Body by Cook, Inc., et al v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, et al., No. 2:2015cv02177 - Document 165 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 157 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and granting 158 Motion to Dismiss. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' state law claim for negligent hiring and/or supervision is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Body by Cook, Inc., et al v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, et al. Doc. 165 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A BOD Y BY COOK, IN C., ET AL., Plain tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 15-2 177 STATE FARM MU TU AL AU TOMOBILE IN SU RAN CE, ET AL., D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E” ( 5 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court are two m otions to dism iss Count Seven of Plaintiffs’ Second Am ended Com plaint. 1 Plaintiffs, Body by Cook, Inc., and Robert Cook, oppose the m otions. 2 Defendant State Farm Mutual Autom obile Co. filed a reply to Plaintiffs’ responses in opposition. 3 For the reasons that follow, the m otions to dism iss are GRAN TED . FACTU AL & PROCED U RAL BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Body by Cook, Inc., is an autom otive repair shop located in Slidell, Louisiana, which is owned and operated by Plaintiff Robert Cook (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs allege that, on num erous occasions, Robert Cook attem pted to register Body by Cook as a “Direct Repair Shop” through the “Direct Repair Program s” offered by Defendants State Farm Mutual Autom obile Co., Allstate Insurance Co., Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Travelers Casualty and Surety Co., GEICO General Insurance Co., and Progressive Security Insurance Co. (collectively, “Defendants”). 4 According to 1 R. Doc. 157 (filed by Defendant State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.); R. Doc. 158 (filed by Defendants Allstate Insurance Co., Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Progressive Security Insurance Co., and Travelers Casualty and Surety Co.). 2 R. Docs. 160 , 161. 3 R. Doc. 164. 4 R. Doc. 10 9 at 1. 1 Dockets.Justia.com Plaintiffs, despite their qualifications, Body by Cook and Robert Cook have “been refused entry into the [Direct Repair Program s], and lesser qualified or sim ilarly situated, nonm inority owned body shops have been granted access.”5 Plaintiffs allege the Defendants discrim inated against Body by Cook because Robert Cook, its sole owner, is an AfricanAm erican m ale. Plaintiffs further allege that the Defendants, due to Robert Cook’s m inority status, conspired with one another to refuse Body by Cook access to their Direct Repair Program s. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that, sin ce the filing of this lawsuit, they have been retaliated against by Defendants, who “virtually shut[] Plaintiffs out from any custom er business of Defendants’ insureds.”6 Plaintiffs filed this action on J une 16, 20 15. 7 Plaintiffs have sin ce been granted leave of court to am end their com plaint on two occasions. 8 In their Second Am en ded Com plaint, Plaintiffs advance seven causes of action: (1) Section 1981 discrim ination (against all Defendants); (2) Section 1985(3) conspiracy (against all Defendants); (3) Section 198 1 retaliation (against all Defendants); (4) Section 1981 retaliation (against the State Farm Defendants only); (5) Title VII discrim in ation (against State Farm only); (6) Title VII retaliation (against State Farm only); and (7) Louisiana state law claim s for negligent hiring and negligent supervision (against all Defendants). 9 The Defen dants filed m otions to dism iss with respect to the federal causes of action, which the Court granted on August 25, 20 16. 10 With regard to Plaintiffs’ state law claim s, the Court concluded that because it dism issed all of Plaintiffs’ federal law claim s, it could no longer exercise 5 R. Doc. 10 9 at 1. R. Doc. 10 9 at 16. 7 R. Doc. 1. 8 R. Docs. 14, 10 9. 9 R. Doc. 10 9 at 13– 22. 10 R. Doc. 135. 6 2 supplem ental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claim s. 11 The Court did not address the m erits of Plaintiffs’ state law claim s. 12 Plaintiffs appealed the Court’s judgm ent to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 13 On October 4, 20 17, the Fifth Circuit issued a judgm ent affirm ing in part and reversing in part. 14 The Fifth Circuit affirm ed this Court’s dism issal of Plaintiffs’ § 1981 conspiracy claim s, § 1981 retaliation claim s, and both of Plaintiff Robert Cook’s Title VII claim s. The Fifth Circuit further concluded this Court was correct to dism iss Robert Cook’s § 1981 contract claim against State Farm and Plaintiffs’ § 1981 contract claim s against all other Defendants, but reversed the dism issal of Body by Cook’s § 1981 contract claim against State Farm . 15 With regard to the state claw claim s, the Fifth Circuit directed, “[b]ecause we reverse the district court’s dism issal of Body by Cook’s § 1981 claim against State Farm , we also reverse the district court’s dism issal of the state law claim s, and rem and those claim s for consideration on the m erits.”16 LEGAL STAN D ARD Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court m ay dism iss a com plaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted if the plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. 17 “To survive a m otion to dism iss, a com plaint m ust contain sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”18 “A claim 11 R. Doc. 135 at 20 -21. See id. 13 R. Doc. 137. 14 R. Doc. 149. 15 R. Doc. 149-1 at 10 . 16 Id. at 14. 17 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 0 7); Cuvillier v. Tay lor, 50 3 F.3d 397, 40 1 (5th Cir. 20 0 7). 18 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quotin g Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 570 ). 