Trotta v. Cajun Conti LLC et al, No. 2:2015cv01186 - Document 83 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 82 Motion Requesting Review of Taxation of Costs. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance. (cml)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Trotta v. Cajun Conti LLC et al Doc. 83 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA J OSEPH TROTTA CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-1186 CAJ UN CONTI LLC SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Plaintiff J oseph Trotta m oves the Court for a review of the Clerk’s taxation of costs in favor of defendants Cajun Conti, LLC, and Cajun Bourbon, LLC. 1 For the following reasons, the Court denies plaintiff’s m otion. I. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Trotta worked at two restaurants owned by defendants in New Orleans, Louisiana. 2 On August 3, 20 14, Defendants term inated Trotta’s em ploym ent. 3 On April 14, 20 15, Trotta filed suit alleging that he was fired in retaliation for protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as am ended, 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 e, et seq. More specifically, Trotta 1 R. Doc. 82. For a m ore in-depth discussion of the facts underlying this case, see generally R. Doc. 67. 3 R. Doc. 67 at 2. 2 Dockets.Justia.com alleged that he was fired for giving a statement to the EEOC regarding defendants’ term ination of another employee. 4 On J anuary 13, 20 17, the Court granted defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgment because Trotta failed to establish a prim a facie case of retaliation. Trotta v. Cajun Conti, LLC, No. 15-1186, 20 17 WL 131551 (E.D. La. J an. 13, 20 17). On May 26, 20 17, the Chief Deputy Clerk issued a taxation of costs in the am ount of $ 3,233.85 against Trotta pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). 5 Plaintiff now m oves the Court for a review of the taxation of costs. 6 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) states that “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs . . . should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). “A district court has wide discretion whether to award costs to the prevailing party.” Energy Mgm t. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471, 483 (5th Cir. 20 0 6) (citations om itted). On m otion and within seven days of the taxation of costs, the Clerk’s action m ay be reviewed by this Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). But 4 5 6 Id. at 3. R. Doc. 80 . R. Doc. 82. Defendants did not file a response in opposition. 2 there is a “strong presumption” contained in Rule 54 that the prevailing party will be awarded costs. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 793 (5th Cir. 20 0 6). III. D ISCU SSION Defendants are the prevailing party in this case. The Fifth Circuit has identified the following circum stances which, if present, m ay justify denial of costs to the prevailing party: “(1) the losing party’s lim ited financial resources; (2) m isconduct by the prevailing party; (3) close and difficult legal issues presented; (4) substantial benefit conferred on the public; and (5) the prevailing party’s enorm ous financial resources.” Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 794. An additional factor the Fifth Circuit considers is whether “the losing party prosecuted the action in good faith.” Id. But good faith m ay not be the sole reason for denying costs to the prevailing party. Id. at 795. Applying the Pacheco factors, the court finds that Trotta has not rebutted Rule 54(d)’s strong presum ption that defendants should be awarded costs. Although the Court recognized that Trotta brought his claims in good faith in its order denying defendants an award of attorney’s fees, see Trotta v. Cajun Conti, No. 15-1186, 20 17 WL 785310 , at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 20 17), good faith alone does not warrant a denial of taxation of costs. See Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 794-95 (noting that good faith alone is not sufficient to 3 deny costs because “[i]f the awarding of costs could be thwarted every tim e the unsuccessful party is a norm al, average party and not a knave, Rule 54(d)(1) would have little substance rem aining”) (citation om itted). Likewise, Trotta’s lim ited financial resources, in addition to proceeding in good faith, is not enough to defeat Rule 54’s presum ption. See id. at 794 (stating that good faith and one other factor m ay not be enough to deny costs); U.S. ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City , L.L.C., 80 7 F.3d 125, 129 (“[W]e have never held that the lim ited resources of the losing party provides a basis for denying the prevailing party its costs.”) (internal quotation and citation om itted); Moore v. Citgo Ref. and Chem . Co., L.P., 735 F.3d 30 9, 320 (5th Cir. 20 13) (holding that awarding costs based on the com parison of the parties’ finances “would not only underm ine the presum ption that Rule 54(d)(1) creates in prevailing parties’ favor, but it would also underm ine the foundation of the legal system that justice is adm inistered to all equally, regardless of wealth or status”) (quoting Cherry v. Cham pion Int’l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 1999)); see also Patterson v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc. No. 0 9-1, 20 10 WL 1424288, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 20 10 ). 7 7 In any event, to the extent that a com parison of the parties’ finances is relevant, Trotta’s reliance on Chenevert v. Cleco Corp., No. 11170 7, 20 13 WL 4648292 (W.D. La. Aug. 28, 20 13), is unavailing. Costs were not taxed against the losing party in Chenevert in part because the prevailing 4 Finally, Trotta relies on Christiansburg Garm ent Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), to contend that im posing costs against unsuccessful Title VII plaintiffs could discourage potential litigants with m eritorious claim s from pursuing civil rights actions. 8 Christiansburg dealt specifically with attorneys’ fees, and has not been extended to taxation of costs. See W ashington v. Patlis, 916 F.2d 10 36, 10 40 (5th Cir. 1990 ) (“Title VII does not m ake an exception to the general rule that federal courts m ay award costs to the prevailing party under Rule 54(d).”). Accordingly, the Clerk’s taxation of costs will not be vacated against the defendants. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion. 3rd New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of J uly, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE party was a com pany with “enormous financial resources” in excess of $ 10 0 m . Id., at *2. That is not the case with defendants here. 8 R. Doc. 82-1 at 3. 5
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
