Jordan v. Ensco Offshore Company, No. 2:2015cv01226 - Document 118 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 74 Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Arson Conviction and Arrest for Felon in Possession of Firearm. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
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Jordan v. Ensco Offshore Company Doc. 118 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A KEVIN JORD AN Pla in tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 15 -12 2 6 EN SCO OFFSH ORE COMPAN Y D e fe n d an t SECTION : “E” ( 1) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is Plaintiff Kevin J ordan’s m otion in lim ine to exclude (1) evidence of Plaintiff’s 20 0 2 arson conviction, and (2) evidence of Plaintiff’s subsequent arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm . 1 The m otion is opposed. 2 For the reasons that follow, the m otion is GRAN TED . Plaintiff was arrested for felony arson in Wayne County, Mississippi, in 20 0 2. 3 Plaintiff pleaded guilty and served two years in Mississippi state prison. 4 Plaintiff was released in 20 0 4 and placed on probation for a period of six m onths. 5 Years later in 20 12, Plaintiff was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm . 6 The charge was later dism issed. 7 Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence of both his 20 0 2 arson conviction an d his 20 12 arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm . 8 Plaintiff argues that, with respect to his arson conviction, the conviction is m ore than 10 years old and its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 9 With respect to his arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm , Plaintiff contends an arrest alone, without a conviction, 1 R. Doc. 74. R. Doc. 83. 3 R. Doc. 74-1 at 1; R. Doc. 74-2 at 3. 4 R. Doc. 74-1 at 1; R. Doc. 74-2 at 3. 5 R. Doc. 74-1 at 1; R. Doc. 74-2 at 3. 6 R. Doc. 74-1 at 1; R. Doc. 74-2 at 2. 7 R. Doc. 74-1 at 1; R. Doc. 74-2 at 2. 8 See generally R. Doc. 74. 9 R. Doc. 74-1 at 1– 2. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com has no probative value whatsoever. 10 Defen dant, in response, contends that Plaintiff’s arson conviction is relevant to “the issues of future lost wages and em ployability.”11 The Defendant, however, does not respond to Plaintiff’s m otion insofar as it addresses his 20 12 arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm . 12 I. 20 0 2 ARSON CONVICTION Federal Rule of Eviden ce 60 9(b) provides: [I]f m ore than 10 years have passed since the witness’s conviction or release from confinem ent for it, whichever is later[,] [e]vidence of the conviction is adm issible only if: (1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circum stances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use. The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Rule 60 9(b) to m ean that “the probative value of a conviction m ore than 10 years old is by definition outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”13 For convictions m ore than 10 years old, “[t]he general rule is inadm issibility.”14 “Convictions should be adm itted under Rule 60 9(b) ‘very rarely an d only in exception al circum stances.’”15 Plaintiff pleaded guilty to felony arson in 20 0 2, was released from prison in 20 0 4, and com pleted a 6-m onth term of probation at som e point in 20 0 5. 16 More than 10 years have passed since Plaintiff’s conviction, his release from confinem ent, and the en d of his term of probation. Thus, under Rule 60 9(b), the conviction is inadm issible unless “its probative value, supported by specific facts and circum stan ces, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”17 10 R. Doc. 74-1 at 3. Doc. 83 at 1– 2. 12 See R. Doc. 83. 13 United States v. Ham ilton, 48 F.3d 149, 154 (5th Cir. 1995). 14 Id. (citing United States v. Estes, 994 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1993)). 15 McInty re v. Bud’s Boat Rentals, LLC, No. Civ.A. 0 2-1623, 20 0 3 WL 22174236, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 20 0 3) (quoting Zinm an v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 983 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotin g congressional report)). 16 See R. Doc. 74-1 at 1; R. Doc. 74-2 at 3. 17 See F ED . R. E VID . 60 9(b). 11 R. 2 The Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s arson conviction is “relevant to the issues of future lost wages and em ployability.”18 According to the Defendant, “despite the fact that m ore than 10 years have passed since the Plaintiff’s conviction for arson, such evidence is adm issible because Plaintiff is m aking a claim regarding his future em ployability and for future lost wages.”19 Defendant im plies that the conviction is relevant because it m ay lim it the future em ploym ent options available to the Plaintiff. Defendant’s argum ent fails for a num ber of reasons. First, Defendant fails to even address whether the probative value of Plaintiff’s arson conviction outweighs the danger for unfair prejudice, irrespective of whether the conviction m ay be “relevant” to an issue in this case. Second, even if Defendant had addressed whether the probative value of Plaintiff’s conviction outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice, the Court disagrees with such an argum ent. As noted above, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[c]onvictions should be adm itted under Rule 60 9(b) ‘very rarely an d only in exceptional circum stances.’”20 Even if Plaintiff’s conviction m ay be relevant to his claim for “future lost wages,” the probative value of the conviction does not outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence of Plaintiff’s 20 0 2 arson conviction is excluded from trial. II. 20 12 ARREST FOR BEING A F ELON IN P OSSESSION OF A F IREARM Plaintiff also seeks to exclude eviden ce of his 20 12 arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm . Defendant does not oppose the exclusion of this evidence. 21 Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff was never convicted of the crim e of being a felon in possession, having only been arrested and then released. “The m ere fact that a m an has 18 R. Doc. 83 at 1. R. Doc. 83 at 1. 20 McInty re v. Bud’s Boat Rentals, LLC, No. Civ.A. 0 2-1623, 20 0 3 WL 22174236, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 20 0 3) (quoting Zinm an v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 983 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotin g congressional report)). 21 See generally R. Doc. 83. 19 3 been arrested has very little, if any, probative value . . . . When form al charges are not filed against the arrested person and he is released without trial, whatever probative force the arrest m ay have had is norm ally dissipated.”22 The circum stances behind Plaintiff’s 20 12 arrest an d subsequent release are unknown, though it is clear that the arrest did not lead to a conviction. Plaintiff’s arrest in and of itself has no probative value. Evidence of Plaintiff’s 20 12 arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm is excluded from trial. IT IS SO ORD ERED . N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is 16 th d ay o f May, 2 0 16 . ____________ ________ __ ______ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 22 McInty re, 20 0 3 WL 22174236, at *4 (internal quotation m arks om itted) (quoting Schw are v. Board of Bar Exam iners of the State of N ew M exico, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957)). 4
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