12 3 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defen dant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”19 However, the court does not accept as true legal conclusions or m ere conclusory statem ents, 20 and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions m asquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a m otion to dism iss.”21 “[T]hreadbare recitals of elem ents of a cause of action, supported by m ere conclusory statem ents” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancem ent” are not sufficient. 22 In sum m ary, “[f]actual allegations m ust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”23 “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not perm it the court to infer m ore than the m ere possibility of m isconduct, the com plaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”24 “Dism issal is appropriate when the com plaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’”25 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS At issue in the present m otions is Count Seven, in which Plaintiff asserts a Louisiana state law tort claim for negligent training and supervision. 26 The negligent training and supervision claim is based on the em ployer’s alleged direct negligence. 27 The claim is gen erally governed by the sam e duty-risk analysis used for all negligence cases. 28 19 Id. Id. 21 S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Suprem e Court of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 20 0 1) (citing Fernandez-M ontes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)). 22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 678 (citations om itted). 23 Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. 24 Id. (quotin g Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 25 Cutrer v . McMillan, 30 8 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (per curiam ) (un published) (quoting Clark v. Am oco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986)). 26 R. Doc. 10 9 at 21. 27 Griffin v. Km art Corp., 0 0 -1334 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/ 28 / 0 0 ); 776 So.2d 1226. See also Cruz v. Fulton, WL 4543613 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 20 16). 28 See Bourgeois v. Allstate Ins. Co., 0 2-10 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/ 29/ 0 2); 8 20 So. 2d 1132, 1135. 20 4 Accordingly, a claim for negligent supervision and training requires a plaintiff to show at trial (1) the defendants had a duty to conform its conduct to the appropriate standard; (2) the defen dants failed to conform its conduct to the appropriate standard; (3) the defendants’ substandard conduct was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries; (4) the defendants’ substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (5) actual dam ages. 29 In Count Seven, Plaintiffs allege “Defendants were negligent in failin g to properly train and/ or supervise its m anagerial and/ or supervisor em ployees to act or to m ake decisions in a m anner as not to discrim inate against African-Am ericans in contracts, in such a m anner as to prevent racial discrim ination which proxim ately caused injury to the Plaintiffs.”30 Plaintiffs further allege, “Defendants were negligent in allowing supervisory and/ or m anagerial em ployees who harbored racial anim us and ill will towards m inorities or people of color and who were in a position of authority to m ake decisions about the [direct repair program ].”31 In Plaintiffs’ m em oranda in opposition to the m otions to dism iss, they argue the Second Am en ded Com plaint asserts facts that “describe to each Defendant what is being sued about with details.”32 Plaintiffs further argue they “[cite] particulars of correspondence and each action Plaintiffs took with respect to each Defendant.”33 Neither Count Seven nor the rem ainder of the Secon d Am ended Com plaint contains any factual allegations. The Court finds the Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient factual allegations to m ake a plausible claim for negligent training and supervision. Nowhere in Plaintiffs’ pleadings 29 Detraz v. Lee, 0 5-1263 (La. 0 1/ 17/ 0 7); 950 So. 2d 557, 562. R. Doc. 10 9 at 21. 31 Id. 32 R. Doc. 160 at 5-6. 33 Id. at 6. 30 5 are there any factual allegations that, taken as true, would enable this Court to infer the Defendants are liable for the conduct alleged. In the Second Am ended Com plaint, Plaintiffs do allege they contacted each of the Defendants regarding their respective direct repair program s, and they do list the n am es of any em ployees with whom they spoke or corresponded. 34 . Plaintiffs do not, however, allege any facts suggesting Defendants failed to train their em ployees or that they negligently hired or retained em ployees who presented a risk of harm to custom ers, let alone that such training program s resulted in any harm to Plaintiffs. Rather, Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent training an d supervision m erely asserts the conclusion that “Defendants were negligent in failing to properly train and/ or supervise [their] . . . em ployees.”35 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ pleadings fail to contain “sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”36 CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORD ERED that the Defendants’ m otions to dism iss are GRAN TED . 37 IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that Plaintiffs’ state law claim for negligent hiring and/ or supervision is D ISMISSED W ITH PREJU D ICE. N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 8 th d ay o f D e ce m be r, 2 0 17. ______________________ _________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 34 R. Doc. 10 9 at 5-12. Id. 36 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 0 7). Defendants also m ove to dism iss Count Seven on the grounds that Plaintiffs have im perm issibly “lum ped” the Defendants together, thus failin g to satisfy Rule 8’s pleadin g requirem ents. See R. Doc. 158-1 at 6. The Court does not address this argum ent, because it finds that even if Plain tiffs collective allegations against Defendants satisfy Rule 8, Plaintiffs have nonetheless failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 37 R. Doc. 157 and 158 . 35 6
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
