Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transports, LLC, No. 2:2015cv02528 - Document 76 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 65 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 12/20/2017. (bwn)
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Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transports, LLC Doc. 76 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A ELW OOD LEE, Pla in tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 15 -2 5 2 8 OFFSH ORE LOGISTICAL & TRAN SPORTS, LLC, D e fe n d an t SECTION : “E” ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is Defendant Offshore Logistical & Transport, LLC’s (“Offshore”) m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent on the issues of J ones Act negligen ce and unseaworthiness. 1 Plaintiff Elwood Lee opposes the m otion. 2 For the reasons that follow, Offshore’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent is D EN IED . BACKGROU N D Lee filed a com plaint on J uly 10 , 20 15, pursuant to the J ones Act 3 and general m aritim e law. 4 In his com plaint, Lee alleges that on J uly 20 , 20 14, while aboard the M/ V BALTY, he “experienced an accident” on the stern deck resulting in “serious painful injuries” to his knee and other parts of his body. 5 The parties agree that: (1) the M/ V BALTY was owned, operated, and/ or controlled by Offshore; (2) Lee was an em ployee of Offshore at the tim e of the accident; and (3) Lee was a seam an under the J ones Act at the tim e of the accident. 6 It is undisputed that Lee, as the senior captain aboard the M/ V BALTY, was involved in getting “the boat organized” and perform ed “gen eralized 1 R. Doc. 65. R. Doc. 70 . 3 46 U.S.C. § 30 10 4. 4 R. Doc. 1. 5 Id. at ¶¶ III– V. 6 Id.; R. Doc. 65-4 at 1, ¶ 3; R. Doc. 70 -1 at 1, ¶ 3. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com m aintenance.” 7 It is undisputed Lee did not see anything that gave him any “con cern about the ability to walk in [the] area” of the alleged injury. 8 Finally, both parties agree there was no non-skid m aterial on the deck of the M/ V BALTY at the tim e of Lee’s injury. 9 The parties, however, dispute whether Offshore’s failure to apply non-skid paint constituted negligence or rendered the M/ V BALTY unseaworthy 10 and whether the lack of non-skid paint contributed to Lee’s injuries. 11 Lee contends Offshore had the duty to ensure there was a non-skid application on the deck, but Offshore asserts that Lee, as the vessel’s captain, bears this duty. On Novem ber 15, 20 17, Offshore filed the instant m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent. 12 In its m otion, Offshore contends Lee has no record evidence creating a genuine issue of m aterial fact with respect to Offshore’s negligence or whether the M/ V BALTY’s alleged unseaworthiness caused or contributed to Lee’s injury. 13 Lee tim ely filed his opposition on Novem ber 21, 20 17. 14 SU MMARY JU D GMEN T STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgm ent is proper only “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to an y m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” 15 “An issue is m aterial if its resolution could affect the outcom e of the action.” 16 When assessing whether a m aterial factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the eviden ce in the record but refrain[s] from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing 7 R. Doc. 65-4 at ¶ 4; 70 -1 at ¶ 4. R. Doc. 65-4 at ¶ 18; 70 -1 at ¶ 18. 9 R. Doc. 65-4 at ¶ 25; 70 -1 at ¶ 25. 10 R. Doc. 65-4 at ¶ 14; R. Doc. 70 -1 at ¶ 14. 11 R. Doc. 65-4 at ¶¶ 28 – 29; R. Doc. 70 -1 at ¶¶ 28 – 29. 12 R. Doc. 65. 13 Id. 14 R. Doc. 70 . 15 F ED . R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322– 23. 16 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 20 0 5). 8 2 the eviden ce.” 17 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-m oving party. 18 There is no genuine issue of m aterial fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonm oving party, thus entitling the m oving party to judgm ent as a m atter of law. 19 “[A] party seeking sum m ary judgm ent always bears the initial responsibility of inform ing the district court of the basis for its m otion[] and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes dem onstrate the absence of a genuine issue of m aterial fact.” 20 If the dispositive issue is one on which the non-m oving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56’s burden, the m oving party m ust do one of two things: it “m ay subm it affirm ative evidence that negates an essential elem ent of the nonm oving party’s claim ” or “dem onstrate to the Court that the nonm oving party’s eviden ce is insufficient to establish an essen tial elem ent of the nonm oving party’s claim .” 21 When the m oving party chooses the latter option it m ust affirm atively show the absence of evidence in the record. This m ay require the m oving party to depose the nonm oving party’s witnesses or to establish the inadequacy of docum entary evidence. If there is literally no evidence in the record, the m oving party m ay dem onstrate this by reviewing for the court the adm issions, interrogatories, and other exchanges between the parties that are in the record. 22 If the m oving party fails to carry this burden, the m otion m ust be denied. If the m oving party successfully carries its burden, the burden of production then shifts to the non-m oving party to direct the Court’s attention to som ething in the 17 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. N ationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 – 99 (5th Cir. 20 0 8); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plum bing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 – 51 (20 0 0 ). 