Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, Inc. v. Hotard, et al, No. 2:2015cv01320 - Document 52 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 49 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 12/5/2017. (cg)
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Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, Inc. v. Hotard, et al Doc. 52 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, INC. CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-1320 J IM HOTARD AND 3839 ULLOA STREET, L.L.C. SECTION “R” (3) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants m ove for attorney’s fees for their successful defense of a Fair Housing Act suit. 1 For the following reasons, the Court denies the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of allegations of housing discrim ination at an apartment building located at 3839 Ulloa Street, in New Orleans, Louisiana. The building is owned and operated by J im Hotard and 3839 Ulloa Street, LLC. Plaintiff Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, Inc. (GNOFHAC) filed this lawsuit on April 23, 20 15, asserting a claim under the 1 R. Doc. 49. 1 Dockets.Justia.com Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 360 1, et seq. 2 Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, dam ages, attorney’s fees, and costs. 3 Plaintiff’s com plaint alleged that Hotard treated potential renters for his property differently on the basis of their race. More specifically, plaintiff alleged that Hotard refused to respond to em ail inquiries regarding his property from African-Am erican testers but responded prom ptly to em ail inquiries from white testers. 4 Plaintiff further alleged that Hotard responded less favorably to phone inquiries from African-Am erican testers than he did to phone inquiries from white testers. 5 On J uly 17, 20 17, the Court held a bench trial. After hearing live testim ony and reviewing all the evidence, the Court held that plaintiff had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Hotard discrim inated against its testers on the basis of their race. 6 Accordingly, the Court rendered judgm ent in favor of defendants. Defendants now m ove for attorney’s fees in the am ount of $ 12,222.70 under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2). 2 3 4 5 6 R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 1 at 11-12. Id. at 4-6. Id. at 6-8. R. Doc. 47. 2 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD It is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants are liable for their own attorney’s fees. See Christiansburg Garm ent Co. v. Equal Em ploy m ent Opportunity Com m ission, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978) (citing Aly eska Pipeline Co. v. W ilderness Soc’y , 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). Congress has provided lim ited exceptions to this rule under certain statutes protecting particular federal rights. See id. Like other civil rights statutes, the FHA provides the district court with a great deal of flexibility and discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to either a prevailing plaintiff or a prevailing defendant. See id. at 416. The FHA states: “In a civil action under subsection (a) of this section, the court, in its discretion, m ay allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2). A prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights case should receive attorney’s fees “in all but special circum stances” in order to encourage private enforcement of the civil rights statutes. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 417. But the policy considerations that support granting fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present when the defendant prevails. As such, a district court m ay grant attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant only when the court finds that the action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not 3 brought in subjective bad faith.” Id. at 421; see also N AACP v. City of Ky le, 626 F.3d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (applying this standard to FHA claim ). The Suprem e Court has em phasized that district courts should not find that a plaintiff’s action was unreasonable or groundless simply because she did not prevail. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22. Engaging in such “hindsight logic” would “discourage all but the m ost airtight claim s” and undercut the efforts of Congress to prom ote vigorous enforcement of civil rights statutes. Id. at 423. III. D ISCU SSION Defendants first argue that they are entitled to attorney’s fees because plaintiff’s com plaint was unreasonable, groundless, and without m erit. Although plaintiff did not prevail at trial, nothing in the record suggests that its claim s were unreasonable or frivolous when filed. Before filing its com plaint, GNOFHAC conducted five tests to investigate whether Hotard discrim inated based on race. The test results showed differential responses to African-Am erican and white testers. Allegations based on this evidence sufficed to m ake out an FHA claim . See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Colem an, 455 U.S. 363, 370 , 374 (1982) (affirm ing circuit court’s holding 4 that tester who allegedly experienced discrim ination had standing to bring an FHA claim ). Defendants further argue that plaintiff continued to litigate this case even though discovery revealed that the case lacked m erit. At trial, Hotard testified that he was not aware of the testers’ race. The Court found this testim ony credible, and concluded that plaintiff failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Hotard knew the race of the AfricanAm erican testers. This conclusion was fatal to plaintiff’s FHA claim . But “attorney’s fees for prevailing defendants are presumptively unavailable unless a showing is m ade that the underly ing civil rights suit was vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise without m erit.” Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 50 5, 50 8 (5th Cir. 20 0 1) (em phasis added). Hotard’s trial testim ony, and the Court’s credibility determ ination, do not render plaintiff’s underlying suit frivolous or unreasonable. To conclude otherwise would be precisely the type of post hoc reasoning the Supreme Court cautioned against in Christiansburg. There, the Supreme Court m ade clear that a district court m ust not rely solely on the ultim ate outcom e of the litigation as the standard for whether attorney’s fees should be awarded. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. As the Suprem e Court stated, “[n]o m atter how honest one’s belief that he has been the victim of discrim ination, no 5 m atter how meritorious one’s claim m ay appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable.” 434 U.S. at 422. In this case, GNOFHAC was unable to support its claim s with evidence sufficient to show discrim inatory intent. For the Court to assess attorney’s fees against plaintiff sim ply because it proved unsuccessful would add substantially to the risks of litigation and underm ine the efforts of Congress to prom ote the vigorous enforcem ent of the FHA. Thus, defendants are not entitled attorney’s fees. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ m otion for attorney’s fees. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of Decem ber, 20 17. 5th _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 6
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