plete relief am ong existing parties; or 24 25 26 Id. Id. at 44-46. Id. at 45. 7 (B) that person claim s an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence m ay: (i) leave as a practical m atter im pair or im pede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, m ultiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). But when no party asserts the Rule 19 issue at trial, the court’s review becom es narrower. Sch. Bd. of Avoy elles Par. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 647 F.3d 570 , 578 (5th Cir. 20 11). In such cases, the court looks in particular to whether the om itted third party will be prejudiced by adjudication in his absence. Id. Aiden Breen was not a required party under any of the Rule 19(a) tests. The existing parties to this case were the insurance companies, Kacie Breen, and the adult Breen children. The only issue in dispute was to whom the insurance proceeds m ust be paid. Kacie Breen was the only nam ed beneficiary, 27 and if she forfeited her interest the proceeds would go to the estate. 28 Therefore, the only parties necessary to grant relief were the estate as an entity and Kacie Breen, the only parties potentially eligible to recover the insurance proceeds. The adm inistratrix Landry was a party on behalf of 27 28 R. Doc. 1 at 2 ¶ 8; Case No. 15-6946, R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 10 . Id. at 4 ¶ 17; Id. at 6 ¶ 19. 8 the estate, and Kacie Breen was a party as the sole beneficiary. Com plete relief could be accorded without the child. He thus was not a required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(A). Proceeding without Aiden Breen also did not im pair the child’s ability to protect his interest in the litigation or leave another party subject to m ultiple liability under Rule 19(a)(1)(B). His interest as to this action is solely as an heir to the estate. He was not nam ed as a beneficiary in either policy. 29 His interest was protected by Landry who represented the estate as a whole. For the sam e reason, his absence did not leave another party subject to m ultiple liability. His interests m atched those of the rest of the heirs. He does not have separate claim s that could expose the insurers to m ultiple liability. The conclusion that Aiden Breen is not a required party is strengthened by Magistrate J udge Daniel E. Knowles’ previous denial of Aaron Knapp’s m otion to intervene. 30 In that order, Magistrate J udge Knowles explained, “as an alleged heir of Wayne Breen, Knapp’s interest will not be im paired or im peded because the decedent’s children – who battle their m other for the interest herein – will adequately represent his interest. Should it be found 29 30 See R. Doc. 1-1 at 2; Case No. 15-6946, R. Doc. 1-3 at 2. See R. Doc. 61. 9 that the funds devolve to the decedent’s children – who, it m ust be noted, do not oppose this m otion – Knapp m ay assert his interest against them at the appropriate tim e.”31 Aiden Breen is identically situated. Neither Aaron Knapp nor Aiden Breen is prejudiced by a lack of involvem ent in this suit because their interests have been protected by Landry. Individual claim s to divide assets in the estate will be adjudicated in a separate action. Sean Breen also argues that Kacie Breen was not Aiden Breen’s tutor. This line of argument is irrelevant to this m otion, which is a m otion for reconsideration of judgm ent in the federal interpleader action to which the child was not a party. Kacie Breen did not claim to be the child’s tutor in the federal court action and did not seek adjudication of claim s on his behalf. Because Kacie Breen did not im pair the child’s claim s or rights in federal court, there is no need to consider whether Kacie Breen was the child’s tutor. Aiden Breen was not a required party under Rule 19(a). As a non-party, he did not have due process rights in the federal interpleader action. The judgm ent is not void under Rule 60 (b)(4). These argum ents are plainly m eritless. 31 Id. at 2. 10 2. Th e r e W a s N o Act io n a b le Fr a u d , M is co n d u ct , Or M is r e p r e s e n t a t io n b y Op p o s in g Pa r t y Or Co u n s e l U n d e r R u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 3 ) Rule 60 (b)(3) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgm ent in the case of fraud, m isrepresentation, or m isconduct by an opposing party. “A party making a Rule 60 (b)(3) m otion m ust establish by clear and convincing evidence (1) that the adverse party engaged in fraud or other m isconduct and (2) that this m isconduct prevented the m oving party from fully and fairly presenting his case.” Gov’t Fin. Servs. One Ltd. P’ship v. Pey ton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation om itted). A party need not establish that the outcom e of the case would have been different absent the alleged m isconduct, only that the judgm ent was “unfairly obtained.” Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation om itted). Sean Breen alleges that Kacie Breen com m itted m isconduct by m isrepresenting to the court that she was the natural tutor of the child. 32 But Sean Breen does not point to any evidence that Kacie Breen told the federal court that she was the child’s tutor. Even if she had falsely held herself out to be the tutor, Sean Breen does not explain how that statem ent would have prevented him as the m oving party from fully and fairly presenting his case. 32 R. Doc. 138-2 at 49-51. 11 Whether or not Kacie Breen was the child’s tutor had no im pact on any evidence or argum ent relevant to Sean Breen at trial. Next, Sean Breen alleges that Kacie Breen’s attorney, Richard Ducote, violated several Rules of Professional Conduct because he did not properly represent Aiden’s interests. 33 But Mr. Ducote did not represent the child in this action because he was not a party to this action. He therefore did not violate any Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to representation of the child. Sean Breen also alleges that Mr. Ducote’s failure to notify the court that Aiden had no tutor or attorney constitutes fraud and m isrepresentation. 34 This inform ation would be relevant only if the child were a party to the suit, which he was not. He was also not a required party who should have been joined. The legal representation of the child was of no im portance to the trial 33 See id. at 29-32, 36, 38-41. Sean Breen cites Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a), 1.3, 1.14, and 8.4. Rule 1.7(a) states that an attorney m ay not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. Rule 1.3 states that an attorney m ust act with reasonable diligence and prom ptness in representing a client. Rule 1.14 states that an attorney m ust, as far as reasonably possible, m aintain a norm al client-lawyer relationship with a client of dim inished capacity because of m inority. Rule 8.4 states that it is m isconduct for an attorney to violate or attem pt to violate the Rules of Professional conduct, or to knowingly assist or induce another to do so. It also forbids engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or m isrepresentation. 34 Id. at 52-54. 12 court, and no fraud or m isrepresentation under Rule 60 (b)(3) resulted from the lack of discussion on this point. Sean Breen’s arguments are again plainly m eritless. 3. Th e r e W a s N o Fr a u d On Th e Co u r t Th a t W o u ld Pr o v id e An o t h e r R e a s o n Ju s t ify in g R e lie f U n d e r R u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) Sean Breen argues that Mr. Ducote’s m isconduct is so egregious that it am ounts to fraud on the court and requests relief under Rule 60 (b)(6). Fraud on the court is reserved for the m ost egregious form s of m isconduct, such as “bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an attorney is im plicated.” Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting U.S. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. sup. 22, 29 (D. Conn. 1972)). It requires a schem e “by which the integrity of the judicial process has been fraudulently subverted by a deliberately planned scheme in a m anner involving far more than an injury to a single litigant.” Addington v. Farm er’s Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 1981) (internal quotations om itted). Mr. Ducote’s conduct did not even constitute m isconduct or fraud. It therefore falls far below the m uch higher bar for fraud on the court. This argum ent is wholly devoid of m erit. 13 4. Th e Tr ia l Co u r t D id N o t M a k e A M is t a k e Of La w U n d e r R u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 1) Sean Breen alleges that J udge Engelhardt m ade a m istake of law sufficient to invoke Rule 60 (b)(1) because his opinion did not explicitly address whether Kacie Breen’s use of deadly force was necessary to prevent the danger she faced from Dr. Breen, one of the requirem ents to prove selfdefense under Louisiana law. 35 Louisiana law requires a showing that the hom icide be comm itted “by one who reasonably believes that he is in im m inent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save him self from that danger.” La. R. S. § 14:20 . J udge Engelhardt held that “[u]nder the circum stances, Kacie’s testim ony that she feared for her life and felt com pelled to use the firearm in selfdefense appears reasonable.”36 This sentence incorporates both prongs of the statute. First, Kacie Breen reasonably believed that she was in imm inent danger of losing her life because she “feared for her life” and that fear “appears reasonable.” Second, the killing was necessary to save her from that danger because she “felt com pelled to use the firearm in self-defense” and that feeling “appears reasonable.” Sean Breen also m ade this argument in his appeal to the Fifth Circuit, which sum m arily rejected it and affirm ed 35 36 Id. at 69. R. Doc. 10 9 at 28. 