18 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). 19 Hibernia N at. Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1993) (citin g Am oco Prod. Co. v. Horw ell Energy , Inc., 969 F.2d 146, 147– 48 (5th Cir. 1992)). 20 Celtic Marine Corp. v. Jam es C. Justice Cos., 760 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 20 14) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). 21 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331. 22 Id. (internal citation om itted). 3 pleadings or other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of m aterial fact does indeed exist. 23 Thus, the non -m oving party m ay defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent by “calling the Court’s attention to supporting eviden ce already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the m oving party.” 24 “[U]nsubstantiated assertions are not com petent sum m ary judgm ent evidence.” 25 Rather, “the party opposing sum m ary judgm ent is required to iden tify specific eviden ce in the record and to articulate the precise m anner in which that evidence supports his or her claim . ‘Rule 56 does not im pose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to sum m ary judgm ent.’” 26 D ISCU SSION The J ones Act provides a seam an with a cause of action against his em ployer for injuries sustained as a result of his em ployer’s negligence. 27 A seam an m ay recover dam ages under the J ones Act if his em ployer’s negligence was the legal cause, in whole or in part, of his injury. 28 At trial, Lee m ust establish that Offshore had a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work, Offshore breached that duty, and Offshore’s negligence caused his injuries. Lee bears a “featherweight” burden of proof to establish causation for 23 Id. at 322– 25. Id. at 332– 33. 25 Ragas v. Tenn . Gas Pipelin e Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citin g Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). 26 Id. (quoting Skotak v. Ten neco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 90 9, 915– 16 & n .7 (5th Cir. 1992)) (citing Forsy th v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994)). 27 Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 10 7 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1997). 28 Id. 24 4 a J ones Act negligence claim and n eed only show that his em ployer contributed to his injuries “in the slightest degree.” 29 Indepen dent from a J ones Act claim , a seam an m ay claim his injuries were caused by the unseaworthiness of a vessel under general m aritim e law. A vessel is deem ed unseaworthy if a condition of the vessel presents an unreasonable risk of harm to the seam an. 30 The two elem ents of an unseaworthiness claim are: (1) the vessel or the vessel’s equipm ent was not reasonably fit for its intended purpose, and (2) the “unseaworthy condition played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness.” 31 A vessel owner’s duty to prevent unseaworthy conditions is absolute, continuing and nondelegable, and lack of knowledge or of opportunity to correct such conditions does not m itigate the owner’s duty. 32 At trial, Lee will bear the burden of proving: (1) Offshore’s negligen ce was a legal cause of his injuries, and (2) that the unseaworthiness of the M/ V BALTY was the proxim ate cause of his injuries. Offshore argues it is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law on Lee’s J ones Act negligence claim and his unseaworthiness claim . Rule 56 states, “The court shall grant sum m ary judgm ent if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” 33 When assessing whether a m aterial factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the eviden ce in the 29 Gavagan v. United States, 955 F.2d 10 16, 10 19 (5th Cir. 1992). Park v. Stockhill Boat Rentals, Inc., 492 F.3d 60 0 , 60 4 (5th Cir. 20 0 7). 31 Mitchell v. Traw ler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960 ). This is a “proxim ate cause” standard. Alverez v. J. Ray McDerm ott & Co., 674 F.2d 10 37, 10 42– 44 (5th Cir. 1982). 32 Allen v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 623 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1980 ). 33 F ED . R. CIV. P. 56(a). 30 5 record but refrains from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.” 34 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-m oving party. 35 “The use of sum m ary judgm ent is rarely appropriate in n egligence . . . cases, even where the m aterial facts are not disputed.” 36 As the Fifth Circuit has explained: Because of the peculiarly elusive nature of the term “negligen ce” and the necessity that the trier of facts pass upon the reasonableness of the conduct in all the circum stances in determ ining whether it constitutes negligence, it is the rare personal injury case which can be disposed of by sum m ary judgm ent, even where the historical facts are concededly undisputed. 37 Thus, a court will grant sum m ary judgm ent in a negligen ce case only in “rare circum stances.” 38 This reasoning is particularly applicable to J ones Act cases. “Because of the policy of providing an expansive rem edy for seam en , subm ission of J ones Act claim s to a jury requires a very low evidentiary threshold; even m arginal claim s are properly left for jury determ ination.” 39 “Summ ary judgm ent is rarely granted in m aritim e negligence cases 34 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. N ationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir.20 0 8); see also Reeves v . Sanderson Plum bing, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 – 51 (20 0 0 ). 35 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir.1994). 