Trotta v. Cajun Conti LLC et al, No. 2:2015cv01186 - Document 79 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER & REASONS denying 69 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 3/1/2017. (mmm)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Trotta v. Cajun Conti LLC et al Doc. 79 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA J OSEPH TROTTA CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-1186 CAJ UN CONTI, LLC, ET AL. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants Cajun Conti, LLC and Cajun Bourbon, LLC m ove the Court for an award of attorneys’ fees incurred by defendants while litigating the Title VII retaliation claim brought by plaintiff J oseph Trotta. 1 For the following reasons, the Court denies defendants’ m otion. I. BACKGROU N D Trotta worked at two restaurants owned by defendants in New Orleans, Louisiana. 2 On August 3, 20 14, Trotta was notified that his em ploym ent with defendants was term inated. 3 On April 14, 20 15, Trotta filed suit alleging that 1 R. Doc. 69. The facts as described here are from the Court’s J anuary 13, 20 17 Order granting defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, R. Doc. 67. 3 Id. at 2 2 Dockets.Justia.com he was fired as retaliation for protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as am ended, 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 e, et seq. More specifically, Trotta alleged that he was fired for giving a statement to the EEOC regarding defendants’ term ination of another em ployee, Arthur Alexander. 4 Defendants filed a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, which the Court granted because Trotta failed to establish a prim a facie case of retaliation. Defendants now m ove the Court for an order of attorneys’ fees in the am ount of $ 60 ,912.90 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §20 0 0 e-5(k). Trotta filed a response in opposition. 5 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD It is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants are liable for their own attorney’s fees. See Christiansburg Garm ent Co. v. Equal Em ploy m ent Opportunity Com m ission, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978) (citing Aly eska Pipeline Co. v. W ilderness Society , 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). Congress has, however, provided lim ited exceptions to this rule under certain statutes protecting particular 4 5 Id. at 3. R. Doc. 71. 2 federal rights. See id. Som e of these statutes m ake fee awards m andatory for a prevailing plaintiff. Som e m ake fee awards perm issive but lim it the parties who can recover to prevailing plaintiffs. See id. at 415-16. Many of these statutes, however, provide the district court with a great deal of flexibility and discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to either a prevailing plaintiff or a prevailing defendant. Section 70 6(k) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act falls squarely within this last category. Section 70 6(k) provides: In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, m ay allow the prevailing party, other than the Com m ission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the Com m ission and the United States shall be liable for costs the sam e as a private person. 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 e-5(k). Under § 70 6(k), a prevailing plaintiff is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circum stances. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 417. However, the policy considerations that support granting fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present when there is a prevailing defendant. As such, a district court m ay grant a prevailing defendant attorney’s fees only when the court in its discretion finds that plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in bad faith.” Id. at 421; see also Little v. S. Elec. Steel Co., 595 F.2d 998, 10 0 2-0 3 (5th Cir. 1979). 3 The Suprem e Court em phasized that district courts need not conclude that sim ply because a plaintiff did not ultim ately prevail, her action m ust have been unreasonable or without foundation. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22. The Supreme Court cautioned district courts against engaging in that type of “hindsight logic,” because it could discourage all but the m ost airtight of claim s and undercut the efforts of Congress to prom ote vigorous enforcem ent of the provisions of Title VII. Id. III. D ISCU SSION Defendants argue that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees because Trotta’s claim s were frivolous, and they base their frivolousness argument entirely on that Trotta was unable to establish a prim a facie case. 6 The argument offered by defendants asks the Court to engage in precisely the type of post hoc reasoning the Supreme Court cautioned against in Christiansburg. Christiansburg m akes clear that a district court m ust not rely solely on the ultim ate outcom e of the ligation as the standard for whether attorney’s fees should be awarded. Id. at 421 (citing Carrion v. Yeshiva University , 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that awards of attorney’s fees should not be granted to a prevailing defendant routinely or simply because 6 R. Doc. 69-1 at 3. 4 he succeeds)); see also Hidden Oaks, Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d 10 36, 10 53 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Hughes v. Row e, 449 U.S. 5, 15-16 (1980 ) (“The fact that the Court dism issed Plaintiffs’ suit is not in itself a sufficient justification for the fee award.”)). Although Trotta was ultim ately unsuccessful in defeating summ ary judgm ent, there is little in the record that shows that his claim s were unreasonable, without foundation, frivolous, or vexatious when filed. Trotta attem pted to support his retaliation claim s with evidence obtained during discovery. This included testim ony regarding his supervisors’ use of racial slurs, hostile treatm ent, and constant threats of term ination. 7 Further, it is undisputed that Trotta engaged in protected activity when he gave a statement to the EEOC, and was fired less than six weeks later. Defendants note that Trotta testified that he had no evidence that defendants were aware that he m ade a statem ent to the EEOC until after they term inated him. 8 The Court relied on this in granting defendants sum mary judgm ent, as courts in this circuit require plaintiffs with retaliation claim s to show at least some evidence that the decisionm akers responsible for the adverse action had knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected activity in order to 7 8 R. Doc. 57-5 at 25, 28. R. Doc. 57-6 at 45. 5 prove the causation prong of the prim a facie case. See, e.g., Manning v. Chevron Chem . Co., LLC, 332 F. 3d 874, 883 (5th Cir. 20 0 3). But plaintiff did not have evidence of this knowledge does not m ake his claim frivolous, especially since, in certain situations, this knowledge (and therefore causation) can be inferred from the tem poral proxim ity of the protected activity and the adverse action. See Richard v. Cingular W ireless LLC, 233 F. App’x 334, 338 (5th Cir. 20 0 7) (“This court allows, however, for an inference of causation to be drawn where the adverse em ployment action occurs in close temporal proxim ity to the protected conduct.”) (citing Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 20 0 1)). Trotta advanced this argument in opposition to sum m ary judgm ent; that it failed is not indicative that his claim was frivolous. As the Suprem e Court stated in Christiansburg, “[n]o m atter how honest one’s belief that he has been the victim of discrim ination, no m atter how m eritorious one’s claim m ay appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable.” 434 U.S. at 422. In this case, Trotta was sim ply unable to support his claim s with evidence sufficient to defeat sum m ary judgment. For the Court to assess attorneys’ fees against Trotta sim ply because he proved unsuccessful would add substantially to the risks of litigation while also undercutting the efforts of Congress to prom ote the vigorous 6 enforcem ent of Title VII. Accordingly, defendants’ m otion for attorneys’ fees is denied. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ m otion for attorneys’ fees. 1st New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of March, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 7
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