14 J udge Engelhardt’s trial order. 37 As the Fifth Circuit has already established, this argument is m eritless, and there was no m istake of law. B. Se an Bre e n ’s Mo tio n to Strike Sean Breen has filed a m otion to strike language from Kacie Breen’s opposition in response to his Rule 60 (b) m otion for relief from the judgm ent. 38 The m otion to strike alleges that Kacie Breen’s entire m otion in opposition should be struck as im m aterial, im pertinent, and scandalous. 39 In the alternative, he contends that m any statem ents within the response be struck for the same reason. 40 A party m ay m ove to strike material only from a pleading under Rule 12(f). 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380 & n.8.5 (3d ed. 20 12) (“Rule 12(f) motions only may be directed towards pleadings as defined by Rule 7(a); thus m otions, affidavits, briefs, and other docum ents outside of the pleadings are not subject to Rule 12(f).”); see also Centex Hom es v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-719-BN, 20 14 WL 122550 1, at *12 (N. D. Tex. Mar. 25, 20 14). Pleadings are defined in Rule 7(a) as a com plaint, counterclaim , crossclaim , third party com plaint, 37 R. Doc. 150 -2 at 4-5; R. Doc. 150 -3 at 6-7; Pruco, 20 18 WL 3933757, at *1. 38 39 40 R. Doc. 149. R. Doc. 149-1 at 1. Id. at 3-12. 15 answer, or reply if the reply was ordered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). A brief responding to a m otion is not a pleading. See Jam es v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 12-90 2, 20 14 WL 290 41, at *6 (E.D. Va. J an. 2, 20 14) (holding that “a party’s brief is not a pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and is therefore not subject to a m otion to strike under Rule 12(f)”). Rule 12(f) does not apply to Kacie Breen’s response m otion. Therefore, the m otion to strike is denied as plainly deficient. C. Se an Bre e n ’s Mo tio n fo r San ctio n s Sean Breen has also filed a m otion for Rule 11 sanctions directed toward statem ents m ade in Kacie Breen’s response to the Rule 60 (b) m otion, which he filed after properly serving Kacie Breen with the m otion and allowing her 21 days to withdraw or appropriately correct the m otion. 41 Rule 11 provides that when an attorney subm its a pleading, m otion or other paper to the court, he certifies to the best of his knowledge that (1) the filing is not presented for an im proper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or increase costs of litigation; (2) the filing is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for m odifying or reversing existing law; and (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support, or if 41 R. Doc. 157 at 1. 16 so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Sean Breen contends that Kacie Breen’s response to his m otion was subm itted for the im proper purpose of harassing Sean Breen’s lawyers. 42 A district court cannot read an im proper purpose into a docum ent that is wellgrounded in fact and law unless the im proper purpose is objectively ascertainable. W hitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 80 5 (5th Cir. 20 0 3). Sean Breen points to no evidence of im proper purpose in filing the response other than the text of the response itself. He points only to the statements in the response casting his lawyers in an unfavorable light. 43 These statements alone do not show that the m otion was filed for an im proper purpose. Thus, sanctions are not warranted. Nevertheless, while it is true that Kacie Breen and Mr. Ducote were responding to a m otion that was m eritless, the court cautions Mr. Ducote to tone down his rhetoric and spend m ore tim e on the legal m erits, vel non, of his opponent’s position rather than advancing ad hom inem argum ents. Sean Breen also alleges that several claim s, defenses, and legal contentions in the response m otion are not warranted by existing law or by 42 43 R. Doc. 157-1 at 4. Id. at 2-4. 17 a nonfrivolous argum ent for extending, m odifying, or reversing existing law or establishing new law. 44 The particular legal contentions he takes issue with are: (1) whether the case In re Law rence is patently irrelevant, (2) whether the child, Aiden Breen, was legally required to be a party to the suit, (3) whether Kacie Breen was qualified to be the child’s tutor, and (4) whether she was in fact the child’s tutor. 45 An attorney m ust m ake a reasonable inquiry into the law underlying a paper he or she subm its to the Court. Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 20 0 1). When a reasonable am ount of research would have revealed that a party’s position is groundless, Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate. Jordaan v. Hall, 275 F. Supp. 2d 778, 787 (N. D. Tex. 20 0 3). Disagreement about the application of a law does not m ake an argument frivolous under Rule 11. See Macklin v. City of N ew Orleans, 30 0 F.3d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (holding that argum ents on issues of first im pression are not sanctionable). An argument m ust have been rejected by well-established case law to qualify as frivolous. Id. None of Kacie Breen’s arguments in the response m isstates a legal rule. Nor has Sean Breen pointed to any legal precedent showing that Kacie Breen’s position has been rejected by well- 44 45 Id. at 5-6. Id. at 5-10 . 18 established law. A disputed application of the law to fact is appropriate in a response to a m otion. Sean Breen’s argum ents are devoid of m erit. Sean Breen argues finally that several factual assertions in the response lack evidentiary support. These are statem ents in the response about the personal m otivations of Sean Breen’s lawyer Michelle Leigh Rees, and about Mary Grace Knapp, who has becom e Sean Breen’s lawyer since the response was filed. 46 Sean Breen does not allege in his m otion for sanctions that the basic underlying facts in Kacie Breen’s response are false. He instead takes issue with the way that the response casts and describes those facts. 47 Reciting facts in a biased m anner is not the sam e as m aking factual allegations that lack evidentiary support. Only the latter warrants sanctions under Rule 11. Because none of the statements in Kacie Breen’s response is sanctionable, the Court denies Sean Breen’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 46 Id. at 11-13. See id. at 11 (whether Ms. Rees filed “essentially the sam e argument” with the Fifth Circuit); id. at 12 (the extent to which Ms. Knapp influenced the content of the Rule 60 (b) m otion); id. at 14 (whether the conflicts of interest asserted in the 60 (b) m otion were “imaginary”); id. whether the issue of tutorship is a “delusion”). 19 47 D. Kacie Bre e n ’s Mo tio n fo r San ctio n s Kacie Breen has filed a m otion for sanctions directed toward Sean Breen’s Rule 60 (b) m otion, after she properly served Sean Breen with the Rule 11 m otion and allowed him 21 days to withdraw or correct the Rule 60 (b) m otion. 48 She alleges that Sean Breen’s Rule 60 (b) m otion violates Rule 11(b) because it was presented for the im proper purpose of harassment, unnecessary delay, and needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. 49 She also argues that the legal claim s are not warranted by law and that the factual contentions have no evidentiary support, because there is “absolutely no cogent legal discussion” and is an “indecipherable conspiracy theory.”50 Kacie Breen does not offer convincing evidence that Sean Breen filed the 60 (b) motion for im proper purposes. She argues that Sean Breen’s attorneys, Ms. Knapp and Ms. Rees, filed the m otion as an attem pt at revenge against Kacie Breen. 51 She points out, without contradiction, that Ms. Knapp has a personal interest in the outcome of this litigation because she is Dr. Breen’s form er lover and the m other of one of his children, who could potentially inherit if the insurance proceeds went to the estate rather than to 48 49 50 51 R. Doc. 151 at 1-2. Id. at 2. R. Doc. 151-2 at 3. Id. at 4-5. 20 Kacie Breen. 52 But the only m anifestations of Ms. Knapp’s bias that Kacie Breen cites are the allegedly frivolous arguments contained in the 60 (b) m otion. 53 As an intervenor defendant, Sean Breen was entitled to both file a 60 (b) m otion and appeal to the Fifth Circuit after he received an adverse judgm ent from J udge Engelhardt. The argum ents in the m otion, while m eritless, were not so frivolous as to give rise to an inference of im proper m otive. Kacie Breen also alleges that the legal assertions in the Rule 60 (b) m otion are unwarranted by existing law, and that the factual assertions lack evidentiary support. But the m otion for sanctions does not point to particular legal argum ents or factual assertions in support of the general argument. Rule 11 requires that a party describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). The Court declines to find Rule 11 violated on this ground. While the Court denies this m otion, it is a close call. Only because the Court is new to this case, which has a long, bitter history, does it exercise extra caution before pulling the trigger on sanctions. The Court warns Sean Breen to desist from further filings of the type filed here. 52 53 Id. Id. 21 IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Sean Breen’s m otion for relief from judgment and m otion to strike. It also DENIES both parties’ m otions for sanctions. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _20th _ _ _ _ day of Septem ber, 20 18. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 22
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