Parker, et al. v. NGM Insurance Company, et al, No. 2:2015cv02123 - Document 56 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 45 Motion in Limine Regarding Collateral Source Rule. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
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Parker, et al. v. NGM Insurance Company, et al Doc. 56 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A ROBERT PARKER, ET AL., Plain tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 15 -2 12 3 N GM IN SU RAN CE COMPAN Y, ET AL., D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E” ( 3 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ m otion in lim ine to exclude testim ony and eviden ce under the collateral source rule. 1 The m otion is unopposed. For the reasons that follow, the m otion in lim ine is GRAN TED . BACKGROU N D This personal-injury case arises from a m otor-vehicle collision in New Orleans, Louisiana, on August 21, 20 14. 2 On that date, Plaintiff Robert Parker was driving his 20 12 Hyundai Sonata in a southerly direction on Tulane Avenue near its intersection with Interstate 10 (“I-10 ”) in New Orleans. Also traveling southbound on Tulane Avenue at that tim e was Defendant Edson Rivera, who was operating a 20 0 3 Ford E250 utility van owned and operated by his em ployer, Multitec, LLC. Rivera was driving directly behind Parker’s vehicle. According to Parker, he began to slow down as he approached congested traffic. It is undisputed that, as Parker slowed, he was rear-ended by the Ford van driven by Rivera. As a result of the collision, on May 13, 20 15, Parker filed suit again st Rivera, his em ployer Multitec, LLC, an d NGM Insurance Com pany in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. 3 The action was rem oved to federal court on the 1 R. Doc. 45. The Background Section of this Order and Reasons derives from a prior Order an d Reasons. 3 R. Doc. 1-1. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com basis of federal diversity jurisdiction on J une 16, 20 15. 4 Parker alleges, due to the collision, he “sustained serious bodily injuries, including but not lim ited to his back, neck, head, shoulders and extrem ities,” and seeks dam ages for “past and future m ental anguish and physical suffering, past and future expen ses for m edical care, in cluding expenses for travel to the physicians’ office, loss of enjoym ent of life, loss of consortium , and past an d future lost earnings, along with property dam age to his vehicle.”5 Parker’s wife, Krista Elaine Parker, also seeks dam ages for “loss of consortium , services, and society of her husband.”6 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS Plaintiffs seek an in lim ine ruling preventing the Defendants from m aking “any m ention of a collateral source” at trial. 7 The m otion is not opposed. 8 The collateral source rule is a substantive rule of law. 9 Because this is a diversity case in which the Court m ust apply substantive Louisiana state law, 10 the Court looks to Louisiana state law on the collateral source rule. 11 Under Louisiana law, the collateral source rule “provides that a tortfeasor m ay not benefit, and an injured plaintiff’s tort recovery m ay not be reduced, because of m onies received by the plaintiff from sources indepen dent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution.”12 “Under the collateral source rule, paym ents received from 4 R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 1-1 at 4. 6 R. Doc. 1-1 at 4. 7 R. Doc. 45 at 1. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to preclude Defendants from “soliciting testim ony and/ or evidence that would show or tend to show any collateral sources or the im putation of a collateral source.” R. Doc. 45-1 at 3– 4. 8 The m otion was set for subm ission on May 4, 20 16, m akin g oppositions due no later than April 26th. 9 See, e.g., Manderson v . Chet Morrison Contractors, Inc., 666 F.3d 373, 381 (5th Cir. 20 12). 10 See generally R. Docs. 1, 1-1. 11 See, e.g., W olf v. PACT X PP Tech., AG, 811 F.3d 758 , 770 (5th Cir. 20 16); Martin Res. Mgm t. Corp. v. AXIS Ins. Co., 8 0 3 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 20 15); W eiser-Brow n Operating Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 80 1 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 20 15) (citing Sy m etra Life Ins. Co. v . Rapid Settlem ents, Ltd., 775 F.3d 242, 248 (5th Cir. 20 14)); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tom pkins, 30 4 U.S. 64 (1938 ). 12 Bellard v. Am erican Cent. Ins. Co., 0 7-1335, p. 18 (La. 0 4/ 18/ 0 8), 98 0 So. 2d 654, 668 (quotations om itted) (citing Bozem an v . State, 0 3-10 16, p. 9 (La. 0 7/ 0 2/ 0 4), 879 So. 2d 692, 698; La. Dep’t of Transp. and Dev. v. Kansas City S. Ry . Co., 0 2-2349, p. 6 (La. 0 5/ 20 / 0 3), 846 So. 2d 734, 739). 5 2 an independent source are not deducted from the award the aggrieved party would otherwise receive from the wrongdoer. As a result, the tortfeasor is not allowed to benefit from the victim ’s foresight in purchasing insurance and other benefits.”13 As such, “the rule bars the introduction of evidence that a plaintiff has received benefits or paym ents from an independent source.”14 Under Louisiana law, “whether the collateral source rule applies depends to a certain extent upon whether the victim has procured the collateral benefits for him self or has in som e m anner sustained a dim inution in his or her patrim ony in order to secure the collateral benefits such that he or she is not m erely reaping a windfall or double recovery.”15 It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have a health-insurance policy with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana, for which Robert Parker “paid, and still pays, good consideration for the policy prem ium and its coverage.”16 Furtherm ore, Parker “had accrued certain vacation tim e, leave tim e and/ or ben efits through his em ploym ent at LSU Medical Center that he was in fact paid during certain portion[s] of his m edical leave that were associated with the injuries and treatm ent he sustained in the accident.”17 Such benefits have been found to be collateral sources, for which recovery cannot be offset, under Louisiana law. 18 Considering the lack of opposition to Plaintiffs’ m otion, the relief requested therein, and the sources identified by Plaintiffs from which they have received collateral 13 Id. (citing Bozem an , 879 So. 2d at 698). Fruge v. B.J. Servs. Co., U.S.A., No. 0 7-10 25, 20 0 9 WL 140 8 933, at *1 (W.D. La. May 18 , 20 0 9) (citing Bozem an, 879 So. 2d at 697). “Married to this substantive rule is an evidentiary rule that such evidence m ight prejudice the jury.” Davis v. Odeco, Inc., 18 F.3d 1237, 1243 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Phillips v. W estern Co. of N .A., 953 F.2d 923, 930 (5th Cir. 1992)). 15 Id. 16 R. Doc. 45-1 at 1. 17 R. Doc. 45-1 at 1– 2. 18 See, e.g., Aucoin v. Doern er, 98-255, pp. 4– 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 0 8/ 25/ 98), 717 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (quotin g Turner v. Sm ith, 556 So. 2d 983 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1990 )) (“Appellees correctly assert that the collateral source rule applies to wages in that a tortfeasor is not entitled to credit for paym ents m ade as sick leave benefits. . . . It is well established that sick leave and vacation tim e is subject to the collateral source rule.”). 14 3 benefits, the Court finds that the m otion should be granted. Defendants are precluded from soliciting testim ony or introducing evidence of any collateral sources, in accordance with the foregoing. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORD ERED that Plaintiffs’ m otion in lim ine under the collateral source rule is GRAN TED , as set forth above. N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is 9 th d ay o f May, 2 0 15 . ________________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 4
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