36 Davidson v. Stanady ne, Inc., 718 F.2d 1334, 1338 – 39 (5th Cir. 1983) (citin g M arsden v. Patane, 380 F.2d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 1967); Gross v. Southern Railw ay Co., 414 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir.1969); Croley v. Matson N avigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.1970 ); King v. Avtech Aviation, Inc., 655 F.2d 77, 78 (5th Cir. 1981); 10 A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2729 at 195 (1983)). 37 Gauk v. Meleski, 346 F.2d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 1965). 38 Davidson, 718 F.2d at 1339 & n.8 (“In tort actions in which determ inations of a less “elusive nature,” such as the existence of an agency relationship, waiver, or whether a plaintiff is in a class protected by a statute, are dispositive, sum m ary judgm ent m ay m ore often be appropriate.” (citing 10 A Wright, § 2729 at 197– 20 1)); see also Keating v. Jones Developm ent of Mo., Inc., 398 F.2d 10 11, 10 15 (5th Cir. 1968) (“Negligence is a seldom enclave for trial judge finality. Negligence is a com posite of the experiences of the average m an and is thus usually confined to jury evaluation .”). 39 Leonard v. Exxon Corp., 581 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1978) (citin g Barrios v . La. Construction Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1162 (5th Cir. 1972)). 6 because the issue of whether a defen dant acted reasonably is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact.” 40 In this case, the jury m ust determ ine whether Offshore’s actions or inactions contributed to Lee’s injuries “in the slightest degree.” 41 Lee alleges he was walking the deck, which undisputedly did not have non-skid paint applied to it, “when [he] turned, . . . [and his] leg [went] in the opposite direction.” Based on this testim ony and the aforem entioned undisputed facts, a reasonable jury could infer that the lack of non-skid paint caused Lee to slip and injure his knee. This determ in ation ultim ately is for the trier of fact. 42 Further, as com parative fault is applicable to J ones Act negligence cases, 43 even if the jury were to conclude Offshore’s alleged negligen ce in som e way caused Lee’s injuries, the jury would also have to determ ine whether and to what extent Lee’s own actions or inactions contributed to his injuries. 44 “A jury is well suited for resolving this type of fact-intensive dispute based on well-settled legal principles.” 45 With respect to Plaintiff’s unseaworthiness claim , that the M/ V BALTY’s deck did not have non-skid pain t applied to it is undisputed. The parties dispute, however, whether this lack of non-skid paint was unreasonable in light of the vessels’ intended purpose. Courts have found that “the absence of non-skid tape or som e other appropriate skid resistant surface” m ay render a vessel unseaworthy. 46 This inquiry is fact inten sive and 40 Schoenfeldt v. Schoenfeldt, No. 13-5468 , 20 14 WL 1910 80 8 , at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 20 14) (citing Christensen v. Georgia– Pacific Corp., 279 F.3d 80 7, 813 (9th Cir. 20 0 2)); see also id (“Questions of forseeability and causation ” in J ones Act negligence cases “particularly lend them selves to resolution by a jury” (citing W y ler v. Holland Am erica Line– USA, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 120 6, 1210 (W.D. Wash. 20 0 3))). 41 Gavagan, 955 F.2d at 10 19. 42 See Leonard, 581 F.2d at 524. 43 See Gautreaux, 10 7 F.3d at 339. 44 Id. 45 Sartin v. Cliff's Drilling Co., No. 0 3– 1825, 20 0 4 WL 55120 9, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 20 0 4). 46 See Courville v. Cardinal W ireline Specialists, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 929, 936 (E.D. La. 1991); see also Thom as v. SHRM Catering Servs., Inc., No. 0 7-1177, 20 0 9 WL 928640 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 20 0 9). 7 requires the jury to balance m any factors—in this case, for exam ple, the jury will be required to consider the kind of friction created by rough deck boards, such as the deck boards on the M/ V BALTY, and whether such boards provide a safe walking surface without non-skid paint—before deciding whether the risks presented in the absen ce of non-skid paint are unreasonable. 47 Further, should the jury find the failure to apply nonskid paint was unreasonable, the jury m ust then determ ine whether the lack of non-skid paint “played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness.” 48 “[C]ausation under this definition is still a fact-intensive inquiry, and sum m ary judgm ent is sim ilarly inappropriate at this tim e.” 49 Accordingly; CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORD ERED that Offshore Logistical & Transport, LLC’s m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent on the issues of liability for J ones Act negligence and unseaworthiness under general m aritim e law, 50 be and hereby is D EN IED . N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 2 0 th d ay o f D e ce m be r, 2 0 17. ______________________ _________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 47 In re Crew boats, Inc., No. 0 2– 20 23, 20 0 3 WL 210 18 858 , at *2 (E.D. La. May 5, 20 0 3); see also In re Pellegrin, Adam s, & Chauvin Tow ing Co., No. 12-156, 20 13 WL 11550 64, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 20 13). 48 Mitchell v. Traw ler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960 ). This is a “proxim ate cause” standard. Alverez v. J. Ray McDerm ott & Co., 674 F.2d 10 37, 10 42– 44 (5th Cir. 1982). 49 In re Crew boats, Inc., 20 0 3 WL 210 188 58 , at *2. 50 R. Doc. 65. 8
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